## SELF-LIBERATION 自我解放戰略規劃指南

A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or Other Oppression 終結獨裁政權或其他壓迫之行動

## EXTENDED READING 5 延伸閱讀⑤

From Dictatorship to Democracy 從獨裁走向民主

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Senior Scholar, Albert Einstein Institution. I am grateful for the advice of Dr. Mary King and Robert L. Helvey, in addition to the general support of the Board of Directors of the Albert Einstein Institution, in the preparation of this document.

亞伯特愛因斯坦研究院資深學者。在此向瑪莉金恩博士(Dr. Mary King)及 羅伯 L. 赫爾維(Robert L. Helvey)的指導致謝,並向亞伯特愛因斯坦研究院 董事會對準備本文件的支持表示感謝。

自序 Preface

One of my major concerns for many years has been how people could prevent and destroy dictatorships. This has been nurtured in part because of a belief that human beings should not be dominated and destroyed by such regimes. That belief has been strengthened by readings on the importance of human freedom, on the nature of dictatorships (from Aristotle to analyses of totalitarianism), and histories of dictatorships (especially the Nazi and Stalinist systems).

多年來,我主要的關心之一,就是人們如何能夠防止及摧 毀獨裁。這種關心的養成一部份是因爲我有一個信念;人類不 應當被這樣的政權所統治與摧毀。閱讀了有關人類自由的重要 性、獨裁政權的本質(從亞里士多德到極權主義的分析)及獨裁 專制政權(特別是納粹與史達林體制)的歷史,都增強了我這個 信念。

Over the years I have had occasion to get to know people who lived and suffered under Nazi rule, including some who survived concentration camps. In Norway I met people who had resisted fascist rule and survived, and heard of those who perished. I talked with Jews who had escaped the Nazi clutches and with persons who had helped to save them.

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這些年來我有機會認識一些在納粹統治下生活而且受過 苦難的人,包括一些從集中營存活過來的人。在挪威,我遇到 過曾經抵抗法西斯統治而倖存的人,並且聽說過因此而喪生的 人。我與逃離納粹魔掌的猶太人以及曾經幫忙拯救他們的人交 談過。

Knowledge of the terror of Communist rule in various countries has been learned more from books than personal contacts. The terror of these systems appeared to me to be especially poignant for these dictatorships were imposed in the name of liberation from oppression and exploitation.

我對許多國家共產黨統治之恐怖的瞭解,大多來自書本 而較少來自個人的接觸。這些體制的恐怖對我來說顯得特別突 兀,因爲這些獨裁政權是以解放壓迫與剝削的名義強加在人民 之上。

In more recent decades through visits of persons from dictatorially ruled countries, such as Panama, Poland, Chile, Tibet, and Burma, the realities of today's dictatorships became more real. From Tibetans who had fought against Chinese Communist aggression, Russians who had defeated the August 1991 hard-line coup, and Thais who had nonviolently blocked a return to military rule, I have gained often troubling perspectives on the insidious nature of dictatorships.

近幾十年來,經由訪問來自獨裁統治國家,例如巴拿馬、 波蘭、智利、圖博與緬甸的人士,當今的獨裁政權的現實就變

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得更真實了。從反抗中國共產黨入侵而戰鬥的圖博人、擊退 1991年8月死硬派之政變的俄羅斯人以及以非暴力阻止軍事統治 復辟的泰國人等這些事件,時常讓我看到獨裁政權陰暗本質之 外而令人擔憂的面向。

The sense of pathos and outrage against the brutalities, along with admiration of the calm heroism of unbelievably brave men and women, were sometimes strengthened by visits to places where the dangers were still great, and yet defiance by brave people continued. These included Panama under Noriega; Vilnius, Lithuania, under continued Soviet repression; Tiananmen Square, Beijing, during both the festive demonstration of freedom and while the first armored personnel carriers entered that fateful night; and the jungle headquarters of the democratic opposition at Manerplaw in "liberated Burma."

訪問過許多仍然面臨危險、而勇敢的人們還是繼續反抗 的地方,增強了我對反抗這些暴政的同情與憤恨,以及對這些 無比勇敢男女之無名英雄主義的欽佩。這些地方包括諾利耶加 (Manuel Antonio Noriega)統治下的巴拿馬、持續受蘇聯鎖壓的 立陶宛首都維爾紐斯(Vilnius)、在那段嘉年華會式慶祝自由的示 威日子及第一批裝甲車開進北京天安門廣場決定命運的當天晚 上、還有位於「緬甸解放區」馬那布羅(Manerplaw)的民主反對 運動的叢林總部。

Sometimes I visited the sites of the fallen, as the television tower and the cemetery in Vilnius, the public park

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in Riga where people had been gunned down, the center of Ferrara in northern Italy where the fascists lined up and shot resisters, and a simple cemetery in Manerplaw filled with bodies of men who had died much too young. It is a sad realization that every dictatorship leaves such death and destruction in its wake.

有時候我訪問了人們被殺害的現場,例如維爾紐斯的電視 塔與公墓、里加(Riga)的公園一人們在那裡被槍斃、義大利北部 費拉拉(Ferrara)的市中心一法西斯主義者在那裡成排槍殺抵抗份 子、還有馬那布羅的一個簡陋的墓地一那裡塡滿了死得太年輕 的男子屍體。認知到每一個獨裁政權的漩渦之下都留下如此的 死亡與破壞,這是令人悲痛的現實。

Out of these concerns and experiences grew a determined hope that prevention of tyranny might be possible, that successful struggles against dictatorships could be waged without mass mutual slaughters, that dictatorships could be destroyed and new ones prevented from rising out of the ashes.

出於這些關心與經驗,我逐漸滋長出一個堅定的希望:暴 政有可能加以預防,反對獨裁政權而不需大規模互相殺戮的抗 爭是可以成功地發動,獨裁政權是可以摧毀的,而且可以防止 新獨裁政權的死灰復燃。

I have tried to think carefully about the most effective ways in which dictatorships could be successfully disintegrated with the least possib1e cost in suffering and

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lives. In this I have drawn on my studies over many years of dictatorships, resistance movements, revolutions, political thought, governmental systems, and especially realistic nonviolent struggle.

我曾試圖仔細思考如何以最少之苦難與生命代價而可以成 功地瓦解獨裁政權的最有效辦法。為此,我以自己多年來對獨 裁政權、抵抗運動、革命、政治思想、政府體制、以及特別是 實際可行之非暴力抗爭的研究,作為我思考的源泉。

This publication is the result. I am certain it is far from perfect. But, perhaps, it offers some guidelines to assist thought and planning to produce movements of liberation that are more powerful and effective than might otherwise be the case.

這本小冊子就是這些思考的結果。我可以確定它離完美 還遠。但是,它也許能夠提供一些指導原則,有助於思考與規 劃,以產生比原本不這麼作而更有力與更有效的解放運動。

Of necessity, and of deliberate choice, the focus of this essay is on the generic problem of how to destroy a dictatorship and to prevent the rise of a new one. I am not competent to produce a detailed analysis and prescription for a particular country. However, it is my hope that this generic analysis maybe useful to people in, unfortunately, too many countries who now face the realities of dictatorial rule. They will need to examine the validity of this analysis for their situations and the extent to which his major recommendations 008 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

are, or can be made to be, applicable for their liberation struggles.

出於需要與特意的選擇,本文著重於如何摧毀獨裁政權及 避免產生另一個新獨裁政權的一般性問題。我的能力不足以針 對某一特定國家提供一份詳細的分析與處方。不過,我希望這 個一般性的分析能夠對不幸還有太多國家目前仍然面對獨裁統 治之現實的人們有所幫忙。他們必須針對他們的情勢檢驗我這 個分析的適用性,對作者主要之建議或者能夠做成建議的分析 範圍,使之適用於他們的解放抗爭。

Nowhere in this analysis do I assume that defying dictators will be an easy or cost-free endeavor. All forms of struggle have complication and costs. Fighting dictators will, of course, bring casualties. It is my hope, however, that this analysis will spur resistance leaders to consider strategies that may increase their effective power while reducing the relative level of casualties.

在本文的分析裡,我完全沒有假設反抗獨裁者會是一件輕 易或者沒有代價的工作。任何形式的抗爭都有它的複雜性與代 價。跟獨裁者鬥爭當然會帶來傷亡。不過,我希望本文的分析 將促使抵抗運動的領導者、考慮能夠提高效能而同時又可以相 對減少傷亡水準的那些戰略。

Nor should this analysis be interpreted to mean that when a specific dictatorship is ended, all other problems will also disappear. The fall of one regime does not bring in a utopia. Rather, it opens the way for hard work and long

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efforts to build more just social, economic, and political relationships and the eradication of other forms of injustices and oppression. It is my hope that this brief examination of how a dictatorship can be disintegrated may be found useful wherever people live under domination and desire to be free.

同樣,也不能把本文的分析解釋爲當某一特定獨裁政權結 束時,所有的問題就都消失。一個政權的垮台並不會帶來烏托 邦。而只是爲艱苦的工作與長期的努力打開一條出路,以建設 更有正義之社會、經濟與政治的關係,並且消滅其他各種形式 的不公不義與壓迫。我希望,這個如何瓦解獨裁政權的簡要研 究能夠對所有生活在受人宰制而又渴望自由的人們有所幫助。

> Gene Sharp 吉恩夏普

6 October 1993 1993年10月6日 Albert Einstein Institution 亞伯特 · 愛因斯坦研究院 Boston, Massachusetts 波士頓,麻薩諸塞州

## 譯者序 Translator's Preface

After a strong joint protest against the pro-China policies of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under Ma Yingjeou regime at the front gate of the Legislative Yuan (the Parliament of Taiwan) organized by the Taiwan Association of University Professors and many other Taiwanese civil rights organizations held on October 25, 2008, the "Alliance of Referendum for Taiwan, ART" was formed. At that time the morale and spirit of Taiwanese people, both domestic and overseas, had hit the rock bottom due to the loss of presidential election held in March, 2008. In 2009, I was invited to give a presentation at the Summer Conference of Taiwanese American Association of East Chapter. I reported to the audience of what ART had done and was planning to do with a conclusion that "a country can only be saved by her own people". After the conference I traveled to other cities in the USA and Canada to encourage more overseas Taiwanese to care for their homeland, particularly under such a depressing and precarious time. I was very much encouraged by their positive responses and supports and convinced firmly that Taiwanese Self-Salvation Movement will prevail.

2008年10月25日台灣教授協會與本土社團,在立法院前門

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開始強烈抗議馬統幫公然傾中後而成立「公投護台灣聯盟」(以 下簡稱「公投盟」)。彼時,國內外台灣人民因本土陣營大選失 敗而士氣低落。2009年夏天在美東夏令營主辦單位的邀請下, 我向大會報告「公投盟」奮鬥的情形,以「自己的國家自己 救」作專題演講,並先後到美國與加拿大之城市拜會,鼓勵海 外台灣鄉親繼續爲「後頭厝」的困境提供關心與協助,得到海 外鄉親的正面回應與支持,得以延續「台灣人民自救運動」。

During my speaking tour and visit to Boston, Professor Albert Lin, who has sworn that he will never shave his beard until the realization of Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, and I, joined by several other friends, paid a visit to Dr. Gene Sharp of Albert Einstein Institution<sup>1</sup>, who was formerly at Harvard University, at a luncheon meeting. Albert proposed an invitation to Gene to revisit Taiwan in order to provide us with advices on the strategies of Taiwan Nation Building Movement. Dr. Sharp has been an internationally well-known theorist and consultant on "Nonviolent Struggle" for oppressed peoples. He has personally provided advices to those who eventually succeeded in restoring those well admired self-liberation movements in three Baltic States and in Serbia. Dr. Sharp responded frankly, stating that it is not for courtesy reason, that his age will not allow him to take long international trips on one hand and emphasized the main reason behind his response is that any oppressed people have to organize their own people's power strategically to liberate themselves on the other. Unfortunately I had to leave

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with a disappointment, shortly after the lunch, for a speaking engagement at a Taiwanese Presbyterian Church outside the City of Boston, but was overwhelmed by joy for Dr. Sharp's verbal permission in allowing me to translate his new book: "Waging Nonviolent Struggle".

其間,利用到美國波士頓演講之便,與發誓台灣沒有獨立 建國就不剃鬍鬚的林哲夫教授,一起拜會哈佛大學愛因斯坦研 究院<sup>1</sup>的吉恩·夏普博士(Dr. Gene Sharp)。午餐見面時,林教授 提到邀請夏普博士再度到台灣指導台灣人的獨立建國運動。夏 普博士是非暴力抗爭的國際級大師,曾經實地指導波羅的海三 國及巴爾幹半島塞爾維亞的獨立運動,獲得令全球追求解放人 民的敬佩。夏普博士表示這不是客套,一方面他說年事已高, 已經不適合長途旅行;另一方面,他說明最主要的理由是,一 個受壓迫的民族要尋求解放,只能透過人民自己的力量,才能 實現這個目標。我提早離開午餐出席演講時,確實有點失望, 無法掩蓋他同意授權由我來翻譯他一本新書《啓動非暴力抗 爭》(*Waging Nonviolent Struggle*)的喜悅。

However, when I finished my speech, Albert, who stayed after the lunch, visited Prof. Sharp at his office of Albert Einstein Institution and had a lengthy discussion with Gene, caught up with me and brought back two unbound copies of Gene's newest book, titled: "Self-Liberation: A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or Other Oppressions" as well as Dr. Sharp's verbal permission to

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translate and publish it in Taiwan. After spending the whole night reading it, I immediately realized that this is the very book that we have been looking for. It will remind the leaders of our civil rights movement to arm and prepare themselves with non-violent strategies to lead and empower the people under the current oppression. When I returned to Taipei, I was fully convinced that the theory and strategies in Gene's booklet with pertinent knowledge and techniques should not be limited to a small group of people. I volunteered myself for its translation into Mandarin Chinese, while Albert invited a dozen experts and scholars for a series of its in-depth study with discussions. The printing and publication of its first edition in two versions, one in pocket-sized Mandarin Chinese only and the other in bilingual of English and Chinese, were sponsored by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, for which we are very grateful. We sincerely hope that every Taiwanese and the youth can learn the importance and usefulness of strategic planning of self-liberation.

不過,等到我演講完畢,午餐時留下來與夏普博士繼續深 談的林教授,帶回來夏普博士贈送的,一份散裝剛完成的「自 我解放(Self Liberation)戰略規劃手冊」一書。當晚經過研讀,發 覺這個手冊整理了受壓迫民族,尋找自我解放的所有知識與進 行實踐的做法,如獲至寶。深覺台灣人民追求獨立建國的運動 就是台灣人民的自我解放運動,而這個運動必須從自我提升及 提升人民之權能(Self Empowerment)開始。演講結束返抵台北之 後,為了按照手冊中提到的另一個重點:這種知識不要淪為菁 英分子所壟斷,即刻著手翻譯,並由林哲夫教授邀請數位具經 014 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

驗且有前瞻眼光的有志之士一起研讀,漢文翻譯草稿經過林哲 夫教授的審閱,台灣基督長老教會決定將這本手冊印製出版, 讓更多關心台灣前途的民衆與青年學生,可以了解自我解放的 戰略思考與做法。

It is particularly crucial in terms of timing to publish this translated booklet when the current colonial regime in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou wants its way of promoting pro-unification policies by ignoring the rights to referendum of Taiwanese people and by passing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the Communist China. ECFA was negotiated in a secret protocol format that even those legislators who were asked to pass it did not know either the full contents or the negotiation processes involved. Under such an oppressive situation, Taiwanese people want to stop Ma' betrayal of his presidential campaign promise to have 23 million Taiwanese in determining the future of Taiwan on one hand and block the invasion of Communist Chinese on the other, I hope that this guide will stimulate deeper strategic thinking among the Taiwanese people and will empower them in overcoming their powerlessness and helplessness. Self-Liberation is to use people's collective power strategically with cost-effectiveness to save their own country from oppression and invasion. Taiwanese people should develop the capability of nonviolent struggle and aim to achieve our national goal of becoming an independent sovereign state in the international community of nations.

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值此馬統幫不顧台灣社會民意的反對,汲汲欲與中國簽訂 ECFA,企圖以經濟手段達成國共兩黨併呑台灣的政治目的。台 灣人民一方面要阻止馬統幫背叛選前對台灣人民所做「自由民 主」的承諾,另一方面必須阻擋中國共產黨勢力的入侵。譯者 期盼這本書的翻譯與出版,能夠爲台灣社會普遍感到的無力感 注入一支強心劑。「自我解放」就是以「人民的力量(People's power)」來解除自己民族被滅亡的危機,進而建立自己的國 家。台灣人民必須培養能力,朝這個戰略目標邁進。

As a translator, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp for his kindness and generosity in granting the permission for us to translate and publish his precious lifelong work and wisdom in facilitating the self-liberation of those peoples who are willing to help themselves with strategic mind, planning and nonviolent actions.

譯者要在此誠摯感謝吉恩夏普教授, 慨允授權我們翻譯及 出版這本他一生長期之心血與智慧結晶的成果,以協助有志以 戰略性思考、規劃及非暴力之行動而尋求自我解放的人們。

> T. K. Aquia Tsay 蔡丁貴



First of all, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp for his sustained mentorship, generous assistance and friendship over those precious years since 1990 in guiding my studies on nonviolent strategies and struggle for the causes of democracy, freedoms, peace with justice and nation building of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state.

首先,我要衷心感謝吉恩夏普教授自1990年以來,對我在 研究以非暴力戰略與抗爭來追求民主、自由、公義及建立台灣 主權獨立國家的努力上,提供持續不斷的教導、慷慨的協助及 友誼。

Any popular movement, though may be started by a very small number of activists initially, is rooted on their collective grand vision. The subsequent public participation during the maturing stage will inevitably usher in changes to this movement on its momentum, mobility, direction, quality, as well as materialization and sublimation of their final vision. A series of inter-related and inter-locked activity plans and strategies will be formulated based on the grand strategy for the realization of final vision.

任何大衆化的運動,雖然起初可能是極少數的人,基於某

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一遠大理想而發動,在其成長過程中,必經大衆的參與,導致 動量、機動性、運動的方向、品質和理想的具體化及昇華,而 將其運動策略化,企畫能符合藉此大策略完成最終理想,環環 相扣主動性的系列活動。

As I reflect on the past five decades of my continuous involvement for Taiwan's democracy and independence movement, I have painfully felt that it has been very difficult to secure the opportunities to participate in essential decision making, exploring, formulating and strategizing pertained to the movement from far Canada. I am very grateful for the precious Providential guidance in being exposed to URM (empowerment through organizing people, Urban Rural Mission) under the leadership of Rev. Prof. Ed File in Toronto 1982; conflict management and resolution program in Taiwan 1994, fortunately taken over by TPN (Third Party Neutral for conflict resolution, management, prevention and transformation) under the leadership of Dr. Steve Chen in Ottawa first and later in Taiwan in 2002; OST (Open Space Technology for re-spiriting and transformation of organization) through Rev. Dr. Larry Peterson in Taiwan 2002; and nonviolent CBD (Civilian-Based Defence) under the mentorship of Prof. Gene Sharp in Boston 1990, and in Taiwan since 1994. All these programs have been subsequently introduced to Taiwan and greatly facilitated in the growth of and impacted on the quality of the movement. However, we are still far from the ideal state of realizing our final vision of building a new

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and independent sovereign state of Taiwan, filled with truth, goodness, beauty, peace, justice, democracy, human rights, freedoms, rule of laws, multi-cultural civil society of vitality. This is the very opportune time for those committed and able leaders and cadres of movement to meet together in honest reflection and critical analyses of their past activities, how they were misled by the KMT resulting in losing their direction and momentum, limiting themselves to reactive programs, losing all the precious opportunities. Who can help us overcome this difficult obstacle by alternative thoughts and strategies?

回顧及探討數十年來,從事台灣的民主化及建國運動,痛 切地體會到身處國外,難有連續性的參與,更難有機會擠進決 策核心,影響大策略的催化、探索及擬定。能在加、美兩國接 觸到數套社會運動所需的工具,謹由衷向所信仰的上帝感謝開 導、指引所獲得的培能(empowerment through organizing people) 的URM(城鄉宣道工作,1982年始於Toronto);衝突處理(1994 年始於Toronto),幸在2002年再由陳校賢教授引進中性第三者 (TPN Ottawa);開放空間技巧(OST,2002年始於台灣),非暴力 的公民防衛(CBD,1994年始於Boston)前後引進台灣,而或多或 少地助長了咱的運動,影響其品質,卻仍與最終的理想目標, 及建立新而主權獨立、充滿真善美、和平、公義、民主、人 權、自由、法治,富有活力之多元公民社會的台灣國的情景仍 遠。此時正是有意願、魄力,繼續參與運動的幹部雲集一堂, 冷靜、坦誠地探討過去的運動,如何被KMT誤導,屢屢喪失其 運動性及方向性,僅侷限於舉辦反應式的活動,而一再喪失良 機,此難關由誰如何重啓另類思考之大門?

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In 2009, Dr. TK Aquia Tsay was able to humble himself greatly as a professor of the National Taiwan University and devoted himself to the actual non-violent action for the democracy and independence movement of Taiwan. He extended his project of recruiting members to the "Senior Revolutionary Army" among the Taiwanese from both inside Taiwan and traveling to North American cities with greater number of Taiwanese through talks and speeches. He planned to attend the "UN for Taiwan" rally in New York City first before continuing his speaking tour to Boston, Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto in mid September. I was moved greatly by his determination and devotion and was able to convince my wife in joining me to drive to NY city for the rally first, and then to provide the transportation for Prof. Tsay from NY city with four stops, to Boston, Montreal, Ottawa to Toronto for his speaking engagements as our first intention. Prof. Tsay offered himself to drive all the way and we ended up the passengers. My second intention for this driving trip was to take time to introduce the essentials of those four sets of tools for social transformation as well as the key personnel related to those tools.

2009年蔡丁貴教授異類地放下台灣大學教授的身段,以實際非暴力行動投入民主建國運動,在國內外招兵買馬,籌募「老人革命軍」,甚至遠飛到北美較多台灣鄉親僑居的城市演講,也趕到紐約市參加「UN for Taiwan」的遊行。並計畫之後到Boston、Montreal、Ottawa及Toronto演講。我深受感動,就 與內人決定先從Toronto驅車到紐約市參加此遊行,然後接蔡教 020 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

授,當他的司機,提供從紐約至Boston、Montreal、Ottawa到 Toronto所需的交通。結果,反而是蔡教授全程當了我們五天的 司機。我的另一用意是想藉此遠程的驅車旅行,找機會向蔡教 授介紹上述四套社會改造工具的相關機構及負責主導的人士。

The first stop is Boston, where I had met Prof. Gene Sharp on February 10, 1990 at the National Conference on Non-Violent Sanction when he was in charge of the "Non-Violent Sanction Program" at Harvard University featured the keynote speaker, Dr. Johan Jurgen Holst, the Executive Director of Institute of International Studies of Norway in Oslo, later Minister of National Defence and of Foreign Affairs. During the three day conference, I met members of the Quakers who had been providing non-violent action training and joined the Civilian Based Defence Association (CBDA), which Prof. Sharp facilitated in founding it. I had the honour of serving as one of the Board Directors of CBDA for five years as well as of hosting the Annual Meeting of CBDA in Toronto in May 1995. I was greatly moved by a telephone from Prof. Sharp in early June of 1994 that he would be ready to respond to my eager and nagging request of inviting him to Taiwan for a lecture-seminar tour on Civilian-Based Defence (CBD). He arrived in Taiwan on December 16, 1994 and provided a two week lecture-seminar series on CBD: a closed lecture to the high ranking military officers at the War College, two public hearings at the Legislative Yuan (Parliament of Taiwan), and ten lecture-seminars to the public.

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與第一站的Gene Sharp教授的認識,則需要追溯到1990年2 月初,在Boston參加他在哈佛大學執教時所主辦的「非暴力制 裁」國際會議,而接觸到非暴力行動訓練的貴格會與加入他啓 蒙創設的公民防衛國際協會(CBDA),也當了五年理事,在多 倫多主辦了該會1995年的年會。而Sharp教授經四年多的拜託及 邀請,終於在1994年12月答應咱的邀請,來台灣做爲期兩個禮 拜的CBD的學術性演講及研討,共有:在戰爭學院非公開的一 場演講、在立法院的兩場公聽會與南北十場的公開演講及研討 會。

Before the departure from Taiwan, Prof. Sharp reminded me repeatedly, a person who had been blacklisted by the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and banned from returning to Taiwan for over 30 years, to find means and ways to invite a person officially who had studied his CBD theory and to share their successful story in applying the non-violent strategies and actions to defeat the Soviet challenge posed by five reinforced divisions, including a crack paratroopers division, in restoring their national independence from USSR to the audience in Taiwan. This person was the former Minister of National Defence of Lithuania, Dr. Audrius Butkevicius. The Lithuanian victory had contributed partially to the disintegration and demise of USSR.

在他離台前,特別叮嚀挑戰一個長久被列入黑名單的人, 想辦法正式由官方邀請,曾實際運用過CBD之理論的立陶宛前 國防部部長Dr. Audrius Butkevicius,來分享其如何以非暴力策略 及行動,擊退蘇聯五個加強師的挑戰,成功地脫離蘇聯,重獲 022 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

立陶宛的獨立,並貢獻於USSR之瓦解的經過。

I believe in that God helps those who help themselves. By the grace and providence of God and help from some comrades, as an absentee candidate. I managed to secure the second position for the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) primary among six candidates for proportional representation from the overseas. When the primary was held in Taiwan in May 1995, I was hosting the Annual Meeting of CBDA in Toronto, Canada. I was included as a member of Legislative Trade Delegation to visit Lithuania in early November, 1996 and met the young psychiatrist, Dr. Butkevicius. I had requested the written record of their long struggle "Nonviolent Resistance in Lithuania: A Story of Peaceful Liberation" by Dr. Grazina Miniotaite, rights to translate and publish it as well as extended our invitation to him for a one week visit with lecture tour to Taiwan in February 1997. During his official visit, Dr. Butkevicius shared their long detailed Baltic Way of their struggle to restore the national independence, including the 600 km human-chain extended by two million Baltic peoples from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius to show their determination and details of the critical strategic event in the evening of January 13, 1991.

依我所信,果然神不負有心人。雖1995年5月須赴約在多 倫多主辦國際公民防衛協會的年會,而不能親自參與同一時間 在台北舉行的民進黨不分區僑選立委的初選,卻讓我擠進而當 選第三屆僑選立委。1996年11月初,隨立法院經貿訪問團去立

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陶宛,成功地見到這位年輕的精神科醫生的前國防部部長Dr. A. Butkevicius,索取其抗蘇的記錄:「立陶宛的非暴力抗爭—— 和平解放運動」,取得翻譯出版權(前衛出版社,1997年2月), 且成功地在1997年2月邀請此位年輕的精神科醫師來台訪問一個 禮拜。在立法院的公聽會外,南北五場演講中,詳細闡述了其 最後關鍵性奮鬥及智取的經過(書名:立陶宛的非暴力抗爭—— 和平解放的故事,前衛),和在此之前所策劃,200萬人跨波海 三國首都600多公里所組織成的人鏈(human-chain),手牽手以展 示其團結的決心,再獨立的盛舉。

Those physically very taxing visits by Prof. Sharp and Dr. Butkevicius and the sharing of their wisdom, theory and experience to the audience in Taiwan and my five year association with CBDA prompted me to organize the Research Association of National Peace-Security in Taiwan (TRANPS) in May 1999. Its main purposes are to encourage NGOs to be involved in advocating and disseminating the concepts of CBD to the public, and in promoting its educational and training programs.

Sharp教授和Butkevicius醫師不辭辛勞前後訪問台灣,他們 在台灣的演講及分享,與在CBDA五年的理事經驗,間接地鼓 勵了「台灣國家和平安全研究協會(TRANPS)」在1999年5月的 成立。主要是企畫利用民間團體來鼓吹、推廣CBD的觀念,教 育及組訓計畫。

Some of the preliminary work on CBD which I had failed to accomplish during my tenure as a legislator of the

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Third House, I was very fortunate to have had the support of those legislators in the Fourth and Fifth House, notably Dr. Michael M S Tsai, Mr. Cheng-yao Tai, Rev. Kok-tiong Cheng, and Mr. S K Jan. Under the leadership spearheaded by Legislator Tsai, and Legislator Prof. Ni-Suan Ng two interrelated bills on National Defence were enacted on January 15, 2000, nationalized the armed forces from being the KMT's Party Army, and incorporated those articles on the concepts and strategies of Total National Defence, Total Civil Defence and broad public military education. With the support and collaboration of Legislator Tai and Vice Minister of Education, Ms. Lulu Fan, TRANPS was able to convene a National Conference on Total National Defence and National Security on September 13-14, 2001 to promote a broader understanding of mutually complementary roles of armed defence and civilian based defence. Subsequently, Legislators Rev. Kok-tiong Cheng and Mr. Chi-hong Chao were able to help us in laying ground work with the Bureau of Military Education of the Ministry of Education to redesign those curricula on Military Education and Training Programs at both the secondary and tertiary levels. We were fortunate to have the participation of Prof. C H Shih, Prof. W C Chen, Prof. C. C. Lin, and Prof. Y Li as well as the support from vice Minister of National Defence, Dr. Michael M S Tsai and Vice Minister of Education, Ms. Lulu Fan. However, the civilian based defence is not a panacea. It has the potential to prevent, deter and defeat any invaders, coup d'état, and

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usurpers with advance research, education and training programs on civilian based defence.

在我任第三屆立法院委員時未能完成的一些初步工作, 非常幸運的獲得第四、五屆數位立委如蔡明憲、戴振耀、鄭國 忠及簡錫堦等的有力支持。在蔡立委與黃爾璇立委的主導下, 2000年1月15日通過了新的國防二法,採納軍隊國家化、全民 國防、全民防衛與政府應推廣全民國防教育的條文。在戴立 委與范巽祿教育部政務次長的合作下,2001年9月13-14日,由 TRANPS主辦「全民國防與國家安全」的學術研討會,改善了 軍民雙方對公民防衛,在加強軍事國防與非武裝國防間互補性 功能的瞭解,進而促成鄭國忠與曹啓鴻兩立委的協助,與教育 部軍訓處合作下的軍訓課程的改編工程,也幸得施正鋒等數位 教授的參與,和蔡國防部副部長與范政務次長幕後的支持。公 民防衛雖非爲「萬能丹」,但在有預先籌畫CBD的教育及組 訓下,卻具備對防犯、嚇阻及擊敗任何外敵的入侵,與國內政 變、篡權等盲舉的潛能。

The future national and human security of Taiwan depends greatly on advance thorough and holistic research, planning, and execution of the realistic CBD educational and training programs. It is also an integral element in enabling to enrich our psychological defence, to strengthen our democracy, and to consolidate Taiwan's security, peace and sustainable growth of our nation building movement through self-liberation.

今後台灣國的國家安全與人的安全(human security),有賴 預先透澈且整全公民防衛的務實教育及組訓策劃及推動,也是咱 自我解放建國運動中,藉著具體的行動及企畫,以充實心防、深 化民主、鞏固台灣國之安全、和平及持續成長的一要素。

On Sunday, September 13, 2009, Prof. Gene Sharp made an exception in receiving guests. Prof. T K Aquia Tsay left for a speaking engagement outside Boston after a simple lunch, and we moved to his Albert Einstein Institution office in East Boston. My question to Prof. Sharp was whether he would be able to make another trip to Taiwan in advising us as we tried to re-chart our future course of action. His answer was that: firstly his health condition would not allow him to travel long distance and secondly if you had seriously pursued thorough strategic research on the issue, you can do it yourselves without any external assistance. He got up and walked to his computer and had two draft copies of his new book: "A Guide to Self-Liberation" printed and gave them to us. He gave us the verbal permission to have it translated and published in Taiwan, but reminded us to ensure the quality of translation and careful in-depth study to facilitate the cost-effectiveness of Taiwan's nation building.

2009年9月13日,Sharp教授破例在禮拜天接見訪客,在餐 館見面寒暄及午餐後,蔡教授因需先離開趕路去市郊演講, 我們就到Sharp教授所創辦的愛因斯坦研究所(Albert Einstein Institution),繼續商討能否再度請他來台灣支援,並指導咱所 需的CBD工作計畫。他率直地回答說:第一、健康上不再允 許他長途旅行;第二、你們只需認真研究策劃,則自力就可以 做到,不需要他人的幫忙。便起身走到他的電腦,列印了兩份

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尚未出版的小冊 — A Guide to Self-Liberation(《自我解放之指 南》)的原稿給我們。他不計較版權,但要我們做有品質、忠實 的翻譯,以供更多有台灣心的人精細地研讀,使我們能更有效 益地推動建國運動。

I am very impressed by the effort and spirit of Prof. T K Aquia Tsay with price paid in encouraging many people to read both this Guide and those additional reading materials. Its Chinese versions will doubtlessly contribute to a greater number of serious readership and to realize its intended impacts. It will encourage more people to join the ranks of Taiwan Independence and Nation Building Movement with constant serious reflection, to cultivate their ability of critical thinking and analytical mind, and of engaging in strategic reflection of the relevance of activities and movement. I hope that this will prompt a group of leaders to put their collective wisdom and effort together in formulating a holistic grand strategy to plan a series of associated proactive strategies, tactics and means and accomplish the task of our nation building. I strongly recommend all of those Taiwanese who care about our future nation of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state, the national and human security of Taiwan, and the well being and happiness of all Taiwanese people, present and future, should read this guide and those additional reading materials seriously as well as join in all of future non-violent actions. I firmly believe that all the readers and the Taiwanese people will benefit greatly from the

publication of this book toward earlier realization of building an independent state of Taiwan.

我非常敬佩蔡丁貴教授的精神、用心及所付出的犧牲,催 促了不少人參加研讀此一指南小冊及所指定近一千頁的必讀文 獻,此漢文翻譯本的出版及有心人士廣泛的研讀,必定會貢獻 並導致Sharp教授寫此書之主旨所期待達到的效應,及促使更 多有心加入台灣民主獨立建國運動之陣營的人士,經常愼重探 討,致力培育思考能力,從戰略觀點反省所推動、從事的活動 與運動的相關性,並催促一群領導者集思廣智,致力擬定一套 整全完成建國大業所需的大策略,並策劃相關系列的主動性活 動及策略、戰術與方法。確信此書所有的讀者及台灣人將因其 出版而獲益良多,促成獨立建國的早日完成。

It is my great honour to be asked by Prof. Tsay to write a preface for this Chinese version. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation and respect for his hard work. The last, but not the least, I would also like to express my heartfelt respect and gratitude to the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) which has made great contributions over the decades with their consistent spirit, principle, and effort toward social transformation and democracy movement based on their Christian faith and those three pertinent elements for social change, namely: love, justice and non-violent power. The PCT have issued statements and declarations at every critical juncture, joined in the non-violent action regularly, and paid dear price selflessly and worked earnestly as prophets, priests,

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and other roles in providing spiritual, human and material resources and support without expecting any returns. The General Assembly Office of PCT has played an important leadership role with the participation of some younger clergies, such as Rev. Hontiong Lyim, Rev. Simon Kok-tiong Cheng, Rev. Daniel Cheng, and Dr. Steve S S Chen through their active participation in those important education, training and mission programs on URM, TPN, OST, and CBD. I firmly believe that the PCT will be able to directly and/or indirectly contribute more and impact, through the professing faith with social actions, on the quality, potential and accomplishments of Taiwan's future socio-political movement as well as to the well being of the Taiwanese. I would like to express my overdue appreciation and respect to many PCT clergies and elders for those precious opportunities in allowing this first generation Christian to work with them for this precious and noble cause over the decades.

