Training Manual for Nonviolent Defense Against the Coup d’État

The purpose of this manual is to help trainers run well-designed workshops to prepare citizens in effective nonviolent methods of defending their governments and their institutions against coup d’états.

Updated Introduction by Hardy Merriman

Original Introduction Session by Richard K. Taylor

I: The Purpose and Importance of Training
II: Understanding the Coup d’état
III: Defeating Coups through Nonviolent Struggle
IV: Historical Examples of Successful Nonviolent Resistance to Coups
V: Developing Strategies to Defeat Coups
VI: Developing Tactics to Defeat Coups
VII: Nonviolence Training Exercises for Sectors
VIII: Planning Next Steps

UPDATED INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING MANUAL FOR NONVIOLENT DEFENSE AGAINST THE COUP D’ÉTAT

Over the last century, in diverse parts of the world, nonviolent action has proven to be a remarkably effective means for people to struggle for democracy, rights, justice, freedom, self- determination, good governance, and accountability from governments and corporations. Those who study nonviolent action have long known—based on theoretical models, historical case studies, and more recent quantitative studies—the advantages that nonviolent action used by civilians (also referred to as “civil resistance”) has over violence.¹  The ability of a civil resistance movement to withdraw societal support from an oppressor, and to induce defections from the oppressor’s own supporters, is documented historical fact. As I remember the scholar Gene Sharp telling me, “If the people do not obey, then the ruler cannot rule.” It is in this way that nonviolent movements wield power and struggle victoriously against even the most repressive of opponents, who ultimately have no power if their commands are no longer obeyed.

The use of nonviolent action to win rights, freedom, and democracy has received the bulk of researchers’ attention in this field in recent decades, while the use of nonviolent action to deter and defend against coups d’état has received relatively less focus. Therefore, Richard K. Taylor has done a service for all who have been or will be affected by coups by laying out, in clear language, a framework for civil society to think about how it can engage in nonviolent anti- coup resistance. I see this manual as a starting point in the effort to develop further an understanding of the potential that nonviolent action has to deter and collapse coups d’état—and in so doing, to prevent one of the most common ways that authoritarian governments are established and perpetuated.

This manual is designed to be used for a two-day training workshop, which, if at all possible, should be given before any suspected coup takes place. As Taylor notes, once a coup is underway, it is extremely important for anti-coup opposition to become active as quickly as possible. The success or failure of coups can sometimes hinge on delays of hours, or even minutes (as in the case of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s narrow escape from arrest during the 1991 coup in Moscow), during the first few days when the coup plotters are struggling to consolidate their grip on power. Hence, once a coup has taken placed, there is little time available at that point to hold training workshops on defense against coups.

Therefore, Taylor’s work is best used by people who want to make advance preparations before any possible coups d’état, especially in societies in which there is a general history of coups, or where conditions (such as political instability and splits between the military and civilian leadership) make a coup more likely. Pro-democracy activists and civil society groups will want to familiarize themselves with the ideas in this book, as may government personnel who would like to make sure that their government is less vulnerable to the threat of coups. In addition, any long-term civil resistance movement that is struggling for democracy will want to review this manual, because there is always a risk when a movement is making progress against a dictatorship that a coup will take place, potentially setting back the movement’s gains.

If you find this manual useful, one additional resource bears mention. In 2003, Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins of the Albert Einstein Institution published a monograph titled The Anti-Coup, which has a similar strategic perspective to Taylor’s Training Manual, but is organized more as a reference for scholars, members of civil society and NGOs, and people in governments.²  Sharp’s and Jenkins’ book also includes two sets of specific preparations that governments and civil society organizations can take to prevent coups d’état.

In addition, in the event that a coup takes place and is able to consolidate its rule and establish a dictatorship, an appendix has been added at the end of the Training Manual listing additional resources that may be useful to people as they prepare for a longer-term struggle against the dictatorship.

It is my hope that this manual will provide valuable information and hope to those facing coups and struggling for a more peaceful, just, and free world.

Hardy Merriman
March 2, 2010

1. Two exciting new quantitative studies have been released in the last several years.

A 2008 study by Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth evaluated 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 and found that “major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance campaigns.” They account for this by pointing out that nonviolent movements tend to have more domestic and international legitimacy than violent movements and therefore tend to get more participation by the domestic population and support by international actors than violent movements. They also found that government repression against nonviolent movements is far more likely to backfire against the government than government repression against violent movements.

A 2005 study by Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman examined 67 transitions from authoritarianism between 1972 and 2005. They found that transitions driven by nonviolent resistance resulted in greater increases in freedom than transitions driven by violence. In 64% (32 out of 50) of the cases in which nonviolent civic resistance was a key factor, the transitions from authoritarianism led to political systems that had high levels of respect for political rights and civil liberties. In contrast, in the cases in which opposition groups used violence, only 20% (4 out of 20) led to governments with high levels of respect for political rights and civil liberties.

Sources:
Stephan, M. J., and Chenoweth, E. (2008) “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict”. International Security 33 (1), 7-44.
Karatnycky, A. and Ackerman, P. (2005) How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

2. Sharp, Gene and Jenkins, Bruce (2003) The Anti-Coup. Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution. Available for download at:
http://aeinstein.org/organizations/org/TAC.pdf