Recovering Nonviolent History

Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles

edited by

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BOULDER
LONDON

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Ghana: Nonviolent Resistance in the Independence Movement, 1890s–1950s

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Ghanaians have a rich and long history of civil resistance that is rooted in both a philosophy and strategic practice of nonviolent action.[1] Relatively unknown to outsiders, this history is also little heralded within Ghana despite its importance in the independence struggle. That is partly because Ghanaians won their independence using boycotts, strikes, associations, and intelligent compromise, but they usually do not describe these as methods of nonviolent action. The term popularized by Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the independence struggle, was *positive action*. Additionally, positive action is identified with Nkrumah himself: later as president of Ghana, he actively supported armed struggle elsewhere in Africa while resorting to authoritarianism at home.[2]

In this chapter, I highlight the role of ordinary people in carrying out nonviolent resistance that paved the road to independence. I trace the roots of nonviolent actions to deeply held traditions of intra-ethnic nonviolent political behavior, as well as growing awareness about people power combined with an increasing resentment toward specific colonial policies. Ghanaians practiced and refined nonviolent tactics to pressure the British to grant independence; the strategy proved successful.

Early Democratic, Participatory, and Nonviolent Strategy in Ghanaian Political Traditions

Nonviolent resistance in Ghana can trace its roots to the political tradition of governance. In West Africa in general, there traditionally were systems

of checks on chiefly powers. The forms of governance of the Akan kingdoms (Fante, Ashanti, and others) were broadly democratic. Public forums in small towns and villages offered everyone the opportunity to participate—men and women, royal or not, youths and elders.[3] At the same time, the rulers' powers were effectively constrained by the community. At the enstooling of a new chief or king, the queen mother ceremonially advised the new chief not to be "hard of hearing" or act on his or her own initiative. Chiefs who disregarded the people faced removal—destooling. A metaphor depicting the chief's cautious use of power was an egg held in a hand.[4]

The Akan also practiced decisionmaking by consensus: if all opinions were heard and all parties agreed, then there was no disgruntled minority to become permanent outsiders liable to turn to violence.[5] The Akan use of deferential and indirect speech in courts, and their addressing the chief through the mediation of the *okyeame* (spokesperson), reflected their preference for less conflictual communication and their fostering of social and political harmony.[6]

Despite such constraints, Akan government could be autocratic—the Asante in particular had a reputation for militarism. Rosy historical narratives remain open to debate, but nevertheless played a historic role in the evolution of the Gold Coast's collective nonviolent resistance.[7] The Akan practice of wide-ranging consultation and the development of rhetorical skills fostering intergroup peace combined with the right to destool chiefs provided their descendants with a set of attitudes and skills essential in waging nonviolent struggle.

Colonial Governance, Growing Resistance, and the Rise of Nationalist Unity

By purchase, conquest, and diplomacy, British interests expanded in the Gold Coast in the nineteenth century, establishing the Gold Coast colony in 1874 and later incorporating the Ashanti kingdom. The Asante, who controlled much of the territory that is now Ghana, fought against British colonialism, their independent kingdom itself having all the attributes of a modern nation, including territory, central government, police and army, national language, and law.[8] Osei Tutu, the first Asantehene in 1701, created the Kotoko Council (a consultative assembly) and the Golden Stool as a symbol to give a strong sense of identity.

As there was little British settlement, the British relied on the cooperation of traditional chiefs and kings, initially the Fante whom the British supported as a counterweight to the Asante. The bond that was agreed in 1844 between Britain and eight Fante chiefs, including King Joseph Aggrey, offered British protection to the Fante while respecting the internal

rule of chiefs and kings. Law and order was to be maintained by a combination of British officials and district chiefs, "moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law."[9] In 1852, in the spirit of this bond, Governor H. Worsley Hill proposed a poll tax, agreed to by the chiefs, in order to improve life on the coast, especially schooling. The tax was a fiasco, provoking armed rebellion and widespread noncompliance, and ultimately was abandoned in 1862.[10]

In the 1860s, intellectuals in the Gold Coast, such as J. Africanus Beale Horton (an army medical officer from Sierra Leone), openly discussed the need for self-government. However, when in 1865 King Aggrey challenged British usurpation of kingly powers, he was promptly exiled to Sierra Leone for "sedition."[11] In 1869, subsequent Fante chiefs formed a Fante Confederation to assert their independence, adopting a constitution, collecting their own poll tax, creating a government seal, and mustering an army. The confederation engendered a nationalist spirit but collapsed, partly due to internal rivalries inflamed by the British.[12] Eventually, the British Gold Coast colony was proclaimed in 1874 as the culmination of a process of buying out or negotiating with imperial competitors such as the Dutch, allying with predominantly coastal African peoples, and fighting wars with others, notably the Asante. The military balance of power was changed dramatically in 1874 through British use of Enfield rifles and their demonstration of the Gatling gun.[13] In 1877, the seat of government was moved from Cape Coast to Christiansborg Castle in Accra. In 1902, the annexation of the Northern Territories completed British territorial expansion.