能受蔡教授之託,爲此書的漢文版爲序,是我極大的榮 幸,並藉此機會向蔡丁貴教授致敬,並由衷致謝!容我套一 句英文格言:「The last, but not least.」在台灣及寫此序文時, 直覺的感觸應指最後才提到,貢獻最大的卻是台灣基督長老教 會(The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan,簡稱PCT)!回顧數十年 來,台灣的社會改造及民主運動始終一貫,秉持其信仰與基督 的愛、公義及和平的三大社會改造要素,參與關鍵危機時發表 聲明及宣言,經常參與非暴力的行動行列,在人力、智力及物 力上,付出極高昂的代價而不求回報,全無私心,默默耕耘, 扮演先知、祭司及其他多種的重要角色。PCT總會提供重要的 0.30 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

領導者角色,其中較年輕的牧師如林芳仲、鄭國忠及鄭英兒等 積極的參與URM, TPN, OST與CBD等的重要教育、組訓工作計 畫。我確信PCT直接及間接地影響、貢獻於台灣的社會政治運 動的品質、潛能及今後的成就,而造福於台灣的國民。亦藉此 文,謹向這一大群的牧長致最大的敬意及謝意,讓我這個第一 代的基督徒有機會和他們共事。

> Abert Lin 林哲夫



Toward a New and Independent State—Taiwan 邁向新而獨立的國家——合灣

On behalf of all members of Editorial Committee. I would like to express our heartfelt appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp for the magnanimous sharing of his life long wisdom and work through various serious publications in printed format as well as through posting on the website of Albert Einstein Institution to whomever willingly pursuing the democracy and human rights and in overcoming the injustice and oppression through strategic non-violent action. We are particularly grateful to Prof. Sharp for making a two week lecture-seminar tour to introducing the essential concepts and theory of Civilian-Based Defense(CBD) to the Taiwanese audience in December 1994, for offering us the permission to translate and publish the Guide to Self-Liberation in September 2009, and for giving us the permission to translate and publish those some 900 pages of recommended additional reading materials into Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan in September 2010.

我代表全體編輯委員向吉恩夏普教授致上十二萬分的感 謝。他將他一生累積的智慧與成果透過許多連續的出版,以及 愛因斯坦研究院的網站貼文,讓所有努力超越不公不義與壓 迫,而能以戰略性的非暴力行動來追求民主與人權。我們特別 感謝夏普教授於1994年12月前來台灣進行兩個星期的參訪與演 講,向台灣的聽衆介紹公民防衛主要的觀念與理論,也特別感 謝他於2009年9月授權同意翻譯及出版這本《自我解放指南》, 及2010年10月即將出版的相關大約900多頁的推薦延伸閱讀資 料。

The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan issued the Human Rights Declaration in 1977 to declare to the world that the future of Taiwan should be decided and building of a new and independent state of Taiwan by the Taiwanese and through self-determination. Whenever the international community is/ are discussing all issues related to the future of Taiwan, they should respect their rights to self-determination and their wish of the building a new and independent state through peaceful means.

自1977年台灣基督長老教會發表人權宣言,揭示台灣的未 來應該經由台灣人民的決定(自決),促使台灣成爲新而獨立的 國家。國際社會略可知道台灣人民的願望,在強國討論與台灣 有關的議題時,至少仍會提到必須尊重台灣人民的意願,而且 必須在和平的狀態下決定。

During the processes of pursuing a new and independent state of Taiwan, many elders and pioneers have laid some foundation for the birth of this nation. They may be the wellknown leaders or hard-working unknown grass root activists,

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but are all being respected. However, we have encountered conflicts due to disputes over the differences in strategies, as well as difficulties due to differences in value systems and identity.

在追尋新而獨立的國家的過程中,許多前輩已經爲這個將 要誕生的國家立下地基,無論是著名的領袖人物或是默默耕耘 的基層運動者,都是令人敬佩的。但是我們也遇到過台灣人之 間因爲運動路線的不同而起的衝突,也曾受到因爲利益或認同 的問題所造成的阻礙。

In 1982, a blacklisted Taiwanese, Dr. Albert J F Lin, was able to facilitate in inviting Rev. Dr. Ed File (known as "I love Taiwan pastor") of Urban Rural Mission of Canada in Toronto in providing the organizers' training programs of empowerment through organizing people for power to those Taiwanese activists in their struggle for democracy, freedoms, human rights, and independence of Taiwan. Those activists, who had been struggling under the martial law and white terrorism were greatly helped by this training of love and non-violence.

1982年,經由加拿大的黑名單林哲夫教授(Dr. Albert Lin), 引介Rev. Dr. Ed File愛台灣牧師傳授城鄉宣教(Urban Rural Mission, URM)給追求民主、自由、獨立的台灣國家的有志之 士,這套組織人民爭取權益的愛與非暴力的訓練,曾在戒嚴、 白色恐怖時期,幫助台灣人民抵抗暴政。

Later on, Dr. Albert Lin was able to introduce directly

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or indirectly the Third Party Neutral (TPN), Open Space Technology (OST), and Civilian-Based Defense (CBD) to Taiwan in order to strengthen the democracy and consolidate the national security.

後來,林哲夫教授陸續將中性第三者經陳校賢教授(Third Party Neutral, TPN)、開放空間技巧經Rev. Dr. Larry Peterson(Open Space Technology, OST)及全民國防(Civilian-Based Defense, CBD) 直接或間接地引入台灣,爲的是深化台灣的民主、鞏固國家安全。

When Prof. Albert Lin and Prof. TK Aquia Tsay visited Prof. Gene Sharp at the Albert Einstein Institution in Boston in September 2009, they were offered two draft copies of "A Guide to Self-Liberation" with permission to translate into Mandarin Chinese and publish. We organized a 12 member study group on this Guide in December of 2009 and met on regular basis.

2009年夏,林哲夫教授與蔡丁貴教授訪問夏普教授(Dr. Gene Sharp)時,得到他慨允贈送A Guide to Self-Liberation(《自我解放》)的手稿。在2009年我們召集了十二人小組定期研讀此手稿。

In the spring of 2010, Prof. Tsay finished the translation, Prof. Albert Lin reviewed, and Rev. Hontiong Lyim led the Editorial Committee members in editing. It was decided to be published by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan in two different versions: a pocket sized one in Mandarin Chinese

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only, and the other in bilingual version of English and Mandarin Chinese. We sincerely hope that those devoted Taiwan Independence activists may take advantages of this Guide, organize various study groups to study the contents of this Guide together in many localities and formulate their proactive strategies and non-violent actions with the help of the open space technology in accordance with our Grand Strategy of Taiwan's nation building.

2010年春,經蔡丁貴教授翻譯、林哲夫教授審訂,林芳仲 牧師指引編輯委員會,決定由台灣基督長老教會出版漢文版與 英漢對照版,希望台灣有志於建立新而獨立的國家者,可以善 用這本書,在各地組成讀書會,一起討論內容,並用OST的方 式制定建國的大戰略等方案。

For conveniences of the readers, this Guide to Self-Liberation and its recommended reading materials are edited into six volumes. It is based on two considerations. At first, recommended reading pages from one book will be organized in the same volume. Secondly, each volume may include several books so that the size of them can be almost equal. The translated version has kept the original page numbers for easy references. We have treated the Guide to Self-Liberation as an overview in a separate volume. Volume I of extended readings contains: "The Politics of Nonviolent Action," "There Are Realistic Alternatives," and "The Anti-Coup;" Reading materials of "Waging Nonviolent Conflict;" "On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict;" "Social 036 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

Power and Political Freedom;" and "From Dictatorship to Democracy" are collected in Volume 2, 3, 4, and 5, separately and respectively. Readers are encouraged to study these translated reading materials in the sequence as Dr. Gene Sharp has strongly recommended.

爲了讀者使用方便,本書編輯的考慮是將「自我解放指 南」,及文中提到之延伸閱讀資料翻譯共分別編成小冊,以延 伸閱讀資料之書籍集中在一本小冊爲原則,而且以每一小冊之 頁數大致相當爲考慮。但譯文中仍然保留原書之頁碼(黑反白和 平鴿標示者),方便讀者查閱引用。「自我解放指南」自成一 冊,可以當作本系列的總論;延伸閱讀系列之第一冊包括「非 暴力行動的政治」、「確實有實際可行的替代方案」及「反政 變」;系列之二爲「啓動非暴力抗爭」;系列之三爲「戰略性 的非暴力衝突」;系列之四爲「社會權力與政治自由」;系列 之五爲「從獨裁走向民主」。閱讀的順序仍然按照「自我解放 指南」一冊中所建議的順序。

Once again, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp, Prof. TK Aquia Tsay and Prof. Albert Lin for their respective contribution to the publication of this Guide. Our gratitude also owe to Mr. Suzu Lee for his beautiful design of the cover pages, to all members of the editorial committee for their suggestions and participation in discussions. Through these publications, with further spreading of knowledge and technology in non-violent struggle, the objective of establishing a democratic system in Taiwan can be achieved.
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本書的出版,再一次感謝夏普教授(Gene Sharp)、林哲夫 教授(Dr. Albert Lin)及蔡丁貴教授的貢獻。感謝李夙儒完成精 美的封面設計,並感謝編輯委員會的討論與建議,讓「非暴 力抗爭」之知識與技術的傳播,可以進一步讓台灣朝向公民 社會邁進。

> Hong-Tiong Lyim 林芳仲

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# FACING DICTATORSHIPS REALISTICALLY 務實地面對獨裁政權

#### 𝒴 P.1-90

In recent years various dictatorships—of both internal and external origin—have collapsed or stumbled when confronted by defiant, mobilized people. Often seen as firmly entrenched and impregnable, some of these dictatorships proved unable to withstand the concerted political, economic, and social defiance of the people.

近年來,許多獨裁政權一不論來自內部的與外部的一當面 臨反抗而動員起來的民衆時,就崩潰或跛腳了。時常,這些獨 裁政權看上去地位牢固並且堅不可摧,但是有些獨裁政權卻無 法承擔人民協同一致之政治、經濟與社會的反抗。

Since 1980 dictatorships have collapsed before the predominantly nonviolent defiance of people in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Slovenia, Madagascar, Mali, Bolivia, and the Philippines. Nonviolent resistance has furthered the movement toward democratization in Nepal, Zambia, South Korea, Chile, Argentina, Haiti, Brazil, Uruguay, Malawi, Thailand, Bulgaria, Hungary, Zaire, Nigeria, and various parts of the former Soviet Union (playing a significant role in the defeat of the August 1991 attempted hard-line coup d'état).

自1980年以來,面對愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞、立陶宛、波 蘭、東德、捷克斯洛伐克、斯洛維尼亞、馬達加斯加、馬利、 玻利維亞與菲律賓等國人民之以非暴力為主的反抗,這些獨裁 政權都垮台了。非暴力抵抗運動推動了在尼泊爾、尙比亞、南 韓、智利、阿根廷、海地、巴西、烏拉圭、馬拉威、泰國、保 加利亞、匈牙利、薩伊、奈及利亞與前蘇聯(在擊敗1991年8月 死硬派所發動軍事政變的企圖中扮演了重要作用)等許多地區朝 向民主化而前進。

In addition, mass political defiance<sup>1</sup> has occurred in China, Burma, and Tibet in recent years. Although those struggles have not brought an end to the ruling dictatorships

<sup>1</sup> The term used in this context was introduced by Robert Helvey. "Political defiance" is nonviolent struggle (protest, noncooperation, and intervention) applied defiantly and actively for political purposes. The term originated in response to the confusion and distortion created by equating nonviolent struggle with pacifism and moral or religious "nonviolence." "Defiance" denotes a deliberate challenge to authority by disobedience, allowing no room for submission. "Political defiance" describes the environment in which the action is employed (political) as well as the objective (political power). The term is used principally to describe action by populations to regain from dictatorships control over governmental institutions by relentlessly attacking their sources of power and deliberately using strategic planning and operations to do so. In this paper, political defiance, nonviolent resistance, and nonviolent struggle will be used interchangeably, although the latter two terms generally refer to struggles with a broader range of objectives (social, economic, psychological, etc.).

政治反抗一詞用在這種定義首先是由羅勃特赫爾維(Robert Helvey)提出的。「政治反抗」是為了政治目的、以反抗與積極主動而進行的非暴力抗爭(抗議、不合作與介入干預)。這個用詞源自為了回應人們把非暴力抗爭等同於和平主義及道德的或宗教的「非暴力」所引起的混淆和扭曲。「反抗」意味著以不服從故意向權威挑戰,沒有屈服的餘地。「政治反抗」描述了採取行動的環境(政治的)與目的(政治權力)。這一詞主要用來描述群衆為了從獨裁統治者那裡奪回對政府機構的控制權而不屈不撓地打擊它們權力的來源、並且特意地運用戰略的規劃及行動來如此進行。本文交替使用政治反抗,非暴力抵抗與非暴力抗爭等三個術語,不過後兩者一般是指具有較廣泛目的(社會的、經濟的、心理的等等)的抗爭。

or occupations, they have exposed the brutal nature of those repressive regimes to the world community and have provided the populations with valuable experience with this form of struggle.

此外,近年來在中國、緬甸與圖博出現了群衆性的政治反抗。<sup>1</sup>這些抗爭雖然還沒有終結獨裁政權或者被佔領,它們已經 向全球國際社會揭露了這些壓迫政權的殘酷,並且帶給人們這 種抗爭方式的寶貴經驗。

The collapse of dictatorships in the above named countries certainly has not erased all other problems in those societies: poverty, crime, bureaucratic inefficiency, and environmental destruction are often the legacy of brutal regimes. However, the downfall of these dictatorships has minimally lifted much of the suffering of the victims of oppression, and has opened the way for the rebuilding of these societies with greater political democracy, personal liberties, and social justice.

前述這些國家之獨裁政權的倒塌當然並沒有消除他們社會 裡的所有其他問題;殘暴政權時常遺留下一些病灶諸如貧困、 犯罪、官僚的沒有效率、以及對環境的破壞。不過,這些獨裁 政權的垮台最低限度解除了被壓迫的受害者相當一大部份的苦 難,並且重建這些社會爲促進政治更民主、個人更自由及社會 更有公義而打開了一條出路。

A continuing problem 一個持續的問題

There has indeed been a trend towards greater democratization and freedom in the world in the past decades. According to *Freedom House*<sup>2</sup>, which compiles a yearly international survey of the status of political rights and civil liberties, the number of countries around the world classified as "free" has grown significantly in the last ten years:<sup>3</sup>

過去幾十年來,世界上的確有一個朝向更民主與更自由的 趨勢。自由之家(Freedom House)<sup>2</sup>每年編纂一份關於政治權利與 公民自由權之狀況的國際調查,根據它的統計,全世界被列爲 「自由」的國家數目過去十年來有顯著的成長<sup>3</sup>:

	Free 自由	Partly Free 部份自由	Not Free 不自由
1983	54	76	64
1993	75	73	38
2007	90	58	45

#### However, this positive trend is tempered by the large

3 Freedom House, Freedom in the World. 自由之家,「世界的自由」。

<sup>2</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007: An annual Survey of political Rights and Civil Liberties (Washington, D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007), s. v. "Map of Freedom 2007", at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007 (January 15, 2008). See http://www.freedomhouse.org for a description of Freedom House's categories of "Free," "Partly Free," and "Not Free."

自由之家,「2007年世界自由度:政治權利與公民自由之年度調查」,(華盛頓特區, 羅門與力特菲爾德出版有限公司,2007年),簡輯「2007年自由地圖」,網址 http:// www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007 (2008年1月15日)。有關「自 由之家」對「自由」、「部分自由」與「不自由」的分類,請參閱網址 http://www. freedomhouse.org。

numbers of peoples still living under conditions of tyranny. As of 2006, 23% of the world's 6.5 billion population lived in countries designated as "Not free," that is, areas with extremely restricted political rights and civil liberties. The 45 countries in the "Not free" category ruled by a range of military dictatorships (as in Burma and Sudan), traditional repressive monarchies (as in Saudi Arabia and Bhutan), dominant political parties (as in China and North Korea), foreign occupiers (as in Tibet and Western Sahara), or are in a state of transition.

不過,這個正面的趨勢卻還是被還有許多人仍然生活在暴 君統治之下所沖淡了。到2006年為止,全世界65億人口中的 23%生活在被列為「不自由」的國家,就是政治權利與公民自 由權受到極端限制的地區。屬於「不自由」類別之45個國家的 統治形式包括軍事獨裁(如緬甸與蘇丹)、傳統的君主壓制(如沙 烏地阿拉伯與不丹)、一黨獨大的體制(如中國與北韓)、外國侵 佔政權(如圖博與西薩哈拉)、或者正處於轉型的過程。

Many countries today are in a state of rapid economic, political, and social change. Although the number of "free" countries has increased in the past ten years, there is a great risk that many nations, in the face of such rapid fundamental changes, will move in the opposite direction and experience new forms of dictatorship. Military cliques, ambitious individuals, elected officials, and doctrinal political parties will repeatedly seek to impose their will. Coups d'état are and will remain a common occurrence. Basic human and political rights will continue to be denied to vast numbers of peoples.

許多國家目前正處於急劇之經濟、政治與社會的變遷狀態。雖然過去十年來「自由」國家的數目增加了,但是仍然有許多國家在面臨如此快迅的根本變化時,會反向而行並且會體驗到獨裁政權的一些新形式。軍事集團、個人野心家、當選的官員與教條式的政黨會重覆想要強制推展他們的意志。軍事政變在現在與未來都會經常發生。對許多人們來說,他們的基本人權與政治權利會繼續受到剝奪。

Unfortunately, the past is still with us. The problem of dictatorships is deep. People in many countries have experienced decades or even centuries of oppression, whether of domestic or foreign origin. Frequently, unquestioning submission to authority figures and rulers has been long inculcated. In extreme cases, the social, political, economic, and even religious institutions of the society outside of state control—have been deliberately weakened, subordinated, or even replaced by new regimented institutions used by the state or ruling party to control the society. The population has often been atomized (turned into a mass of isolated individuals) unable to work together to achieve freedom, to confide in each other, or even to do much of anything at their own initiative.

不幸的是,歷史還是一直糾纏著我們。獨裁政權的問題根 深蒂固。在許多國家裡,人們經歷了數十年甚至數百年、不論 是來自國內還是國外的壓迫。時常,長期的灌輸形成了對有權 勢之人士與統治者毫無質疑的屈從。在極端的情況下,社會上

之政治、經濟、社會甚至宗教的機構一不受國家機器控制一被 有意地加以削弱、收編、甚至被國家或執政黨用新的任務機構 所代替,以便控制整個社會。民衆往往被分化(變成一群孤立的 個體),無法共同努力來爭取自由、取得彼此的信任、甚至不能 主動地做任何事情。

The result is predictable: the population becomes weak, lacks self-confidence, and is incapable of resistance. People are often too frightened to share their hatred of the dictatorship and their hunger for freedom even with family and friends. People are often too terrified to think seriously of public resistance. In any case, what would be the use? Instead, they face suffering without purpose and a future without hope.

這個結果是可以預見的:民衆的力量變弱了,缺乏自信 心,無力抗爭。人們往往太害怕,連親友之間都不敢交換對獨 裁統治的憎恨及對自由的渴望。人們往往過於恐懼,而沒有能 力去認真考慮進行公開的抗爭。不管是那一種情形,這樣又有 什麼用呢?相反的,他們面臨的是沒有目的的苦難與沒有希望 的未來。

Current conditions in today's dictatorships may be much worse than earlier. In the past, some people may have attempted resistance. Short-lived mass protests and demonstrations may have occurred. Perhaps spirits soared temporarily. At other times, individuals and small groups may have conducted brave but impotent gestures, asserting some principle or simply their defiance. However noble the motives, such past acts of resistance have often been insufficient to overcome the people's fear and habit of obedience, a necessary prerequisite to destroy the dictatorship. Sadly, those acts may have brought instead only increased suffering and death, not victories or even hope.

當今獨裁政權之下的情況可能比早期的情形更惡劣得多。 過去,人們可能曾經嘗試過加以抵抗;可能曾經發生過短暫的 群衆抗議與示威;人們的士氣也許短暫地高昂過。在其他時 候,少數個人或小型團體也許做出過一些勇敢但無力的舉動、 主張過某些原則或者只是表達過他們的反對威權。不過無論動 機多麼高尙,過去這些抵抗的行動往往不足以克服人民的恐懼 與習慣性的服從,而這正是摧毀獨裁政權的必要前提條件。可 悲的是,這些行動可能反而帶來了更多的苦難與死亡,而不是 勝利與希望。

# Freedom through violence? 以暴力獲得自由?

What is to be done in such circumstances? The obvious possibilities seem useless. Constitutional and legal barriers, judicial decisions, and public opinion are normally ignored by dictators. Understandably, reacting to the brutalities, torture, disappearances, and killings, people often have concluded that only violence can end a dictatorship. Angry victims have sometimes organized to fight the brutal dictators with whatever violent and military capacity they could muster, despite the odds being against them. These people have

often fought bravely, at great cost in suffering and lives. Their accomplishments have sometimes been remarkable, but they rarely have won freedom. Violent rebellions can trigger brutal repression that frequently leaves the populace more helpless than before.

在這種情況下到底可以做甚麼?一些明顯的可能作法看起 來似乎毫無用處。獨裁者通常不會理會憲法與法律的制約、司 法的裁決及公衆的輿論。可以理解地,人們面對暴行、酷刑、 失蹤與殺害的反應,往往做出只有暴力才能終結獨裁政權的結 論。有時候憤怒的受害者會組織起來,儘管成功的機會很小, 用自己能夠湊合起來的任何暴力與武裝力量,向殘暴的獨裁者 宣戰。這些人往往勇敢戰鬥,付出慘痛的苦難與生命的代價。 他們的成就有時候很了不起,但很少能夠贏得自由。暴力的反 抗會觸發殘暴的鎭壓,這種結果往往會使民衆變得比以前還要 軟弱無助。

Whatever the merits of the violent option, however, one point is clear. By placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have superiority. The dictators are equipped to apply violence overwhelmingly. However long or briefly these democrats can continue, eventually the harsh military realities usually become inescapable. The dictators almost always have superiority in military hardware, ammunition, transportation, and the size of military forces. Despite bravery, the democrats are (almost always) no match.

不管選擇暴力它有多少正面的理由,有一點是明確清楚

的。如果將信心寄託於暴力手段,就是選擇了壓迫者幾乎總是 佔盡優勢的這種抗爭形式。獨裁者擁有施加壓倒性暴力的裝 備。不論這些民主人士能夠堅持多麼長久或短暫,最終經常還 是逃避不了嚴酷的軍事現實。獨裁者幾乎總是在軍事裝備、彈 藥、運輸與軍隊的規模方面佔有優勢。民主人士儘管勇敢,但 (幾乎總是)不是獨裁者的對手。

When conventional military rebellion is recognized as unrealistic, some dissidents then favor guerrilla warfare. However, guerrilla warfare rarely, if ever, benefits the oppressed population or ushers in a democracy. Guerrilla warfare is no obvious solution, particularly given the very strong tendency toward immense casualties among one's own people. The technique is no guarantor against failure, despite supporting theory and strategic analyses, and sometimes international backing. Guerrilla struggles often last a very long time. Civilian populations are often displaced by the ruling government, with immense human suffering and social dislocation.

當認識到傳統之軍事反叛並不實際的時候,有些異議者就 會傾向採用游擊戰。不過,游擊戰很少,如果有的話,給被壓迫 群衆帶來好處或者帶往民主體制。打游擊戰不會是一個好的解 答,特別是它會造成自己人民重大傷亡的明顯趨勢。游擊戰儘管 有理論與戰略分析的支持,有時還有國際的支援,卻不能保證不 會失敗。游擊戰往往持續很長的時間。社會大衆往往受到統治 政府的強迫搬遷,造成人們的巨大痛苦與及社會紛亂不安。

Even when successful, guerrilla struggles often have significant long-term negative structural consequences. Immediately the attacked regime becomes more dictatorial as a result of its countermeasures. If the guerrillas should finally succeed, the resulting new regime is often more dictatorial than its predecessor due to the centralizing impact of the expanded military forces and the weakening or destruction of the society's independent groups and institutions during the struggle—bodies that are vital in establishing and maintaining a democratic society. Opponents of dictatorships should look for another option.

游擊抗爭即使有時候能夠成功,往往會有顯著長期負面的 結構性後果。受到攻擊的結果,統治政權立即採取的反制手段 就會變得更獨裁。如果游擊份子最後獲得勝利,由於在抗爭過 程中武裝力量擴張所造成之權力集中的效應、或者社會上的獨 立團體與機構的被削弱與被破壞一這些團體與機構對建立及維 持一個民主社會是必不可或缺的一所產生的新政權往往比其前 任還要獨裁。反對獨裁政權的人士應當尋找別的替代方案。

Coups, elections, foreign saviors? 政變、選舉、外國救星?

A military coup d'état against a dictatorship might appear to be relatively one of the easiest and quickest ways to remove a particularly repugnant regime. However, there are very serious problems with that technique. Most importantly, it leaves in place the existing mal-distribution of power between the population and the elite in control of the government and its military forces. The removal of particular persons and cliques from the governing positions most likely will merely make it possible for another group to take their place. Theoretically, this group might be milder in its behavior and be open in limited ways to democratic reforms. However, the opposite is as likely to be the case.

要推翻一個特別惡名昭彰之政權,軍事政變看起來也許在 相對之下是一個比較容易與快速的辦法。但是,這個辦法存在 著非常嚴重的問題。最重要的是,民衆與控制政府及其軍事力 量的菁英分子之間現存不合理的權力分配還是原封不動。將某 些特殊個人及某些集團從政府的職位上趕下台來,最有可能只 是讓另一批人有機會取而代之。理論上,後一批人的行爲可能 會溫和一些,而且會對民主改革開放一些小型的方式。但是, 也很有可能是相反的結果。

After consolidating its position, the new clique may turn out to be more ruthless and more ambitious than the old one. Consequently, the new clique—in which hopes may have been placed—will be able to do whatever it wants without concern for democracy or human rights. That is not an acceptable answer to the problem of dictatorship.

新集團在鞏固了自己的地位以後,有可能比其前任更無 情、更有野心。結果,新集團一人們可能曾經寄以厚望一就可 以爲所欲爲,而不會顧慮到對民主或人權的關心。這不是解決 獨裁問題而大家可以接受的答案。

Elections are not available under dictatorships as an

instrument of significant political change. Some dictatorial regimes, such as those of the former Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc, went through the motions in order to appear democratic. Those elections, however, were merely rigidly controlled plebiscites to get public endorsement of candidates already hand picked by the dictators.

在獨裁政權之下,並沒有選舉可以作為實現重大政治改革 的工具。有些獨裁政權,例如前蘇聯所控制的東歐集團,為了 看起來像民主,曾經裝模做樣地搞過選舉。不過,這些選舉只 是受到嚴格控制的公民投票,讓社會大衆為這些獨裁者事先挑 選過的候選人背書。

Dictators under pressure may at times agree to new elections, but then rig them to place civilian puppets in government offices. If opposition candidates have been allowed to run and were actually elected, as occurred in Burma in 1990 and Nigeria in 1993, results may simply be ignored and the "victors" subjected to intimidation, arrest, or even execution. Dictators are not in the business of allowing elections that could remove them from their thrones.

獨裁者有時在壓力下會同意舉行新的選舉,然後再操縱 這些選舉,把傀儡放到政府官位上。反對陣營的候選人如果被 允許參選,而且真的當選了,像1990 年在緬甸及 1993 年在奈 及利亞,選舉結果不受尊重,而且對「勝選者」施以恐嚇、逮 捕甚至行刑殺害。獨裁者是不會從事舉辦能把他們趕下台的選 舉。 Many people now suffering under a brutal dictatorship, or who have gone into exile to escape its immediate grasp, do not believe that the oppressed can liberate themselves. They expect that their people can only be saved by the actions of others. These people place their confidence in external forces. They believe that only international help can be strong enough to bring down the dictators.

目前正在殘酷之獨裁政權統治下飽受苦難、或者為了逃 避它緊迫之魔掌而流亡的許多人,卻不相信受壓迫者能夠自己 解放他們自己。他們期待只有靠別人的行動才能拯救他們的人 民。這些人將信心寄託在外來的力量。他們相信只有國際的援 助才有足夠的力量打倒獨裁者。

The view that the oppressed are unable to act effectively is sometimes accurate for a certain time period. As noted, often oppressed people are unwilling and temporarily unable to struggle because they have no confidence in their ability to face the ruthless dictatorship, and no known way to save themselves. It is therefore understandable that many people place their hope for liberation in others. This outside force may be "public opinion," the United Nations, a particular country, or international economic and political sanctions.

認為受壓迫者沒有能力採取有效行動的這種觀點,在某 些期間內有時候是正確的。如前所述,被壓迫的人民往往不願 意、也暫時沒有能力抗爭,因為他們對自己是否有能力面對殘 酷無情的獨裁政權缺乏信心,也不知道有甚麼方法可以拯救他 們自己。因此,許多人把解放的希望寄託在別人身上,是可以

理解的。這種外來的力量可能是「大衆輿論」、聯合國、某一 個特別的國家或者國際的經濟與政治的制裁。

Such a scenario may sound comforting, but there are grave problems with this reliance on an outside savior. Such confidence may be totally misplaced. Usually no foreign saviors are coming, and if a foreign state does intervene, it probably should not be trusted.

這樣的設想情境聽起來可能令人欣慰,但依靠外來的救星 存在著嚴重的問題。這種信心可能完全擺錯地方了。通常沒有 外來救星會出現,而且如果有外國來進行介入干預,它大概是 靠不住的。

A few harsh realities concerning reliance on foreign intervention need to be emphasized here:

這裡需要強調依賴外來干預的一些嚴酷現實:

- Frequently foreign states will tolerate, or even positively assist, a dictatorship in order to advance their own economic or political interests.
- 外國往往會容忍、甚至正面幫助一個獨裁政權,以便獲 得更多他們自己的經濟或者政治利益。
- Foreign states also may be willing to sell out an oppressed people instead of keeping pledges to assist their liberation at the cost of another objective.
- 外國也有可能願意為了其他目的而出賣被壓迫的人民, 而不是遵守幫助人民獲得解放的諾言。

- Some foreign states will act against a dictatorship only to gain their own economic, political, or military control over the country.
- 有些外國國家會反對某個獨裁政權,只是為了取得對那個國家的經濟、政治或軍事的控制。
- The foreign states may become actively involved for positive purposes only if and when the internal resistance movement has already begun shaking the dictatorship, having thereby focused international attention on the brutal nature of the regime.
- 只有當內部的抵抗運動已經開始動搖了獨裁政權,從而 使國際的注意力集中於該政權的殘酷本質時,外國才有 可能為了正面的目的而積極地參與。

Dictatorships usually exist primarily because of the internal power distribution in the home country. The population and society are too weak to cause the dictatorship serious problems, wealth and power are concentrated in too few hands. Although dictatorships may benefit from or be somewhat weakened by international actions, their continuation is dependent primarily on internal factors.

獨裁政權之所以可以存在,通常主要是因為它統治國家內 部的權力分配。民衆與社會太軟弱,以至於沒有能力讓獨裁政 權造成嚴重的問題,財富及權力集中在極少數人的手裡。雖然 獨裁政權有可能由於國際的行動而受益或者有些受損,但是它 們的維續主要取決於內部的因素。 International pressures can be very useful, however, when they are supporting a powerful internal resistance movement. Then, for example, international economic boycotts, embargoes, the breaking of diplomatic relations, expulsion from international organizations, condemnation by United Nations bodies, and the like can assist greatly. However, in the absence of a strong internal resistance movement such actions by others are unlikely to happen.

不過,當國際壓力支持強有力的國內抵抗運動時,可以是 很有幫助的。這時候,例如國際的經濟制裁、禁運、斷絕外交 關係、國際組織除名、聯合國機構的譴責等等類似的行動,可 以有很大的幫助。然而,沒有強大的國內抵抗運動,別人的這 類行動不太可能會發生。

## Facing the hard truth 面對殘酷的眞實

The conclusion is a hard one. When one wants to bring down a dictatorship most effectively and with the least cost then one has four immediate tasks:

結論是蠻殘酷的。要想最有效地及以最少代價推翻一個獨 裁政權的時候,就會有四個迫切的工作:

- One must strengthen the oppressed population themselves in their determination, self-confidence, and resistance skills;
- ■必須強化受壓迫民眾自己的決心、自信及抗爭的技能;
- One must strengthen the independent social groups

and institutions of the oppressed people ;

- ■必須強化受壓迫人民的獨立社會團體與機構;
- One must create a powerful internal resistance force; and
- ■必須建立一個強而有力的内部抵抗勢力;及
- One must develop a wise grand strategic plan for liberation and implement it skillfully.
- 必須爲爭取解放而制定一個睿智的總體大戰略,並且熟 練地加以實踐。

A liberation struggle is a time for sell-reliance and internal strengthening of the struggle group. As Charles Stewart Parnell called out during the Irish rent strike campaign in 1879 and 1880:

解放抗爭是一段自力更生而且需要從抗爭陣營內部增強力 量的時期。在1879年及1880年愛爾蘭的罷租運動期間,查爾斯 司都華帕那爾(Charles Stewart Parnell)曾經呼籲:

It is no use relying on the Government.... You must only rely upon your own determination.... (H) elp yourselves by standing together... strengthen those amongst yourselves who are weak..., band yourselves together, organize yourselves... and you must win....

依靠政府是沒有用的,…你們必須要靠自己的決心, ……團結一致才能互相幫助,…替你們當中軟弱的人增強 力量,…聯合起來,組織起來,……你們必定贏得勝利。 When you have made this question ripe for settlement, then and not till then will it be settled.<sup>4</sup>

當你們讓這個問題成熟到需要解決的時刻,也只有到了 這個時刻,問題才能得到解決<sup>4</sup>。

Against a strong self-reliant force, given wise strategy, disciplined and courageous action, and genuine strength, the dictatorship will eventually crumble. Minimally, however, the above four requirements must be fulfilled.

面對一個自力更生的堅強隊伍,加上有睿智的戰略、有紀 律而勇敢的行動及真正的力量,獨裁專制政權最終必然垮台。 不過,至少必須完成上述四項的必要條件。

As the above discussion indicates, liberation from dictatorships ultimately depends on the people's ability to liberate themselves. The cases of successful political defiance—or nonviolent struggle for political ends— cited above indicate that the means do exist for populations to free themselves, but that option has remained undeveloped. We will examine this option in detail in the following chapters. However, we should first look at the issue of negotiations as a means of dismantling dictatorships.

如同上述的討論所顯示的,要從獨裁政權下獲得解放,最

<sup>4</sup> Patrick Sarsfield O'Hegart, A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1880-1922 (London: Methuen, 1952), pp. 490-491.
培特里克薩斯菲爾德歐黑尬特(Patrick Sarsfield O'Hegart),「聯邦下愛爾蘭的歷史, 1880-1922年」,(倫敦:梅休因, 1952年),第490-491頁。

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關鍵的是取決於人民自己解放自己的能力。前面提到之政治反 抗一或者稱之為有政治目的的非暴力抗爭一的成功事例,在在 說明了人民爭取自由的方法的確是存在的,只是這個替代方案 還沒有得到充份的開發。在以下幾章裡面,我們將詳細地研究 這個替代方案。不過,我們應當先審視一下把談判當作瓦解獨 裁政權之一種手段的議題。

# THE DANGERS OF NEGOTIATIONS 談判的危險性

When faced with the severe problems of confronting a dictatorship (as surveyed in Chapter One), some people may lapse back into passive submission. Others, seeing no prospect of achieving democracy may conclude they must come to terms with the apparently permanent dictatorship, hoping that through "conciliation," "compromise." and "negotiations" they might be able to salvage some positive elements and to end the brutalities. On the surface, lacking realistic options, there is appeal in that line of thinking.

當面臨對抗獨裁政權之嚴重問題的時候(如同第一章裡所探 討的),有些人可能會退縮到消極的屈服。另一些人因為看不到 實現民主的前途,可能會做結論說,他們必須接受形式上看起 來是永久獨裁政權的這個現實,同時希望透過「和解」、「妥 協」與「談判」,他們也許能夠保護某些正面的要素並且終結 暴政。表面上,因爲缺乏實際可行的替代方案,這種想法是有 一些吸引力。

Serious struggle against brutal dictatorships is not a pleasant prospect. Why is it necessary to go that route? Can't everyone just be reasonable and find ways to talk, to negotiate the way to a gradual end to the dictatorship? Can't the democrats appeal to the dictators' sense of common

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humanity and convince them to reduce their domination bit by bit, and perhaps finally to give way completely to the establishment of a democracy?

反對殘暴獨裁政權的嚴肅抗爭並不是一件令人愉快的前 景。爲什麼需要走這一條路呢?難道大家不能講道理、想辦法 對話、談判出一條逐步終結獨裁政權的途徑嗎?難道民主陣營 不能向獨裁者訴諸個人對一般人性的情感,並且說服他們一點 一滴地減少他們的宰制,而最終也許可以完全讓位而建立一個 民主社會嗎?

It is sometimes argued that the truth is not all on one side. Perhaps the democrats have misunderstood the dictators, who may have acted from good motives in difficult circumstances? Or perhaps some may think, the dictators would gladly remove themselves from the difficult situation facing the country if only given some encouragement and enticements. It may be argued that the dictators could be offered a "win-win" solution, in which everyone gains something.

有時候有人這樣主張:眞理不會都是在某一邊。也許民 主人士將獨裁者誤解爲他們有可能是在困難的條件下出於善意 而採取行動?也許有人可能會這麼想,只要給予一些鼓勵與誘 因,獨裁者就會很高興地從國家所面臨的困境中自己退讓出 來。可能有人主張說:可以向獨裁者提出一個「雙贏」的解決 辦法,讓每一方都得到一點好處。

The risks and pain of further struggle could be

unnecessary, it may be argued, if the democratic opposition is only willing to settle the conflict peacefully by negotiations (which may even perhaps be assisted by some skilled individuals or even another government). Would that not be preferable to a difficult struggle, even if it is one conducted by nonviolent struggle rather than by military war?

也可能有人主張說:只要民主反對陣營肯透過談判和平地 解決衝突(可以在某些老練的個人或者甚至是另一個政府的幫助 下進行),就沒有必要繼續承擔抗爭所帶來的風險與痛苦。即使 是非暴力的抗爭而不是軍事戰爭,難道談判不會比艱苦的抗爭 更好嗎?

### Merits and limitations of negotiations 談判的優點與侷限性

Negotiations are a very useful tool in resolving certain types of issues in conflicts and should not be neglected or rejected when they are appropriate.

要解決衝突中某些特定的議題,談判是一個非常有用的工 具。適當的時候,不應該加以忽視或拒絕談判。

In some situations where no fundamental issues are at stake, and therefore a compromise is acceptable, negotiations can be an important means to settle a conflict. A labor strike for higher wages is a good example of the appropriate role of negotiations in a conflict; a negotiated settlement may provide an increase somewhere between the sums originally proposed by each of the contending sides.

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Labor conflicts with legal trade unions are, however, quite different than the conflicts in which the continued existence of a cruel dictatorship or the establishment of political freedom are at stake.

在某些情況,並沒有根本性的議題,因此妥協是可以接受 的,談判是可以解決衝突的一個重要手段。為爭取提高工資而 進行的罷工,是談判在解決衝突中扮演恰當角色的一個很好例 子,談判取得的和解可能提供介於爭議雙方原來提議的數字之 間的某個工資增加額。不過,合法工會發生的勞資衝突,與面 臨殘暴獨裁政權之繼續存在或者是建立政治自由的衝突,有很 大的不同。

When the issues at stake are fundamental, affecting religious principles, issues of human freedom, or the whole future development of the society, negotiations do not provide a way of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. On some basic issues there should be no compromise. Only a shift in power relations in favor of the democrats can adequately safeguard the basic issues at stake. Such a shift will occur through struggle, not negotiations. This is not to say that negotiations ought never to be used. The point here is that negotiations are not a realistic way to remove a strong dictatorship in the absence of a powerful democratic opposition.

當涉及的議題是根本的議題、影響到宗教信仰、人類自由 的議題或者是整個社會未來的發展問題,談判就不會是一個可 以提供達到雙方互相滿意之答案的方法。對於某些基本議題,

不應該有所妥協。只有權力關係之改變有利於民主陣營的時候,才能充份地捍衛那些所面對的根本性議題。這種改變只能透過抗爭才能達到,而不是談判。這並不是說絕對不應當使用談判。這裡要指出的是,缺乏一個有力的民主反對運動,而要推翻一個強大的獨裁政權,談判是不切實際的。

Negotiations, of course, may not be an option at all. Firmly entrenched dictators who feel secure in their position may refuse to negotiate with their democratic opponents. Or, when negotiations have been initiated, the democratic negotiators may disappear and never be heard from again.

當然,談判有可能根本就行不通。根深蒂固的獨裁者,感 到自己地位牢固,可能拒絕跟民主陣營的對手進行談判。也有 可能,在談判開始以後,民主陣營的談判者會失蹤,從此下落 不明。

# Negotiated surrender? 談判而投降嗎?

Individuals and groups who oppose dictatorship and favor negotiations will often have good motives. Especially when a military struggle has continued for years against a brutal dictatorship without final victory, it is understandable that all the people of whatever political persuasion would want peace.

反對獨裁者而贊成談判的個人及團體往往出於善意。尤其 是歷經長年累月對抗殘暴獨裁政權進行軍事武裝抗爭而無法贏 得最後勝利的時候,所有人民不論政治見解如何,都會想要和 平,這是可以理解的。

Negotiations are especially likely to become an issue among democrats where the dictators have clear military superiority and the destruction and casualties among one's own people are no longer bearable. There will then be a strong temptation to explore any other route that might salvage some of the democrats' objectives while bringing an end to the cycle of violence and counter-violence.

當獨裁者具有明顯的軍事優勢,而且民主陣營自己人民遭 受到的摧毀與傷亡又達到無法忍受之地步的時候,談判的手段 特別有可能變成民主陣營內部的議題。這時候就會有很強的誘 惑去探尋任何其他途徑,以挽救民主陣營的某些目標,同時又 可以終結暴力與反制暴力的輪迴。

The offer by a dictatorship of peace through negotiations with the democratic opposition is, of course, rather disingenuous. The violence could be ended immediately by the dictators themselves, if only they would stop waging war on their own people. They could at their own initiative without any bargaining restore respect for human dignity and rights, free political prisoners, end torture, halt military operations, withdraw from the government, and apologize to the people.

獨裁政權向民主反對陣營提出談判謀和的建議,當然是相 當狡猾而不真誠的。獨裁者只要停止對自己的人民發動戰爭, 自己就能立即將暴力結束。他們不需要任何討價還價就可以自 己主動,恢復對人性尊嚴與權利的尊重、釋放政治犯、停止刑

求。終止軍事行動,退出政府、並且向人民道歉。

When the dictatorship is strong but an irritating resistance exists, the dictators may wish to negotiate the opposition into surrender under the guise of making "peace". The call to negotiate can sound appealing, but grave dangers can be lurking within the negotiating room.

當獨裁政權強大卻存在著一個惹他們討厭之抵抗運動的時 候,獨裁者有可能希望在「和平」的幌子底下透過談判來誘使 反對陣營投降。談判的呼籲聽起來很有吸引力,但在談判室裡 可能暗藏著嚴重的危險。

On the other hand, when the opposition is exceptionally strong and the dictatorship is genuinely threatened, the dictators may seek negotiations in order to salvage as much of their control or wealth as possible. In neither case should the democrats help the dictators achieve their goals.

另一方面,當反對陣營特別強大,而獨裁政權真實地感受 到威脅的時候,獨裁者可能尋求談判以儘可能挽救他們更多的 權力控制與財富。不論是哪一種情況,民主陣營都不應當幫助 獨裁者達到他們的目的。

Democrats should be wary of the traps that may be deliberately built into a negotiation process by the dictators. The call for negotiations when basic issues of political liberties are involved may be an effort by the dictators to induce the democrats to surrender peacefully while the

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violence of the dictatorship continues. In those types of conflicts the only proper role of negotiations may occur at the end of a decisive struggle in which the power of the dictators has been effectively destroyed and they seek personal safe passage to an international airport.

民主陣營必須注意獨裁者在談判過程中故意設置的圈套。 在涉及政治自由之基本議題的時候,談判的呼籲可能是獨裁者 企圖誘使民主陣營和平地投降、而讓獨裁政權的暴力可以維續 下去的努力。在這些類型的衝突裡,談判唯一適當的角色,可 能發生在決定性之抗爭要結束的時候,這個時候獨裁者的權力 已經實質上被摧毀,而且他們想要拿到的是自己通往國際機場 的安全通行證。

### Power and justice in negotiations 談判裡的力量與正義

If this judgment sounds too harsh a commentary on negotiations, perhaps some of the romanticism associated with them needs to be moderated. Clear thinking is required as to how negotiations operate.

如果說上述對談判的評斷聽起來過於嚴酷,那麼也許需要 對伴隨談判的某些浪漫主義可以穩健一點。要了解談判是如何 進行就必需要有清晰的思考。

"Negotiation" does not mean that the two sides sit down together on a basis of equality and talk through and resolve the differences that produced the conflict between them. Two facts must be remembered. First, in negotiations it is not the

relative justice of the conflicting views and objectives that determines the content of a negotiated agreement. Second, the content of a negotiated agreement is largely determined by the power capacity of each side.

「談判」並不表示雙方是以平等的基礎坐在一起,透過 交談並解決造成他們之間衝突的那些差異。有兩個事實必須記 住。首先,在談判裡決定談判要達成之協議內容的,不是造成 衝突之各種觀點與目標之間的相對正義性。其次,談判所達成 的協議內容在很大程度上取決於雙方各自的權力能量。

Several difficult questions must be considered. What can each side do at a later date to gain its objectives if the other side fails to come to an agreement at the negotiating table? What can each side do after an agreement is reached if the other side breaks its word and uses its available forces to seize its objectives despite the agreement?

必須考慮許多困難的問題。如果一方不能在談判桌上達成 協議,雙方從今以後爲達到其目的各自能做些什麼?達成協議 以後,如果一方不守信用,不顧協議而利用它所擁有的力量掌 握它的目標,雙方各自能做些什麼?

A settlement is not reached in negotiations through an assessment of the rights and wrongs of the issues at stake. While those may be much discussed, the real results in negotiations come from an assessment of the absolute and relative power situations of the contending groups. What can the democrats do to ensure that their minimum claims cannot

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be denied? What can the dictators do to stay in control and neutralize the democrats? In other words, if an agreement comes, it is more likely the result of each side estimating how the power capacities of the two sides compare, and then calculating how an open struggle might end.

在談判中評估所涉及之議題的對或錯,是不會達成和解 的。儘管這些議題可能被討論得很多,談判的真正結果是來自 評估參與陣營之絕對與相對權力的情勢狀況。民主陣營能做些 什麼以保證自己的最低訴求聲明不會被拒絕?獨裁者為了保持 控制及中立化民主陣營,會做些什麼?換句話說,如果達成協 議,這個協議更有可能是雙方各自估計雙方權力能量的比較, 然後計算公開的抗爭會如何結束,而得到的結果。

Attention must also be given to what each side is willing to give up in order to reach agreement. In successful negotiations there is compromise, a splitting of differences. Each side gets part of what it wants and gives up part of its objectives.

還必須注意,爲了達成協議雙方各自願意放棄些什麼。成 功的談判裡總是會有妥協,同中存異。雙方各自得到自己所要 的一部分,而且放棄一部分的目標。

In the case of extreme dictatorships what are the prodemocracy forces to give up to the dictators? What objectives of the dictators are the pro-democracy forces to accept? Are the democrats to give to the dictators (whether a political party or a military cabal) a constitutionally-established permanent role in the future government? Where is the democracy in that?

對於極端獨裁政權來說,支持民主的勢力可以向獨裁者放 棄什麼呢?民主勢力可以接受獨裁者的哪些目標呢?民主陣營 是否要在未來的政府裡給獨裁者(不論是一個政黨或者是軍事小 集團)一個由憲法保障的永久角色呢?那還有民主嗎?

Even assuming that all goes well in negotiations, it is necessary to ask: What kind of peace will be the result? Will life then be better or worse than it would be if the democrats began or continued to struggle?

即使假設在談判裡一切都順利,仍然有必要提問:結果會 是什麼樣的和平?協議之後的日子會比民主陣營開始或繼續抗 爭還要好或是還是壞?

### "Agreeable" dictators 「可以被接受」的獨裁者

Dictators may have a variety of motives and objectives underlying their domination: power, position, wealth, reshaping the society, and the like. One should remember that none of these will be served if they abandon their control positions. In the event of negotiations dictators will try to preserve their goals.

獨裁者他們的統治之下,可能有各種動機與目標:權力、 地位、財富、改造社會等等。要記住,如果他們放棄他們的統 治地位,這些目標一個也實現不了。如果要談判的話,這些獨 裁者會力圖保存他們的目標。
Whatever promises offered by dictators in any negotiated settlement, no one should ever forget that the dictators may promise anything to secure submission from their democratic opponents, and then brazenly violate those same agreements.

無論獨裁者在談判達成的和解中提出任何保證,千萬不能 忘記,獨裁者可以爲了確保得到他們之民主陣營對手的屈服, 可以做出任何承諾,然後毫無忌憚地違反這些協議。

If the democrats agree to halt resistance in order to gain a reprieve from repression, they may be very disappointed. A halt to resistance rarely brings reduced repression. Once the restraining force of internal and international opposition has been removed, dictators may even make their oppression and violence more brutal than before. The collapse of popular resistance often removes the countervailing force that has limited the control and brutality of the dictatorship. The tyrants can then move ahead against whomever they wish. "For the tyrant has the power to inflict only that which we lack the strength to resist" wrote Krishnalal Shridharani.<sup>1</sup>

如果民主陣營同意為了暫緩受到鎭壓而停止抵抗,他們 可能會很失望。停止抵抗很少會帶來鎭壓的減輕。一旦國內及

 Krishnalal Shridharani, War Without Violence: A Study d Gandhi's Method and Its Accomplishments (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. and reprint New York and London: Garland Publishing. 1972), p.260.

克里希納拉爾奚里哈蘭尼(Krishnalal Shridharani),「沒有暴力的戰爭:甘地方法及其成就的研究」,(紐約:哈克爾特,布蕾斯,1939年:紐約、倫敦:葛蘭德出版社重新出版,1972年),第260頁。

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國際的嚇阻力量解除了,獨裁者的暴力與鎮壓可能比以前更殘 暴。群衆抵抗運動的瓦解,往往解除了原來限制獨裁政權之控 制與暴行的抗衡力量。暴君就能橫衝直撞、為所欲為。克里希 納拉爾奚里哈蘭尼(Krishnalal Shridharani)寫到:「因為暴君有 能力只在我們無力抵抗之處施加壓力<sup>1</sup>。」

Resistance, not negotiations, is essential for change in conflicts where fundamental issues are at stake. In nearly all cases, resistance must continue to drive dictators out of power. Success is most often determined not by negotiating a settlement but through the wise use of the most appropriate and powerful means of resistance available. It is our contention, to be explored later in more detail, that political defiance, or nonviolent struggle, is the most powerful means available to those struggling for freedom.

在涉及根本性議題的衝突當中,抵抗運動,而不是談判, 對要求改變是重要的。幾乎在所有的情況下,抵抗運動必須持 續下去,才能打倒獨裁者。成功最經常是透過睿智地使用現有 之最恰當及最有力的抗爭手段來完成,而不是取決於談判來達 成協議。我們要論述的是,政治反抗,或稱爲非暴力抗爭,是 人們爲自由而抗爭所擁有之最強而有力的手段,這一點在下文 將更詳細探討。

What kind of peace? 什麼樣的和平?

If dictators and democrats are to talk about peace at all, extremely clear thinking is needed because of the dangers involved. Not everyone who uses the word "peace" wants peace with freedom and justice. Submission to cruel oppression and passive acquiescence to ruthless dictators who have perpetrated atrocities on hundreds of thousands of people is no real peace. Hitler often called for peace, by which he meant submission to his will. A dictators' peace is often no more than the peace of the prison or of the grave.

如果獨裁者與民主陣營一定要討論和平的話,因爲涉及的 危險,必須要有極清醒的思維。不是每一個使用「和平」這個 詞的人要的是具有自由與正義的和平。屈服於殘暴鎭壓並且以 消極默認對待向成千上萬之人民犯下暴行的無情獨裁者,不是 眞正的和平。希特勒經常呼籲和平,他的意思是屈服於他的意 志。這些獨裁者的和平往往就是監獄或者墳墓裡的和平。

There are other dangers. Well-intended negotiators sometimes confuse the objectives of the negotiations and the negotiation process itself. Further, democratic negotiators, or foreign negotiation specialists accepted to assist in the negotiations, may in a single stroke provide the dictators with the domestic and international legitimacy that they had been previously denied because of their seizure of the state, human rights violations, and brutalities. Without that desperately needed legitimacy, the dictators cannot continue to rule indefinitely. Exponents of peace should not provide them legitimacy.

還有其他的危險。有些善意的談判者有時將談判的目的與談判過程本身混淆了。甚至,民主陣營的談判代表、或受命協

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助談判的外國談判專家,可能大筆一揮就給獨裁者提供了由於 他們霸佔國家政權、侵犯人權及實施暴行而喪失之國內與國際 的合法性。缺少了那個迫切需要的合法性,獨裁者不能毫無止 盡地統治下去。和平的鼓吹者不應該給他們提供合法性。

## Reasons for hope 有希望的理由

As stated earlier, opposition leaders may feel forced to pursue negotiations out of a sense of hopelessness of the democratic struggle. However, that sense of powerlessness can be changed. Dictatorships are not permanent. People living under dictatorships need not remain weak, and dictators need not be allowed to remain powerful indefinitely. Aristotle noted long ago"... [O] ligarchy and tyranny are shorter-lived than any other constitution. . . [A]II round, tyrannies have not lasted long."<sup>2</sup> Modern dictatorships are also vulnerable. Their weaknesses can be aggravated and the dictators' power can be disintegrated. (In Chapter Four we will examine these weaknesses in more detail.)

如前所述,抵抗運動的領導者可能出於對民主抗爭感到沒 有希望而覺得不得不尋求談判。不過,那種無能爲力的感覺是 可以改變的。獨裁政權不會是永久的。生活在獨裁政權底下的 人們不必保持軟弱,也不必讓獨裁者無限期地保持強而有力。

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, The Politics, transl. by T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England and Baltimore Maryland: Penguin Books 1976 [1962]), Book V, Chapter 12, pp. 231 and 232. 亞里士多德著,《政治學》,辛克雷(T. A. Sinclair)譯,(哈蒙茲渥斯,米德勒斯克、英 國及巴爾提摩、馬里蘭,企鵝書局)第5卷第12章,第231頁及第232頁。

亞里士多德很久以前就指出,「……一切政體中最短命的就是 寡頭政體與暴君體制了。……整體來看,暴君都無法維持長 久<sup>2</sup>。」現代的獨裁政權也是脆弱的。它們的弱點是可以擴大 的,而這些獨裁者的權力是可以瓦解的。(我們將在第四章裡更 詳細探討這些弱點)。

Recent history shows the vulnerability of dictatorship, and reveals that they can crumble in a relatively short time span: whereas ten years-1980-1990-were required to bring down the Communist dictatorship in Poland, in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1989 it occurred within weeks. In El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944 the struggles against the entrenched brutal military dictators required approximately two weeks each. The militarily powerful regime of the Shah in Iran was undermined in a few months. The Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines fell before people power within weeks in 1986: the United States government quickly abandoned President Marcos when the strength of the opposition became apparent. The attempted hard-line coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 was blocked in days by political defiance. Thereafter, many of its long dominated constituent nations in only days, weeks, and months regained their independence.

從近代歷史可以看出獨裁政權的脆弱性,並且揭露出它 們能在相對較短的時間裡衰敗:波蘭在十年的時間裡—1980-1990年,使共產黨獨裁政權倒台了,在東德與捷克斯洛伐克, 於1989年的幾個星期裡就發生了。1944年在薩爾瓦多及瓜地 馬拉,反對牢固之殘暴軍事獨裁者的抗爭各自花了大約兩個 星期。伊朗國王夏(Shah)的軍事強大政權在幾個月裡就被顛覆 了。1986年,菲律賓的馬可仕(Marcos)獨裁政權面對人民力量 在幾個星期之內就垮台了:當反對陣營的力量變得很明顯時, 美國政府很快地就拋棄了馬可仕總統。1991年8月蘇聯強硬派 企圖發動政變,幾天內就被政治反抗所阻斷了。之後,長期受 其統治的許多成員國家在幾天、幾週與幾個月裡紛紛重新獲得 獨立。

The old preconception that violent means always work quickly and nonviolent means always require vast time is clearly not valid. Although much time may be required for changes in the underlying situation and society, the actual fight against a dictatorship sometimes occurs relatively quickly by nonviolent struggle.

古老的成見認為,暴力手段總是可以很快地達到效果,而 非暴力手段總是需要花很長的時間,這個成見顯然不會成立。 雖然維繫情勢與社會的改變可能需要許多時間,以非暴力反抗 獨裁政權的實際戰鬥有時候相對地發生得相當快。

Negotiations are not the only alternative to a continuing war of annihilation on the one hand and capitulation on the other. The examples just cited, as well as those listed in Chapter One, illustrate that another option exists for those who want both peace and freedom: political defiance.

在一端是持久的殲滅戰與另一端是投降的兩者之間,該判 不是唯一的選擇。上面剛介紹的,以及第一章裡列出的例子,

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說明對於既要和平又要自由的人們,存在著另一個替代方案: 政治反抗。

### WHENCE COMES THE POWER? 權力從哪裡來?

Achieving a society with both freedom and peace is of course no simple task. It will require great strategic skill, organization, and planning. Above all, it will require power. Democrats cannot hope to bring down a dictatorship and establish political freedom without the ability to apply their own power effectively.

要實現一個既有自由又有和平的社會,當然不是一個簡單的任務。它需要宏大的戰略技巧、組織與規劃。首先,它需要 權力。如果民主陣營不能有效地運用自己的權力,就不能指望 可以打倒獨裁政權而建立政治的自由。

But how is this possible? What kind of power can the democratic opposition mobilize that will be sufficient to destroy the dictatorship and its vast military and police networks? The answers lie in an oft ignored understanding of political power. Learning this insight is not really so difficult a task. Some basic truths are quite simple.

但是這種情形要如何做才有可能呢?民主反對陣營可以動 員哪些權力,才足以摧毀獨裁政權及其龐大的軍事與警察網絡 呢?問題的解答存在於過去經常沒有受到重視之對政治權力的 理解當中。學習認知到這種深度見解實際上並不困難。有些基 本的真理其實是很簡單的。

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The "Monkey Master" fable 「狙公」的寓言

A Fourteenth Century Chinese parable by Liu-Ji, for example, outlines this neglected understanding of political power quite well.<sup>1</sup>

例如,十四世紀中國的劉基寫了一篇寓言,相當高明地大 體描述了被人忽視的對政治權力的理解<sup>1</sup>。

In the feudal state of Chu an old man survived by keeping monkeys in his service. The people of Chu called him "ju gong" (monkey master).

在楚國,有一位老人以養猴(狙)驅使為生。楚人稱他為狙 公(猴子的主人)。

Each morning, the old man would assemble the monkeys in his courtyard, and order the eldest one to lead the others

<sup>1</sup> This story, originally titled "Rule by Tricks" is from Yu-li-zi by Liu Ii (1311 -1375) and has been translated by Sidney Tai, all rights reserved. Yu-li-zi is also the pseudonym of Liu Ji. The translation was originally published in Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein Institution (Cambridge, Mass.), Vol. IV, No. 3 (Winter 1992-1993), p. 3.

此故事原名「權謀統治」,取自劉基(1311-1375)所著的《郁離子》。戴西尼(Sidney Tai) 翻譯,版權所有。郁離子也是劉基的化名。英文譯本原載於「非暴力制裁:亞爾伯特愛 因斯坦研究院報導」,(劍橋,麻州),第四冊,第3集,(1992-1993冬季),第3頁。 直言譯者註:劉基,元末明初政論家、文學家,字伯溫。〈楚人養狙〉原文如下:「楚 有養狙以為生者,楚人謂之狙公。旦日,必部分衆狙於庭,使老狙率以之山中,求草 木之實,賦什一以自奉。或不給,則加鞭棰焉。群狙皆畏苦之,弗敢違也。一日,有 小狙謂衆狙曰:『山之果,公所樹與?』曰:『否也,天生也。』曰:『非公不得而取 與?』曰:『否也,皆得而取也。曰:『然則吾何假於彼而為之役乎?』言未既,衆狙 皆寤。其夕,相與伺狙公之寢,破柵毀柙,取其積,相攜而入於林中,不復歸。狙公卒 餒而死。郁離子曰,『世有以術使民而無道揆者,其如狙公乎?惟其昏而未覺也:一旦 有開之,其術窮矣。』」

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to the mountains to gather fruits from bushes and trees. It was the rule that each monkey had to give one-tenth of his collection to the old man. Those who failed to do so would be ruthlessly flogged. All the monkeys suffered bitterly but dared not complain.

每天早晨,老人把猴子集合在庭院裡,命令最年長的猴子 帶領其他的猴子到山裡從灌木與樹上採集果實。他規定,每個 猴子必須以其所獲的十分之一交給他。如果不依照規定繳納, 就要受到嚴厲的鞭打。衆猴子受到壓迫而備感痛苦,但是卻不 敢抗議。

One day, a small monkey asked the other monkeys: "Did the old man plant all the fruit trees and bushes?" The others said : "No, they grew naturally." The small monkey further asked: "Can't we take the fruits without the old man's permission?" The others replied: "Yes, we all can." The small monkey continued: "Then, why should we depend on the old man; why must we all serve him?"

有一天,一隻小猴子問其他的猴子說:「果樹與灌木是 老人種的嗎?」衆猴子說:「不是,它們是天生的。」這隻小 猴子再問:「未經老頭同意,我們不能摘取果子嗎?」衆猴子 回答說:「可以,我們都可以摘取。」小猴子接著說:「既 然如此,那我們為什麼還要依靠老人;我們為什麼必須為他服 務?」

Before the small monkey was able to finish his statement, all the monkeys suddenly became enlightened

and awakened.

這隻小猴子的話還沒說完,衆猴猛然領悟,並且覺醒了。

On the same night, watching that the old man had fallen asleep, the monkeys tore down all the barricades of the stockade in which they were confined, and destroyed the stockade entirely. They also took the fruits the old man had in storage, brought all with them to the woods, and never returned. The old man finally died of starvation.

當晚,看到老人已經熟睡了,衆猴群破壞了監禁它們之 柵欄的障礙物,並且將柵欄完全拆毀。他們吃了老人儲存的水 果,把剩下的全部帶走而且逃進山林,不再回來。這個老人終 於飢餓而死。

Yu-li-zi says, "Some men in the world rule their people by tricks and not by righteous principles. Aren't they just like the monkey master? They are not aware of their muddleheadedness. As soon as their people become enlightened, their tricks no longer work."

郁離子說:「有些人靠計謀而不是按照正當的原則來統治 人民,他們不是正像狙公一樣嗎?他們昏庸而不自覺。一旦老 百姓覺悟了,他們的計謀就不會再靈光了。」

### Necessary sources of political power 政治權力的必要來源

The principle is simple. Dictators require the assistance of the people they rule, without which they cannot secure and maintain the sources of political power. These sources of political power include:

原理很簡單。獨裁者需要得到受他們統治之人民的協助, 沒有這種協助,他們無法獲得及維持政治權力的源泉。政治權 力的源泉包括:

- Authority, the belief among the people that the regime is legitimate, and that they have a moral duty to obey it;
- 權威性。人民之間的一種信念,認為政權是合法的,而
   且他們自己有道義上的責任服從這個政權;
- Human resource, the number and importance of the persons and groups which are obeying, cooperating, or providing assistance to the rulers;
- 人力資源。向統治者服從、合作、提供協助之人們與團 體的數量與重要性;
- Skills and knowledge, needed by the regime to perform specific actions and supplied by the cooperating persons and groups;
- 技能與知識。統治政權為了執行特定施政所需要的、而 由與統治者合作之人們與團體所提供的技能與知識;
- Intangible factors, psychological and ideological factors that may induce people to obey and assist the rulers;
- 無形因素。可能誘使人們服從與協助統治者之心理上與 意識形態上的因素;
- Material resources, the degree to which the rulers control or have access to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, and means

of communication and transportation; and

- 物質資源。統治者對於財產、自然資源、財務資源、經 濟體系、以及通訊與運輸等管道的控制或掌握程度;及
- Sanctions, punishments, threatened or applied, against the disobedient and noncooperative to ensure the submission and cooperation that are needed for the regime to exist and carry out its policies.
- 制裁。為了政權能夠存在及其政策能夠貫徹,必須以威 脅使用或實際使用懲罰、確保可以迫使那些不服從與不 合作的人們屈服與合作。

All of these sources, however, depend on acceptance of the regime, on the submission and obedience of the population, and on the cooperation of innumerable people and the many institutions of the society. These are not guaranteed.

不過,所有這些來源,有賴於人們對這個政權的接受,有 賴於人們的屈服與合作,有賴於無數人們及社會上許多機構的 合作。而這些條件並不保證都是不變的。

Full cooperation, obedience, and support will increase the availability of the needed sources of power and, consequently, expand the power capacity of any government.

完全的合作、服從與支持,會增加所需要之權力來源的供給,從而擴大任何政府的權力能量。

On the other hand, withdrawal of popular and institutional

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cooperation with aggressors and dictators diminishes, and may sever, the availability of the sources of power on which all rulers depend. Without availability of those sources, the rulers' power weakens and finally dissolves.

另一方面,公衆與社團撤回對侵略者與獨裁者的合作,可 以減少、甚至可能切斷所有統治者所依賴之權力來源的供應。 沒有這些來源可以使用,統治者的權力就會減弱,最後會完全 消散。

Naturally, dictators are sensitive to actions and ideas that threaten their capacity to do as they like. Dictators are therefore likely to threaten and punish those who disobey, strike, or fail to cooperate. However, that is not the end of the story. Repression, even brutalities, do not always produce a resumption of the necessary degree of submission and cooperation for the regime to function.

當然,獨裁者對於威脅他們為所欲為之能力的任何行動 與理念,是很敏感的。因此,獨裁者很可能會威脅與懲罰那些 不服從的、罷工的或者不合作的人們。不過,事情不是到此為 止。鎮壓、甚至暴行,並不總是可以讓屈服與合作恢復到使統 治集團能夠運作所需要之權力的那種程度。

If, despite repression, the sources of power can be restricted or severed for enough time, the initial results may be uncertainty and confusion within the dictatorship. That is likely to be followed by a clear weakening of the power of the dictatorship. Over time, the withholding of the sources of power can produce the paralysis and impotence of the regime, and in severe cases, its disintegration. The dictators' power will die, slowly or rapidly from political starvation.

即使有鎖壓,如果能夠讓權力的來源有一段足夠長的時 間受到限制或中斷,初步的成果可能是獨裁政權產生內部的不 穩定與心理混亂。隨後很可能會發生,獨裁政權的權力明顯地 減弱。假以時日,拒絕提供權力來源就能夠讓執政當局癱瘓而 無能爲力,在嚴重的情況下,會使它瓦解。由於政治權力的飢 餓,或快或慢,獨裁者的權力就會滅亡。

The degree of liberty or tyranny in any government is, it follows, in large degree a reflection of the relative determination of the subjects to be free and their willingness and ability to resist efforts to enslave them.

由此可見,任何政府之自由或者專制的程度,在很大程度 上反映了被統治者爭取自由的相對決心,以及他們對奴役他們 之工作進行抵抗的意志力與能力。

Contrary to popular opinion, even totalitarian dictatorships are dependent on the population and the societies they rule. As the political scientist Karl W. Deutsch noted in 1953:

與一般的想法相反的,即使是極權主義的獨裁政權,也要 依靠它們所統治的民衆與社會。政治學家卡爾德意契(Karl W. Deutsch)在 1953 年指出:

Totalitarian power is strong only if it does not have to

be used too often. If totalitarian power must be used at all times against the entire population, it is unlikely to remain powerful for long. Since totalitarian regimes require more power for dealing with their subjects than do other types of government, such regimes stand in greater need of widespread and dependable compliance habits among their people; more than that they have to be able to count on the active support of at least significant parts of the population in case of need.<sup>2</sup>

極權主義者的權力會強大,只有在不需要太頻繁使用它 的時候才是強大的。如果隨時都需要使用極權主義的權力 來對付民眾,它不大可能長久保持強大。因為極權主義政 權比其他形式之政府需要用更大的力量來對付被統治者, 這些政權就更需要它們人民廣泛而可靠的服從習慣;不僅 如此,遇到困難的時候,它們還必須依靠至少主要部分人 們的積極支持<sup>2</sup>。

The English Nineteenth Century legal theorist John Austin described the situation of a dictatorship confronting a disaffected people. Austin argued that if most of the population were determined to destroy the government and were willing to endure repression to do so, then the might of the government, including those who supported it, could not

<sup>2</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 313-314. 卡爾德意契(Karl W. Deutsch),「巨石的崩裂」,卡爾佛列德利奇(Carl J. Friedrich)編 輯,「極權主義體制」,(劍橋,麻州:哈佛大學出版社,1954年),第313至314頁。

preserve the hated government, even if it received foreign assistance. The defiant people could not be forced back into permanent obedience and subjection, Austin concluded.<sup>3</sup>

十九世紀英國法學理論家約翰奧斯汀(John Austin)描述了 獨裁統治面對不滿之人民的情況。他申論說,如果大多數的民 衆下定決心打倒政府並且願意為此而承擔鎭壓,那麼政府的威 力,包括那些支持它的人,即使政府得到外國的支援,不可能 維持得住這個令人憎恨的政府。奧斯汀得到的結論是,反抗的 人民不可能被強迫退回到永久的服從與接受統治<sup>3</sup>。

Niccolo Machiavelli had much earlier argued that the prince "... who has the public as a whole for his enemy can never make himself secure; and the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become."<sup>4</sup>

尼科洛馬基維利(Niccolo Machiavelli)比這更早就申論說, 國君「…以人民全體爲敵則永遠無法讓自己安心,而且他越是 出手殘暴,他的政權就變得越是脆弱<sup>4</sup>。」

<sup>3</sup> John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (Fifth edition, revised and edited by Robert Campbell, 2 vol., London: John Murray 1911 [1861]), Vol. I, p. 296.

約翰奧斯汀(John Austin),「正面法律之管轄理念或哲學講義」,(第五版,羅伯特勘貝爾Robert Campbell改版與編輯,第2冊,倫敦,約翰莫雷出版社,1911年〔1861年〕), 第一冊,第296頁。

<sup>4</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy" in The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), Vol. I, p.254. 尼科洛馬基維利(Niccolo Machiavelli)著,「解讀李維(Livy)的第一部十本書」,於「解 讀尼科洛馬基維利」(倫敦,路特雷機與開甘保羅,1950年),第一冊,第254頁。 譯註,馬基維利著,呂健忠譯,《李維羅馬史疏義》,新店:左岸文化,2003 年 4 月,卷1,頁48。

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The practical political application of these insights was demonstrated by the heroic Norwegian resisters against the Nazi occupation, and as cited in Chapter One, by the brave Poles, Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, and many others who resisted Communist aggression and dictatorship, and finally helped produce the collapse of Communist rule in Europe. This, of course, is no new phenomenon: cases of nonviolent resistance go back at least to 494 B.C. when plebeians withdrew cooperation from their Roman patrician masters.<sup>5</sup> Nonviolent struggle has been employed at various times by peoples throughout Asia, Africa, the Americas, Australasia, and the Pacific islands, as well as Europe.