In 1896, Britain again tried to introduce direct taxation—the house tax. Women in Accra protested nonviolently, marching to Government House and noisily refusing to disperse when Governor William Maxwell would not meet them. They next sent a petition to the colonial secretary in London.[14] While this did not change British policy (neither did the 1898 Hut Tax War in Sierra Leone), it succeeded in rallying the support of King Tackie and other Accra kings. The first explicitly political organization in the colony was the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS), founded in 1897 to campaign against a bill ceding control of "all waste and unoccupied lands" to colonial authorities. Roger S. Gocking comments that, "in a remarkable show of unity, ARPS brought together both the colony's chiefs and educated elite" as well as gained support from British commercial interests who were fearful for their investments.[15] In 1898 ARPS sent a delegation to London to meet the colonial secretary, and succeeded in having the bill withdrawn—according to Desmond George-Williams "a major victory of African nonviolent strategic action."[16]

Even before the foundation of ARPS, some of its future leading figures were a thorn in the flesh of the colonial administration, notably John Mensah Sarbey who founded the *Gold Coast People* in 1890. Its allegations that

the courts were corrupt and unprofessional prompted the first restrictions on freedom of the press, the 1893 Newspaper Registration Ordinance.[17] Publications linked with the growing number of voluntary associations became a vital outlet for criticism of colonial rule. Usually they needed to be subsidized by wealthy professionals,[18] but they eventually reached beyond the educated elite through the practice of literate people retelling what they had read.[19] In 1902, Mensah Sarbah and others established the Mfantsi National Education Fund in order to set up independent primary and secondary schools where pupils would read and write in Fante and, consequently, establish a Fante literature and history.[20]

Voluntary associations with mixed European and African members had begun in Ghana as early as 1787, but ARPS's success encouraged emulation. Benevolent societies, first founded in 1902, flourished and grew after 1930. Women founded charitable associations. While some associations were responses to a specific grievance and usually founded by the urban educated elites, they quickly grew to encompass a wide range of fraternal and mutual benefit associations (some based on ethnicity), charitable organizations, professional associations, trade unions, youth groups, women's groups, farmers' groups and cooperatives, and finally political parties. In the 1920s, associations such as the Gold and Silver Smith's Association, the Colony and Ashanti Motor Union, and the Carpenters and Masons Union were in existence, but dormant. Eventually these groups combined to become a countervailing force against the colonial status quo and for nationalist mobilization. Through voluntary associations the less educated became "conscious of their strength vis-à-vis the political leaders" and aware of their ability to influence and, if necessary, to resist the government.[21]

From 1895 onward, Britain increasingly practiced "indirect rule," setting up a Native Administration in its West African colonies, a policy criticized as a maneuver setting traditional chiefs against the rising demands of the educated elite.[22] The British used various means to assert their control over chiefs and kings, refusing to recognize some, deporting and reinstating others—all the while insisting that they were not interfering with the native order. In the Gold Coast, the governorship of Gordon Guggisberg (during the economic boom of 1919–1927) brought a rapid expansion of secondary and technical education to meet the needs of a modernizing economy together with constitutional reform in 1925.[23] The Trinidadian promoter of pan-Africanism, George Padmore, remarked that the only good thing about the Gold Coast's 1925 Constitution was that it "gave recognition for the first time in the history of British tropical Africa of the elective principle, as far as officers are concerned." But it also had the impact of transforming "the status of the chiefs, from elected servants of the people into paid agents of British imperialism," thereby dividing chiefs and the ARPS.[24] For a time, the ARPS withheld cooperation from the new legislative and district

councils, but ultimately the organization itself split and the most significant cooperator with the new system was none other than its vice-president, J. E. Casely Hayford, one of the prime movers of pan-Africanism in West Africa.

Casely Hayford was perpetually working for a wider alliance against colonialism. In 1920, he convened the first National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), which involved activists from all four British colonies and drew up a charter of eighteen demands. Ghana's foremost historian, A. Adu Boahen, wrote that Casely Hayford's "idealism, political vision and faith in the unity of African peoples . . . injected a flavour of pan-Africanism into West African politics matched only by Kwame Nkrumah's efforts 25 years later."[25] Padmore too considered Casely Hayford a "John the Baptist" to a younger generation of leaders, but regretted his failure "to realize that without the active support of the plebeian masses, especially the peasantry, who form the bulk of the population, the middle-class intellectuals, small in number and disunited among themselves, were ineffective."[26]

The NCBWA faded out after Casely Hayford's death in 1930; however, linked youth initiatives thrived. The most prominent youth organizer was the Comintern-trained Sierra Leonean, Wallace Johnson, who contributed to Padmore's *The Negro Worker,* a publication that featured articles like "A Few Hints on How to Carry Out a Strike." However, when Johnson got to Ghana in 1933 (after being deported from Nigeria for his political activities), he did not suggest striking since there were too many unemployed willing to take strikers' jobs. Instead, he helped illiterate people who sought redress against employers. Despite his rhetoric of mass action, perhaps his most enduring contribution to Ghanaian politics was the connections he forged with British anticolonialist parliamentarians whom he briefed with information for parliamentary questions to the colonial secretary, especially about issues affecting Gold Coast workers. Johnson even once posed as a miner to investigate hazardous conditions down in the mines.[27]

Johnson also cofounded the West African Youth League, cooperating with a study group of former ARPS members. In Leo Spitzer and LaRay Denzer's view, "his efforts raised political expectations throughout the general public, confirming the belief of the middle elite that they had a right to influence decisions which concerned them, teaching the working class and the farmers that they might share that right."[28]

A. Adu Boahen considered the interwar years a "transitional period" in Ghanaian politics "during which both chiefs and intelligentsia participated in agitational politics," but that unfortunately was plagued by conflict among the leaders:

> Neither the NCBWA nor the youth movement ever commanded a mass following nor did any significant linkage occur between urban and rural politics. The leaders could therefore be written off by the colonial rulers as

> being unrepresentative of the people. . . . There were certainly elements of radicalism in the mid-1930s but in general these movements were moderate nationalist movements, conducting their politics within the colonial framework. Political independence was decidedly not on their programme.[29]