這些深度見解在政治上的實際應用,展示在英勇之挪威反 抗納粹佔領的抵抗者身上,及如第一章裡所提到的,抵抗共產 黨員入侵與獨裁政權、並且最終促使共產黨在歐洲統治崩潰之 勇敢的波蘭人、德國人、捷克人、斯洛伐克人以及其他許多人 民的身上。當然,這不是一個新的現象:非暴力抗爭的例子至 少可以追溯到紀元前494 年,那時羅馬的平民撤回與他們之貴 族主人<sup>5</sup>的合作。在不同時期,亞洲、非洲、美洲、澳洲、太平 洋諸島嶼以及歐洲的人民都曾經使用過非暴力抗爭。

Three of the most important factors in determining to what degree a government's power will be controlled or

<sup>5</sup> See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), p. 75 and passim for other historical examples.
參閱吉恩夏普著,「非暴力行動的政治」(波士頓,波特薩金斯出版社, 1973年),第75 頁及各處有其他歷史實例。

uncontrolled therefore are: (1) the relative *desire* of the populace to impose limits on the governments power; (2) the relative *strength* of the subjects' independent organizations and institutions to withdraw collectively the sources of power; and (3) the population's relative *ability* to withhold their consent and assistance.

因此,決定一個政府的權力受到控制或是不受到控制之程 度的三個最重要因素是:(1) 民衆限制政府權力的相對意願;(2) 被統治者之獨立組織與機構集體撤回權力來源的相對力量;及 (3) 民衆保留他們認同與支持的相對能力。

### Centers of democratic power 民主權力的中心

One characteristic of a democratic society is that there exist independent of the state a multitude of nongovernmental groups and institutions. These include, for example, families, religious organizations, cultural associations, sports clubs, economic institutions, trade unions, student associations, political parties, villages, neighborhood associations, gardening clubs, human rights organizations, musical groups, literary societies, and others. These bodies are important in serving their own objectives and also in helping to meet social needs.

民主社會的特徵之一,就是會有許多非政府之團體與機構 獨立於國家之外。這些包括諸如家庭、宗教組織、文化協會、 體育俱樂部、經濟機構、職業工會、學生會、政黨、鄉里、村 鄰協會、園藝俱樂部、人權組織、音樂團體、文學學會等等。 這些團體為本身的目的服務,並且也幫助滿足社會的需求。

Additionally these bodies have great political significance. They provide group and institutional bases by which people can exert influence over the direction of their society and resist other groups or the government when they are seen to impinge unjustly on their interests, activities, or purposes. Isolated individuals, not members of such groups, usually are unable to make a significant impact on the rest of the society, much less a government, and certainly not a dictatorship.

此外,這些團體還有很大的政治重要性。它們提供了社團 與機構的基地,使人們能夠影響他們自己社會的前進方向,而 且在當政府或其他團體被認為不公正地影響他們之利益、活動 或者目的的時候,能夠與它們對抗。孤立而不屬於這些團體成 員的個人,通常無法對社會之其他部門有顯著的影響,對政府 的影響就更少,更不用提對一個獨裁政權的影響了。

Consequently, if the autonomy and freedom of such bodies can be taken away by the dictators, the population will be relatively helpless. Also, if these institutions can themselves be dictatorially controlled by the central regime or replaced by new controlled ones, they can be used to dominate both the individual members and also those areas of the society.

因此,如果這些團體的自主性與自由被獨裁者剝奪了,民 衆就會感到相對地無能爲力。同時,如果中央政府能夠對這些 機構進行獨裁式的控制、或者用新而被控制的機構取而代之,

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那麼這些機構就會被用來支配其個人成員及相關的社會領域。

However, if the autonomy and freedom of these independent civil institutions (outside of government control) can be maintained or regained they are highly important for the application of political defiance. The common feature of the cited examples in which dictatorships have been disintegrated or weakened has been the courageous mass application of political defiance by the population and its institutions.

不過,如果這些獨立之民間機構的自主性與自由能夠受到 維護或重新恢復(不受政府控制),它們對政治反抗的運作就非 常重要。前面所述之獨裁政權被瓦解或削弱的這些例子有一個 共同特點,就是民衆及其機構勇敢而集體地運用了政治反抗。

As stated, these centers of power provide the institutional bases from which the population can exert pressure or can resist dictatorial controls. In the future, they will be part of the indispensable structural base for a free society. Their continued independence and growth therefore is often a prerequisite for the success of the liberation struggle.

如前所述,這些權力中心提供了民衆能夠施加壓力或者抵 抗獨裁式控制的機構性基地。在未來,它們將成為自由社會不 可或缺之結構性基礎的一部份。因此它們的持續獨立性與成長 往往是解放抗爭成功的必要前提條件。

If the dictatorship has been largely successful in

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destroying or controlling the society's independent bodies, it will be important for the resisters to create new independent social groups and institutions, or to reassert democratic control over surviving or partially controlled bodies. During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956-1957 a multitude of direct democracy councils emerged, even joining together to establish for some weeks a whole federated system of institutions and governance. In Poland during the late 1980s workers maintained illegal Solidarity unions and, in some cases, took over control of the official, Communist-dominated, trade unions. Such institutional developments can have very important political consequences.

如果獨裁政權相當成功地摧毀或控制了社會的獨立機構, 那麼很重要的,抵抗者就需要建立新而獨立的社會團體與機 構,或者對碩果僅存的或者僅部份受控制的機構重新實施民主 控制。在1956-1957年匈牙利革命期間,湧現了許多直接民主 的委員會,它們甚至聯合起來,在數週內建立了一整套聯盟性 的機構與管理體系。在波蘭,1980年代後期,工人們維持了 非法的團結工聯(Solidarity),並且在有些情況下還奪取了官方 的、受共產黨控制的工會領導權。這些機構性的發展可以產生 重要的政治後果。

Of course, none of this means that weakening and destroying dictatorships is easy nor that every attempt will succeed. It certainly does not mean that the struggle will be free of casualties, for those still serving the dictators are likely to fight back in an effort to force the populace to resume cooperation and obedience.

當然,這並不意味削弱及摧毀獨裁政權是輕而易舉的事, 也不是每一次嘗試都會成功。這也絕不意味抗爭都不會有傷 亡,因為仍舊為獨裁者服務的那些人很可能反擊,力圖迫使民 衆重新合作與服從。

The above insight into power does mean, however that the deliberate disintegration of dictatorships is possible. Dictatorships in particular have specific characteristics that render them highly vulnerable to skillfully implemented political defiance. Let us examine these characteristics in more detail.

不過,上述對權力的深入理解,確實意味著有意識地要瓦 解獨裁政權是可能的。特別是獨裁政權具有一些特性,讓它們 在熟練實施的政治反抗之下出現高度的脆弱性。讓我們更詳細 地探討這些特性。

### DICTATORSHIPS HAVE WEAKNESSES 獨裁政權有弱點

Dictatorships often appear invulnerable. Intelligence agencies, police, military forces, prisons, concentration camps, and execution squads are controlled by a powerful few. A country's finances, natural resources, and production capacities are often arbitrarily plundered by dictators and used to support the dictators will.

獨裁政權往往看上去是堅不可摧的。情報機構、警察、軍 隊、監獄、集中營與行刑隊由少數擁有巨大權力的人所控制。 國家的財政、自然資源與生產能力往往被獨裁者任意侵呑,用 來支持獨裁者的願望。

In comparison, democratic opposition forces often appear extremely weak, ineffective, and powerless. That perception of invulnerability against powerlessness makes effective opposition unlikely.

與此相比,民主反對陣營往往顯得非常脆弱、低效率及沒 有力量。以堅不可摧對付無能為力,這種看法讓有效的反抗運 動很難產生。

That is not the whole story, however. 不過,事情並不是完全如此。

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# Identifying the Achilles heel 確認阿基里斯(Achilles)的腳後跟

A myth from Classical Greece illustrates well the vulnerability of the supposedly invulnerable. Against the warrior Achilles, no blow would injure and no sword would penetrate his skin. When still a baby Achilles' mother had supposedly dipped him into the waters of the magical river Styx, resulting in the protection of his body from all dangers. There was, however, a problem. Since the baby was held by his heel so that he would not be washed away, the magical water had not covered that small part of his body. When Achilles was a grown man he appeared to all to be invulnerable to the enemies' weapons. However, in the battle against Troy instructed by one who knew the weakness, an enemy soldier aimed his arrow at Achilles' unprotected heel, the one spot where he could be injured. The strike proved fatal. Still today, the phrase "Achilles' heel" refers to the vulnerable part of a person, a plan, or an institution at which if attacked there is no protection.

有一個希臘古典神話,將想像中之不可摧毀的脆弱點解說 得很好。戰士阿基里斯(Achilles),周身刀槍不入。傳說在他還 是嬰兒的時候,他母親把他浸在神異的冥河(Styx)水中,使他身 體不受任何侵害。不過有一個問題。為了不被河水沖走,嬰兒 是從腳後跟被提著浸入水裡的,他身體的這一小部份沒有沾到 冥河的神水。阿基里斯長大以後,敵人的武器都奈何他不得。 但是,在對特洛伊(Troy)的戰爭中,由於受到了解他弱點的人 098 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 ⑤

指點,一個敵人士兵把箭瞄準阿基里斯唯一弱點的腳後跟。一 箭致命。一直到現在,「阿基里斯的腳後跟」這一成語即指一 個人、一個計劃或一個機構的致命弱點,此處若受到攻擊,將 毫無防護。

The same principle applies to ruthless dictatorships. They, too, can be conquered, but most quickly and with least cost if their weaknesses can be identified and the attack concentrated on them.

這個相同的原理適用於殘暴的獨裁統治。它們也是能夠被 征服,而且如果能夠確認它們的弱點,並且把攻擊集中在它們 這些弱點上,就能最快地及以最少的代價征服它們。

### Weaknesses of dictatorships 獨裁政權的弱點

Among the weaknesses of dictatorships are the following:

獨裁政權的弱點中有如下列:

1.The cooperation of a multitude of people, groups, and institutions needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn.

這個體制之運作需要來自許多人、團體與機構的合 作,可能受到限制或被撤回。

2. The requirements and effects of the regime's past policies will somewhat limit its present ability to adopt and implement conflicting policies.

面對尖銳的衝突 099

這個政權過去政策之必要條件與效應,會在某種程度 上限制它現在採用與實施與過去政策互相矛盾之政策 的能力。

3.The system may become routine in its operation, less able to adjust quickly to new situations. 這個體制的運作可能變得例行公事化,不大能夠很快

適應新的情勢。

4.Personnel and resources already allocated for existing tasks will not be easily available for new needs.

分配給現有任務的人員與資源,不大容易用來應付新 的需要。

5.Subordinates fearful of displeasing their superiors may not report accurate or complete information needed by the dictators to make decisions.

下屬由於害怕得罪上級長官,可能不會向獨裁者報告 決策所需要之準確的或完整的資訊。

6.The ideology may erode, and myths and symbols or the system may become unstable.

意識形態可能遭到鏽蝕,並且其神話與圖騰或體制會 變得不穩定。

7.If a strong ideology is present that influences one's view of reality, firm adherence to it may cause inattention to actual conditions and needs.

如果存在一個強烈的意識形態,會影響著人們對現實 的看法,那麼堅決認同這個意識形態可能導致人們忽 視實際的狀況與需求。 8.Deteriorating efficiency and competency of the bureaucracy or excessive controls and regulations, may make the system's policies and operation ineffective.

官僚體系工作效率與競爭能力的惡化,或者過多的控 制與管理規章,有可能使該體制的政策與運作變得沒 有效用。

9.Internal institutional conflicts and personal rivalries and hostilities may harm, and even disrupt, the operation of the dictatorship.

内部部門間之衝突與個人間的爭權奪利與交惡,可能 損害甚至破壞獨裁政權的運作。

10.Intellectuals and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions, doctrinalism, and repression.

由於對條件、限制、教條主義與鎮壓的反應,知識份 子與學生可能變得不安。

- The general public may over time become apathetic, skeptical, and even hostile to the regime.
   時間久了,一般民眾可能變得冷漠、懷疑甚至對既有 政權懷有敵意。
- 12.Regional, class, cultural, or national differences may become acute.

地區、階級、文化或族群之間的差異分歧可能變得尖 鏡。

13. The power hierarchy of the dictatorship is always unstable to some degree, and at times extremely

so. Individuals do not only remain in the same position in the ranking, but may rise or fall to other ranks or be removed entirely and replaced by new persons.

獨裁政權的權力階級體系某種程度上總是不大穩定, 有時會極不穩定。每個人在這個體系裡的職位不會總 是在同一位置,而可能會升或降到別的階級,或者被 完全革職而被新人所取代。

- 14.Sections of the police or military forces may act to achieve their own objectives, even against the will of established dictators, including by coup d'état. 警察與軍隊之某些部門可能爲了達到他們自己的目的 而採取行動,甚至違背地位牢固獨裁者的意志,包括 發動軍事政變。
- 15.If the dictatorship is new, time is required for it to become well established.

如果是新的獨裁政權,它需要時間來鞏固自己。

16.With so many decisions made by so few people in the dictatorship, mistakes of judgment, policy, and action are likely to occur. 獨裁政權裡這麼少的人要做那麼多的決定,很可能出

現判斷、政策與行動上的錯誤。

17.If the regime seeks to avoid these dangers and decentralizes controls and decision making, its control over the central levers of power may be further eroded.

政權如果想避免這些錯誤而把控制與決策分散化,它

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對權力槓桿中心的控制可能進一步遭到腐蝕削弱。

### Attacking weaknesses of dictatorships 打擊獨裁政權的弱點

With knowledge of such inherent weaknesses, the democratic opposition can seek to aggravate these "Achilles' heels" deliberately in order to alter the system drastically or to disintegrate it.

認知了這些內在的弱點,民主反對陣營就能夠有意識地試 圖擴大這些「阿基里斯的腳後跟」,以促使這個體制發生重大 轉變,或者使它分支瓦解。

The conclusion is then clear: despite the appearances of strength, all dictatorships have weaknesses, internal inefficiencies, personal rivalries, institutional inefficiencies, and conflicts between organizations and department. These weaknesses, over time, tend to make the regime less effective and more vulnerable to changing conditions and deliberate resistance. Not everything the regime sets out to accomplish will get completed. At times, for example, even Hitler's direct orders were never implemented because those beneath him in the hierarchy refused to carry them out. The dictatorial regime may at times even fall apart quickly, as we have already observed.

那麼結論就是清晰明顯的:儘管外表上它是強大的,但所 有獨裁政權都有弱點、內部的無能、個人間的爭權奪利、機構 性的無效率、以及組織與部門之間的衝突。時間長了,這些弱 點會讓政權的效率降低,更容易受到變化之情勢及有意識反抗 的攻擊。獨裁政權想要實現的事,不是每一件都能完成的。例 如,有時候連希特勒的直接命令都沒有得到執行,因爲他下面 的人拒絕貫徹。如我們前面觀察到的,獨裁政權有時候甚至會 迅速潰散。

This does not mean dictatorships can be destroyed without risks and casualties. Every possible course of action for libration will involve risks and potential suffering, and will take time to operate. And, of course, no means of action can ensure rapid success in every situation. However, types of struggle that target the dictatorship's identifiable weakness have greater chance of success than those that seek to fight the dictatorship where it is clearly strongest. The question is how this struggle is to be waged.

這並不意味著能夠消滅獨裁政權而沒有風險與傷亡。爭 取解放的每一條可能採取行動的路線都會涉及風險與潛在的苦 難,而且運作也需要時間。當然,任何行動的手段也不能確保 在各種情勢下都會迅速成功。不過,那些針對獨裁政權可以確 認之弱點的抗爭方式,比起試圖在獨裁政權明顯而最強大的地 方與它戰鬥的方式來說,成功的希望較大。問題是如何啓動這 種抗爭。



In Chapter One we noted that military resistance against dictatorships does not strike them where they are weakest, but rather where they are strongest. By choosing to compete in the areas of military forces, supplies of ammunition, weapons technology and the like, resistance movements tend to put themselves at a distinct disadvantage. Dictatorships will almost always be able to muster superior resources in these areas. The dangers of relying on foreign powers for salvation were also outlined. In Chapter Two we examined the problems of relying on negotiations as a means to remove dictatorships.

在第一章裡我們提到,用軍事抗爭來對付獨裁政權常常 無法打擊它們的最弱處,反而是打在它們最強的地方。抵抗運 動如果選擇在軍事武力、彈藥補給、武器技術等等領域進行競 爭,會使自己處於明顯的劣勢。在這些領域,獨裁政權總是能 夠聚集優勢的資源。我們也略述了依靠外來力量提供援助的危 險性。在第二章裡,我們也探討了以談判作爲驅逐獨裁政權之 手段所存在的問題。

What means are then available that will offer the democratic resistance distinct advantages and will tend to aggravate the identified weaknesses of dictatorships? What

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technique of action will capitalize on the theory of political power discussed in Chapter Three? The alternative of choice is political defiance.

那麼,還有哪些手段可以給民主抵抗運動提供明顯的優勢,同時又能擴大獨裁政權已經被確認的弱點呢?哪些行動技 巧能夠集中利用第三章所討論的政治權力的理論呢?這個選擇 的替代方案應該就是政治反抗。

Political defiance has the following characteristics: 政治反抗有下列特徵:

- It does not accept that the outcome will be decided by the means of fighting chosen by the dictatorship.
- 它拒絕接受,讓抗爭的結果由獨裁政權所採用的鬥爭手
   段所決定。
- It is difficult for the regime to combat.
- 要讓執政當局投入戰鬥會有困難。
- It can uniquely aggravate weaknesses of the dictatorship and can sever its sources of power.
- 它能獨特地擴大獨裁政權的弱點,並且切斷獨裁政權的 權力來源。
- It can in action be widely dispersed but can also be concentrated on a specific objective.
- 它在行動上可以是很分散的,但也可以聚焦在一個具體 目標上。
- It leads to errors of judgment and action by the dictators.

- 它能導致這些獨裁者作出錯誤的判斷與行動。
- It can effectively utilize the population as a whole and the society's groups and institutions in the struggle to end the brutal domination of the few.
- 在終結以少數人為首之殘酷統治的抗爭中,它能有效地 運用變成一個整體之群眾及社會上的各種團體與機構。
- It helps to spread the distribution of effective power in the society, making the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society more possible.
- 它有助於社會有效權力的分配,讓建立及維持一個民主的社會成為更有可能。

# The workings of nonviolent struggle 非暴力抗爭的運作

Like military capabilities, political defiance can be employed for a variety of purposes, ranging from efforts to influence the opponents to take different actions, to create conditions for a peaceful resolution of conflict, or to disintegrate the opponents' regime. However, political defiance operates in quite different ways from violence. Although both techniques are means to wage struggle, they do so with very different means and with different consequences. The ways and results of violent conflict are well known. Physical weapons are used to intimidate, injure, kill, and destroy.

如同軍事能力一樣,政治反抗可以運用於各種不同的目 的,包括力圖影響對方使之採取不同的行動、創造可以和平解

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決爭端的局面、或者瓦解對方的政權。不過,政治反抗的操作 方式與暴力方式有很大不同。儘管這兩者都是啓動抗爭的手 段,但它們採用之方法有很大的差別,其後果也不相同。暴力 抗爭之方式與結果是衆所週知的。它們用實際的武器來脅迫、 傷害、殺死及毀滅對方。

Nonviolent struggle is a much more complex and varied means of struggle than is violence. Instead, the struggle is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons applied by the population and the institutions of the society. These have been known under various names of protests, strikes, noncooperation, boycotts, disaffection, and people power. As noted earlier, all governments can rule only as long as they receive replenishment of the needed sources of their power from the cooperation, submission, and obedience of the population and the institutions of the society. Political defiance, unlike violence, is uniquely suited to severing those sources of power.

與暴力抗爭相比,非暴力的抗爭是一種更複雜、而且更 多樣化的抗爭方式。相反的,這種抗爭是民衆與社會之各種機 構運用心理的、社會的、經濟的及政治之武器來進行的戰鬥。 人們以各種不同的名稱認識這些武器,諸如抗議、罷工、不合 作、抵制、不滿與背叛、與人民的力量。如前所述,所有的政 府只有在它們能夠從民衆與社會機構經由合作、屈服與服從而 取得它們所需要之權力來源的補充,才能實行統治。與暴力不 同,政治反抗獨特地適合於切斷這些權力來源。 108 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 ⑤

# Nonviolent weapons and discipline 非暴力的武器與紀律

The common error of past improvised political defiance campaigns is the reliance on only one or two methods, such as strikes and mass demonstrations. In fact, a multitude of methods exist that allow resistance strategists to concentrate and disperse resistance as required.

過去一些毫無準備、即興式之政治反抗運動的通病是只依 靠一兩種方法,例如罷工與群衆示威。實際上,有許多方法可 以供抵抗運動之戰略規劃者根據情況的需要,進行集中的或分 散的抵抗。

About two hundred specific methods of nonviolent action have been identified, and there are certainly scores more. These methods are classified under three broad categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are largely symbolic demonstrations, including parades, marches, and vigils (54 methods). Noncooperation is divided into three sub-categories: (a)social noncooperation (16 methods), (b) economic noncooperation, including boycotts (26 methods) and strikes (23 methods), and (c)political noncooperation (38 methods). Nonviolent intervention, by psychological, physical, social, economic, or political means, such as the fast, nonviolent occupation, and parallel government (41 methods), is the final group. A list of 198 of these methods is
included as the Appendix to this publication.

已經被確認之非暴力行動的具體方法大約有二百種,一定 還有更多的方法。這些方法分爲三大類:抗議與說服、不合作 及介入干預。非暴力抗議與說服的方法大多是象徵性的示威, 包括遊行、列隊行進、守夜等(54 種方法)。不合作分爲三個子 類別:(a)社會性的不合作(16 種方法);(b)經濟性的不合作,包 括抵制(26 種方法)、罷工(23 種方法);及(c)政治不合作(38 種 方法)。非暴力的介入干預是最後一個類別,是用心理的、物理 的、社會的、經濟的或政治的手段,如禁食、非暴力佔領以及 平行政府等(41 種方法)。本文附錄列有這些方法共198 種。

The use of a considerable number of these methods carefully chosen, applied persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate tactics, by trained civilians—is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems. This applies to all dictatorships.

經過訓練之公民可以利用相當數目的這些方法一小心地挑 選、持續的應用並且用於大規模的尺度,加以組成一個明智之 戰略與適當之戰術的內容一有可能讓任何不合法之獨裁政權產 生嚴重的問題。這適用於所有的獨裁政權。

In contrast to military means, the methods of nonviolent struggle can be focused directly on the issues at stake. For example, since the issue of dictatorship is primarily political, then political forms of nonviolent struggle would be crucial. These would include denial of legitimacy to the dictators and noncooperation with their regime. Noncooperation would 110 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 5

also be applied against specific policies. At times stalling and procrastination may be quietly and even secretly practiced, while at other times open disobedience and defiant public demonstrations and strikes may be visible to all.

與軍事的手段不同,非暴力抗爭的方法可以直接集中運用 於當前面臨的議題。例如,既然獨裁政權的議題主要是政治性 的,那麼非暴力抗爭的政治形式就至關重要。其中包括否定獨 裁政權的合法性,以及對它的統治不給予合作。不合作也可以 是針對特定的政策。有時候拖延與耽擱可能是靜靜地甚至是秘 密地進行,而在其他時候,公開的不服從、反抗性的公衆示威 與罷工是可以全然公開的。

On the other hand, if the dictatorship is vulnerable to economic pressures or if many of the popular grievances against it are economic, then economic action, such as boycotts or strikes, may be appropriate resistance methods. The dictators' efforts to exploit the economic system might be met with limited general strikes, slow-downs, and refusal of assistance by (or disappearance of) indispensable experts. Selective use of various types of strikes may be conducted at key points in manufacturing, in transport, in the supply of raw materials, and in the distribution of products.

在另一方面,若獨裁政權有經濟壓力的弱點,或者公衆對 獨裁政權的許多不滿是屬於經濟性的,那麼採取經濟行動,例 如抵制或罷工,就是適當的抗爭方法。獨裁者剝削經濟體制圖 謀私利,可以採取小型的總罷工、怠工、以及某些無法取代之 專門技術人員拒絕提供協助(或突然失蹤)來對應。選擇性地進

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行各種形式的罷工可以在原材料之製造、運輸、供應與產品之流通等某些關鍵的環節上進行。

Some methods of nonviolent struggle require people to perform acts unrelated to their normal lives, such as distributing leaflets, operating an underground press, going on hunger strike, or sitting down in the streets. These methods may be difficult for some people to undertake except in very extreme situations.

有些非暴力抗爭的方法需要人們做一些與他們日常生活不 相關的事,例如散發傳單、經營一個地下報刊、進行絕食、在 街道上靜坐等。對於某些人來說,除非在極端情況下,要這樣 做可能有些困難。

Other methods of nonviolent struggle instead require people to continue approximately their normal lives, though in somewhat different ways. For example, people may report for work, instead of striking, but then deliberately work more slowly or inefficiently than usual. "Mistakes" may be consciously made more frequently. One may become "sick" and "unable" to work at certain times. Or, one may simply refuse to work. One might go to religious services when the act expresses not only religious but also political convictions. One may act to protect children from the attackers' propaganda by education at home or in illegal classes. One might refuse to join certain" recommended" or required organizations that one would not have joined freely in earlier 112 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 ⑤

times. The similarity of such types of action to people's usual activities and the limited degree of departure from their normal lives may make participation in the national liberation struggle much easier for many people.

另一些非暴力抗爭的方法則要求人們大致繼續過他們的 正常生活,只是方式略有不同。例如,人們可能照常上班而不 罷工,卻故意做得比平常更慢一些或效率更低一些。可能更頻 繁地出些「錯誤」。有時候可能「生病」了,或「無法」在某 些時段工作。或者乾脆拒絕上班工作。人們可以去參加宗教儀 式,而這個行動除了表達宗教信念以外,還表達了政治信念。 人們可能爲了保護子女不受攻擊者的宣傳而讓他們在家裡或非 法的課堂裡受教育。人們可以拒絕參加自己過去不會自由參加 的某些「被推薦」的或指定的組織。對許多人來說,由於這類 行動與人們平常的活動很相似,並且與他們的正常生活又沒有 多大的偏離,可能使他們更容易參與民族解放抗爭。

Since nonviolent struggle and violence operate in fundamentally different ways, even limited resistance violence during a political defiance campaign will be counterproductive, for it will shift the struggle to one in which the dictators have an overwhelming advantage (military warfare). Nonviolent discipline is a key to success and must be maintained despite provocations and brutalities by the dictators and their agents.

因為非暴力抗爭與暴力者有根本不同的運作方式。在政治 反抗運動中即使是抵抗運動的小型暴力,也會產生反效果,因 爲這樣會讓抗爭轉移到獨裁者具有壓倒性優勢的方向(軍事戰 閉)。非暴力的紀律是成功的關鍵,不論獨裁者及其特勤人員如 何挑釁與殘暴,也必須維持這種紀律。

The maintenance of nonviolent discipline against violent opponents facilitates the workings of the four mechanisms of change in nonviolent struggle (discussed below). Nonviolent discipline is also extremely important in the process of political jiu-jitsu. In this process the stark brutality of the regime against the clearly nonviolent actionists politically rebounds against the dictators' position, causing dissention in their own ranks as well as fomenting support for the resisters among the general population, the regime's usual supporters, and third parties.

要維持非暴力的紀律以對抗使用暴力的對手,非暴力抗爭 中有四種促成改變之機制的運作(下文將討論)。在政治柔道術 的過程中,非暴力紀律也是非常重要。在這個過程中,政權對 顯然是非暴力活動者的赤裸裸暴行,會在政治上對獨裁者的地 位產生反彈、在他們自己的陣容中產生異議、同時會激起一般 民衆、政權的平時支持者及第三者對抵抗者的支持。

In some cases, however, limited violence against the dictatorship may be inevitable. Frustration and hatred of the regime may explode into violence. Or, certain groups may be unwilling to abandon violent means even though they recognize the important role of nonviolent struggle. In these cases, political defiance does not need to be abandoned. However, it will be necessary to separate the violent action as far as possible from the nonviolent action. This should be

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done in terms of geography, population groups, timing, and issues. Otherwise the violence could have a disastrous effect on the potentially much more powerful and successful use of political defiance.

不過在有些情況下,對獨裁者使用小型的暴力也許是不可 避免的。對政權的不滿與怨恨可能會爆發成暴力。或者儘管他 們認識到非暴力抗爭的重要角色,某些團體可能不願意放棄暴 力的手段。在這些情況下,並不需要放棄政治反抗。不過,需 要儘可能把暴力行動從非暴力的行動分隔開來。這可以按照地 理、人群、時間與議題來分隔。不然的話,這種暴力也許會對 有可能更有力與更成功的政治反抗運動,帶來災難性的效果。

The historical record indicates that while casualties in dead and wounded must be expected in political defiance, they will be far fewer than the casualties in military warfare. Furthermore, this type of struggle does not contribute to the endless cycle of killing and brutality.

歷史記錄指出,雖然政治反抗必然會有傷亡,但是傷亡會 比軍事戰鬦裡少得多。甚且,這類的抗爭不會造成殺戮與暴行 之無窮盡的輪迴。

Nonviolent struggle both requires and tends to produce a loss (or greater control) of fear of the government and its violent repression. That abandonment or control of fear is a key element in destroying the power of the dictators over the general population.

非暴力抗爭須要、並且也會逐步產生對政府及其暴力鎭壓

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之恐懼的消除(或更好的控制)。排除恐懼或對恐懼有所控制, 是摧毀獨裁者支配一般大衆之權力的一個關鍵因素。

# Openness, secrecy, and high standards 開放性、機密性、與高標準

Secrecy, deception, and underground conspiracy pose very difficult problems for a movement using nonviolent action. It is often impossible to keep the political police and intelligence agents from learning about intentions and plans. From the perspective of the movement, secrecy is not only rooted in fear but contributes to fear, which dampens the spirit of resistance and reduces the number of people who can participate in a given action. It also can contribute to suspicions and accusations, often unjustified, within the movement, concerning who is an informer or agent for the opponents. Secrecy may also affect the ability of a movement to remain nonviolent.

對於一個使用非暴力行動的運動來說,機密、欺騙與地下 陰謀變成是很困難的問題。往往不可能不讓政治警察與情報人 員知道運動的意圖及計劃。從運動的角度來看,保持機密不僅 是根源於恐懼,而且也會增強恐懼,從而使抵抗的士氣低落, 也讓可以參與某一個行動的人數減少。保密也會增加運動內部 往往沒有根據之懷疑與指控誰是對方派來的告密者或特務。保 密也會影響到運動保持非暴力的能力。

In contrast, openness regarding intentions and plans will not only have the opposite effects, but will contribute to

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an image that the resistance movement is in fact extremely powerful. The problem is of course more complex than this suggests, and there are significant aspects of resistance activities that may require secrecy. A well-informed assessment will be required by those knowledgeable about both the dynamics of nonviolent struggle and also the dictatorship's means of surveillance in the specific situation.

與此相反的,有關意圖與計劃的公開不僅會有相反的效 果,而且會增強抵抗運動實際上力量非常大的形象。當然這個 問題比這裡講的要複雜許多,而且有些抵抗活動的重要層面有 可能需要保密。在特定情況下,必須要由熟悉非暴力抗爭的 動態、也熟悉獨裁政權監視手段的人,根據詳實的資訊來做評 估。

The editing, printing, and distribution of underground publications, the use of illegal radio broadcasts from within the country, and the gathering of intelligence about the operations of the dictatorship are among the special limited types of activities where a high degree of secrecy will be required.

地下刊物的編輯、印刷與發行、發自國內的非法無線電廣 播、以及關於獨裁政權運作的情報蒐集,是屬於少數必須高度 保密的特殊活動。

The maintenance of high standards of behavior in nonviolent action is necessary at all stages of the conflict. Such factors as fearlessness and maintaining nonviolent

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discipline are always required. It is important to remember that large numbers of people may frequently be necessary to effect particular changes. However, such numbers can be obtained as reliable participants only by maintaining the high standards of the movement.

在對抗的各個階段,非暴力行動有必要保持行為的高標 準。諸如無畏無懼及保持非暴力紀律這些因素,都是永遠須要 的。要記住,為了影響某些改變,往往需要很多人。不過,只 有保持運動的高標準,才能得到這麼大數量之可靠的參與者。

### Shifting power relationships 權力關係的轉移

Strategists need to remember that the conflict in which political defiance is applied is a constantly changing field of struggle with continuing interplay of moves and countermoves. Nothing is static. Power relationships, both absolute and relative, are subject to constant and rapid changes. This is made possible by the resisters continuing their nonviolent persistence despite repression.

戰略規劃者必須記住,以政治反抗進行之對抗是一個經常 變化的戰場,動作與反制的動作會不斷互相交錯。沒有一樣是 靜態不變的。絕對的及相對的權力關係會受到不斷而且迅速的 變化。由於抵抗者儘管受到鎭壓,卻繼續他們的非暴力堅持, 這個才變成有可能。

The variations in the respective power of the contending sides in this type of conflict situation are likely to be more 118 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 5

extreme than in violent conflicts, to take place more quickly, and to have more diverse and politically significant consequences. Due to these variations, specific actions by the resisters are likely to have consequences far beyond the particular time and place in which they occur. These effects will rebound to strengthen or weaken one group or another.

在這種對抗情況下,衝突雙方各自權力的變化有可能比 暴力對抗的情況還要劇烈,來得更迅速,而且其後果也會更多 樣化、及更具有重要的政治意義。由於這些變化,抵抗者的特 定行動造成的結果有可能遠遠超出這些行動本身發生之時間及 地點之情況的範圍。這些效果會回饋而加強或削弱一方或另一 方。

In addition, the nonviolent group may, by its actions exert influence over the increase or decrease in the relative strength of *the opponent group* to a great extent. For example, disciplined courageous nonviolent resistance in face of the dictators' brutalities may induce unease, disaffection, unreliability, and in extreme situations even mutiny among the dictators' own soldiers and population. This resistance may also result in increased international condemnation of the dictatorship. In addition, skillful, disciplined, and persistent use of political defiance may result in more and more participation in the resistance by people who normally would give their tacit support to the dictators or generally remain neutral In the conflict.

除此之外,非暴力陣營可能具有透過它的行動可以很大

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程度地影響「對方陣營」的相對力量。例如,面對獨裁者的暴 行,有紀律而勇敢的非暴力抵抗有可能在獨裁者自己之軍隊與 支持群衆裡引起不安、不滿意、不信任,並且在極端情況下 甚至造成叛變。這種抵抗也可能導致國際上對獨裁者更多的譴 責。另外,有技巧、有紀律而且堅定地運用政治反抗,可能會 讓更多通常默默支持獨裁者或在衝突中保持中立的民衆投入抵 抗運動。

### Four mechanisms of change 四種改變的機制

Nonviolent struggle produces change in four ways. The first mechanism is the least likely, though it has occurred. When members of the opponent group are emotionally moved by the suffering of repression imposed on courageous nonviolent resisters or are rationally persuaded that the resisters' cause is just, they may come to accept the resisters' aims. This mechanism is called conversion. Though cases of *conversion* in nonviolent action do sometimes happen, they are rare, and in most conflicts this does not occur at all or at least not on a significant scale.

非暴力抗爭以四種方式造成改變。第一種機制的可能性最 小,但也發生過。當敵對陣營中的某些成員情感上被勇敢的非 暴力抵抗者因受到鎭壓而飽受苦難所感動,或者理性上相信抵 抗者理念具有正當性的時候,他們有可能接受抵抗者的目標。 這個機制叫作「說服轉變」。雖然在非暴力行動中有時可能會 發生說服轉換的實例,但這種情況很少見,在大多數衝突中不 是根本不會發生就是規模不是舉足輕重。 Far more often, nonviolent struggle operates by changing the conflict situation and the society so that the opponents simply cannot do as they like. It is this change that produces the other three mechanisms: accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Which of these occurs depends on the degree to which the relative and absolute power relations are shifted in favor of the democrats.

更常見的是,非暴力抗爭靠著改變衝突的情勢與社會本 身,而只是讓對手無法為所欲為。要達到這樣的改變就會產生 另外三種機制:調解配合、非暴力強制脅迫與分支瓦解。至於 究竟其中哪一種機制會發生,就看哪一種機制會讓相對的與絕 對的權力關係產生對民主陣營有利的變化程度而定。

If the issues are not fundamental ones, the demands of the opposition in a limited campaign are not considered threatening, and the contest of forces has altered the power relationships to some degree, the immediate conflict may be ended by reaching an agreement, a splitting of differences or compromise. This mechanism is called *accommodation*. Many strikes are settled in this manner, for example, with both sides attaining some of their objectives but neither achieving all it wanted. A government may perceive such a settlement to have some positive benefits, such as defusing tension, creating an impression of "fairness," or polishing the international image of the regime. It is important, therefore, that great care be exercised in selecting the issues on which a settlement by accommodation is acceptable. A struggle to bring down a dictatorship is not one of these.

如果這些議題不是根本性的,反對陣營在一個小型的運 動裡的訴求被認為不具有威脅性,而且雙方勢力的競爭又在某 種程度上改變了權力關係,那麼眼前的衝突有可能達成協議, 就是維持差異的分離或者妥協而結束。這個機制叫作「調解配 合」。例如,許多罷工是以這種方式解決的,雙方各自得到自 己的部份目的,但沒有一方得到它所要的一切。政府可能認 爲這樣的解決為有正面的好處,例如緩和緊張局勢、營造一種 「公平」的印象、或者改善執政當局的國際形像。因此,小心 謹慎地選擇哪些議議是可以用調解配合的機制來加以解決,就 很重要。要推翻獨裁政權的抗爭是不屬於這一類的。

Nonviolent struggle can be much more powerful than indicated by the mechanisms of conversion or accommodation. Mass noncooperation and defiance can so change social and political situations, especially power relationships, that the dictators' ability to control the economic, social, and political processes of government and the society is in fact taken away. The opponents' military forces may become so unreliable that they no longer simply obey orders to repress resisters. Although the opponents' leaders remain in their positions, and adhere to their original goals, their ability to act effectively has been taken away from them. That is called *nonviolent coercion*.

非暴力抗爭可以遠比說服轉變與調解配合這些機制所展示 的還要有力量得多。群衆性的不合作與反抗能夠改變社會及政 治局勢,特別是權力關係,以至於獨裁者控制政府與社會之經 122 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

濟、社會及政治之過程的能力實際上是被奪走了。對手的軍事 力量可能變得如此不可靠,以至於他們不再單純地服從命令去 鎖壓抵抗者。雖然對手的領導者仍然逗留在其權位,而且還堅 持他們的目標,但是他們早已被剝奪了有效行動的能力。這叫 作「非暴力強制脅迫」。

In some extreme situations, the conditions producing nonviolent coercion are carried still further. The opponents' leadership in fact loses all ability to act and their own structure of power collapses. The resisters' self-direction, noncooperation, and defiance become so complete that the opponents now lack even a semblance of control over them. The opponents' bureaucracy refuses to obey its own leadership. The opponents' troops and police mutiny. The opponents' usual supporters or population repudiate their former leadership, denying that they have any right to rule at all. Hence, their former assistance and obedience falls away. The fourth mechanism of change, *disintegration* of the opponents' system, is so complete that they do not even have sufficient power to surrender. The regime simply falls to pieces.

在某些極端情況下,產生非暴力強制脅迫的情勢條件還 可以進一步發展。對手們的領導階層實際上喪失了一切行動 的能力,而且他們自己的權力結構崩潰了。抵抗者的自立自 主、不合作與反抗變得如此全面,以至這些對手對抵抗者連一 點像樣的控制也沒有了。這些對手的官僚體系拒絕服從它自己 的領導。這些對手的軍隊與警察叛變了。對手平常的支持者或

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群衆唾棄了他們過去的領導階層,完全否定他們有任何統治的 權力。因此,他們從前的幫助與服從消失無蹤了。第四種造成 改變的機制,就是將這些對手的體系「分支瓦解」,是如此徹 底,以至於他們連投降的能力都沒有了。政權就只有分崩離析 之一途了。

In planning liberation strategies, these four mechanisms should be kept in mind. They sometimes operate essentially by chance. However, the selection of one or more of these as the intended mechanism of change in a conflict will make it possible to formulate specific and mutually reinforcing strategies. Which mechanism (or mechanisms) to select will depend on numerous factors, including the absolute and relative power of the contending groups and the attitudes and objectives of the nonviolent struggle group.

在規劃解放抗爭的戰略時,必須謹記這四種機制。有時 候這些機制的運作實質上是偶然的。不過,在衝突中選擇其中 一種或幾種作為預期使用的改變機制,就有可能制定具體的及 互相強化的戰略。選擇哪一種(或哪幾種)機制將取決於許多因 素,包括參與陣營之絕對的與相對的權力、以及非暴力抗爭陣 營的態度與目標。

## Democratizing effects of political defiance 政治反抗的民主化效應

In contrast to the centralizing effects of violent sanctions, use of the technique of nonviolent struggle contributes to democratizing the political society in several ways. 與暴力制裁之中央集中化的效果相反,採用非暴力抗爭的 技術在許多方面會有助於政治社會的民主化。

One part of the democratizing effect is negative. That is, in contrast to military means, this technique does not provide a means of repression under command of a ruling elite which can be turned against the population to establish or maintain a dictatorship. Leaders of a political defiance movement can exert influence and apply pressures on their followers, but they cannot imprison or execute them when they dissent or choose other leaders.

民主化的效果有一部份是負面的。那就是說,與軍事手段 相反,非暴力的抗爭方法不會提供在統治菁英指揮下進行鎖壓 的手段,而這種手段可能會轉而用來對付群衆,以便建立或維 持一個獨裁政權。政治反抗運動的領導者能夠對他們的追隨者 施加影響與壓力,但是當他們的追隨者有異議或選擇其他領導 者的時候,他們不能監禁或處死他們。

Another part of the democratizing effect is positive. That is, nonviolent struggle provides the population with means of resistance that can be used to achieve and defend their liberties against existing or would-be dictators. Below are several of the positive democratizing effects nonviolent struggle may have:

民主化效應的另一部份是正面的。那就是說,非暴力抗爭 給群衆提供了抵抗的手段,可以用來對付現有的或者未來的獨 裁者,以實現及保衛他們的自由。下面列出非暴力抗爭可能有 的正面民主化效應:

- Experience in applying nonviolent struggle may result in the population being more self-confident in challenging the regime's threats and capacity for violent repression.
- 運用非暴力抗爭的經驗,可以導致民眾對挑戰執政當局 之威脅與暴力鎮壓的能力更有自信。
- Nonviolent struggle provides the means of noncooperation and defiance by which the population can resist undemocratic controls over them by any dictatorial group.
- 非暴力抗爭提供了不合作與反抗的手段,讓民眾可以使
  用它們來抵抗任何獨裁陣營對人民實行的不民主控制。
- Nonviolent struggle can be used to assert the practice of democratic freedoms, such as free speech, free press, independent organizations, and free assembly in face of repressive controls.
- 面對強制壓迫性的控制,非暴力抗爭可以用來維護民主 自由的實踐,例如言論自由、新聞自由、獨立結社與集 會自由。
- Nonviolent struggle contributes strongly to the survival, rebirth, and strengthening of the independent groups and institutions of the society, as previously discussed. These are important for democracy because of their capacity to mobilize the power capacity of the population and to impose limits on the effective power of any would-be dictators.

- 如前所述,非暴力抗爭非常有助於社會上獨立團體與機構的生存、重生與強化。這些獨立社團與機構對民主十分重要,因為它們有動員群眾之權力能量以及可以限制任何未來獨裁者的有效權力。
- Nonviolent struggle provides means by which the population can wield power against repressive police and military action by a dictatorial government.
- 非暴力抗爭提供了群眾能夠行使團結力量的手段,用來 對付獨裁政府之警察的壓迫與軍事行動。
- Nonviolent struggle provides methods by which the population and the independent institutions can in the interests of democracy restrict or sever the sources of power for the ruling elite, thereby threatening its capacity to continue Its domination.
- 非暴力抗爭提供了民眾與獨立機構為了民主的福祉而可以限制或切斷統治菁英之權力來源的方法,從而威脅他 們繼續統治的能力。

# Complexity of nonviolent struggle 非暴力抗爭的複雜性

As we have seen from this discussion, nonviolent struggle is a complex technique of social action, involving a multitude of methods, a range of mechanisms of change, and specific behavioral requirements. To be effective, especially against a dictatorship, political defiance requires careful planning and preparation. Prospective participants will need to understand what is required of them. Resources

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will need to have been made available. And strategists will need to have analyzed how nonviolent struggle can be most effectively applied. We now turn our attention to this latter crucial element: the need for strategic planning.

我們從上面的討論可以看出,非暴力抗爭是一個社會行動 的複雜技術,包括許多方法、一套造成改變的機制以及行為上 的一些必要條件。政治反抗要有效果,特別是對抗獨裁政權統 治,就需要仔細的規劃與準備。未來可能的參與者必須懂得對 自己有哪些要求。必須掌握一些資源以資利用。而且戰略規劃 者必須對如何最有效地運用非暴力抗爭進行分析。下面我們將 把注意力集中到後者這個關鍵因素:戰略規劃的必要性。

## THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING 戰略規劃的必要性

Political defiance campaigns against dictatorships may begin in a variety of ways. In the past these struggles have almost always been unplanned and essentially accidental. Specific grievances that have triggered past initial actions have varied widely, but often included new brutalities, the arrest or killing of a highly regarded person, a new repressive policy or order, food shortages, disrespect toward religious beliefs, or an anniversary of an important related event. Sometimes, a particular act by the dictatorship has so enraged the populace that they have launched into action without having any idea how the rising might end. At other times a courageous individual or a small group may have taken action which amused support. A specific grievance may be recognized by others as similar to wrongs they had experienced and they, too, may thus join the struggle. Sometimes, a specific call for resistance from a small group or individual may meet an unexpectedly large response.

反對獨裁政權的政治反抗運動可能以不同的方式開始。 在過去,這些抗爭幾乎總是沒有計劃的,實質上是偶然的。 過去,觸發初始行動之特定不滿訴求是各式各樣的,但經常 是包括新的暴行、一個衆望所歸的人物被捕或被殺、一個新的 壓制政策或法令、食物短缺、不尊重宗教信仰、或某一重大相 關事件的週年。有時候,獨裁政權的某一特別行動如此激怒了 群衆,以至於他們發起了行動,卻對這個起義會如何結束毫無 概念。另一些時候,某一個勇敢的個人或一個小團體採取了行 動,激起了群衆的支持。別人可能看到某一具體不滿訴求類似 自己過去經歷過的冤屈,他們也可能就會參加這個抗爭。有時 候,一個小團體或個人提出的特定反抗號召會獲得出乎意料的 強大回響。

While spontaneity has some positive qualities, it has often had disadvantages. Frequently, the democratic resisters have not anticipated the brutalities of the dictatorship, so that they suffered gravely and the resistance has collapsed. At times the lack of planning by democrats has left crucial decisions to chance, with disastrous results. Even when the oppressive system was brought down, lack of planning on how to handle the transition to a democratic system has contributed to the emergence of a new dictatorship.

儘管自發性有一些優點,它往往有一些缺點。時常,民主 抵抗者沒有預料到獨裁政權的暴行,結果受到劇烈的苦難,而 抵抗運動也潰散了。有時候民主陣營缺乏規劃,讓關鍵性的決 策聽憑機運,結果是災難一場。即使在壓迫之體制被推翻的時 候,由於缺乏如何處理過渡到民主體制的規劃,以致造成新獨 裁政權的浮現。

### Realistic planning 實際可行的規劃

In the future, unplanned popular action will undoubtedly

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play significant roles in risings against dictatorships. However, it is now possible to calculate the most effective ways to bring down a dictatorship, to assess when the political situation and popular mood are ripe, and to choose how to initiate a campaign. Very careful thought *based on a ra1istlc assessment* of the situation and the capabilities of the populace is required in order to select effective ways to achieve freedom under such circumstances.

在未來,沒有計劃之群衆行動毫無疑問地會在反對獨裁的 起義裡扮演重要的角色。不過,現在已經有可能,計算出打倒 獨裁政權最有效的途徑、評估政治局勢與群衆情緒什麼時候成 熟、並且選擇如何啓動一場運動。在對局勢與群衆能力的實際 評估之基礎上,必須進行非常仔細的思考,以便選擇在這種環 境條件下實現自由的有效途徑。

If one wishes to accomplish something, it is wise to plan how to do it. The more important the goal, or the graver the consequences of failure, the more important planning becomes. Strategic planning increases the likelihood that all available resources will be mobilized and employed most effectively. This is especially true for a democratic movement — which has limit material resources and whose supporters will be in danger - that is trying to bring down a powerful dictatorship. In contrast, the dictatorship usually will have access to vast material resources, organizational strength, and ability' to perpetrate brutalities.

一個人要想完成某些件事,聰明的話就要規劃如何去做。

目標越重要,或者失敗的後果越嚴重,規劃就會越重要。戰略 性的規劃能夠增加所有可利用之資源得到最有效動員與運用的 可能性。這個理念對民主運動一在力圖推翻一個強大之獨裁政 權、它的物質資源有限、它的支持者又會處在危險當中的時候 一尤其是千眞萬確的。與此相反的,獨裁政權通常擁有龐大的 物質資源、組織力量與實施暴行的能力。

"To plan a strategy" here means to calculate a course of action that will make it more likely to get from the present to the desired future situation. In terms of this discussion, it means from a dictatorship to a future democratic system. A plan to achieve that objective will usually consist of a phased series of campaigns and other organized activities designed to strengthen the oppressed population and society and to weaken the dictatorship. Note here that the objective is not simply to destroy the current dictatorship but to emplace a democratic system. A grand strategy that limits its objective to merely destroying the incumbent dictatorship runs a great risk of producing another tyrant.

這裡「規劃一個戰略」是指計算一個行動的路徑過程, 以便更有可能從當前的形勢達到所期望的未來局勢。在本文討 論的範圍,就是指從獨裁政權走向未來的民主體制。為了達到 此一目標之規劃通常包含一系列分階段的活動與其他有組織的 活動,其目的是在強化受壓迫的民衆與社會,並且削弱獨裁政 權。這裡需要指出,目的不但單純只是要摧毀當前的獨裁政 權,並且要建立一個民主體制。一個把目標侷限於摧毀當今之 獨裁政權的總體大策略,很可能冒著產生另一個暴君的巨大風 132 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

險。

### Hurdles to planning 規劃的障礙

Some exponents of freedom in various parts of the world do not bring their full capacities to bear on the problem of how to achieve liberation. Only rarely do these advocates fully recognize the extreme importance of careful strategic planning before they act. Consequently, this is almost never done.

世界上不同角落提倡自由的人們,不會把他們全部能力用 在如何實現解放的問題上。這些倡議者很少充份認識到在他們 行動之前,仔細戰略規劃的極端重要性。結果是幾乎從來沒有 做過戰略規劃。

Why is it that the people who have the vision of bringing political freedom to their people should so rarely prepare a comprehensive strategic plan to achieve that goal? Unfortunately, often most people in democratic opposition groups do not understand the need for strategic planning or are not accustomed or trained to think strategically. This is a difficult task. Constantly harassed by the dictatorship, and overwhelmed by immediate responsibilities, resistance leaders often do not have the safety or time to develop strategic thinking skills.

具有要為他們人民帶來自由這樣遠見的人們,為什麼很 少為了實現這個目標而制定一個全面整體的戰略規劃?不幸的 是,民主反對陣營裡的多數人時常不懂得進行戰略規劃的必要 性、或者不習慣於戰略思考、或者沒有受過這方面的訓練。這 是一個艱難的任務。抵抗運動的領導者不斷受到獨裁政權的威 嚇騷擾,並且被當前的職責壓得喘不過氣來,他們往往沒有時 間與安全環境來培養自己戰略思考的技能。

Instead, it is a common pattern simply to react to the initiatives of the dictatorship. The opposition is then always on the defensive, seeking to maintain limited liberties or bastions of freedom, at best slowing the advance of the dictatorial controls or causing certain problems for the regime's new policies.

相反的,通常的模式是對獨裁政權的主動行動單純地作出 回應。這樣一來,反對陣營總是處於被動的守勢,企圖維持有 限的自由權利或者部份零散的自由,最多只能減緩獨裁政權控 制的進展或者給政權的新政策製造某些麻煩。

Some individuals and groups, of course, may not see the need for broad long-term planning of a liberation movement. Instead, they may naively think that if they simply espouse their goal strongly firmly, and long enough, it will somehow come to pass. Others assume that if they simply live and witness according to their principles and ideals in face of difficulties, they are doing all they can to implement them. The espousal of humane goals and loyalty to ideals are admirable, but are grossly inadequate to end a dictatorship and to achieve freedom. 當然,某些個人與團體可能看不到解放運動需要有廣泛的 長期規劃。相反的,他們可能天真地以爲只要強烈地、堅定地 抱持著他們的目標,而且時間足夠長的話,這個目標不論如何 就會到來。另一些人則假設認爲,他們只要在面對困難的時候 按照自己的信仰與理想去過日子及作見證,他們就已經盡了全 力去實現它們了。抱持人道的目標與忠於理想固然令人敬佩, 但是整體上是不足以終結獨裁政權以及實現自由。

Other opponents of dictatorship may naively think that if only they use enough violence, freedom will come. But, as noted earlier, violence is no guarantor of success. Instead of liberation, it can lead to defeat, massive tragedy, or both. In most situations the dictatorship is best equipped for violent struggle and the military realities rarely, if ever, favor the democrats.

另一些獨裁政權的反對者可能天真地認為,只要他們運用 足夠的暴力,自由就會到來。但是,如前所述,暴力並不會保 證成功。不但不能得到解放,它可能導致挫敗、大規模的災難 悲劇,或者二者都有。在大多數情況下,獨裁政權擁有暴力抗 爭的裝備,並且這些軍事上的現實也極少,如果曾經有的話, 有利於民主陣營。

There are also activists who base their actions on what they "feel" they should do. These approaches are, however, not only egocentric but they offer no guidance for developing a grand strategy of liberation.

也有一些積極份子根據他們「感覺」想要做甚麼而採取活

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動。不過,這些處理問題的方式不僅是自我本位的,而且它們 也不能提供制定一個解放之總體大戰略的指導方針。

Action based on a "bright idea" that someone has had is also limited. What is needed instead is action based on careful calculation of the "next steps" required to topple the dictatorship. Without strategic analysis, resistance leaders will often not know what that "next step" should be, for they have not thought carefully about the successive specific step required to achieve victory. Creativity and bright ideas are very important, but they need to be utilized in order to advance the strategic situation of the democratic forces.

根據某人的「好主意」而採取之行動也是有限的。相反 的,我們必須根據仔細計算推翻獨裁政權所需的「下幾步」而 採取的行動。沒有戰略分析,抵抗運動的領導者往往不知道 「下一步」該是什麼,因為他們沒有仔細思考過贏得勝利所需 要的連續具體步驟。創造性與好主意固然重要,但是必須可以 使用它們,以推進民主勢力的戰略局勢。

Acutely aware of the multitude of actions that could be taken against the dictatorship and unable to determine where to begin, some people counsel "Do everything simultaneously" That might be helpful but, of course, is impossible, especially for relatively weak movements. Furthermore, such an approach provides no guidance on where to begin, on where to concentrate efforts, and how to use often limited resources. 有些人警覺地意識到對抗獨裁政權有無數可以採取的行動,卻無從決定要從哪裡開始,他們就建議「同時進行每一項 行動」。當然,這也許有幫助,但不幸的是,它不可能做到, 尤其是比較微弱的運動。甚至,這種做法對運動要從哪裡開 始、力量應集中在何處、以及如何使用往往有限的資源,提不 出指導的方針。

Other persons and groups may see the need for some planning, but are only able to think about it on a short-term or tactical basis. They may not see that longer-term planning is necessary or possible. They may at times be unable to think and analyze in strategic terms, allowing themselves to be repeatedly distracted by relatively small issues, often responding to the opponents' actions rather than seizing the initiative for the democratic resistance. Devoting so much energy to short-term activities, these leaders often fail to explore several alternative courses of action which could guide the overall efforts so that the goal is constantly approached.

另一些個人與團體可能了解某種程度的規劃是必要的, 但是只在短期或戰術性的基礎上加以考慮。他們可能沒有了解 長期規劃是必須的或者是可能的。他們也許有時候因為一些比 較小的議題分散了他們的注意力、而無法從戰略的角度進行思 考與分析,往往只就對手的行動作出回應,而不是爲民主抵抗 運動把握住主動性。這些領導者把這麼多精力放在短期的活動 上,往往不能探討行動路徑過程的許多替代方案,從而指導他 們整體的努力,以便持續穩定地邁向目標。

It is also just possible that some democratic movements do not plan a comprehensive strategy to bring down the dictatorship, concentrating instead only on immediate issues, for another reason. Inside themselves, they do not really believe that the dictatorship can be ended by their own efforts. Therefore, planning how to do so is considered to be a romantic waste of time or an exercise in futility. People struggling for freedom against established brutal dictatorships are often confronted by such immense military and police power that it appears the dictators can accomplish whatever they will. Lacking real hope, these people will, nevertheless, defy the dictatorship for reasons of integrity and perhaps history. Though they will never admit it, perhaps never consciously recognize it, their actions appear to themselves as hopeless. Hence, for them, long-term comprehensive strategic planning has no merit.

民主運動也剛好可能有其他原因,不制定打倒獨裁政權 的全面戰略,而只專注於當前迫切的議題。在他們自己內心, 他們並不真正相信靠自己的努力就能夠終結獨裁統治。因此, 規劃如何去實現它被認爲是浪漫的浪費時間、或是白費力氣的 事。爲自由而對當前殘暴獨裁政權進行抗爭的人們,往往面對 如此強大之軍事與警察的力量,看起來似乎獨裁者可以爲所欲 爲。雖然缺乏真正的希望,這些人民還是會出於尊嚴,也許還 有歷史的原因,而反抗獨裁政權。儘管他們永遠不會承認它, 也許永遠不會有以意識地認知到它,但他們的行動從自己的角 度來看是毫無希望的。因此,對他們來說,長期而全面的戰略 規劃是沒有價值的。 The result of such failures to plan strategically is often drastic: one's strength is dissipated, one's actions are ineffective, energy is wasted on minor issues, advantages are not utilized, and sacrifices are for naught. If democrats do not plan strategically they are likely to fail to achieve their objectives. A poorly planned, odd mixture of activities will not move a major resistance effort forward. Instead, it will more likely allow the dictatorship to increase its controls and power.

不能進行戰略規劃的結果往往是嚴厲的:人們的力量被消 耗了、人們的行動沒有效果、能量浪費在次要的議題上、優勢 沒有受到運用、白白作了犧牲。民主陣營如果不作戰略性的規 劃,很可能無法達到他們的目的。一個規劃得很差的行動大雜 燴不可能把一個重大的抵抗活動往前推進。相反的,它更可能 讓獨裁政權加強它的控制與權力。

Unfortunately, because comprehensive strategic plans for liberation are rarely, if ever, developed, dictatorships appear much more durable than they in fact are. They survive for years or decades longer than need be the case.

不幸的是,因爲很少有人,如果曾經有,制定全面完整的 解放戰略規劃,這些獨裁政權看起來就顯得比他們實際上要長 命而耐久得多。他們存活的時間比應該有的還要長數年或數十 年。

### Four important terms in strategic planning 戰略規劃的四個重要名詞

In order to help us to think strategically, clarity about the

meanings of four basic terms is important.

爲了幫助我們作戰略性的思考,四個基本術語的明確定義 是重要的。

*Grand strategy* is the conception that serves to coordinate and direct the use of all appropriate and available resources (economic, human, moral, political, organizational, etc.) of a group seeking to attain its objectives in a conflict.

「總體大戰略」是這樣一個概念,它的功能是讓一個試圖 在衝突中實現其目標的陣營,可以協調與指揮一切適當的與現 有的資源(經濟的、人力的、道義的、政治的、組織的等等)之 運用。

Grand strategy by focusing primary attention on the group's objectives and resources in the conflict, determines the most appropriate technique of action (such as conventional military warfare or nonviolent struggle) to be employed in the conflict. In planning a grand strategy resistance leaders must evaluate and plan which pressures and influences are to be brought to bear upon the opponents. Further, grand strategy will include decisions on the appropriate conditions and timing under which initial and subsequent resistance campaigns will be launched.

透過把主要注意力放在衝突中陣營之目標與資源,總體大 戰略決定在衝突中應當使用之最恰當的行動技術(例如傳統軍事 戰爭或是非暴力抗爭)。抵抗運動的領導者在規劃總體大戰略 的時候,必須評估與計劃向對手施加哪些壓力與影響。進一步 140 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

說,總體大戰略應該包括決定發動初始的及隨後之各場抵抗活動的適當條件與時機。

Grand strategy sets the basic framework for the selection of more limited strategies for waging the struggle. Grand strategy also determines the allocation of general tasks to particular groups and the distribution of resources to them for use in the struggle.

總體大戰略是為了選擇更多之小型策略以啟動抗爭而建立 的基本架構。總體大戰略也決定將總體任務分配給特定之團體 以及分配抗爭中他們可以使用的資源。

*Strategy* is the conception of how best to achieve particular objectives in a conflict, operating within the scope of the chosen grand strategy. Strategy is concerned with whether, when, and how to fight, as well as how to achieve maximum effectiveness in struggling for certain ends. A strategy has been compared to the artist's concept, while a strategic plan is the architect's blueprint.<sup>1</sup>

「策略」是這樣一個概念,即在所選擇的總體大戰略的範 圍內,如何在衝突中最佳地實現特定的目標。策略的關注在是 否、何時及如何戰鬥,以及在爲特定之目的而抗爭的時候,如 何達到最大的效果。一個策略好比畫家的構思,而策略性的規 劃好比是建築師的藍圖<sup>1</sup>。

<sup>1</sup> Robert Helvey, personal communication. 15 August 1993. 羅伯特哈爾維,私人通信,1993年8月15日。

Strategy may also include efforts to develop a strategic situation that is so advantageous that the opponents are able to foresee that open conflict is likely to bring their certain defeat, and therefore capitulate without an open struggle. Or, if not, the improved strategic situation will make success of the challengers certain in struggle. Strategy also involves how to act to make good use of successes when gained.

策略也可以包括發展有利之策略情勢的工作,以至讓對 手能夠預見到公開的衝突有可能導致他們某些註定的挫敗,因 此不必經過公開抗爭而投降。否則,如果對方不這樣做,那麼 由於戰略局勢的改善,會使挑戰陣營在抗爭中會肯定地贏得勝 利。策略還包括一旦取得成功時如何行動以便充份利用這個勝 利的果實。

Applied to the course of the struggle itself, the strategic plan is the basic idea of how a campaign shall develop, and how its separate components shall be fitted together to contribute most advantageously to achieve its objectives. It involves the skillful deployment of particular action groups in smaller operations. Planning for a wise strategy must take into consideration the requirements for success in the operation of the chosen technique of struggle. Different techniques will have different requirements. Of course, just fulfilling "requirements" is not sufficient to ensure success. Additional factors may also be needed.

應用於抗爭過程本身時,策略性的規劃就是這樣一個基本 概念:如何發展運動,以及如何將運動之各個組成部份整合一 142 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

起以便最有利地實現它的目標。它包括在較小的行動中熟練地 部署特定的行動團體。制定一個睿智之策略規劃、必須考慮所 選定之抗爭方法在運作中取得成功的必要條件。不同的方法會 有不同的必要條件。當然,僅僅滿足「必要條件」並不足以保 證成功。其他因素可能還是必要的。

In devising strategies, the democrats must clearly define their objectives and determine how to measure the effectiveness of efforts to achieve them. This definition and analysis permits the strategist to identify the precise requirements for securing each selected objective. This need for clarity and definition applies equally to tactical planning.

在制定策略時,民主陣營必須明確定義他們的目標,並且 決定如何衡量為實現這些目標所作努力的效果。這個定義與分 析讓戰略規劃者能夠確認為達到所選擇每一項目標的明確必要 條件。這種對清晰性與定義的必要性同樣適用於戰術的規劃。

Tactics and methods of action are used to implement the strategy. *Tactics* relate to the skillful use of one's forces to the best advantage in a limited situation. A tactic is a limited action, employed to achieve a restricted objective. The choice of tactics is governed by the conception of how best in a restricted phase of a conflict to utilize the available means of fighting to implement the strategy. To be most effective, tactics and methods must be chosen and applied with constant attention to the achievement of strategic objectives. Tactical gains that do not reinforce the attainment of strategic objectives may in the end turn out to be wasted energy.

戰術與方法是用來執行策略的。「戰術」是指在小型的局 勢裡,熟練地運用自己的力量以取得最大優勢的作為。戰術是 小型的行動,用來達到一個有限的目標。戰術的選擇取決於這 樣一個概念,即在衝突中的一個有限階段、如何利用現有的戰 鬥手段來執行策略。為了達到最大的效果,戰術與方法的選擇 與運用,必須持續注意策略目標的實現。不能強化實現策略目 標的戰術性成果,最終可能只是能量的浪費。

A tactic is thus concerned with a limited course of action that fits within the broad strategy, just as a strategy fits within the grand strategy. Tactics are always concerned with fighting, whereas strategy includes wider considerations. A particular tactic can only be understood as part of the overall strategy of a battle or a campaign. Tactics are applied for shorter periods of time than strategies, or in smaller areas (geographical, institutional, etc.), or by a more limited number of people, or for more limited objectives. In nonviolent action the distinction between a tactical objective and a strategic objective may be partly indicated by whether the chosen objective of the action is minor or major.

因此,戰術關注的是符合廣泛策略的小型行動,正如同策 略符合總體大戰略一樣。戰術總是同戰鬥有關,而策略則包含 更廣泛的考慮。一個特殊的戰術只能被理解為一場戰鬥或活動 之總策略的一部份。跟策略相比,戰術用於較短的時間或較小 的區域(地理的、機構的等等),或運用較有限的人數,或設定 較小型的目標。在非暴力行動中,戰術目標與策略目標之間的 144 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

#### 差別可以部份地由所選定之行動目標的大小來區別。

Offensive tactical engagements are selected to support attainment of strategic objectives. Tactical engagements are the tools of the strategist in creating conditions favorable for delivering decisive attacks against an opponent. It is most important, therefore, that those given responsibility for planning and executing tactical operations be skilled in assessing the situation, and selecting the most appropriate methods for it. Those expected to participate must be trained in the use of the chosen technique and the specific methods.

選擇攻擊性的戰術交戰,是為了支持實現策略性的目標。 戰術性的交戰是策略規劃者的工具,用以引導創造有利於向對 手發動關鍵性攻擊的條件。因此,最重要的是,身負規劃與執 行戰術行動責任的人要具有對局勢的評估、及選擇最適合這種 局勢的熟悉技能。預期要參與行動的人們,必須接受使用所選 擇之技巧與特定方法的訓練。

*Method* refers to the specific weapons or means of action. Within the technique of nonviolent struggle, these include the dozens of particular forms of action (such as the many kinds of strikes, boycotts, political noncooperation, and the like) cited in Chapter Five. (See also Appendix.)

「方法」是指行動的具體武器或手段。在非暴力抗爭的技 巧中,包括第五章裡提到的幾十種具體的行動形式(例如許多種 罷工、抵制、政治不合作等等)。(也請參見附錄)
The development of a responsible and effective strategic plan for a nonviolent struggle depends upon the careful formulation and selection of the grand strategy, strategies, tactics, and methods.

研擬一個非暴力抗爭之可靠而有效的戰略性規劃,有賴於 細心地擬定及選擇總體大戰略、策略、戰術、與方法。

The main lesson of this discussion is that a calculated use of one's intellect is required in careful strategic planning for liberation from a dictatorship. Failure to plan intelligently can contribute to disasters, while the effective use of one's intellectual capacities can chart a strategic course that will judiciously utilize one's available resources to move the society toward the goal of liberty and democracy.

這一章討論主要的教訓是,為了從獨裁政權下獲得解放, 必須精密地使用人們的智慧,以進行仔細的戰略規劃。沒有睿 智地進行規劃,會導致災難。而有效地使用人們的智慧能力, 可以繪出一張戰略性的路徑過程圖案,這張圖案將指導性地利 用人們擁有的資源,將社會往朝向自由與民主的目標推進。



In order to increase the chances for success, resistance leaders will need to formulate a comprehensive plan of action capable of strengthening the suffering people, weakening and then destroying the dictatorship, and building a durable democracy. To achieve such a plan of action, a careful assessment of the situation and of the options for effective action is needed. Out of such a careful analysis both a grand strategy and the specific campaign strategies for achieving freedom can be developed. Though related, the development of grand strategy and campaign strategies are two separate processes. Only after the grand strategies be fully developed. Campaign strategies will need to be designed to achieve and reinforce the grand strategic objectives.

爲了增加成功的機會,抵抗運動的領導者必須擬訂一套完整的行動計劃,足以增強受苦受難之群衆的力量、削弱並最後 摧毀獨裁政權、並且建設一個可長可久的民主體制。為了完成 這樣一個行動計劃,必須對局勢與採取有效行動之選項作仔細 的評估。經過這樣的仔細分析,就能制定出實現自由之總體大 戰略與具體的運動策略。總體大戰略與運動策略的制定儘管互 有聯繫,但它們是兩個不同的過程。只有在總體大戰略制定完 成以後,才能充份地制定具體的運動策略。運動策略的設計必

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須是爲了達成與強化總體大戰略的目標。

The development of resistance strategy requires attention to many questions and tasks. Here we shall identify some of the important factors that need to be considered, both at the grand strategic level and the level of campaign strategy. All strategic planning, however, requires that the resistance planners have a profound understanding of the entire conflict situation, including attention to physical, historical, governmental, military, cultural, social, political, psychological, economic, and international factors. Strategies can only be developed in the context of the particular struggle and its background.

制定抵抗運動的策略,必須要注意許多問題與任務。在這 裡,我們將確認在總體大戰略與運動策略層次上需要考慮的一 些重要因素。不過,所有的戰略規劃,都會要求抵抗運動的規 劃者對整體衝突局勢有深刻的了解,包括對實體的、歷史的、 政府的、軍事的、文化的、社會的、政治的、心理的、經濟 的、及國際的等因素。只有在考慮特殊的抗爭及其背景的範圍 下才有可能制定這些戰略。

Of primary importance, democratic leaders and strategic planners will want to assess the objectives and importance of the cause. Are the objectives worth a major struggle, and why? It is critical to determine the real objective of the struggle. We have argued here that overthrow of the dictatorship or removal of the present dictators is *not* enough.

The objective in these conflicts needs to be the establishment of a free society with a democratic system of government. Clarity on this point will influence the development of a grand strategy and of the ensuing specific strategies.

最重要的是,民主陣營的領導者與戰略規劃者應當評估 運動之目標與理念的重要性。這些目標值得進行一個大規模的 抗爭嗎、而且是為了什麼?確定抗爭的真正目標是具有關鍵性 的。我們在這裡要強調推翻獨裁政權或趕走當政的獨裁者是 「不夠」的。這些衝突的目標必須是建立一個民主體制政府的 自由社會。對這一個要點的明確無誤,會影響總體大戰略以及 一系列具體策略的制定。

Particularly, strategists will need to answer many fundamental questions, such as these:

特別地,戰略規劃者必須回答許多根本性的問題,例如這些:

- What are the main obstacles to achieving freedom?
- 爲實現自由,有哪些主要障礙?
- What factors will facilitate achieving freedom?
- 哪些因素會有助於實現自由?
- What are the main strengths of the dictatorship?
- 獨裁政權的主要優勢是哪些?
- What are the various weaknesses of the dictatorship?
- 獨裁政權有哪些不同的弱點?
- To what degree are the sources of power for the dictatorship vulnerable?