Two ordinances in 1934 did provoke concerted resistance. The Waterworks Bill imposed rates on previously free supplies of water and Ordinance 21 (the Sedition Amendment) further curbed press freedom. "The intelligentsia, the African legislators, and the chiefs all united in opposition against these ordinances, and the populace came to feel that these groups were keenly concerned with public opinion."[30] A Gold Coast and Ashanti delegation and an ARPS delegation went to London to petition against the Waterworks Bill. Although neither ordinance was repealed, organizing against them "clearly revealed . . . the potential political strength of the masses when they were mobilized in opposition to an action which directly and adversely affected their best interests."[31]

The first Gold Coast trade union was founded in 1939 and by 1941 the colonial government had a system of registration that steered trade unions into a British model where industrial action had to be apolitical and limited to employment issues.[32]

Boycotts, Protests, and Developments Abroad

The events highlighted below were immediate precursors of the 1950s independence movement. They offered practical experience of nonviolent actions that proved invaluable in organizing later resistance.

The 1937 Cocoa Boycott

Britain had invested in Ghanaian infrastructure by building railroads and deepening Takoradi harbor to expand cocoa exports, which had become about 60 percent of the colony's income. In the global economic depression, prices plunged to one-third of their 1927 level. Therefore, European companies formed a price-fixing cartel: the United Africa Company.[33] Farmers and traders responded by organizing a refusal to sell cocoa combined with a boycott of imported goods in 1930–1931, but this first boycott lasted only two months. It failed because it was not universally observed.[34] Yet seven years later, an alliance of brokers, market women, and chiefs organized a much more successful holdup of cocoa. This second holdup lasted seven months, from October 1937 to April 1938, and reached participation levels of around 80 percent, particularly in rural areas.[35] Farmers and chiefs visited areas where the holdup and boycott of European goods

was weak. Native tribunals took account of the hardships incurred by not pressing cases against farmers for repayment of debts. Market women reinforced the boycott against foreign goods by refusing to buy them. Truck drivers refused to deliver goods and even fishermen refused to fish. Under this pressure, small importers found their stocks piling up while, back in Britain, textile workers were laid off due to reduced cloth exports.[36]

When London instructed Governor Arnold Hodson to enforce the cartel, there occurred something "almost unprecedented: he decided not to carry out the instructions."[37] Instead, he advised the British government to defuse the situation by appointing a Commission of Inquiry. This commission, reporting in 1938, condemned the European firms. Contemporary historians now acknowledge the cocoa boycott as "a major event in the political history of Ghana," posing a threat to the entire colonial system,[38] and representing "a spirited, morale-boosting and novel form of resistance against white power and private foreign interests."[39] Padmore later referred to it as a pre-Nkrumah example of nonviolent positive action.[40]

Interlude: Developments Abroad

The Fifth Pan-African Congress met in Manchester, England, in October 1945, organized by Padmore and aided by the young Nkrumah.[41] Of the ninety delegates, twenty-six were from Africa, including future leaders of independent countries. As Nkrumah explained later, the 1945 Congress agreed on a plan of action "based on the Gandhist technique of non-violent non-cooperation, in other words, the withholding of labour, civil disobedience, and economic boycott."[42] The congressional declaration, "Colonial and Coloured Unity," called on colonial workers and farmers to organize:

> Colonial workers must be in the front of the battle against Imperialism. Your weapons—the Strike and the Boycott—are invincible. We also call upon the intellectuals and professional classes of the Colonies to awaken to their responsibilities. By fighting for trade union rights, the right to form cooperatives, freedom of the press, assembly, demonstration and strike, freedom to print and read the literature which is necessary for the education of the masses, you will be using the only means by which your liberties will be won and maintained. Today there is only one road to effective action—the organisation of the masses. And in that organisation the educated Colonials must join.[43]

Impressed by the success of nonviolent resistance in India, the African movements carried a real concern that colonial reprisals against violence would take a high toll. This was also a time of optimism because the victorious World War II Allies had reaffirmed the right to self-determination. Many of these influences reached Ghana through returning ex-servicemen.

The Ex-Servicemen

Britain, as other European powers, relied heavily on colonial recruits during the two world wars—11,000 Gold Coast recruits served in the British forces in World War I and 65,000 in World War II.[44] The returning ex-servicemen, as they were known, brought home ideas and aspirations acquired through their experiences in the world outside.[45] Ex-serviceman Geoffrey Aduamah, housed at a large camp in Durban, recalls being challenged by South African Indians: "Why are you fighting for Britain? Are you yourselves free?"[46]

Ex-servicemen mimeographed their own *Kintampo Camp Weekly* in 1945–1946, reflecting their own political discussions with Indian nationalists in both India and Burma.

> The war has generated new ideas and created a new sense of values throughout the world, and West Africa too has caught the spirit of the age. Her sons have gone to other lands; they have seen; they have conquered. They have conquered not only the physical, but also those habits of thought fostered by the ancient forces of reaction. There is every indication that they would not take tamely to the old order of things.[47]

John Baku, an ex-serviceman interviewed by Adrienne Israel, remembers drinking at bars with Indian soldiers:

> They had obtained a "leave pass" and gone into Bombay in order to try and get a glimpse of [Mahatma] Gandhi. . . . People were so crowded that we couldn't find the man, so we had to climb the hill. Climb upstairs [in] a four-storey building . . . I saw him, with all his party members moving together with him, creating noise, singing. . . . He was there with all his people, an old man with glasses. . . . I found out he was a hero, a great man.[48]

Likewise, Frank W. Aidoo explained,

> We didn't see much difference in how we were being governed and how the Indians were being governed by the British. When we came back [to the Gold Coast] negotiations started for Indian independence. We who were fortunate to go to India to learn first-hand the conditions there and compare it to the conditions here, we saw no reason why India should be granted independence and not our African colonies, because we didn't see much difference between India and Ghana. . . . And that actually brought this political awakening.[49]

Such encounters stiffened Ghanaian determination to seek independence. Although ex-servicemen had economic grievances, their demand for independence had its roots in a profound, ideational change about becoming free men in an independent country.[50]

Most accounts of Ghana's independence struggle focus too narrowly on the leading role of J. B. Danquah, the founder of the United Gold Coast

Convention (UGCC) party, and especially on Nkrumah.[51] For all of Nkrumah's organizing skills and his awareness of the need to include the poorer members of society in a widespread grassroots movement, he could not have succeeded unless the Ghanaian people had the necessary will, skills, and discipline. When the Ex-Servicemen's Union called a march to Christiansborg Castle, on February 28, 1948, both Danquah and Nkrumah were addressing a political meeting outside of Accra at Saltpond. About 2,000 marchers turned up, but police would not let them proceed. In the confusion, stones were thrown and the police opened fire, killing one ex-serviceman outright and wounding others (two later died).[52]

The distraught marchers ran to another section of Accra where people had gathered to conclude a month-long boycott of foreign merchants organized by Nii Kwabena Bonne III, a prominent merchant and UGCC leader.[53] With emotions running high, the crowd turned to violence, looting and burning shops. Police opened fire. A crowd battered down the gate to Ussher Fort Prison in order to let prisoners escape. As the news spread, rioting broke out in Kumasi where it continued for two weeks. According to British figures, 29 people died and 237 were injured within a month.[54]

Nkrumah and Danquah seized the moment, issuing telegrams that argued the riots showed Britain could no longer effectively rule the country and proposed that the UGCC form an interim government to restore order.[55] Several days later, trying to calm the crowds and channel their outrage into more productive political goals, the UGCC leaders addressed a 9,000-strong rally where Nkrumah urged that "people should fight with unity, not guns for independence."[56] Partly through the guidance of Nkrumah and other leaders, and partly through deeply held values, the future people's movement for independence for the most part was able to avoid violence. However, on March 11, 1948, the governor ordered the arrest of six UGCC leaders, including Danquah, Nkrumah, and Nii Kwabena Bonne III. This quickly backfired, raising the popularity of the "Big Six" to national heights.[57]

Mass Organizing and the Positive Action Campaign

Due to their different opinions of how best to organize the movement for independence, Nkrumah broke with Danquah and the UGCC and, in July 1949, formed the Convention People's Party (CPP), sometimes called the "verandah boys" (those who had no home and slept on the verandahs of the rich). The CPP mainly consisted of elementary school leavers (that is, students who finished elementary school but did not go on to secondary school), people with just enough education to read and with English as a common language. They spread the nationalist message with slogans that had wide appeal such as "We Have the Right to Live as Men," "Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom, and All Things Will Be Added unto It," and

"Self-Government Now."[58] Bankole Timothy describes Nkrumah's approach: "The farmer, the fisherman, the petty trader and the labourer were made to feel that they were equally as important as the lawyers in contributing to the progress of the country."[59]

Nkrumah worked closely with CPP organizers such as K. A. Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio to organize the youth into political action for independence. Youth groups like the Asante Youth Organization and Accra Youth Study Group were later federated into the Committee of Youth Organizations (CYO).[60]

Market women were major supporters, supplying the CPP with funds and vehicles. Nkrumah remembered a rally where a Kumasi woman slashed her own face with a razor blade: "Then, smearing the blood over her body, she challenged the men present to do likewise in order to show that no sacrifice was too great in their united struggle for freedom and independence."[61] The CPP supported three newspapers, the *Accra Evening News,* the Cape Coast's *Daily Mail,* and Sekondi's *Morning Telegraph,* but also saw that the CPP could reach people through couching its message in religious terms or using religious symbols such as manner of dress, speech, honorifics, and ascriptive titles.[62]

The positive action campaign of 1950–1951 envisaged strikes, boycotts, and noncooperation. As Nkrumah later explained, "We had no guns, but even if we had, the circumstances were such that non-violent alternatives were open to us, and it was necessary to try them before resorting to other means."[63] Nkrumah learned about Gandhi's nonviolent methods of struggle during his studies in the West as well as through his involvement in pan-Africanism. His 1949 pamphlet, *What I Mean by Positive Action,* in which he outlined the nonviolent methods for independence struggle, was modeled closely on C. V. H. Rao's 1945 *Civil Disobedience Movements in India*.[64] Britain had to be pressured to respect Ghana's right to self-government.

Nkrumah delineated three categories of positive action: (1) legitimate constitutional political agitation; (2) newspaper and educational campaigns, including political education, agitation, platform speeches, and establishing independent schools and colleges; and (3) "as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation on the principle of absolute nonviolence."[65]

The colonial government greeted Nkrumah's call for positive action by fining him £400 and arresting several newspaper editors. In fact, Gocking reports that the Trades Union Congress (TUC) rather than Nkrumah himself took the lead in starting positive action "by calling for a general strike in support of the Meteorological Employees Union," thereby forcing the CPP's hands.[66] The next day Nkrumah made his declaration that positive action would begin at midnight. Everyone should stay home from work. On

January 8, at a crowded rally at Accra's West End Arena, he explained that enemies of the CPP—the imperialists' "concealed agent-provocateurs and stooges"—had spread rumors that positive action really meant "riot, looting, and disturbances, in a word violence."[67] His speech, echoing his 1949 pamphlet, said, "There are two ways to achieve Self-government: either by armed revolution and violent overthrow of the existing regime, or by constitutional and legitimate non-violent methods. In other words: Either by armed might or by moral pressure."[68] His speech continued to stress his movement's commitment to "absolute nonviolence," explaining that the education stage of the campaign had already begun through newspapers, Ghanaian schools and colleges, and traveling speakers, but that it might escalate to "Nationwide Non-Violent Sit-Down-at-Home Strikes, Boycotts, and Non-Cooperation."[69]