- 獨裁政權之這些權力來源易受攻擊的程度有多大?
- What are the strengths of the democratic forces and the general population?
- ■民主勢力與一般群眾的優勢是哪些?
- What are the weaknesses of the democratic forces and how can they be corrected?
- ■民主勢力的弱點是哪些、如何改正這些缺點?
- What is the status of third parties, not immediately involved in the conflict, who already assist or might assist either the dictatorship or the democratic movement, and if so in what ways?
- 沒有立即涉入衝突之第三者的情況如何,哪些人已經或 可能協助獨裁政權或民主運動?如果有,以什麼方式?

# Choice of means 手段的選擇

At the grand strategic level, planners will need to choose the main means of struggle to be employed in the coming conflict. The merits and limitations of several alternative techniques of struggle will need to be evaluated, such as conventional military warfare, guerrilla warfare, political defiance, and others.

在總體大戰略的層次上,規劃者必須選擇未來衝突中將 要使用的主要抗爭手段。必須評估抗爭之不同替代技術的優點 與限制,例如傳統的軍事戰、游擊戰、政治反抗及其他手段等 等。

In making this choice the strategists will need to consider such questions as the following: Is the chosen type of struggle within the capacities of the democrats? Does the chosen technique utilize strengths of the dominated population? Does this technique target the weaknesses of the dictatorship, or does it strike at its strongest points? Do the means help the democrats become more self-reliant, or do they require dependency on third parties or external suppliers? What is the record of the use of the chosen means in bringing down dictatorships? Do they increase or limit the casualties and destruction that may be incurred in the coming conflict? Assuming success in ending the dictatorship, what effect would the selected means have on the type of government that would arise from the struggle? The types of action determined to be counterproductive will need to be excluded in the developed grand strategy.

進行這些策略之選擇的時候,戰略規劃者必須考慮如下的 一些問題:所選擇的抗爭方式是民主陣營能力所及嗎?所選擇 的技術運用了被統治群衆的優勢嗎?這個技術有針對獨裁政權 的弱點、還是打擊在它的最強處?這些手段是否有助於民主陣 營更能夠自力更生、還是需要依靠第三者或外來支持者?運用 所選擇之手段打倒獨裁政權的記錄如何?這些手段是增加還是 減少未來衝突中發生的傷亡與破壞?假設能夠成功地終結獨裁 政權,所選擇的手段對抗爭結果所產生的政府類型會有什麼影 響?在所制定的總體大戰略中,必須排除已經被確定有反效果 的那些行動。 In previous chapters we have argued that political defiance offers significant comparative advantages to other techniques of struggle. Strategists will need to examine their particular conflict situation and determine whether political defiance provides affirmative answers to the above questions.

在前面幾章裡,我們強調政治反抗比其他抗爭之技術具有 顯著的優點。戰略規劃者必須研究他們特殊的衝突局勢,並且 確定政治反抗是否對上述問題提供了正面的答案。

#### Planning for democracy 爲民主而規劃

It should be remembered that against a dictatorship the objective of the grand strategy is not simply to bring down the dictators but to install a democratic system and make the rise of a new dictatorship impossible. To accomplish these objectives, the chosen means of struggle will need to contribute to a change in the distribution of effective power in the society. Under the dictatorship the population and civil institutions of the society have been too weak, and the government too strong. Without a change in this imbalance, a new set of rulers can, if they wish, be just as dictatorial as the old ones. A "palace revolution" or a coup d'état therefore is not welcome.

應當記住,反對獨裁政權的總體大戰略,其目標不只是 要打倒獨裁者,而是要建立一個民主體制,並且使新的獨裁政 權不可能復辟。爲實現這些目標,所選擇的抗爭手段必須有助 於改變社會上有效權力的分配。在獨裁統治下,群衆與公民機

構太軟弱,而政府太強大。如果不改變這種不平衡,一批新的 統治者,如果他們想這樣做的話,會與舊統治者一樣獨裁。因 此,一場「宮廷革命」或者是政變都是不受歡迎的。

Political defiance contributes to a more equitable distribution of effective power through the mobilization of the society against the dictatorship, as was discussed in Chapter Five. This process occurs in several ways. The development of a nonviolent struggle capacity means that the dictatorship's capacity for violent repression no longer as easily produces intimidation and submission among the population. The population will have at its disposal powerful means to counter and at times block the exertion of the dictators' power. Further, the mobilization of popular power through political defiance will strengthen the independent institutions of the society. The experience of once exercising effective power is not quickly forgot. The knowledge and skill gained in struggle will make the population less likely to be easily dominated by would-be dictators. This shift in power relationships would ultimately make establishment of a durable democratic society much more likely.

如第五章所討論的那樣,政治反抗、透過社會動員反對獨 裁政權,有助於有效權力比較公平的分配。這種過程以幾種方 式發生。非暴力抗爭能力的發展意味著獨裁政權暴力鎭壓的能 力不再容易地在群衆當中產生恐嚇與屈服。人民將擁有反制與 有時候可以阻止獨裁者行使其權力的強大運用力量。另外,透 過政治反抗來動員群衆的權力將可以加強社會中的獨立機構。 一旦行使過了有效權力,這種經驗是不會很快忘記的。抗爭中 獲得之知識與技能不大可能輕易地讓人民接受未來可能之獨裁 者的控制。這種權力關係的轉移改變最終會讓建立可長可久的 民主社會更有可能。

# External assistance 外來支援

As part of the preparation of a grand strategy it is necessary to assess what will be the relative roles of internal resistance and external pressures for disintegrating the dictatorship. In this analysis we have argued that the main force of the struggle must be borne from inside the country itself. To the degree that international assistance comes at all, it will be stimulated by the internal struggle.

在總體大戰略的準備中,有一部份需要評估內部抵抗與 外部壓力在摧毀獨裁政權中所扮演的相對角色。在本文的分析 中,我們曾經強調抗爭的主要力量必須由國內自己來承擔。即 使到了總算有國際支援要到來的程度,它也是因爲受到內部抗 爭所激勵出來的。

As a modest supplement, efforts can be made to mobilize world public opinion against the dictatorship, on humanitarian, moral, and religious grounds. Efforts can be taken to obtain diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions by governments and international organizations against the dictatorship. These may take the forms of economic and military weapons embargoes, reduction in levels of diplomatic

recognition or the breaking of diplomatic ties, banning of economic assistance and prohibition of investments in the dictatorial country, expulsion of the dictatorial government from various international organizations and from United Nations bodies. Further, international assistance, such as the provision of financial and communications support, can also be provided directly to the democratic forces.

作為適度的補充,可以努力動員世界輿論基於人道、道 德與宗教的原因而反對獨裁。可以採取行動得到外國政府與國 際組織對獨裁政權在外交、政治與經濟上加以制裁。這些制裁 可以有如下的各種形式:經濟與軍事的武器禁運、降低外交承 認的層級或斷絕外交關係、禁止經濟援助與對獨裁國家進行投 資、把獨裁政權逐出各種國際組織與聯合國機構。另外,也可 以直接向民主勢力提供如財政與通訊等方面的國際支援。

# Formulating a grand strategy 制定總體大戰略

Following an assessment of the situation, the choice of means, and a determination of the role of external assistance, planners of the grand strategy will need to sketch in broad strokes how the conflict might best be conducted. This broad plan would stretch from the present to the future liberation and the institution of a democratic system. In formulating a grand strategy these planners will need to ask themselves a variety of questions. The following questions pose (in a more specific way than earlier) the types of considerations required in devising a grand strategy for a political defiance struggle:

在評估局勢、選擇手段與確定外來支援的角色以後,總體 大戰略的規劃者就必須綱要式地描述要如何對衝突的抗爭作最 好的指揮。這個總規劃要從現在延伸到未來之解放與民主體制 的建立。規劃者在制定總體大戰略時必須問自己各種不同的問 題。下面(比前面提到的更具體一些)提出在設計政治反威權抗 爭的總體大戰略時必需要考慮的問題:

How might the long-term struggle best begin? How can the oppressed population muster sufficient self-confidence and strength to act to challenge the dictatorship, even initially in a limited way? How could the population's capacity to apply noncooperation and defiance be increased with time and experience? What might be the objectives of a series of limited campaigns to regain democratic control over the society and limit the dictatorship?

長期抗爭最好如何開始?受壓迫人民如何激起足夠的自信 與力量以行動去挑戰獨裁政權,即使開始的時候是以小型有限 的方式?如何隨著時間與經驗的積累,增加人民實施不合作及 反抗的能力?為了重新取得以民主對社會的控制及對獨裁政權 的限制,一系列的小型運動應當有哪些目標?

Are there independent institutions that have survived the dictatorship which might be used in the struggle to establish freedom? What institutions of the society can be regained from the dictators' control, or what institutions need to be newly created by the democrats to meet their needs and establish spheres of democracy even while the dictatorship continues?

有沒有經歷獨裁統治而存活下來的獨立機構,可以在建立 自由的抗爭中加以運用?從獨裁者控制底下可以收復哪些社會 機構,或者在獨裁統治還是繼續的情況下,民主陣營需要創建 哪些機構以滿足自己的需要及建立民主的勢力範圍?

How can organizational strength in the resistance be developed? How can participants be trained? What resources (finances, equipment, etc.) will be required throughout the struggle? What types of symbolism can be most effective in mobilizing the population?

如何發展抵抗運動中組織性的力量?如何訓練參加的人? 在抗爭的全部過程中需要哪些資源(財務、設備等等)?什麼樣 的意象圖騰能夠最有效地動員群衆?

By what kinds of action and in what stages could the sources of power of the dictators be incrementally wakened and severed? How can the resisting population simultaneously persist in its defiance and also maintain the necessary nonviolent discipline? How can the society continue to meet its basic needs during the course of the struggle? How can social order be maintained in the midst of the conflict? As victory approaches, how can the democratic resistance continue to build the institutional base of the postdictatorship society to make the transition as smooth as possible?

用什麼樣的行動及在哪些階段能夠逐步削弱與切斷獨裁者 的權力來源?反抗的群衆怎樣才能既堅持反抗,同時又能保持

必要的非暴力紀律?在抗爭過程中,社會如何才能繼續滿足其 基本需求?在抗爭當中,社會秩序如何維持?當勝利接近來臨 時,民主抵抗運動如何繼續建立後獨裁社會的機構性基礎,使 得過渡時期儘可能地順利?

It must be remembered that no single blueprint exists or can be created to plan strategy for every liberation movement against dictatorships. Each struggle to bring down a dictatorship and establish a democratic system will be somewhat different. No two situations will be exactly alike, each dictatorship will have some individual characteristics, and the capacities of the freedom-seeking population will vary. Planners of grand strategy for a political defiance struggle will require a profound understanding not only of their specific conflict situation, but of their chosen means of struggle as well.<sup>1</sup>

必須記住,不存在也不可能創造單獨一份藍圖,用來為所 有反對獨裁政權的解放運動進行戰略規劃。每一個打倒獨裁政 權並且建立民主體制的抗爭都會有某些不同。沒有兩個情況是 完全一模一樣的,每一個獨裁政權會有某些自己的特性,而且

Recommended full length studies are Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, (Boston, Massachusetts: Porter Sargent, 1973) and Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994). Also see Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential. Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005.

推薦全文研讀的論述有:吉恩夏普「非暴力行動的政治」,(波士頓,麻州:波特薩金特,1973年)及彼得亞克曼(Peter Ackerman)與克里斯多福克魯格勒(Christopher Kruegler) 「戰略性的非暴力衝突」(魏斯波特,康州,佩雷格,1994年)。也請閱讀吉恩夏普「啓動非暴力抗爭:20世紀的實踐與21世紀的潛力」(波士頓,波特薩金特,2005年)。

爭取自由之群衆的能力也會不同。政治反威權抗爭之整體大戰 略的規劃者不僅須要對他們具體的衝突局勢有深入的了解,而 且對他們所選擇的抗爭手段,必須要有深刻的認識<sup>1</sup>。

When the grand strategy of the struggle has been carefully planned there are sound reasons for making it widely known. The large numbers of people required to participate may be more willing and able to act if they understand the general conception, as well as specific instructions. This knowledge could potentially have a very positive effect on their morale, their willingness to participate, and to act appropriately. The general outlines of the grand strategy would become known to the dictators in any case and knowledge of its features potentially could lead them to be less brutal in their repression knowing that it could rebound politically against themselves. Awareness of the special characteristics of the grand strategy could potentially also contribute to dissension and defections from the dictators' own camp.

當抗爭的總體大戰略經過仔細規劃完成的時候,有充份的 理由將它讓更多人知道。抗爭需要很多人來參與,如果他們可 以了解整體的概念以及具體的指示,他們可能會更有意願而且 更有能力來參加行動。這種知識對他們的士氣、參與的意願及 採取恰當的行動,具有非常潛在的正面效果。總體大戰略的整 體要點無論如何是會被獨裁者知道的,而知道了總體大戰略的 特點,可以潛在地使他們在鎭壓時減少殘暴一點,因爲他們會 意識到殘暴會在政治上對他們自己產生反撲。對總體大戰略特

點的了解潛在地助長在獨裁者自己陣營裡的意見分歧與起義來歸。

Once a grand strategic plan for bringing down the dictatorship and establishing a democratic system has been adopted, it is important for the pro-democracy groups to persist in applying it. Only in very rare circumstances should the struggle depart from the initial grand strategy. When there is abundant evidence that the chosen grand strategy was misconceived, or that the circumstances of the struggle have fundamentally changed, planners may need to alter the grand strategy. Even then, this should be done only after a basic reassessment has been made and a new more adequate grand strategic plan has been developed and adopted.

爲了打倒獨裁政權及建立民主體度的總體大戰略一旦被 採納以後,重要的是主張民主的陣營要堅定地運用它。只能在 極少數的情況下,抗爭才可以偏離最初的總體大戰略。當有大 量證據顯示所選擇之總體大戰略的設想有錯誤、或者抗爭之形 勢發生了根本性之轉變的時候,規劃者可能必須修改總體大戰 略。即使在這個時候,也只有在作了基本的重新評估、並且 制定及採納了新而更適當的總體大戰略規劃以後,才可以這麼 做。

# Planning campaign strategies 運動策略的規劃

However wise and promising the developed grand strategy to end the dictatorship and to institute democracy

may be, a grand strategy does not implement itself. Particular strategies will need to be developed to guide the major campaigns aimed at undermining the dictators' power. These strategies, in turn, will incorporate and guide a range of tactical engagements that will aim to strike decisive blows against the dictators' regime. The tactics and the specific methods of action must be chosen carefully so that they contribute to achieving the goals of each particular strategy. The discussion here focuses exclusively on the level of strategy.

爲了終結獨裁統治及建立民主體制而制定的總體大戰略, 不論多麼睿智及讓人有所期待,它是不會自己執行的。必須制 定特殊的策略,以指導旨在破壞獨裁者權力的各個主要運動。 這些策略反過來就會整合與指導旨在給予獨裁者政權致命打擊 的各種戰術性交鋒。必須仔細選擇戰術與具體的行動方法,使 它們有助於實現每一個具體策略的目標。這裡的討論集中僅限 於策略的層次。

Strategists planning the major campaigns will, like those who planned the grand strategy, require a thorough understanding of the nature and modes of operation of their chosen technique of struggle. Just as military officers must understand force structures, tactics, logistics, munitions, the effects of geography and the like in order to plot military strategy, political defiance planners must understand the nature and strategic principles of nonviolent struggle. Even then, however, knowledge of nonviolent struggle, attention

to recommendations in this essay, and answers to the questions posed here will not themselves produce strategies. The formulation of strategies for the struggle still requires an informed creativity.

總體大戰略的規劃者一樣,主要運動的策略規劃者必須 要對他們所選擇之抗爭技術的本質與運作方式有全面的了解。 正如同軍官為了制定軍事戰略必須了解軍隊的結構、戰術、後 勤、彈藥、地理條件的影響等等一樣,政治反抗的規劃者必須 了解非暴力抗爭的本質與策略性的原則。然而即使如此,了解 非暴力抗爭的知識、注意到本文的建議及回答了這裡所提出的 一些問題,它們並不會自己產生策略。為抗爭而制定策略,仍 然必須要有充分資訊的創造力。

In planning the strategies for the specific selective resistance campaigns and for the longer term development of the liberation struggle, the political defiance strategists will need to consider various issues and problems. The following are among these:

在為具體而已經做了選擇的反抗運動方式及發展較長期之 解放抗爭而制定策略規劃的時候,政治反抗之策略規劃者必須 考慮各種議題與問題。其中包括:

- Determination of the specific objectives of the campaign and their contributions to implementing the grand strategy.
- 確定運動之具體目標以及它們對實現總體大戰略的貢獻。

- Consideration of the specific methods, or political weapons, that can best be used to implement the chosen strategies. Within each overall plan for a particular strategic campaign it will be necessary to determine what smaller, tactical plans and which specific methods of action should be used to impose pressures and restrictions against the dictatorship's sources of power. It should be remembered that the achievement of major objectives will come as a result of carefully chosen and implemented specific smaller steps.
- 為了所選擇策略的執行,要考慮最有用之具體方法或政治武器。在每一個特定之策略性運動的整體計劃中,有必要決定運用哪些較小而戰術性的計劃及哪些具體的行動方法,以對獨裁政權的權力來源施加壓力與限制。應當記住,主要目標之實現是在較小具體步驟的仔細選擇與執行所產生的結果。
- Determination whether, or how, economic issues should be related to the overall essentially political struggle. If economic issues are to be prominent in the struggle, care will be needed that the economic grievances can actually be remedied after the dictatorship is ended. Otherwise, disillusionment and disaffection may set in if quick solutions are not provided during the transition period to a democratic society. Such disillusionment could facilitate the rise of dictatorial forces promising an end to economic woes.

- 確定是否,或如何,把經濟議題連結到整體而重要的政治性抗爭。如果在抗爭中經濟議題會很突出,必須注意讓經濟的不滿訴求在獨裁統治終結以後實際上能夠得到解決。否則,在民主社會過渡時期如果不能提供迅速的解決辦法,可能會滲入失望與不滿。這種失望可能會造成產生承諾終結經濟困難之獨裁勢力的出現。
- Determination in advance of what kind of leadership structure and communications system will work best for initiating the resistance struggle. What means of decision-making and communication will be possible during the course of the struggle to give continuing guidance to the resisters and the general population.
- 為了啓動抵抗抗爭,要事先決定什麼樣的領導結構及通 訊系統會運作得最好。在抗鬥爭過程中,什麼樣的決策 與通訊管道能夠提供給抵抗者及廣大群眾不斷的指導。
- Communication of the resistance news to the general population, to the dictators' forces, and the international press. Claims and reporting should always be strictly factual. Exaggerations and unfounded claims will undermine the credibility of the resistance.
- 向一般大眾、獨裁者陣營與國際媒體傳達抵抗運動的新 聞。一切聲明與報導必須嚴格符合事實。誇大其詞與沒 有根據的聲明會破壞抵抗運動的信譽。
- Plans for self-reliant constructive social, educational, economic, and political activities to meet the needs of one's own people during the coming conflict. Such projects can be conducted by persons not directly

involved in the resistance activities.

- 規劃自力更生而有建設性之社會、教育、經濟與政治性的活動,以滿足即將到來的衝突過程中自己人民的需求。這些計畫項目可以由不直接參與抵抗活動的人來運作。
- Determination of what kind of external assistance is desirable in support of the specific campaign or the general liberation struggle. How can external help be best mobilized and used without making the internal struggle dependent on uncertain external factors? Attention will need to be given to which external groups are most likely, and most appropriate, to assist, such as non-governmental organizations (social movements, religious or political groups, labor unions, etc.), governments, and/or the United Nations and its various bodies.
- 決定期待什麼樣的外援可以支持具體的運動或總體的解放抗爭。如何最好地動員與運用外部援助、而不致於使内部抗爭依賴不確定的外部因素?必須要注意哪些外部團體最有可能、也最適合援助,例如非政府組織(社會運動、宗教或政治團體、工會等等)、政府以及(或者)聯合國及其下屬各機構。

Furthermore, the resistance planners will need to take measures to preserve order and to meet social needs by one's own forces during mass resistance against dictatorial controls. This will not only create alternative independent

democratic structures and meet genuine needs, but also will reduce credibility for any claims that ruthless repression is required to halt disorder and lawlessness.

除此之外,在反對獨裁控制的群衆抵抗運動過程中,抵抗 運動的規劃者必須採取措施,維持秩序及滿足自己陣營的社會 需求。這樣做不僅會創建替代性的獨立民主機構與滿足眞實的 需求,而且還會減少任何聲稱必須要以無情之鎭壓才能中止騷 亂失序與目無法紀之局面的可信度。

# Spreading the idea of noncooperation 傳播不合作的理念

For successful political defiance against a dictatorship, it is essential that the population grasp the idea of noncooperation. As illustrated by the "Monkey Master" story (see Chapter Three), the basic idea is simple: if enough of the subordinates refuse to continue their cooperation long enough despite repression, the oppressive system will be weakened and finally collapse.

為了讓對抗獨裁政權的政治反抗可以成功,社會大衆必須 掌握體會不合作的理念。正如「狙公」的故事(見第三章)所闡 明的,這個基本理念很簡單:儘管受到鎭壓,如果有足夠數量 的部屬在足夠長的時間裡拒絕繼續合作,暴虐的體制就會遭到 削弱而最終崩潰。

People living under the dictatorship may be already familiar with this concept from a variety of sources. Even so, the democratic forces should deliberately spread and

popularize the idea of noncooperation. The "Monkey Master" story, or a similar one, could be disseminated throughout the society. Such a story could be easily understood. Once the general concept of noncooperation is grasped, people will be able to understand the relevance of future calls to practice noncooperation with the dictatorship. They will also be able on their own to improvise a myriad of specific forms of noncooperation in new situations.

生活在獨裁政權統治下的人們可能已經從不同的來源熟悉 這個理念。儘管如此,民主勢力應當有意識地傳播及推廣這個 不合作的理念。可以在全社會散佈「狙公」或類似的故事。這 種故事很容易理解。人們一旦掌握體會了不合作的整體理念, 他們就能夠理解今後針對獨裁政權實行不合作之號召的相關意 義。他們自己也將能夠在新形勢下即興創造出許多不合作的具 體形式。

Despite the difficulties and dangers in attempts to communicate ideas, news, and resistance instructions while living under dictatorships, democrats have frequently proved this to be possible. Even under Nazi and Communist rule it was possible for resisters to communicate not only with other individuals but even with large public audiences through the production of illegal newspapers, leaflets, books, and in later years with audio and video cassettes.

儘管生活在獨裁統治下,企圖傳播理念、新聞與抵抗的 指示存在著困難與危險,民主人士已經證明這些工作往往還是 可能做到的。即使在納粹與共產黨的統治下,抵抗份子不僅能

夠與其他個人進行聯繫,並且能夠透過發行地下報紙、傳單、 書本以及近年來利用錄音帶與錄影帶與廣大的公衆進行溝通聯 繫。

With the advantage of prior strategic planning, general guidelines for resistance can be prepared and disseminated. These can indicate the issues and circumstances under which the population should protest and withhold cooperation, and how this might be done. Then, even if communications from the democratic leadership are severed, and specific instructions have not been issued or received, the population will know how to act on certain important issues. Such guidelines would also provide a test to identify counterfeit "resistance instructions" issued by the political police designed to provoke discrediting action.

戰略性規劃可以事先進行的優點,讓抵抗運動的一般指導 原則可以準備及散佈。這些指導原則可以指出,在哪些議題與 情況下民衆應當抗議及拒絕合作,以及如何完成它們。這種情 況,即使來自民主運動領導階層的通訊被切斷,並且沒有發出 或收到具體指示,民衆還是會知道針對某些重要議題應該如何 行動。這些指導原則還可以提供一種檢驗,用來鑑別政治警察 為了製造中傷行動而僞造的「抵抗運動指示」。

# Repression and countermeasures 鎮壓與反制措施

Strategic planners will need to assess the likely responses and repression, especially the threshold of

violence, of the dictatorship to the actions of the democratic resistance. It will be necessary to determine how to withstand, counteract, or avoid this possible increased repression without submission. Tactically for specific occasions, appropriate warnings to the population and the resisters about expected repression would be in order, so that they will know the risks of participation. If repression may be serious, preparations for medical assistance for wounded resisters should be made.

戰略規劃者必須評估獨裁政權對民主抵抗運動可能的回應 與鎭壓,特別是使用暴力的臨界點。有必要確定如何承受、反 擊或避免這種可能增強的鎭壓而不致屈服。戰術上在特定的情 況,需要向群衆與抵抗份子提出可能會進行鎭壓的適當警告, 使他們知道參與行動的風險。如果鎭壓可能相當嚴重,應當做 好對受傷之抵抗者提供醫療支援的準備。

Anticipating repression, the strategists will do well to consider in advance the use of tactics and methods that will contribute to achieving the specific goal of a campaign, or liberation, but that will make brutal repression less likely or less possible. For example, street demonstrations and parades against extreme dictatorships may be dramatic, but they may also risk thousands of dead demonstrators. The high cost to the demonstrators may not, however, actually apply more pressure on the dictatorship than would occur through everyone staying home, a strike, or massive acts of noncooperation from the civil servants.

要預料到會有鎭壓,戰略規劃者最好事先考慮採用有助 於實現解放或某個運動之具體目標,而且又能減少殘暴鎭壓之 可能性的戰術與方法。例如,針對極端獨裁政權的街頭示威與 遊行也許很有戲劇性,但也可能冒著數以千計示威者死亡的風 險。不過,示威者付出的高昂代價,可能實際上不會比每個人 呆在家裡、罷工或者公務員大規模不合作的行為,能夠對獨裁 政權施加更大的壓力。

If it has been proposed that provocative resistance action risking high casualties will be required for a strategic purpose, then one should very carefully consider the proposal's costs and possible gains. Will the population and the resisters be likely to behave in a disciplined and nonviolent manner during the course of the struggle? Can they resist provocations to violence? Planners must consider what measures may be taken to keep nonviolent discipline and maintain the resistance despite brutalities. Will such measures as pledges, policy statements, discipline leaflets, marshals for demonstrations, and boycotts of pro-violence persons and groups be possible and effective? Leaders should always be alert for the presence of *agents provocateurs* whose mission will be to incite the demonstrators to violence.

如果有人建議為了某個戰略性的目的,必須採取冒著大 量傷亡風險的挑釁式抵抗行動,那麼就應當非常小心地考慮這 項建議的代價與可能的收穫。在抗爭的過程中,民衆與抵抗者 是否有可能保持有紀律與非暴力的行為?他們是否能抵抗有人 煽動採用暴力?規劃者必須考慮,儘管面對暴行,可以採取哪 些措施來維持非暴力的紀律並且維續抗爭。類似誓言、政策聲 明、紀律傳單、示威糾察隊及抵制暴力傾向之個人與團體等措 施,是否行得通而且有效?領導者對專門負責激發示威群衆採 用暴力的「煽動份子」,應當永遠保持警覺。

# Adhering to the strategic plan 遵守這個戰略性規劃

Once a sound strategic plan is in place, the democratic forces should not be distracted by minor moves of the dictators that may tempt them to depart from the grand strategy and the strategy for a particular campaign, causing them to focus major activities on unimportant issues. Nor should the emotions of the moment—perhaps in response to new brutalities by the dictatorship—be allowed to divert the democratic resistance from its grand strategy or the campaign strategy. The brutalities may have been perpetrated precisely in order to provoke the democratic forces to abandon their well-laid plan and even to commit violent acts in order that the dictators could more easily defeat them.

一旦有了一個健全的戰略規劃,民主勢力不應當受到獨裁 者一些次要的動作而分散其注意力,這些次要動作有可能誘使 他們偏離總體大戰略及某一特定運動的策略,使他們把重大的 活動集中到不重要的議題上去。也不應當讓一時的情緒一也許 是對獨裁政權新暴行的反應一使民主抵抗運動偏離它的總體大 戰略或運動的策略。那些暴行的施行,可能正是爲了挑撥民主 勢力讓他們放棄考慮周到的規劃,甚至作出暴力的行動,使獨 裁者更容易擊敗他們。

As long as the basic analysis is judged to be sound, the task of the pro-democracy forces is to press forward stage by stage. Of course, changes in tactics and intermediate objectives will occur and good leaders will always be ready to exploit opportunities. These adjustments should not be confused with objectives of the grand strategy or the objectives of the specific campaign. Careful implementation of the chosen grand strategy and of strategies for particular campaigns will greatly contribute to success.

只要認定基本的分析是健全的,愛好民主勢力的任務就是 一步一腳印地向前推進。當然,戰術與中間過程的目標可能會 有變更,而優秀的領導者都會有所準備而隨時利用機會。這些 調整不能與總體大戰略的目標或具體運動的目標混爲一談。小 心謹慎地執行所選定的總體大戰略與特定運動的策略,會大大 有助於達到成功。

# APPLYING POLITICAL DEFIANCE 政治反抗的運用

In situations in which the population feels powerless and frightened, it is important that initial tasks for the public be low-risk, confidence-building actions. These types of actions—such as wearing one's clothes in an unusual way may publicly register a dissenting opinion and provide an opportunity for the public to participate significantly in acts of dissent. In other cases a relatively minor (on the surface) nonpolitical issue (such as securing a safe water supply) might be made the focus for group action. Strategists should choose an issue the merits of which will be widely recognized and difficult to reject. Success in such limited campaigns could not only correct specific grievances but also convince the population that it indeed has power potential.

在民衆感到無能為力與恐懼的情況下,交給社會大衆的最 初任務必須是低風險的而且是建立信心的任務。這些類型的行 動一例如以不尋常的方式穿衣服一可以公開表示一種異議,並 給社會大衆一個機會以顯著的方式參與異議行動。在另一些情 況下,可以以(表面上)比較次要而非政治性的議題(例如爭取供 應安全的水源)作爲集體行動的焦點。戰略規劃者應當選擇這樣 的議題,其價值會受到廣泛認可而且難以拒絕。在這類小型的 運動裡取得勝利不僅能解決具體的不滿訴求,而且使民衆確信 他們確實有潛在的權力。 Most of the strategies of campaigns in the long-term struggle should not aim for the immediate complete downfall of the dictatorship, but instead for gaining limited objectives. Nor does every campaign require the participation of all sections of the population.

大多數長期抗爭之各個運動的策略,不應當以立即徹底打 倒獨裁政權為目的,而相反的應當是為了完成小型的目的。也 不是每一個運動都需要群衆的各個部門都參加。

In contemplating a series of specific campaigns to implement the grand strategy the defiance strategists need to consider how the campaigns at the beginning, the middle, and near the conclusion of the long-term struggle will differ from each other.

在思考為執行總體大戰略之一系列具體運動的時候,政治 反抗的戰略規劃者必須考慮長期抗爭的初期、中期與接近終結 時各個階段之運動彼此的互相不同。

#### Selective resistance 選擇性的抵抗

In the initial stages of the struggle, separate campaigns with different specific objectives can be very useful. Such selective campaigns may follow one after the other. Occasionally, two or three might overlap in time.

在抗爭的初期階段,具有不同而具體目標的個別運動會很 有用處。這些有選擇性的運動可以一個接一個。有時候,兩、 三個運動可以在相同時間上重疊。

In planning a strategy for "selective resistance" it is necessary to identify specific limited issues or grievances that symbolize the general oppression of the dictatorship. Such issues may be the appropriate targets for conducting campaigns to gain intermediary strategic objectives within the over-all grand strategy.

在規劃「選擇性抵抗」的戰略時,有必要確定象徵獨裁政 權整體迫害的一些具體而小型的議題與不滿。這些議題可以作 為在總體大戰略範圍內、為了達到中期策略目標而開展運動的 適當標的。

These intermediary strategic objectives need to be attainable by the current or projected power capacity of the democratic forces. This helps to ensure a series of victories, which are good for morale, and also contribute to advantageous incremental shifts in power relations for the long-term struggle.

這些中期策略目標必須是民主陣營當前或預期之能力範圍 內能夠實現的。這樣就有助於保證一系列的勝利,這對士氣有 幫助,也有助於在長期抗爭中逐步有利地轉變權力關係。

Selective resistance strategies should concentrate primarily on specific social, economic, or political issues. These may be chosen in order to keep some part of the social and political system out of the dictators' control, to regain control of some part currently controlled by the dictators, or to deny the dictators a particular objective. If possible, the campaign of selective resistance should also strike at one weakness or more of the dictatorship, as already discussed. Thereby, democrats can make the greatest possible impact with their available power capacity.

選擇性抵抗的戰略應當主要集中於具體之社會、經濟與政 治上的議題。這些議題的選擇,可以是爲了讓社會與政治體系 的一部分不再受到獨裁者的控制、爲了奪回當前被獨裁者控制 的某些部份、或者拒絕讓獨裁者達到特殊的目的。如有可能, 選擇性抵抗的運動也應當如前面所討論的那樣,打擊獨裁政權 的一個或數個弱點。這樣,民主陣營就能用他們現有之權力能 量得到可能最大的衝擊。

Very early the strategists need to plan at least the strategy for the first campaign. What are to be its limited objectives? How will it help fulfill the chosen grand strategy? If possible, it is wise to formulate at least the general outlines of strategies for a second and possibly a third campaign. All such strategies will need to implement the chosen grand strategy and operate within its general guidelines.

戰略規劃者必須很早就規劃至少第一次運動的策略。它的 小型目標是甚麼?它如何有助於實現所選擇的總體大戰略?如 有可能,聰明的話至少要制定第二次、或許還有第三次運動的 策略大綱。所有這些策略都必須執行所選擇的總體大戰略,並 在其整體指導大綱的範圍之內運作。

Symbolic challenge 象徵性的挑戰 At the beginning of a new campaign to undermine the dictatorship, the first more specifically political actions may be limited in scope. They should be designed in part to test and influence the mood of the population, and to prepare them for continuing struggle through noncooperation and political defiance.

在破壞獨裁政權之新運動開始的時候,第一個比較具體之 政治行動的範圍可能有限。這些行動的設計,一部分應當是為 了測試及影響民衆的情緒,並且使他們有透過不合作與政治反 抗進行持續抗爭的準備。

The initial action is likely to take the form of symbolic protest or may be a symbolic act of limited or temporary noncooperation. If the number of persons willing to act is small, then the initial act might, for example, involve placing flowers at a place of symbolic importance. On the other hand, if the number of persons willing to act is very large, then a five minute halt to all activities or several minutes of silence might be used. In other situations, a few individuals might undertake a hunger strike, a vigil at a place of symbolic importance, a brief student boycott of classes, or a temporary sit-in at an important office. Under a dictatorship these more aggressive actions would most likely be met with harsh repression.

初期的行動很可能採取象徵性抗議的形式,或者是一個 小型或者短暫之不合作的象徵性行動。如果願意參加行動的人 數少,舉例來說,初期的行動可能是在一個有重要象徵意義的 地方獻花。另一方面,如果願意參加行動的人數很多,那麼就 可以使用停止一切活動五分鐘或者保持靜默幾分鐘。在另一些 情況下,少數個人可以舉行絕食、在某個有象徵意義的地方 守夜、學生短暫的罷課、或在某個重要辦公場所短暫的靜坐。 在獨裁統治下,這些比較挑釁性的行動很可能會遭到嚴厲的鎭 壓。

Certain symbolic acts, such as a physical occupation in front of the dictator's palace or political police headquarters may involve high risk and are therefore not advisable for initiating a campaign.

某些象徵性的行動,例如實質佔據獨裁者宮殿或者政治 警察總部的前門,可能風險很高,因此不適合用來啓動一個運動。

Initial symbolic protest actions have at times aroused major national and international attention—as the mass street demonstrations in Burma in 1988 or the student occupation and hunger strike in Tiananman Square in Beijing in 1989. The high casualties of demonstrators in both of these cases points to the great care strategists must exercise in planning campaigns. Although having a tremendous moral and psychological impact, such actions by themselves are unlikely to bring down a dictatorship, for they remain largely symbolic and do not alter the power position of the dictatorship.