Nkrumah's own newspaper, the *Accra Evening News,* carried many articles warning that, if necessary, people would resort to positive action as a last recourse against British intransigence, but it less often explained what positive action was. An article signed by "Agitator" argued that "agitation is, after all, the civilized peaceful weapon of moral force. It is preferable to violence and brute physical force . . . to agitate means to inform."[70] On May Day 1949, Gandhi was held up as an inspiration to Ghana's movement for freedom and democracy.[71] Sometimes there were overtones or symbols of violence, such as a cartoon where a figure crying for help personifying "imperialism" was being crushed under the boot of the CPP.[72]

The *Gold Coast Observer* reported a public lecture by Bankole Renner, who argued that to free the country from imperialism "hatred should be in our hearts" and, while this hatred should be aimed at a system rather than individuals, when individuals identified with the system "we must hate that person too."[73] This rousing speech was followed by a less inflammatory explanation that positive action used methods of boycott and general strike. Other articles had a more pronounced insistence on nonviolence. J. Ahinful Quansah urges that "the fundamental principle of non-violence be indoctrinated into the people. Yes, non-violence, for we are a religious race!"[74] Articles also castigated British violence. "Tell Britain that we as Youths have tasted the sweetness of gun bullets and we entertain no fear. We are now on brainy warfare. We believe in the maxim of 'The pen is mightier than the sword.'"[75] The newspaper also exhorted readers to explain these political insights and program of action to those who could not read.[76]

While the CPP-supported newspapers called for positive action, the colonial government broadcast counterpropaganda on the radio, telling people to go back to work and open their shops. Most city stores closed down on January 9, 1950, but the next day enthusiasm seemed to be waning and the day after some stores reopened. When Nkrumah took a walk through

Accra on January 11, dressed in a smock typical of Ghana's Northern Territories, people began to follow him. Before long, a large crowd gathered in front of the *Accra Evening News* offices. Nkrumah addressed the crowd, asking them to fill the arena that evening. His speech in the arena, and its favorable news coverage, resuscitated the movement and the strike.[77] To no avail, the colonial government moved against the press, suspending the three CPP newspapers and accusing their editors of sedition.

On January 17, the ex-servicemen again marched to Christiansborg Castle. During violent outbreaks provoked by the police, protesters killed two police officers. The chiefs on the Legislative Council then passed a motion deploring positive action as violent and coercive and blaming "grasshopper leaders" for inciting trouble and trying to usurp chiefly authority.[78] These criticisms pleased the colonial government, but did not sway the people who were solidly behind the CPP.

Nkrumah was arrested on charges of organizing an illegal "political" strike—called not in a labor dispute, but to pressure the government—and was blamed for the deaths of the two police officers. At his trial Nkrumah, describing himself as a disciple of Gandhi, insisted that positive action was absolutely nonviolent. Sentenced to twelve months with hard labor, Nkrumah's correspondence from jail reveals his determination to consolidate his relationship with the trade union movement, which he described as "the backbone of the party."[79]

While Nkrumah and other leaders were in jail, his mass movement sprang into action. The CPP swept all seven seats in the Accra Municipal Council election in April 1950 and almost all of the seats in the Kumasi Town Council election in November. Party branches were established everywhere so that the CPP would contest all possible seats in the February 1951 Legislative Assembly election. The CPP then engaged in a voter registration drive, overcoming the reluctance of some potential voters who had not wanted to pay the voter registration fee.

The CPP's election campaign was innovative and energetic. Local campaigns included picnics, dances, skits, and tours by loudspeaker vans decorated in CPP colors. As well as conventional rallies, public ceremonies were held to award diplomas to CPP "prison graduates" (those who served time in prison for their actions of political protest). The CPP adapted well-known hymns, prayers, and biblical phrases with an anticolonial message.[80]

Nkrumah was in jail during the campaign and elections. But when the CPP won thirty-four of the thirty-eight seats[81] (with Nkrumah's gaining 22,780 of the 23,122 votes in Accra Central constituency), Governor Charles Arden-Clarke released him, recognizing that "Nkrumah and his party had the mass of the people behind them . . . [while] no other party [had] appreciable public support."[82] CPP processions through streets were "dominated by women adorned with a sea of Nkrumah cloth"; that is, cloth printed with

Nkrumah's picture.[83] Also evident at this point in history was that ethnic-based antagonism had been abandoned in the struggle for independence.

Arden-Clarke asked Nkrumah to take the position of leader of government business. Nkrumah accepted and, in 1952, the constitution was amended to rename this post prime minister. Now, argued Nkrumah, the time was ripe to switch from positive to tactical action, from noncooperation to a compromise testing the limits of reform possible within the system. Nkrumah's government built roads, bridges, harbors, railways, municipal housing, water supplies, and hospitals; extended free compulsory primary education; set up teacher training colleges; and supported secondary schools. The University of Ghana at Legon was established. Many of these initiatives were made affordable by the fact that world cocoa prices soared in the 1950s, increasing the government budget fourfold.[84]

But during the 1950s, there was some internal opposition to Nkrumah. In the Ashanti region, some opposed the fixing of cocoa prices in order to fund development projects. Various close followers left the CPP and joined the National Liberation Movement (NLM), a group active in Ashanti areas that used mass political action as well as paramilitary "action groupers." The former CPP members were able to steer the NLM away from violence.[85]