初期的象徵性抗議行動有時候會引起重大之全國及國際的 注意一例如1988 年緬甸的群衆性街頭示威或1989 年北京天安門 學生的佔領廣場與絕食。這兩個案例裡示威者的重大傷亡都指

出,戰略規劃者規劃運動時必須非常謹慎。儘管有巨大之道義 與心理的衝擊,但這些行動本身不大可能打倒一個獨裁政權, 因為它們在很大程度上仍然是象徵性的,不會改變獨裁政權的 權力地位。

It usually is not possible to sever the availability of the sources of power to the dictators completely and rapidly at the beginning of a struggle. That would require virtually the whole population and almost all the institutions of the society —which had previously been largely submissive—to reject absolutely the regime and suddenly defy it by massive and strong noncooperation. That has not yet occurred and would be most difficult to achieve. In most cases, therefore, a quick campaign of full noncooperation and defiance is an unrealistic strategy for an early campaign against the dictatorship.

通常不可能在抗爭初期就完全及迅速地切斷獨裁者既有的 權力來源。那樣會需要幾乎全體民衆與社會上幾乎所有的機構 一他們此前在很大程度上一直是順從的一都完全拒絕這個政權 並且突然以大規模與堅決的不合作來反抗它。這種情況還沒有 發生過,也最難實現。因此,在大多數情況下,作爲反對獨裁 政權的初期運動,以全面不合作與反抗的快速運動,是一個不 切實際的策略。

# Spreading responsibility 分擔責任

During a selective resistance campaign the brunt of the struggle is for a time usually borne by one section or more of the population. In a later campaign with a different objective, the burden of the struggle would be shifted to other population groups. For example, students might conduct strikes on an educational issue, religious leaders and believers might concentrate on a freedom of religion issue, rail workers might meticulously obey safety regulations so as to slow down the rail transport system, journalists might challenge censorship by publishing papers with blank spaces in which prohibited articles would have appeared, or police might repeatedly fail to locate and arrest wanted members of the democratic opposition. Phasing resistance campaigns by issue and population group will allow certain segments of the population to rest while resistance continues.

在選擇性抵抗的運動過程中,在一段時間裡,抗爭中首當 其衝的通常是一個部門以上的民衆。較後期而具有不同目標的 運動,抗爭的負擔將會轉移到群衆的其他部門。例如,學生可 能爲了某個教育議題而罷課,宗教領袖與信徒可能關注宗教信 仰自由的議題,鐵路工人可能鉅細靡遺地遵守安全規章而使鐵 路系統的速度緩慢下來,新聞記者可能以出版開天窗、在要刊 登被禁文章之處留出空白的報紙、挑戰新聞檢查,或者警察可 能三番五次地找不到及抓不到遭通緝的民主反對運動份子。以 議題與民衆團體爲依據將運動做階段性的設計,就可以讓某些 部門的民衆在抗爭持續時也可以休息。

Selective resistance is especially important *to defend* the existence and autonomy of independent social, economic, and political groups and institutions outside the control of

the dictatorship, which were briefly discussed earlier. These centers of power provide the institutional bases from which the population can exert pressure or can resist dictatorial controls. In the struggle, they are likely to be among the first targets of the dictatorship.

選擇性的抵抗運動在「防衛」獨立而不受獨裁政權控制之 社會、經濟、及政治團體與機構上,是特別重要的,這些之前 已經簡略地討論過。這些權力的中心提供機構性的基礎,民衆 可以從這裡對獨裁控制施加壓力或者加以抵抗。在抗爭中,他 們很可能是獨裁政權打擊的第一批目標。

# Aiming at the dictators' power 瞄準獨裁者的權力

As the long-term struggle develops beyond the initial strategies into more ambitious and advanced phases, the strategists will need to calculate how the dictators' sources of power can be further restricted. The aim would be to use popular noncooperation to create a new more advantageous strategic situation for the democratic forces.

當長期抗爭的發展超越初期策略而進入到更有企圖心與晉 級的階段,戰略規劃者必須計算如何進一步限制獨裁者的權力 來源。這個目標將是運用群衆性的不合作,以創造一個對民主 勢力之新而更有利的戰略性情勢。

As the democratic resistance forces gained strength, strategists would plot more ambitious noncooperation and defiance to sever the dictatorships sources of power, with the
goal of producing increasing political paralysis, and in the end the disintegration of the dictatorship itself.

隨著民主抗爭勢力的力量增強,戰略規劃者將策劃更具企 圖心之不合作與反抗,以切斷獨裁者的權力來源,其目的是擴 大政治性的癱瘓,而最終將使獨裁政權本身分支瓦解。

It will be necessary to plan carefully how the democratic forces can weaken the support that people and groups have previously offered to the dictatorship. Will their support be weakened by revelations of the brutalities perpetrated by the regime, by exposure of the disastrous economic consequences of the dictators' policies, or by a new understanding that the dictatorship can be ended? The dictators' supporters should at least be induced to become "neutral" in their activities ("fence sitters") or preferably to become active supporters of the movement for democracy.

民主陣營需要仔細規劃如何才能削弱人們與團體過去提供 給獨裁政權的支持。可能削弱他們提供給獨裁政權之支持的理 由,是揭露政權施加的暴行、是暴露獨裁者政策所帶來之災難 性的經濟後果、或是對能夠終結獨裁政權有新的認識?至少應 當誘導獨裁者的支持者在他們的活動中採取「中立」(「騎牆 者」),或者更好的是成爲民主運動的積極支持者。

During the planning and implementation of political defiance and noncooperation, it is highly important to pay close attention to all of the dictators' main supporters and aides, including their inner clique, political party, police, and bureaucrats, but especially their army.

在規劃及執行政治反抗與不合作的過程中,仔細注意獨裁 者所有的主要支持者與助手,包括他們的內部派系、政黨、警 察與官僚,特別是他們的軍隊,這有高度的重要性。

The degree of loyalty of the military forces, both soldiers and officers, to the dictatorship needs to be carefully assessed and a determination should be made as to whether the military is open to influence by the democratic forces. Might many of the ordinary soldiers be unhappy and frightened conscripts? Might many of the soldiers and officers be alienated from the regime for personal, family, or political reasons? What other factors might make soldiers and officers vulnerable to democratic subversion?

需要仔細評估軍隊,包括士兵與軍官,對獨裁政權的忠誠 度,並且要決定軍隊是否會開放接受民主陣營的影響。許多普 通士兵可能是不快樂而且心裡害怕的義務兵?許多官兵可能由 於個人、家庭或政治因而與執政當局疏遠?還有什麼其他因素 可能使官兵容易受民主力量的策動而改變?

Early in the liberation struggle a special strategy should be developed to communicate with the dictators' troops and functionaries. By words, symbols, and actions, the democratic forces can inform the troops that the liberation struggle will be vigorous, determined, and persistent. Troops should learn that the struggle will be of a special character, designed to undermine the dictatorship but not to threaten their lives. Such efforts would aim ultimately to undermine the morale of the dictators' troops and finally to subvert their loyalty and obedience in favor of the democratic movement. Similar strategies could be aimed at the police and civil servants.

在解放抗爭的初期,應當制定特別的策略來與獨裁者的 軍隊與官僚溝通。民主陣營可以透過文字、符號與行動讓軍隊 知道解放抗爭將會是激烈的、堅定的及持久的。應當讓軍隊了 解,抗爭會具有特殊的本質,旨在破壞獨裁政權而不是要威脅 軍隊他們的生命。這些努力之最終目的是要破壞獨裁者軍隊的 士氣,最後瓦解他們的忠誠與服從,以有利於民主運動。類似 的策略也應該針對警察與公務人員。

The attempt to garner sympathy from and, eventually, induce disobedience among the dictators forces ought not to be interpreted, however, to mean encouragement of the military forces to make a quick end to the current dictatorship through military action. Such a scenario is not likely to install a working democracy, for (as we have discussed) a coup d'état does little to redress the imbalance of power relations between the populace and the rulers. Therefore, it will be necessary to plan how sympathetic military officers can be brought to understand that neither a military coup nor a civil war against the dictatorship is required or desirable.

不過,不要把企圖在獨裁者的隊伍當中獲得同情並且最終 誘導他們不服從,解釋爲鼓勵軍隊透過軍事行動很快終結當前 的獨裁政權。這樣的情境不大可能建立一個能夠運作的民主體 制,因爲(正如我們前面已經討論過的)軍事政變並不能糾正民 184 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

衆與統治者之間不平衡的權力關係。因此,需要規劃如何讓同 情的軍官理解,不論是軍事政變還是反對獨裁政權的內戰,都 是既不需要也不是令人期待的。

Sympathetic officers can play vital roles in the democratic struggle, such as spreading disaffection and noncooperation in the military forces, encouraging deliberate inefficiencies and the quiet ignoring of orders, and supporting the refusal to carry out repression. Military personnel may also offer various modes of positive nonviolent assistance to the democracy movement, including safe passage, information, food, medical supplies, and the like.

同情的軍官在民主抗爭中可以扮演關鍵的角色,例如在軍 隊裡傳播不滿情緒與不合作、鼓勵故意的低效率與默默地不理 會命令、以及支持部隊拒絕執行鎭壓。軍事人員也可以給民主 運動提供各種形式而正面積極的非暴力援助,包括安全通行、 資訊、食物、醫療器材等等。

The army is one of the most important sources of the power of dictators because it can use its disciplined military units and weaponry directly to attack and to punish the disobedient population. Defiance strategists should remember that it will be exceptionally difficult, or impossible, to disintegrate the dictatorship if the police, bureaucrats, and military forces remain fully supportive of the dictatorship and obedient in carrying out its commands. Strategies aimed at subverting the loyalty of the dictators' forces should therefore be given a high priority by democratic strategists.

軍隊是獨裁者最重要的權力來源之一,因為它可以直接利 用其紀律嚴明的軍事單位與武器,攻擊與懲罰不服從的民衆。 反抗運動的戰略規劃者應當記住,如果警察、官僚與軍隊始終 全力支持獨裁政權並在執行其命令時完全服從,那麼要瓦解獨 裁政權是非常困難或者不可能的。因此,民主之戰略規劃者應 當對旨在策反獨裁者隊伍之忠誠度的策略給予高度優先的考 慮。

The democratic forces should remember that disaffection and disobedience among the military forces and police can be highly dangerous for the members of those groups. Soldiers and police could expect severe penalties for any act of disobedience and execution for acts of mutiny. The democratic forces should not ask the soldiers and officers that they immediately mutiny. Instead, where communication is possible, it should be made clear that there are a multitude of relatively safe forms of "disguised disobedience" that they can take initially.

民主勢力應當記住,軍隊與警察隊伍裡的不滿與不服從對 這些隊伍的成員來說可能是很危險的。士兵與警察的任何不服 從會遭受到嚴厲的懲罰,而叛變行爲會導致死刑。民主陣營不 應當要求官兵們立即叛變。相反的,在有可能溝通的情況下, 讓他們清楚地知道他們起初可以採取許多比較安全之「隱蔽式 不服從」的形式。

For example, police and troops can carry out instructions

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for repression inefficiently, fail to locate wanted persons, warn resisters of impending repression, arrests, or deportations, and fail to report important information to their superior officers. Disaffected officers in turn can neglect to relay commands for repression down the chain of command. Soldiers may shoot over the heads of demonstrators. Similarly, for their part, civil servants can lose files and instructions, work inefficiently, and become "ill" so that they need to stay home until they "recover."

例如,警察與軍隊可以無效率地執行鎭壓的指令、找不到 遭受通緝的人、警告抵抗者即將進行鎭壓、逮捕或驅逐出境、 以及不向上級長官報告重要的資訊。反過來,不滿的軍官則可 以忽視而讓鎭壓之命令無法傳到指揮體系的末端。士兵可以對 示威者頭顱以上對空開槍。同樣的,公務員這方面則可以遺失 文件與指示、沒有效率地工作、並且「生病」而必須呆在家裡 直到他們「康復」。

#### Shifts in strategy 戰略的轉變調整

The political defiance strategists will need constantly to assess how the grand strategy and the specific campaign strategies are being implemented. It is possible, for example, that the struggle may not go as well as expected. In that case it will be necessary to calculate what shifts in strategy might be required. What can be done to increase the movements strength and regain the initiative? In such a situation, it will be necessary to identify the problem, make a strategic reassessment, possibly shift struggle responsibilities to a different population group, mobilize additional sources of power, and develop alternative courses of action. When that is done, the new plan should be implemented immediately.

政治反抗的戰略規劃者必須經常評估總體大戰略與具體之 運動策略的執行情況。例如,有可能抗爭進行得不如預期的那 樣好。在那種情況下就必須計算戰略可能需要做哪些調整。要 做甚麼才能增強運動的力量並且重新取得主動性?在這種情況 下就必須確定問題的所在、進行戰略性的重新評估、可能把抗 爭的責任轉移給另一個民間團體、動員另外的權力來源及制定 替代的行動方案。當做完這些事情之後,應當立即執行新的規 劃。

Conversely, if the struggle has gone much better than expected and the dictatorship is collapsing earlier than previously calculated, how can the democratic forces capitalize on unexpected gains and move toward paralyzing the dictatorship? We will explore this question in the following chapter.

與此相反的,如果抗爭進行得比預期的要好得多,而且獨 裁政權的崩潰進行得比原先計算的要早,民主陣營要如何充份 利用意想不到的戰果,向前推進使獨裁政權癱瘓?我們將在下 一章裡探討這個問題。

### DISINTEGRATING THE DICTATORSHIP 分支瓦解獨裁政權

The cumulative effect of well-conducted and successful political defiance campaigns is to strengthen the resistance and to establish and expand areas of the society where the dictatorship faces limits on its effective control. These campaigns also provide important experience in how to refuse cooperation and how to offer political defiance. That experience will be of great assistance when the time comes for noncooperation and defiance on a mass scale.

一系列實施得良好而且成功之政治反抗運動的累積效果, 是要強化抵抗運動,並且建立及擴大可以限制獨裁政權有效控 制的社會領域。這些運動還提供了如何拒絕合作及如何進行政 治反抗的重要經驗。當大規模之不合作與反抗的時機來臨時, 這個經驗會有很大的幫助。

As was discussed in Chapter Three, obedience, cooperation, and submission are essential if dictators are to be powerful. Without access to the sources of political power, the dictators' power weakens and finally dissolves. Withdrawal of support is therefore the major required action to disintegrate a dictatorship. It may be useful to review how the sources of power can be affected by political defiance.

正如第三章所討論的,服從、合作與屈服是使獨裁者們能

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夠強大的必要條件。獨裁者們如果得不到政治權力的來源,他 們的權力就會被削弱,最後就會消失無蹤。因此,撤銷支持是 分支瓦解一個獨裁政權主要的必要行動。回顧一下政治反抗如 何能夠影響權力的來源是有幫助的。

Acts of symbolic repudiation and defiance are among the available means to undermine the regime's moral and political *authority*—its legitimacy. The greater the regime's authority, the greater and more reliable is the obedience and cooperation which it will receive. Moral disapproval needs to be expressed in action in order to seriously threaten the existence of the dictatorship. Withdrawal of cooperation and obedience are needed to sever the availability of other sources of the regime's power.

象徵性之破壞形象與反抗行為,是破壞這個政權之道德與 政治「權威性」一它的合法性一可供使用的手段之一。政權的 權威性越高,它所得到的服從與合作就會越多與越可靠。為了 嚴重地威脅獨裁政權的存續,必須用行動來表達道義上的無法 認同。為了切斷這個政權可以使用之其他權力來源,必須撤銷 合作與服從。

A second important such source of power is *human resources*, the number and importance of the persons and groups that obey cooperate with, or assist the rulers. If noncooperation is practiced by large parts of the population, the regime will be in serious trouble. For example, if the civil servants no longer function with their normal efficiency

or even stay at home, the administrative apparatus will be gravely affected.

第二個重要的權力來源是「人力資源」,即服從合作與協助統治者之個人與團體的數量及他們的重要性。如果大部份的 民衆實行不合作,這個政權就會有嚴重的麻煩。例如,如果公 務人員不再以正常的效率工作或者甚至呆在家裡,行政機器就 會受到嚴重的影響。

Similarly, if the non-cooperating persons and groups include those that have previously supplied specialized *skills and knowledge*, then the dictators will see their capacity to implement their will gravely weakened. Even their ability to make well-informed decisions and develop effective policies may be seriously reduced.

同樣的,如果不合作的個人與團體當中、包含過去曾經提 供過的,是擁有專業「技能與知識」的那些個人與團體,獨裁 者們就會瞭解到執行獨裁者意願的能力被大大地削弱了。甚至 他們根據完整資訊作決定與制定有效政策的能力也會大大地降 低。

If psychological and ideological influences—called *intangible factors*— that usually induce people to obey and assist the rulers are weakened or reversed, the population will be more inclined to disobey and to noncooperate.

如果通常促使人們服從與幫助統治者之心理與意識形態的 影響一稱為「無形因素」一被削弱或被倒轉過來了,民衆就會 更容易傾向於不服從與不合作。

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The dictators' access to *material resources* also directly affects their power. With control of financial resources, the economic system, property, natural resources, transportation, and means of communication in the hands of actual or potential opponents of the regime, another major source of their power is vulnerable or removed. Strikes, boycotts, and increasing autonomy in the economy, communications, and transportation will weaken the regime.

這些獨裁者掌握「物質資源」的管道也會直接影響他們的 權力。如果財務資源、經濟體系、房地產、自然資源、運輸與 通訊管道控制在這個政權之實際或潛在對手陣營的手裡,那麼 獨裁者的另一個主要的權力來源就變成脆弱了或者被排除了。 在經濟、通訊與運輸領域裡的罷工、抵制與日益增加的自治會 削弱這個政權。

As previously discussed, the dictators' ability to threaten or apply *sanctions*—punishments against the restive, disobedient, and noncooperative sections of the population—is a central source of the power of dictators. This source of power can be weakened in two ways. First, if the population is prepared, as in a war, to risk serious consequences as the price of defiance, the effectiveness of the available sanctions will be drastically reduced (that is, the dictators' repression will not secure the desired submission). Second, if the police and the military forces themselves become disaffected, they may on an individual or mass basis evade or outright defy orders to arrest, beat, or shoot 192 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 ⑤

resisters. If the dictators can no longer rely on the police and military forces to carry out repression, the dictatorship is gravely threatened.

如前所述,這些獨裁者威脅或實施「制裁」一對不受管 束、不服從與不合作的部份民衆進行懲罰一的能力是獨裁者權 力來源的核心。有兩種方法可以削弱這個權力來源。第一、如 果民衆已經做好準備,如在戰爭中,要冒著風險爲反抗的嚴重 後果付出代價,那麼制裁的有效度就會大大降低(這就是說,這 些獨裁者的鎭壓就不能達到他們所希望的屈從)。第二、如果警 察與軍隊本身變得不滿意,他們可能以個人或集體的方式迴避 甚至乾脆違抗進行逮捕、拷打或槍殺抵抗者的命令。如果這些 獨裁者不再能夠依靠警察與軍隊達到鎭壓,獨裁政權就會受到 嚴重的威脅。

In summary, success against an entrenched dictatorship requires that noncooperation and defiance reduce and remove the sources of the regime's power. Without constant replenishment of the necessary sources of power the dictatorship will weaken and finally disintegrate. Competent strategic planning of political defiance against dictatorships therefore needs to target the dictators' most important sources of power.

總而言之,要想成功地對抗根深蒂固的獨裁政權,就必須 有可以減少及排除政權之權力來源的不合作與反抗運動。缺少 不斷補充所需要的權力來源,獨裁政權就會變得脆弱、並且最 後會被分支瓦解。因此,為了反抗獨裁政權,針對這些獨裁者 之最重要權力來源,政治反抗就必須要有一個足夠有效力的戰 略規劃。

# Escalating freedom 逐步提升自由

Combined with political defiance during the phase of selective resistance, the growth of autonomous social, economic, cultural, and political institutions progressively expands the "democratic space" of the society and shrinks the control of the dictatorship. As the civil institutions of the society become stronger vis-à-vis the dictatorship, then, whatever the dictators may wish, the population is incrementally building an independent society outside of their control. If and when the dictatorship intervenes to halt this "escalating freedom," nonviolent struggle can be applied in defense of this newly won space and the dictatorship will be faced with yet another "front" in the struggle.

結合政治反抗之選擇性抵抗的階段中,自治之社會、經 濟、文化與政治機構的成長,會持續逐步擴大社會的「民主空 間」,並且縮小獨裁政權的控制。隨著社會的公民機構相對於 獨裁政權變得日益強大,那麼不論這些獨裁者想要的是甚麼, 民衆卻在一步一步地建立一個不受獨裁者控制的獨立社會。如 果而且當獨裁政權為了終止這種「逐步升級之自由」而進行干 預,就可以運用非暴力抗爭來捍衛這個新爭取而贏得的空間, 而獨裁政權在抗爭中就又要面臨另一個「戰線」了。

In time, this combination of resistance and institution building can lead to *de facto* freedom, making the collapse

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of the dictatorship and the formal installation of a democratic system undeniable because the power relationships within the society have been fundamentally altered.

假以時日,結合抗爭與機構之建立就可以導致「實際」上 的自由,使獨裁政權的崩潰與民主制度的正式建立變得無法否 認,因爲社會內部的權力關係已經根本被改變了。

Poland in the 1970s and 1980s provides a clear example of the progressive reclaiming of a society's functions and institutions by the resistance. The Catholic church had been persecuted but never brought under full Communist control. In 1976 certain intellectuals and workers formed small groups such as K.O.R (Workers Defense Committee) to advance their political ideas. The organization of the Solidarity trade union with its power to wield effective strikes forced its own legalization in 1980. Peasants, students, and many other groups also formed their own independent organizations. When the Communists realized that these groups had changed the power realities, Solidarity was again banned and the Communists resorted to military rule.

波蘭在1970 與 1980 年代提供了以抵抗運動逐步收回社會 功能與機構的一個明顯例子。天主教會曾經受到迫害,但始終 沒有完全被共產黨控制。在1976 年,某些知識份子與工人組成 了例如K.O.R.(工人保衛委員會)的小型團體,來推廣他們的政治 理念。團結工會(Solidarity)的組成,伴隨著它組織有效罷工的能 力,迫使當局在1980 年承認它的合法化。農民、學生與許多其 他團體也組成了他們各自的獨立組織。當共產黨發現這些團體 已經改變了權力之眞實狀況的時候,又重新禁止了團結工會, 並且又倒退而訴諸軍事統治。

Even under martial law, with many imprisonments and harsh persecution, the new independent institutions of the society continued to function. For example, dozens of illegal newspapers and magazines continued to be published. Illegal publishing houses annually issued hundreds of books, while well-known writers boycotted Communist publications and government publishing houses. Similar activities continued in other parts of the society.

即使在軍事戒嚴統治下,受到許多監禁與嚴酷迫害,這些 新而獨立的社會機構繼續發揮作用。例如,數十份的地下非法 報紙與雜誌繼續出版。地下的出版社每年發行數以百計的書, 而知名的作家抵制共產黨刊物與政府的出版社。類似的活動在 社會的其他部份也繼續進行。

Under the Jaruselski military regime, the military-Communist government was at one point described as bouncing around on the top of the society. The officials still occupied government offices and buildings. The regime could still strike down into the society, with punishments, arrests, imprisonment, seizure of printing presses, and the like. The dictatorship, however, could not control the society. From that point, it was only a matter of time until the society was able to bring down the regime completely.

在賈魯塞斯基(Wojciech Jaruzelski)軍事政權下,有一段時間

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軍事共產黨政府被描述成在社會頂頭上玩大風吹。官員們照樣 佔據政府職位與辦公大樓。執政當局照樣能夠以實施懲罰、逮 捕、監禁、沒收印刷機等等打擊社會各階層。不過,獨裁政權 卻無法控制社會。從那個時刻開始,社會最終能夠徹底打倒這 個政權只是時間的問題而已了。

Even while a dictatorship still occupies government positions it is sometimes possible to organize a democratic "parallel government." This would increasingly operate as a rival government to which loyalty, compliance, and cooperation are given by the population and the society's institutions. The dictatorship would then consequently on an increasing basis, be deprived of these characteristics of government. Eventually, the democratic parallel government may fully replace the dictatorial regime as part of the transition to a democratic system. In due course then a constitution would be adopted and elections held as part of the transition.

即使在獨裁政權仍然佔據政府權位的時候,有時候也有 可能組織一個民主的「平行政府」。它可以逐漸作為一個競爭 的政府而運作,民衆與社會的機構則對這個政府給予效忠、遵 從與合作。結果,獨裁政權就會逐漸地被剝奪了這些政府的特 徵。最後,民主的平行政府可能會完全取代獨裁的執政當局, 作為邁向民主體制過渡的一部份。如此發展下去,在轉型過渡 的一部份就會通過憲法、舉行選舉。

### Disintegrating the dictatorship 分支瓦解獨裁政權

While the institutional transformation of the society is taking place, the defiance and noncooperation movement may escalate. Strategists of the democratic forces should contemplate early that there will come a time when the democratic forces can move beyond selective resistance and launch mass defiance. In most cases, time will be required for creating, building, or expanding resistance capacities, and the development of mass defiance may occur only after several years. During this interim period campaigns of selective resistance should be launched with increasingly important political objectives. Larger parts of the population at all levels of the society should become involved. Given determined and disciplined political defiance during this escalation of activities, the internal weaknesses of the dictatorship are likely to become increasingly obvious.

當社會的機構性轉型正在發生的時候,反抗與不合作運動 可能逐步升級。民主勢力的戰略規劃者應當及早思考到這樣的 時刻會到來,就是民主勢力可以超越選擇性抗爭而發動群衆大 規模反抗的時候。在大多數場合,創造、建立或擴大抗爭能力 需要時間,而只須要經過幾年的時間,就有可能發起大規模反 抗。在此暫時過渡期間,應當發動具有逐漸重要政治目標之選 擇性抵抗的運動。應當讓社會各階層更多的民衆參與。在活動 升級的這個過程中,只要有堅決的與有紀律的政治反抗,獨裁 政權的內部弱點很可能就會漸漸地越來越明顯。 The combination of strong political defiance and the building of independent institutions is likely in time to produce widespread international attention favorable to the democratic forces. It may also produce international diplomatic condemnations, boycotts, and embargoes in support of the democratic forces (as it did for Poland).

結合強大的政治反抗與獨立機構的建立,有可能及時產生 國際上對民主勢力有利的關注,它也可能產生支持民主勢力的 外交譴責、抵制與禁運(像在波蘭發生的那樣)。

Strategists should be aware that in some situations the collapse of the dictatorship may occur extremely rapidly, as in East Germany in 1989. This can happen when the sources of power are massively severed as a result of the whole population's revulsion against the dictatorship. This pattern is not usual, however, and it is better to plan for a long-term struggle (but to be prepared for a short one).

戰略規劃者應當注意在某些情況下獨裁政權的倒塌可能發 生得非常快,像1989年在東德那樣。當權力之來源由於全體民 衆對獨裁政權的厭惡而被大規模切斷的時候,可能會發生這種 情況。不過,這種模式並不常見,最好還是要爲長期抗爭而規 劃(但是要對爲短期的抗爭有所準備)。

During the course of the liberation struggle, victories, even on limited issues, should be celebrated. Those who have earned the victory should be recognized. Celebrations with vigilance should also help to keep up the morale needed for future stages of the struggle.

在解放抗爭的過程中,每一個勝利,即使是在小型議題上 的勝利,也應當慶祝一下。贏得勝利的人們應當受到表揚。慶 祝的同時不忘提醒,也會有助於鼓舞抗爭未來階段所需要的士 氣。

#### Handling success responsibly 負責任地處理勝利

Planners of the grand strategy should calculate in advance the possible and preferred ways in which a successful struggle might best be concluded in order to prevent the rise of a new dictatorship and to ensure the gradual establishment of a durable democratic system.

總體大戰略的規劃者應當事先計算有哪些可能的與比較好 的方法可以最妥善地終結一場成功的抗爭,以防止出現新的獨 裁政權並且保證逐步建立可長可久的民主體制。

The democrats should calculate how the transition from the dictatorship to the interim government shall be handled at the end of the struggle. It is desirable at that time to establish quickly a new functioning government. However, it must not be merely the old one with new personnel. It is necessary to calculate what sections of the old governmental structure (as the political police) are to be completely abolished because of their inherent anti-democratic character and which sections retained to be subjected to later democratization efforts. A complete governmental void could open the way to chaos or a new dictatorship.

民主陣營應當計算到在抗爭結束時如何從獨裁政權過渡 到臨時政府。在那個時候,最好迅速建立一個能夠運作的新政 府。不過,這個政府不能只是舊政府換上新的人事。有必要計 算舊政府結構的哪些部門(例如政治警察)由於它們內在的反民 主本質必須徹底廢除,及哪些部門應當保留,以待之後授予投 入民主化的努力。全面的政府真空可能爲混亂或者新獨裁打開 一條機會。

Thought should be given in advance to determine what is to be the policy toward high officials of the dictatorship when its power disintegrates. For example, are the dictators to be brought to trial in a court? Are they to be permitted to leave the country permanently? What other options may there be that are consistent with political defiance, the need for reconstructing the country and building a democracy following the victory? A blood bath must be avoided which could have drastic consequences on the possibility of a future democratic system.

應該事先考慮決定獨裁政權瓦解時處置舊政權高級官員的 政策。例如,獨裁者是否帶到法院加以審判?是否准許他們永 遠離開這個國家?還有哪些符合政治反抗、勝利後重建國家以 及建立民主體制之需求的替代方案?必須避免血腥清算事件, 這會給未來建立民主體制之可能性帶來嚴重的後果。

Specific plans for the transition to democracy should be ready for application when the dictatorship is weakening or collapses. Such plans will help to prevent another group from seizing state power through a coup d'état. Plans for the institution of democratic constitutional government with full political and personal liberties will also be required. The changes won at a great price should not be lost through lack of planning.

當獨裁政權正在變弱或瓦解時,要準備好過渡到民主體制 可以實施的具體計劃。這些計劃有助於預防其他陣營透過軍事 政變奪取國家權力。也有必要建立有充份政治與個人自由之民 主憲政政府的計劃。付出高度代價而贏得的這些改變不應當因 爲缺乏計劃而又輸了。

When confronted with the increasingly empowered population and the growth of independent democratic groups and institutions—both of which the dictatorship is unable to control—the dictators will find that their whole venture is unravelling. Massive shut-downs of the society, general strikes, mass stay-at-homes, defiant marches, or other activities will increasingly undermine the dictators own organization and related institutions. As a consequence of such defiance and noncooperation, executed wisely and with mass participation over time, the dictators would become powerless and the democratic defenders would, without violence, triumph. The dictatorship would disintegrate before the defiant population.

面對逐漸擁有權能之民衆與獨立之民主社團與機構的增 長一兩者都是獨裁政權所無法控制的一這些獨裁者會發現他們 的整個豪賭正在煙消雲散。社會上的大規模之集體停工、總罷 工、集體呆在家裡不上班、反抗性的遊行或其他活動會逐漸破 壞這些獨裁者自己的組織與相關的機構。並且由於這些反抗與 不合作長時間下來受到睿智的執行及獲得大量民衆參與,這些 獨裁者將變得軟弱無力,而民主的捍衛者將不需要訴諸暴力就 能取得勝利。獨裁政權就會在反抗的民衆面前分支瓦解。

Not every such effort will succeed, especially not easily, and rarely quickly. It should be remembered that as many military wars are lost as are won. However, political defiance offers a real possibility of victory. As stated earlier, that possibility can be greatly increased through the development of a wise grand strategy careful strategic planning, hard work, and disciplined courageous struggle.

這種努力不是每一次都會成功,尤其不會輕易地成功,並 且很少會迅速成功。應當記住,軍事戰爭之失敗與勝利的次數 一樣多。不過,政治反抗提供了獲得勝利的眞實可能性。如前 所述,透過制定睿智之總體大戰略的謹慎策略規劃、艱辛的努 力及有紀律而勇敢的抗爭,就可以大大地增加這個可能性。

#### GROUNDWORK FOR DURABLE DEMOCRACY 可長可久之民主的紮根工作

The disintegration of the dictatorship is of course a cause for major celebration. People who have suffered for so long and struggled at great price merit a time of joy, relaxation, and recognition. They should feel proud of themselves and of all who struggled with them to win political freedom. Not all will have lived to see this day. The living and the dead will be remembered as heroes who helped to shape the history of freedom in their country.

獨裁政權的分支瓦解當然是值得大肆慶祝的理由。受過這 麼長時間的苦難又付出巨大代價而進行抗爭的人民值得享受一 段歡樂、放鬆與表揚的時光。他們應當爲自己及所有同他們一 起爲贏得政治自由而抗爭的人們感到驕傲。不是所有的人都能 活著看到這一天的到來。活著的與死去的人們會被當作爲幫助 塑造他們國家之自由歷史的英雄而受到人們的紀念。

Unfortunately this is not a time for a reduction in vigilance. Even in the event of a successful disintegration of the dictatorship by political defiance, careful precautions must be taken to prevent the rise of a new oppressive regime out of the confusion following the collapse of the old one. The leaders of the pro-democracy forces should have prepared in advance for an orderly transition to a democracy.

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The dictatorial structures will need to be dismantled. The constitutional and legal bases and standards of behavior of a durable democracy will need to be built.

不幸的是,這還不是放鬆警惕的時候。即使是透過政治反 抗而成功地瓦解了獨裁政權,仍然必須採取謹慎的預防措施以 防止在舊政權垮台之後的混亂中出現新的壓迫性政權。支持民 主勢力的這些領導者應當事先就要爲有秩序地過渡到民主體制 而作好準備。獨裁的結構必須加以拆解。必須建立一個可長可 久之民主體制所需要的憲政與法律基礎與行爲準則。

No one should believe that with the downfall of the dictatorship an ideal society will immediately appear. The disintegration of the dictatorship simply provides the beginning point, under conditions of enhanced freedom, for long-term efforts to improve the society and meet human needs more adequately. Serious political, economic, and social problems will continue for years, requiring the cooperation of many people and groups in seeking their resolution. The new political system should provide the opportunities for people with varying outlooks and favored measures to continue constructive work and policy development to deal with problems in the future.

不要相信隨著獨裁政權的垮台,就會立即出現一個理想的 社會。獨裁政權的瓦解只是在自由有所改善的條件下、為今後 的長期努力提供了一個起點,以便改善社會與更充份地滿足人 類的需要。嚴重之政治、經濟與社會問題還會持續多年,需要 許多人與團體的合作來尋求解決的方案。這個新的政治體制應

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當提供機會,使具有不同觀點與主張採取不同措施的人們能夠 繼續進行創造性的工作與制定政策,來處理未來的問題。

### Threats of a new dictatorship 新獨裁的威脅

Aristotle warned long ago that "...tyranny can also change into tyranny... "<sup>1</sup> There is ample historical evidence from France (the Jacobins and Napoleon), Russia (the Bolsheviks), Iran (the Ayatollah), Burma (SLORC), and elsewhere that the collapse of an oppressive regime will be seen by some persons and groups as merely the opportunity for them to step in as the new masters. Their motives may vary, but the results are often approximately the same. The new dictatorship may even be more cruel and total in its control than the old one.

很久以前,亞里士多德就曾經警告過:「…暴君體制還 會轉為另外形式的暴君體制…<sup>1</sup>。從法國(雅各賓黨人Jacobins 與拿破崙)、俄國(布爾什維克Bolsheviks)、伊朗(阿亞圖拉 Ayatollah)、緬甸(國家法律與秩序重建委員會SLORC)以及其他 地方,有足夠的歷史證據顯示,一個壓迫性政權的倒塌會被某 些人與集團當作只是讓他們插手充當新主人的機會。他們的動 機可能各有不同,但結果卻往往大致相同。新獨裁政權的控制 甚至可能比舊政權更為殘暴與徹底。

Aristotle, The Politics, Book V. Chapter 12, p. 233.
亞里士多德著,「政治學」,第5卷,第12章,第233頁。

Even before the collapse of the dictatorship, members of the old regime may attempt to cut short the defiance struggle for democracy by staging a coup d'état designed to preempt victory by the popular resistance. It may claim to oust the dictatorship, but in fact seek only to impose a new refurbished model of the old one.