Yet in the 1956 election, the CPP won 71 of 104 seats with some 57 percent of the popular vote. Not long afterward, Britain announced that Ghana would receive its independence on March 6, 1957, and Nkrumah became Ghana's first president.[86]

Conclusion

The newly independent state of Ghana took a leading role in advocating and using civil resistance. In December 1958, independent Ghana hosted the All-African Peoples' Conference, a follow-up to the 1945 Pan-African Congress. Patrice Lumumba and Tom Mboya were there along with a large Algerian contingent. In his opening speech, Nkrumah attributed the success of the Ghanaian independence movement to nonviolent positive action.[87] Kojo Botsio, who led the CPP delegation, told countries still struggling for liberation that, "with the united will of the people behind you, the power of the imperialists can be destroyed without the use of violence."[88] Some delegations were unhappy with the emphasis on nonviolent resistance, especially the Algerians and Egyptians who "regarded the very word 'nonviolence' as an insult to brothers fighting and dying for freedom."[89] Ultimately, the congress declared its support for peaceful means in territories where democratic means were available, but also supported those in circumstances where arms were the only protection from colonial violence.[90]

In 1959, after hearing that France planned to test nuclear weapons in the Sahara Desert at Regan, Algeria, a group of eleven Ghanaians along with British and other international activists attempted to intervene nonviolently, but were ejected from French territory in Upper Volta and ended up back in Ghana. Another conference to discuss the way forward for positive action was held in Accra in April 1960, Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa. While Nkrumah opened the conference with a speech advocating "nonviolent positive action" as the main tactic, after the criticisms of Frantz Fanon and pressure from some other African delegates, the conference's emphasis on continent-wide nonviolent positive action was muted.[91] Nevertheless, Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer describe positive action as being "a phenomenal success for Gandhian strategy."[92] Nonviolent tactics were used as part of a self-conscious overall nonviolent strategy that led Ghana quickly to independence with minimal casualties. They included consciousness-raising among the people about their right to self-government, a determination to act in concert with each other through a variety of associations, and a willingness to accept imprisonment. Boycotts and strikes showed the people that withdrawing cooperation leaves colonial forces powerless (and that cooperation reinforces subjection). Many marginalized sectors of society were mobilized in a common cause, including the youth, market women, and elementary school graduates. Newspapers and popular songs spread the message of the movement and the leaders' emphasis on the need for nonviolent discipline resonated with people's deeply held value systems. There was the grace to accept compromise in certain situations as well as the determination to go the harder way of strikes and imprisonment when sacrifice was required. The impact of mass nonviolent civil resistance on shaping Ghanaian nationalism needs further exploration, but it is clear—if rarely acknowledged—that it facilitated this process of nation building.

Notes

I would like to gratefully acknowledge inspiration for this study from Anil Nauriya and Matt Meyer, both through their published works and personally. I thank Nancy Benignus, Lonn Monroe, Stephen Roberts, and Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah for help in finding sources, and the University of Detroit Professor's Union for a grant supporting this research. I thank Rodopi and editors David Boersema and Katy Gray Brown for permission to draw on several paragraphs of an earlier published paper, "Strategic Nonviolence in Africa: Reasons for Its Embrace and Later Abandonment by Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda," in *Spiritual and Political Dimensions of Nonviolence and Peace,* ed. David Boersema and Katy Gray Brown (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 75–101.

1. "Ghanaian" refers to the territories that now constitute Ghana that were home to more than 100 different ethnic groups, the major ones now being the Akan (including the Asante and Fante), Ewe, Mole-Dagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adangbe. J.

B. Danquah is credited with suggesting the name "Ghana," referring back to a medieval African empire, while it was Nkrumah who argued before the Parliament in British-ruled Gold Coast (on May 18, 1956) that the country should be renamed Ghana. See Ebenezer Obiri Addo, *Kwame Nkrumah: A Case Study of Religion and Politics in Ghana* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), 184.

2. Gail Presbey, "Strategic Nonviolence in Africa: Reasons for Its Embrace and Later Abandonment by Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda," in *Spiritual and Political Dimensions of Nonviolence and Peace,* ed. David Boersema and Katy Gray Brown (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 75–101.

3. Kofi A. Busia, "The Political Heritage of Africa in Search of Democracy," in *Readings in African Philosophy: An Akan Collection,* ed. Safro Kwame (New York: University Press of America, 1995), 207–220; Kwame Gyekye, "Traditional Political Ideals, Their Relevance to Development in Contemporary Africa," in *Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies,* vol. 1, ed. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye (Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), 243–256; Kwasi Wiredu, "Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-Party Polity," in *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader,* ed. Emmanuel C. Eze (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 303–312. Kwesi Yankah's study provides Akan examples of female chiefs, queen mothers who have extensive leadership roles, and even female *akyeame* (orators). Kwesi Yankah, *Speaking for the Chief: Okyeame and the Politics of Akan Royal Oratory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 68–83.

4. Gyekye, "Traditional Political Ideals," 251.

5. Wiredu, "Democracy and Consensus," 304, 310–311.

6. Yankah, *Speaking for the Chief,* 54–56.

7. See Gail Presbey, "Akan Chiefs and Queen Mothers in Contemporary Ghana: Examples of Democracy, or Accountable Authority?" *International Journal of African Studies* 3, no. 1 (2001): 63–83.

8. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State* (London: James Currey, 1992), 62.

9. Roger S. Gocking, *The History of Ghana* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), 32.

10. Ibid.

11. Kwaku Nti, "Actions and Reactions: An Overview of the Ding Dong Relationship Between the Colonial Government and the People of the Cape Coast," *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 11, no. 1 (2002): 1–37, at 3–4.

12. "Protest Movements and the Fante Confederation, 1830–1874" (Accra: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and Maks Publications and Media Services, 2006), www.ghanadistricts.com/home/?_=49&sa=4768&ssa=709, accessed November 4, 2012.

13. The British finally defeated the Ashanti militarily in 1901 and incorporated them into the Gold Coast. See Adu Boahen, *Topics in West African History* (London: Longman, 1974); Anthony Smith, *Machine Gun: The Story of the Men and the Weapon That Changed the Face of the Earth* (New York: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 2004), 67–69.

14. Desmond George-Williams, *Bite Not One Another: Selected Accounts of Nonviolent Struggle in Africa* (Addis Ababa: University for Peace, Africa Program, 2006), 30.

15. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 44.

16. George-Williams, *Bite Not One Another,* 32–33.

17. Fred I. A. Omu, "The Dilemma of Newspaper Freedom in Colonial Africa: The West Africa Example," *Journal of African History* 9, no. 2 (1968): 279–278.

18. S. Ekwelie, "The Press in Gold Coast Nationalism" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971), 258–269.

19. Stephanie Newell, *Literary Culture in Colonial Ghana: "How to Play the Game of Life"* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).

20. Nti, "Actions and Reactions," 5.

21. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence* (Paris: Mouton, 1964), 67, 88–94, 112, 123.

22. The following sources describe how the British through "indirect rule" tried to bypass popular control of chiefs: Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence,* 110, 151; Roger S. Gocking, "Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast: Competition for Office and the Invention of Tradition," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 28, no. 3 (1994): 421–446; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 122, 125, 168; Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor, *Ghana: A Political History from Pre-European to Modern Times* (Accra: Sedco; Woeli, 1990), 127.

23. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 59–60.

24. George Padmore, *The Gold Coast Revolution: The Struggle of an African People from Slavery to Freedom* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1953), 92.

25. A. Adu Boahen, "Politics and Nationalism in West Africa 1919–35," in *Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935,* ed. A. Adu Boahen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 633.

26. Padmore, *Gold Coast Revolution,* 52.

27. Leo Spitzer and LaRay Denzer, "I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 6, no. 3 (1973): 413–452, 425, 429.

28. Ibid., 423–424.

29. Boahen, "Politics and Nationalism," 641–642.

30. Ray Y. Gildea Jr., *Nationalism and Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast, 1900–1950* (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1964), 12.

31. Stanley Shaloff, "The Gold Coast Water Rate Controversy 1909–1938," *Institute of African Studies: Research Review* 8, no. 3 (1972): 30. Ordinance 21 was turned against Wallace Johnson as well as Nnamdi Azikwe, who later became Nigeria's first president. The governor argued that the people "in their present stage of development should be protected from disloyal intrigue and subversive propaganda." Quoted in Stanley Shaloff, "Press Controls and Sedition Proceedings in the Gold Coast, 1933–39," *African Affairs* 71, no. 284 (1972): 241–263, at 243. Even before Ordinance 21, the governor had ordered the investigation of anyone in touch with Padmore who at this time worked with the Comintern. (Padmore later argued that the Comintern put the interests of the Soviet Union above those of colonized peoples.)

32. Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence,* 67, 88–92, 112; Ekwelie, "The Press in Gold Coast Nationalism," 258–269.

33. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 64–68.

34. Benjamin Acquaah, *Cocoa Development in West Africa: The Early Period with Particular Reference to Ghana* (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1999), 50. Although the cocoa holdup cost United Africa Company (of Unilever) about £1 million in profit, the companies remained profitable. See George Padmore, "West Africans, Watch Your Land," *International African Opinion* 1, no. 3 (1938): 11; see also George Padmore, "Gold Coast Report," *International African Opinion* 1, no. 5 (1938): 6.

35. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 67–68.

36. Acquaah, *Cocoa Development,* 52.

37. Ibid.

38. Bjorn Beckmann, *Organizing the Farmers: Cocoa and the Politics of National Development in Ghana* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979), 41, 48.

39. Barbara Bush, *Imperialism, Race, and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919–1945* (London: Routledge, 1999), 108.

40. Padmore, *Gold Coast Revolution,* 9.

41. The first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919. Spearheaded by the African-American W. E. B. Du Bois, the pan-African movement worked for the liberation of Africa from European colonization, through strengthening global solidarity among members of the African diaspora.

42. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963), 134–135; Anil Nauriya, *The African Element in Gandhi* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House and National Gandhi Museum, 2006), 82–83.

43. George Padmore, ed., *Colonial and Coloured Unity, A Programme of Action: A History of the Pan African Congress* (London: Hammersmith Bookshop, 1947), parts 6 and 7, www.marxists.org/archive/padmore/1947/pan-african-congress/index.htm, accessed August 27, 2010.

44. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 75.

45. Adrienne Israel interviewed and collected writings of many ex-servicemen. Scholars such as David Killingray argue that the ex-servicemen were apolitical, that their concerns were narrowly self-interested (focused on improving benefits for veterans), and that they were basically used by those like Nkrumah and Danquah. David Killingray, "Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen, and Politics in the Gold Coast, 1939–50," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 21, no. 3 (1983): 523–524. In contrast, Israel sees the two groups (nationalists and ex-servicemen) as mutually influencing each other and other Ghanaians. Interviewees deny that they were unwittingly used by the UGCC, but decided for themselves to march in protest at the colonial government. See Adrienne M. Israel, "Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads: Protest and Politics in Post-War Ghana," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (1992): 359–368.