甚至在獨裁政權垮台以前,舊政權的某些成員可能會透過 發動軍事政變而企圖將民主之反抗運動短線操作,以免除群衆 抵抗運動的勝利。政變者可能聲稱是為了打倒獨裁,但實際上 只是企圖在舊獨裁政權之上加上一個經過翻修的新模式。

#### Blocking coups 阻止政變

There are ways in which coups against newly liberated societies can be defeated. Advance knowledge of that defense capacity may at times be sufficient to deter the attempt. Preparation can produce prevention.

針對新解放社會的政變,是有一些辦法可以加以擊敗的。 有時候,事先知道有這種防衛能力就足以嚇阻政變的企圖。準 備就有預防的效果。

Immediately after a coup is started, the putschists require legitimacy, that is, acceptance of their moral and political right to rule. The first basic principle of anti-coup defense is therefore to deny legitimacy to the putschists.

政變者發動一場政變以後立即需要有正當性,那就是人們 對他們進行統治的道義與政治權利的認可。因此,反政變的第 一個基本原則就是拒絕授予政變者這個正當性。

The putschists also require that the civilian leaders and population be supportive, confused, or just passive. The putschists require the cooperation of specialists and advisors, bureaucrats and civil servants, administrators and judges in order to consolidate their control over the affected society. The putschists also require that the multitude of people who operate the political system, the society's institutions, the economy, the police, and the military forces will passively submit and carry out their usual functions as modified by the putschists' orders and policies.

政變者還需要民間領袖與民衆表示支持、無所適從或只是 消極被動。政變者需要專家與顧問、官僚與公務人員、行政管 理人員與法官們的合作,才能鞏固他們對受其影響之社會的控 制。政變者還需要各種參與政治體制、社會機構、經濟、警察 與軍隊之運作的衆多人們,會被動地屈從並按照政變者之命令 與政策執行他們的日常職責。

The second basic principle of anti-coup defense is to resist the putschists with noncooperation and defiance. The needed cooperation and assistance must be denied. Essentially the same means of struggle that was used against the dictatorship can be used against the new threat, but applied immediately. If both legitimacy and cooperation are denied, the coup may die of political starvation and the chance to build a democratic society restored. 反政變的第二個基本原則是用不合作與反抗來抵制政變 者。必須拒絕提供政變者所需要的合作與協助。用於反對獨裁 政權的抗爭手段,基本上同樣可以用來反對新的威脅,不過要 立即採取行動。如果人們拒絕給予正當性與合作,政變可能死 於政治性的飢餓,而建立一個民主社會的機會就得以恢復。

#### Constitution drafting 憲法的起草

The new democratic system will require a constitution that establishes the desired framework of the democratic government. The constitution should set the purposes of government, limits on governmental powers, the means and timing of elections by which governmental officials and legislators will be chosen, the inherent rights of the people, and the relation of the national government to other lower levels of government.

新的民主體制將需要一部憲法以確立所期望之民主政府的 架構。這部憲法應當規定政府的目的、對政府權力的限制、選 舉政府官員與立法者的選舉方法與時間、人民固有的權利以及 全國性的政府與其他下級政府之間的關係。

Within the central government, if it is to remain democratic, a clear division of authority should be established between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. Strong restrictions should be included on activities of the police, intelligence services, and military forces to prohibit any legal political interference.

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在中央政府裡,如果要保持其民主性的話,就應當在政府 之立法、行政、與司法部門之間樹立明確的分權。對警察、情 報機構與軍隊的活動應當有嚴格的限制,以禁止任何合法的政 治干與。

In the interests of preserving the democratic system and impeding dictatorial trends and measures, the constitution should preferably be one that establishes a federal system with significant prerogatives reserved for the regional, state, and local levels of government. In some situations the Swiss system of cantons might be considered in which relatively small areas retain major prerogatives, while remaining a part of the whole country.

爲了維護民主體制與阻止獨裁的趨勢與手段,這個憲法最 好確立一種聯邦制度,同時有相當大的專有權力保留給地區、 州與地方各級政府。在某些情況下,可以考慮採用瑞士的州制 度,其中面積相對較小的地區保有主要的權力,同時仍然維持 是整體國家的一部分。

If a constitution with many of these features existed earlier in the newly liberated country's history, it may be wise simply to restore it to operation, amending it as deemed necessary and desirable. If a suitable older constitution is not present, it may be necessary to operate with an interim constitution. Otherwise, a new constitution will need to be prepared. Preparing a new constitution will take considerable time and thought. Popular participation in this 210 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

process is desirable and required for ratification of a new text or amendments. One should be very cautious about including in the constitution promises that later might prove impossible to implement or provisions that would require a highly centralized government, for both can facilitate a new dictatorship.

如果新解放的國家歷史上曾經有過具有上述許多特點的一 部憲法,那麼恢復啓用它,如果有需要而且合適的話,加以修 訂也許是明智的。如果沒有一個合適的舊憲法,也許需要按照 一部臨時憲法先運作。否則,就需要準備一部新憲法。準備制 定一部新憲法將需要相當的時間與思考。爲了批准新的條文或 修正條文,最好有公衆參與這個過程。在憲法裡包含以後可能 無法實現的諾言或需要高度性集中之中央政府的條款應該要特 別審愼,因爲這兩者都可能會促成新獨裁的出現。

The wording of the constitution should be easily understood by the majority of the population. A constitution should not be so complex or ambiguous that only lawyers or other elites can claim to understand it.

憲法的用語應當是讓大多數的民衆能夠理解的。憲法不應 當太複雜或太模棱兩可,以致只有律師或其他菁英才能宣稱可 以理解它。

## A democratic defense policy 民主式的防衛政策

The liberated country may also face foreign threats for which a defense capacity would be required. The country might also be threatened by foreign attempts to establish economic, political, or military domination.

得到解放之國家可能面臨外來的威脅,因此必須要有防衛 的能力。這個國家也可能受到外來而企圖建立經濟、政治或軍 事控制的威脅。

In the interests of maintaining internal democracy serious consideration should be given to applying the basic principles of political defiance to the needs of national defense.<sup>2</sup> By placing resistance capacity directly in the hands of the citizenry, newly liberated countries could avoid the need to establish a strong military capacity which could itself threaten democracy or require vast economic resources much needed for other purposes.

爲了維護國內民主,應當認眞考慮將政治反抗的基本原理 應用於國防的需求<sup>2</sup>。透過把抵抗能力直接放在公民手裡,新解 放的國家就可能不需要建立大的軍事能力,後者本身可能對民 主產生威脅、或者佔用其他用途所迫切需要的大量經濟資源。

It must be remembered that some groups will ignore any constitutional provision in their aim to establish themselves as new dictators. Therefore, a permanent role will exist for the population to apply political defiance and noncooperation

 See Gene Sharp, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).
參閱吉恩夏普,「公民防衛:一個超越軍事武器的系統」(普林斯頓, 紐澤西州, 普林 斯頓大學出版社, 1990)。 against would-be dictators and to preserve democratic structures, rights, and procedures.

必須記住,有些集團為了把自己豎立為新的獨裁者,會無 視任何憲法條款。因此,民衆永遠有這樣一個角色,就是用政 治反抗與不合作來對付這些未來可能的獨裁者,並保衛民主的 結構、權利與程序。

# A meritorious responsibility 高尙的責任

The effect of nonviolent struggle is not only to weaken and remove the dictators but also to empower the oppressed. This technique enables people who formerly felt themselves to be only pawns or victims to wield power directly in order to gain by their own efforts greater freedom and justice. This experience of struggle has important psychological consequences, contributing to increased self-esteem and self-confidence among the formerly powerless.

非暴力抗爭的效用不僅是削弱與驅逐這些獨裁者,而且 還要給受壓迫的人們授與權能。這種方法使原來感到自己只是 一枚棋子或是受害者的人們能夠直接運用權力,透過自己的努 力獲得更多的自由與正義。這個抗爭的經驗具有重要的心理效 果,有助於對原來毫無權力的人們增強自尊與自信。

One important long-term beneficial consequence of the use of nonviolent struggle for establishing democratic government is that the society will be more capable of dealing with continuing and future problems. These might include future governmental abuse and corruption, maltreatment of any group, economic injustices, and limitations on the democratic qualities of the political system. The population experienced in the use of political defiance is less likely to be vulnerable to future dictatorships.

利用非暴力抗爭來建立民主政府之一個重要長期的有益效 果是,社會將更有能力處理當前及未來的問題。這些問題可能 包括政府將來的濫權與腐敗、對任何群體的虐待、經濟上的不 公不義以及對政治體制的民主品質設限。有政治反抗經驗的民 衆不大容易受到未來獨裁政權之傷害。

After liberation, familiarity with nonviolent struggle will provide ways to defend democracy, civil liberties, minority rights, and prerogatives of regional, state, and local governments and nongovernmental institutions. Such means also provide ways by which people and groups can express extreme dissent peacefully on issues seen as so important that opposition groups have sometimes resorted to terrorism or guerrilla war fare.

獲得解放以後,熟悉非暴力抗爭將爲保衛民主、民權、少 數族群權利以及地區、省、地方政府及非政府機構之特殊權提 供一些方法。這些手段也讓人民與團體能夠以和平方式對他們 認爲很重要之議題表示極端的異議,而過去反對陣營有時曾爲 這些議題而訴諸恐怖主義或游擊戰。

The thoughts in this examination of political defiance or nonviolent struggle are intended to be helpful to all persons 214 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

and groups who seek to lift dictatorial oppression horn their people and to establish a durable democratic system that respects human freedoms and popular action to improve the society.

本文探討政治反抗或非暴力抗爭的思想,目的是希望對人 民與團體尋求解除他們所遭受的獨裁壓迫有所幫助、並且建立 一個可長可久的民主體制,這個體制尊重人類自由與民衆的行 動以改善社會。

There are three major conclusions to the ideas sketched here:

以上扼要敘述的想法有三個主要結論:

- Liberation from dictatorships is possible;
- ■從獨裁統治下獲得解放是可能的;
- Very careful thought and strategic planning will be required to achieve it; and
- 為達到這個目的,必須要有審慎的思考與戰略性的規 劃;並且
- Vigilance, hard work, and disciplined struggle, often at great cost, will be needed.
- 必須要以有警覺、艱辛的工作以及有紀律的抗爭,即使 代價往往龐大。

The oft quoted phrase "Freedom is not free" is true. No outside force is coming to give oppressed people the freedom they so much want. People will have to learn how to take that freedom themselves. Easy it cannot be.

人們常引述說:「自由不是免費的」,這句話千眞萬確。 不會有外來的力量來賜予被壓迫人民他們所渴望的自由。人民 必須學會自己去爭取自由。這不是一件容易的事。

If people can grasp what is required for their own liberation, they can chart courses of action which, through much travail, can eventually bring them their freedom. Then, with diligence they can construct a new democratic order and prepare for its defense. Freedom won by struggle of this type can be durable. It can be maintained by a tenacious people committed to its preservation and enrichment.

如果人們能掌握領會需要什麼才能解放自己,他們就能 制定一些行動方針,透過許多艱苦的努力,最終會帶給他們自 由。然後,再假以勤奮,他們就能夠建立一個新的民主秩序並 且準備做好它的保衛。透過這種抗爭贏得的自由才是可長可久 的。這種自由能夠讓獻身於保護它、並且使它更豐富多采的堅 韌民族維持下去。

#### Appendix One: THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION<sup>1</sup> 附錄一:非暴力行動的方法<sup>1</sup>

#### THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION 非暴力抗議與勸說的方法

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- 1.Public speeches公開講演
- 2.Letters of opposition or support表 示反對或支持的信函
- 3.Declarations by organizations and institutions組織與機構發表的宣言
- 4.Signed public statements有簽名的 公開聲明
- 5.Declarations of indictment and intention起訴與意向宣言
- 6.Group or mass petitions團體或群 衆集體的請願

### Communications with a wider audience向更多的公眾傳達信息

- 7.Slogans, caricature, and symbols 口號、漫畫與象徵符號
- 8.Banners, posters, and displayed

communications橫幅、標語與張貼 的宣傳品

- 9.Leaflets, pamphlets, and books傳 單、小冊子與書籍
- 10.Newspapers and Journals報紙與 期刊雜誌
- 11.Records, radio, and television唱 片、廣播電台與電視台
- Skywriting and earthwriting天書 (註:租用飛機在天空噴出煙霧寫 成文字)與地書(註:在山坡或空地 上書寫標語)

#### Group representations 團體表達意願

- 13.Deputations代表團
- 14.Mock awards嘲笑式的頒獎
- 15.Group lobbying集體遊說

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This list, with definitions and historical examples, is taken from Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action.
本列表單含定義與歷史實例摘自吉恩夏普著「非暴力行動的政治」第二部,「非暴力行動的方法」。
- 16.Picketing抗議糾察線
- 17.Mock elections嘲笑式的選舉

#### Symbolic public acts 象徵性的公開行動

- 18.Display of flags and symbolic colors展示旗幟與象徵性的顏色
- 19.Wearing of symbols 配戴符號標記
- 20.Prayer and worship 祈禱與禮拜
- 21.Delivering symbolic objects 傳送 象徵式的物品
- 22.Protest disrobing 脫光衣服抗議
- 23.Destruction of own property 破壞 自有財產
- 24.Symbolic Lights 象徵意義的燈光
- 25.Displays of portraits懸掛相片
- 26.Paint as protest為抗議而繪畫
- 27.New signs and names新的標語與 名字
- 28.Symbolic sounds象徵意義的聲音
- 29.Symbolic reclamations 象徵式的 教化
- 30.Rude gestures 粗魯的姿態

#### Pressures on individuals 對個人施壓

- 31."Haunting" officials「糾纏」官員
- 32.Taunting officials辱罵嘲笑官員
- 33.Fraternization交友結盟
- 34.Vigils燭光守夜
- Drama and music戲劇與音樂

- 35.Humorous skits and pranks幽默 小品與惡作劇
- 36.Performance of plays and music 戲劇與音樂表演
- 37.Singing唱歌
- Processions各種遊行
- 38.Marches排隊行進
- 39.Parades遊行
- 40.Religious processions宗教遊行
- 41.Pilgrimages進香朝拜
- 42.Motorcades摩托車隊

#### Honoring the dead尊崇逝者

- 43.Political mourning政治性悼念
- 44.Mock funerals 嘲笑式的葬禮
- 45.Demonstrative funerals示威性的 葬禮
- 46.Homage at burial places在墓地公 開集會致敬
- Public assemblies公開集會
- 47.Assemblies of protest or support 表示抗議或支持的集會
- 48.Protest meetings抗議性集會
- 49.Camouflaged meetings of protest 偽裝的抗議性集會
- 50.Teach-ins大型上課抗議

#### Withdrawal and renunciation 撤退與放棄

- 51.Walk-outs退場
- 52.Silence靜默

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#### 53.Renouncing honors放棄榮譽 54.Turning one's back轉身蔑視

THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION 社會性不合作的方法

#### Ostracism of persons 對個人的排斥

- 55.Social boycott社會性抵制
- 56.Selective social boycott選擇性的 社會抵制
- 57.Lysistratic nonaction萊希斯脫拉 塔式(Lysistratic)的不行動
- 58.Excommunication開除教籍逐出 教會
- 59.Interdict禁制、停權

Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions 與社會活動、習俗及機構的不合作

- 60.Suspension of social and sports activities暫停社交與體育活動
- 61.Boycott of social affairs抵制社會 事務
- 62.Student strike學生罷課
- 63.Social disobedience社會性的不 服從
- 64.Withdrawal from social institutions 退出社會機構

Withdrawal from the social system 退出社會體系

- 65.Stay-at-home呆在家裡
- 66.Total personal noncooperation個 人的全方位不合作

67.Flight of workers工人出走

- 68.Sanctuary避難所
- 69.Collective disappearance集體失蹤
- 70.Protest emigration(hijrat)抗議性的 移民

#### THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION 經濟性不合作的方法

#### (1)ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS 經濟性抵制

#### Action by consumers 消費者的行動

- 71.Consumers' boycott消費者抵制
- 72.Nonconsumption of boycotted goods不消費被抵制商品
- 73.Policy of austerity節儉政策
- 74.Rent withholding拒交租金
- 75.Refusal to rent拒絶租讓房屋
- 76.National consumers' boycott全國 性消費者抵制
- 77.International consumers' boycott 國際性消費者抵制

#### Action by workers and producers 工人與生產者的行動

78.Workmen's boycott工人抵制

79.Producers' boycott生產者抵制

Action by middlemen 中間人的行動

80.Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

供貨商與中間商的抵制

#### Action by owners and management 僱主與管理階層的行動

- 81.Traders' boycott貿易商的抵制
- 82.Refusal to let or sell property拒絶 出租或出售財產
- 83.Lockout停業
- 84.Refusal of industrial assistance拒 絶工業援助
- 85.Merchants' "general strike" 商人 的「集體罷市」

## Action by holders of financial resources擁有財金資源者的行動

- 86.Withdrawal of bank deposits擠兌 銀行存款
- 87.Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments拒絶支付各種費 用、會費與規費
- 88.Refusal to pay debts or interest拒 絶支付欠款或利息
- 89.Severance of funds and credit斷 絶資金與信用貸款
- 90.Revenue refusal拒受收益
- 91.Refusal of a government's money 拒絶政府的錢

Action by governments 政府的行動

- 92.Domestic embargo國内禁運
- 93.Blacklisting of traders貿易商黑名單
- 94.International sellers' embargo國 際性賣主禁運
- 95.International buyers' embargo國 際性買主禁運
- 96.International trade embargo國際 性貿易禁運
- (2)THE STRIKE罷工

#### Symbolic strikes象徵性罷工

- 97.Protest strike抗議性罷工
- 98.Quickie walkout (lightning strike) 閃電式罷工

#### Agricultural strikes農業罷工

99.Peasant strike農民罷工

100.Farm workers' strike農場工人罷工

#### Strikes by special groups 特殊團體的罷工

- 101.Refusal or impressed labor拒絶 強制性勞役
- 102.Prisoners' strike監獄犯人罷工

103.Craft strike手工藝業者罷工

104.Professional strike專業人員罷工

#### Ordinary industrial strikes 一般的工業罷工

105.Establishment strike有名企業罷工 106.Industry strike行業罷工

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- 107.Sympathetic strike同情性罷工

#### Restricted strikes有限的罷工

- 108.Detailed strike企業内部分行業工 人罷工
- 109.Bumper strike輪流罷工
- 110.Slowdown strike消極怠工
- 111.Working-to-rule strike 「照章辦 事」磨洋工
- 112.Reporting "sick"(sick-in)請病假
- 113.Strike by resignation以辭職罷工
- 114.Limited strike有限罷工
- 115.Selective strike選擇性罷工

#### Multi-industry strikes多行業罷工

- 116.Generalized strike多行業同步罷 工
- 117.General strike總罷工

#### Combinations of strikes and economic closures 罷工與經濟性停業相結合

118.Hartal聯合停業停工

119.Economic shutdown停止經濟活動

#### THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION 政治性不合作的方法

#### Rejection of authority 否定政府權威

- 120.Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance放棄或撤回效忠
- 121.Refusal of public support拒絶提

供公開的支持

122.Literature and speeches advocating resistance主張抵抗 的文字與言論

### Citizens' noncooperation with government公民對政府的不合作

- 123.Boycott of legislative bodies抵制 立法機構
- 124.Boycott of elections抵制選舉
- 125.Boycott of government employment and positions抵制 政府工作與職務
- 126.Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies抵制政府部門機構 和其他組織
- 127.Withdrawal from government educational institutions退出政府 教育機構
- 128.Boycott of governmentsupported organizations抵制政 府支持的組織
- 129.Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents拒絶幫助執 法人員
- 130.Removal of own signs and placemarks拆除屬於自己的標牌 與地標

131.Refusal to accept appointed

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officials拒絶接受被任命的官員

132.Refusal to dissolve existing institutions拒絶解散現有的機構

## Citizens' alternatives to obedience公民不服從的替代辦法

- 133.Reluctant and slow compliance 消極的與緩慢的服從
- 134.Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision在沒有直接監 督的情況下拒絕服從
- 135.Popular nonobedience公衆的不 服從
- 136.Disguised disobedience隐蔽的 不服從
- 137.Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse拒絶散會
- 138.Sitdown坐下
- 139.Noncooperation with conscription and deportation拒 絕徵兵與被驅逐出境
- 140.Hiding, escape and false identities藏身、逃亡與使用假身 分
- 141.Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws公民不服從 「不正當」的法律

## Action by government personnel 政府員工的行動

142.Selective refusal of assistance

by government aides選擇性拒絶 接受政府人員的幫助

- 143.Blocking of lines of command and information阻斷政府命令與 資訊的流通
- 144.Stalling and obstruction拖延與阻 攔
- 145.General administrative noncooperation一般的行政管理 性不合作
- 146.Judicial noncooperation司法部 門的不合作
- 147.Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents執法人員故 意怠工和選擇性不合作

148.Mutiny兵變

#### Domestic governmental action 國内的政府行動

- 149.Quasi-legal evasions and delays 準合法的迴避與拖延
- 150.Noncooperation by constituent governmental units某些政府單 位的不合作

## International governmental action國際性的政府行動

151.Changes in diplomatic and other representation更換外交及其他 代表 222 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀 ⑤

- 152.Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events推遲與取消外 交活動
- 153.Withholding of diplomatic recognition不予外交承認
- 154.Severance of diplomatic relations斷絶外交關係
- 155.Withdrawal from International organizations退出國際組織
- 156.Refusal of membership in international bodies拒絶成為國 際機構的成員
- 157.Expulsion from international organizations自國際組織開除

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#### Psychological intervention 心理干預

158.Self-exposure to the elements自 我承受要求

159.The fast禁食

- (a)Fast of moral pressure道德壓 力的禁食
- (b)Hunger strike絶食
- (c)Satyagrahic fast不合作主義式 絶食
- 160.Reverse trial反訴(變原告為被告)

161.Nonviolent harassment非暴力騒 擾

#### Physical intervention 肢體的介入干預

- 162.Sit-in(在特定的建築物内)靜坐
- 163.Stand-in(在特定的建築物前)強 行站立
- 164.Ride-in(在特定的車座)強行搭車
- 165.Wade-in(在特定的池塘)強行涉水
- 166.Mill-in(在特定的場所)強行逗留遊 蕩
- 167.Pray-in強行祈禱
- 168.Nonviolent raids非暴力進襲
- 169.Nonviolent air raids非暴力空襲
- 170.Nonviolent invasion非暴力入侵
- 171.Nonviolent interjection非暴力突 然發聲
- 172.Nonviolent obstruction非暴力阻擋
- 173.Nonviolent occupation非暴力佔領

Social intervention 社會性的介入干預

- 174.Establishing new social patterns 建立新的社交模式
- 175.Overloading of facilities使設備不 堪負荷
- 176.Stall-in強行進住塞爆
- 177.Speak-in強行發言干擾
- 178.Guerrilla theater游擊劇場
- 179.Alternative social institutions建

#### 立取代性社會機構

180.Alternative communication system建立取代性傳播系統

## Economic intervention 經濟性的介入干預

- 181.Reverse strike倒罷工(無償工作)
- 182.Stay-in strike留守罷工
- 183.Nonviolent land seizure非暴力 佔用土地
- 184.Defiance of blockades反抗封鎖 禁運
- 185.Politically motivated counterfeiting 為達成政治目的而印製偽鈔
- 186.Preclusive purchasing壟斷性購 買
- 187.Seizure of assets 沒收資產
- 188.Dumping傾倒
- 189.Selective patronage選擇性的照 顧
- 190.Alternative markets設立替代性

市場

- 191.Alternative transportation systems建立替代性交通系統
- 192.Alternative economic institutions成 立替代性經濟機構

## Political intervention 政治性的介入干預

- 193.Overloading of administrative systems使行政系統超越負荷
- 194.Disclosing identities of secret agents暴露特務身分
- 195.Seeking imprisonment設法入獄
- 196.Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws公民不服從「中立性」的法 律
- 197.Work-on without collaboration 堅守崗位、拒絶與篡權者合作
- 198.Dual sovereignty and parallel government雙重主權與平行政 府

#### Appendix Two:

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY

附錄二:致謝詞與「從獨裁走向民主」之簡史

I have incurred several debts of gratitude while writing the original edition of this essay. Bruce Jenkins, my Special Assistant in 1993, made an inestimable contribution by his identification of problems in content and presentation. He also made incisive recommendations for more rigorous and clearer presentations of difficult ideas (especially concerning strategy), structural reorganization, and editorial improvements.

當我第一次撰述這一篇短文的時候,我就深感許多必須表示感謝的虧欠。布魯斯傑金斯(Bruce Jenkins),他是我1993年的特別助理,對內容與編排問題的確認做出無法估計的貢獻。他也對一些困難之理念(特別是有關戰略)、組織結構與編輯改進精準地建議了更有力與更清晰的呈現。

I am also grateful for the editorial assistance of Stephen Coady, Dr. Christopher Kruegler and Robert Helvey offered very important criticisms and advice. Dr. Hazel McFerson and Dr. Patricia Parkman provided in formation on struggles in Africa and Latin America, respectively. However, the analysis and conclusions contained therein are solely my responsibility.

我也要感謝史蒂芬柯第(Stephen Coady)、克利斯朵夫克

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魯格勒博士(Dr. Christopher Kruegler)與羅伯特哈爾維(Robert Helvey)在編輯上的協助,他們提供了非常重要的指正與指導。哈瑞爾麥克福森博士(Dr. Hazel McFerson)與派翠西亞派克曼博士(Dr. Patricia Parkman)分別提供了非洲與拉丁美洲之非暴力抗爭的資料。不過,本文文內的分析與結論由我單獨承擔責任。

In recent years special guidelines for translations has been developed, primarily due to Jamila Raqib's guidance and to the lessons learned from earlier years. This has been necessary in order to ensure accuracy in languages in which there has earlier been no established clear terminology for this field.

近年來,已經發展出翻譯的特殊指導手冊,主要是依據 傑米菈拉基博(Jamila Raqib)建立的指導原則與歷年來得到的教 訓。早期這個領域並沒有建立專門術語,爲了確保語言的精 準,這樣的指導原則是有必要的。

"From Dictatorship to Democracy" was written at the request of the late U Tin Maung Win, a prominent exile Burmese democrat who was then editor of *Khit Pyaing (The New Era Journal)*.

「從獨裁走向民主」一書是在已經過世的鄔廷茂文(U Tin Maung Win),一位傑出之緬甸流亡民主人士、時任「新時代期 刊(*Khit Pyaing*)」編輯,的要求下而進行的。

The preparation of this text was based over forty years of research and writing on nonviolent struggle, dictatorships,

totalitarian systems, resistance movements, political theory, sociological analysis, and other fields.

經過四十多年對非暴力抗爭、獨裁政權、極權體制、抵抗 運動、政治理論、社會分析及其他領域的研究與論文發表,這 是本文準備撰述的基礎。

I could not write an analysis that had a focus only on Burma, as I did not know Burma well. Therefore, I had to write a generic analysis.

因為我對緬甸並不熟悉,我無法寫出一篇只將焦點放在緬甸的分析。因此,我就寫了一篇通用的分析。

The essay was original published in installments in Khit Pyaing in Burmese and English in Bangkok, Thailand in 1993. Afterwards it was issued as a booklet in both languages (1994) and in Burmese again (1996 and 1997). The original booklet editions from Bangkok were issued with the assistance of the Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma.

這篇論文最先於1993年以緬甸文發表在新時代期刊(Khit Pyaing)以及以英文在泰國曼谷出版。之後,於1994年以這 兩種語言印成小冊子,並且再以緬甸文出版(1996年與1997 年)。原始在曼谷發行小冊子的版本是在緬甸民主復興委員會 (Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma)的協助下得 以進行。

It was circulated both surreptitiously inside Burma and

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among exiles and sympathizers elsewhere. This analysis was intended only for use by Burmese democrats and various ethnic groups in Burma that wanted independence from the Burman-dominated central government in Rangoon. (Burmans are the dominant ethnic group in Burma.)

這本小冊子在緬甸之內與其他地區的流亡人士與同情者之 間暗中廣泛流傳。這個分析原本只是爲了緬甸民主人士與不同 的族群團體從毛門人(Burman)統治的仰光中央政府之下追求獨 立。(毛門人是緬甸的主要多數族群)。

I did not then envisage that the generic focus would make the analysis potentially relevant in any country with an authoritarian or dictatorial government. However, that appears to have been the perception by people who in recent years have sought to translate and distribute it in their languages for their countries. Several persons have reported that it reads as though it was written for their country.

當時我並沒有前瞻到,通則性的關注可以讓這個分析更有 潛力關係到極權或獨裁政權的政府。不過,這是由近年來努力 將本文翻譯成他們國家語文之人士的印象所產生出來的。許多 人都說,讀起來好像這本小冊子是為了他們的國家而寫的。

The SLORC military dictatorship in Rangoon wasted no time in denouncing this publication. Heavy attacks were made in 1995 and 1996, and reportedly continued in later years in newspapers, radio, and television. As late as 2005, persons were sentenced to seven year prison terms merely for being in possession of the banned publication.

在仰光的SLORC軍事獨裁政權立即醜化這本出版品,並在 1995年與1996年出手嚴厲攻擊,據報導持續多年在報紙、廣播 電台與電視上繼續攻擊。在2005年末期,有人只因爲持有這個 禁止之出版品而被判處了7年的監禁。

Although no efforts were made to promote the publication for use in other countries, translations and distribution of the publication began to spread on its own. A copy of the English language edition was seen on display in the window of bookstore in Bangkok by a student from Indonesia, was purchased, and taken back home. There, it was translated into Indonesian, and published in 1997 by a major Indonesian publisher with an introduction by Abdurrahman Wahid. He was then head of Nadhlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in the world with thirty-five million members, and later President of Indonesia.

雖然我們並沒有費力在其他的國家推廣這個出版品的使 用,它的翻譯與發放自己就傳播開了。一位印尼的學生在曼 谷的書店看到這本書就買下來帶回印尼去了。它被翻譯成印 尼文並在1997年由印尼的主要出版商出版,由阿巴都拉曼瓦 希德(Abdurrahman Wahid)寫序。他是當時納德拉土爾烏拉馬 (Nadhlatul Ulama)擁有3千5百萬成員之全世界最大回教組織的首 領,後來成爲印尼的總統。

During this time, at my office at the Albert Einstein Institution we only had a handful of photocopies from the 附錄二:致謝詞與「從獨裁走向民主」之簡史 229

Bangkok English language booklet. For a few years we had to make copies of it when we had enquiries for which it was relevant. Later, Marek Zelaskiewz, from California, took one of those copies to Belgrade during Milosovic's time and gave it to the organization Civic Initiatives. They translated it into Serbian and published it. When we visited Serbia after the collapse of the Milosevic regime we were told that the booklet had been quite influential in the opposition movement.

在這期間,我們亞伯特愛恩坦研究院辦公室裡只剩下 幾本曼谷出版之英文小冊子的影印本。有幾年我們必須在被 索取之下去影印。稍後,加州的馬列克瑞拉斯基維茲(Marek Zelaskiewz)在米羅塞維奇時代帶了幾本到貝爾格雷德(Belgrade) 給「人民做主(Civic Initiatives)」的組織。他們將它翻譯成塞爾 維亞文後出版。當我們在米羅塞維奇政權倒台之後訪問塞爾維 亞,有人告訴我們這本小冊子在反對運動中還蠻有影響力的。

Also important had been the workshop on nonviolent struggle that Robert Helvey, a retired US Army colonel, had given in Budapest, Hungary, for about twenty Serbian young people on the nature and potential of nonviolent struggle. Helvey also gave them copies of the complete *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. These were the people who become the Otpor organization that led the nonviolent struggle that brought down Milosevic.

羅伯特哈爾維(Robert Helvey),一位美國陸軍退休上校,出 席在匈牙利布達佩斯舉辦的非暴力抗爭研討會也是很重要的, 有大約20名塞爾維亞的年輕人參加了這場非暴力本質與潛力的 研討會。哈爾維同時提供他們幾本完整的「非暴力抗爭的政治」。這些人就是後來變成「歐特破(Otpor)」組織的成員,他們帶領了打倒米羅塞維奇的非暴力抗爭。

We usually do not know how awareness of this publication has spread from country to country. Its availability on our web site in recent years has been important, but clearly that is not the only factor. Tracing these connections would be a major research project.

通常,我們無法得知這個出版品如何在國家之間流傳。近 年來可以在我們的網站上找到應該是一個重要的原因,但是顯 然這並非單獨唯一的因素。如果要找到這些連結勢必需要一個 重大的研究計劃。

"From Dictatorship to Democracy" is a heavy analysis and is not easy reading. Yet it has been deemed to be important enough at least twenty-eight translations (as of January 2008) to be prepared, although they required major work and expense.

「從獨裁走向民主」是一本分析的重頭書,並不容易閱 讀。雖然負擔沉重與所費不貲,但是它卻被認爲很重要而至少 有28種翻譯(到2008年1月爲止)版本。

Translations of this publication in print or on a web site include the following languages: Amharic (Ethiopia), Arabic, Azeri (Azerbaijan), Bahasa Indonesia, Belarusian, Burmese, Chin (Burma), Chinese (simplified and traditional Mandarin), Dhivehi (Maldives), Farsi (Iran), French, Georgian, German, Jing Paw (Burma), Karen (Burma), Khmer (Cambodia), Kurdish, Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstan), Nepali, Pashto (Afghanistan and Pakistan), Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Tibetan, Tigrinya (Eritrea), Ukrainian, Uzbek (Uzbekistan), and Vietnamese. Several others are in preparation.

本出版品的翻譯印刷版或網路版有以下之語文版:亞摩哈 語(Amharic)(衣索比亞)、阿拉伯語、亞濟利(Azeri)(亞塞拜然)、 巴哈沙(Bahasa)(印尼)、貝拉魯西亞語(Belarusian)、緬甸語、秦 語(Chin)(緬甸)、漢語(簡體與正體字華語)、蒂維西(Dhivehi)(馬 蒂夫)、法爾希(Farsi)(伊朗)、法語、喬治亞語、德語、金波(Jing Paw)(緬甸)、卡人(Karen)(緬甸)、卡摩(Khmer)(寮國)、庫德語、 喀贊語(Kyrgyz)(喀贊斯坦)、尼帕語、巴需多(Pashto)(阿富汗與 巴基斯坦)、俄文、塞爾維亞文、西班亞文、圖博文、提格尼亞 (Tigrinya)(埃力特利亞)、烏克蘭文、烏茲別克文、與越南文。 還有其他的語文正在準備當中。

Between 1993 and 2002 there were six translations. Between 2003 and 2008 there have been twenty-two.

在1993年與2002年之間,有6種翻譯版本。到了2003年與 2008年之間總共有22種版本。

The great diversity of the societies and languages into which translations have spread support the provisional conclusion that the persons who initially encounter this document have seen its analysis to be relevant to their society. 232 自我解放戰略規劃指南 | 延伸閱讀⑤

由於社會的高度多元化與經由翻譯而有多種語言的傳播, 證實了我們假設的結論,那就是第一次接觸到本文件的都可以 了解本文的分析與他們的社會息息相關。

> Gene Sharp 吉恩夏普

January 2008 2008年1月 Albert Einstein Institution 亞伯特 · 愛因斯坦研究院 Boston, Massachusetts 波士頓,麻薩諸塞州



《自我解放戰略規劃指南》

延伸閱讀

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## Self-Liberation 自我解放戰略規劃指南

A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or Other Oppression 終結獨裁政權或其他壓迫之行動

Extended Reading 5 延伸閱讀⑤

From Dictatorship to Democracy 從獨裁走向民主

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