46. Geoffrey Aduamah, "Freedom Now: 1947–1990," PBS People's Century Series, 2000, www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/freedomnow/aduamahtranscript.html, accessed November 4, 2012.

47. *Kintampo Camp Weekly,* March 24, 1946. Anonymous, quoted in Adrienne M. Israel, "Measuring the War Experience: Ghanaian Soldiers in World War II," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 1 (1987): 160.

48. Israel, "Measuring the War Experience," 167.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 160, 162.

51. See, for example, Basil Davidson, *Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Bankole Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

52. Vincent N. Okyere, *Ghana: A Historical Survey* (Accra: Vinojab, 2000), 154; Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: International, 1971 [1957]), 76–77.

53. This "anti-inflation" boycott opposed unfair British pricing policies. Nii Kwabena Bonne III, *Autobiography of Nii Kwabena Bonne III* (London: Diplomatist, 1953), 64.

54. Colonial Office, *Report on the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948), 85, cited in F. M.

Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960), 169.

55. Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946–1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 74–75.

56. Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in Israel, "Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads," 364, see also 367.

57. Austin, *Politics in Ghana,* 77.

58. Ibid., 17; see also Dennis Austin, *Ghana Observed: Essays on the Politics of a West African Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), 21–22.

59. Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 67.

60. Nkrumah, *Autobiography,* 97–100; Bourret, *Ghana: The Road,* 172–174.

61. Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in Addo, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 90.

62. Addo, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 183.

63. Nkrumah, *Autobiography,* 103, 111, 114; Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan-African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000), 30.

64. Austin, *Politics in Ghana,* 87.

65. Kwame Nkrumah, *What I Mean by Positive Action* (Accra: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1963 [1949]), 2–3. Nkrumah regarded political oppression as, by its very nature, illegitimate and unconstitutional. Hence, in his view, nonviolent resistance should be considered "constitutional" and part of the democratic tradition.

66. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 93–94.

67. Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 88.

68. Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in ibid., 89–90.

69. Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 91.

70. "Agitation," *Accra Evening News,* September 3, 1948, 1.

71. "Light Spirited Leadership," *Accra Evening News,* May 1, 1949, 1.

72. Front page cartoon, *Accra Evening News,* October 6, 1951, 1.

73. "Hatred as a Weapon," *Gold Coast Observer* 9, no. 49, April 8, 1949, 583–584.

74. J. Ahinful Quansah, "A Clarion Call for Still Greater Unity: Imperialism Is a Die-Hard Not Yet Dead," *Accra Evening News,* June 5, 1950, 2.

75. Komfo Atta, "A Very Dangerous Maxim Indeed," *Accra Evening News,* January 8, 1949, 2; Kobina Egyir, "Tell Britain: Dedicated to the Coussey Committee," *Accra Evening News,* February 25, 1949, 1.

76. Kofi Annan, "The Tenser the Struggle, the Sweeter Its Gains," *Accra Evening News,* October 29, 1949, 1.

77. Nkrumah, *Autobiography,* 117–119.

78. Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 93–94.

79. Kwame Nkrumah, *Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Directives for Running of the Convention People's Party and the Evening News from James Fort Prison, Accra, 22 January 1950–12 February 1951.* Public Records and Archives, National Archives, Accra, Ghana. Letter dated June 17, 1950, from Kojo Botsio to Kobina Sekyi.

80. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 96; Addo, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 101–103.

81. The Legislative Assembly of 1951 had eighty-four members, thirty-eight elected and forty-six nonelected. The CPP had the support of twenty-two nonelected members, hence, a majority of fifty-four. Only two UGCC candidates were elected and the party subsequently disbanded.

82. Charles Arden-Clarke, *African Affairs* 57, no. 226 (1958): 29–37, quoted in Bourret, *Ghana: The Road,* 175.

83. Janet Berry Hess, "Imagining Culture: Art and Nationalism in Ghana" (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1999), 33.
84. Gocking, *History of Ghana,* 97–101.
85. Ibid., 104, 106.
86. Ibid., 108–111.
87. Sutherland and Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi,* 35.
88. Patrick Duncan, "Nonviolence at Accra," *Africa Today* 6, no. 1 (1959): 31.
89. Ibid., 32.
90. Ibid.
91. Sutherland and Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi,* 36–41.
92. Ibid., 31.

Appendix: Conflict Summaries

This appendix has been compiled by the book's editor, Maciej Bartkowski, based on the information presented in the corresponding chapters of the book. Cases are arranged alphabetically. (Any omissions in the tables are either of the editor's own making or the information was not available.)

Key

Method and Type of Nonviolent Action

Nonviolent intervention
- *Disruptive*
- *Creative*

Noncooperation
- *Political*
- *Economic*
- *Social*

Protest and persuasion

Length of the Campaign

Short: 1 day up to 4 weeks
Medium: 1 month up to 1 year
Long: More than 1 year

Level of Participation of People

Low: 1–100 people or less than 20 percent of the population
Medium: 100–1,000 people or between 20 percent and 50 percent of the population
High: More than 1,000 people or more than 50 percent of the population

Ghana

Main Campaigns	Action	Method/*Type*	Date	Length	Level of Participation	Direct Impact	Long-Term/Overall Impact of Civil Resistance
Protest against direct taxation	Women in Accra marched to Government House and protested against British direct taxation	Protest and persuasion	1896	Short	High	The nonviolent actions did not change British policy, but mobilized indigenous elites	Nonviolent resistance showed that withdrawing cooperation leaves colonial forces powerless while cooperation reinforces colonial control Nonviolent resistance facilitated the process of nation building
	Women sent a petition to the colonial secretary in London to protest direct taxation	Protest and persuasion					
Campaign against bill ceding control of "all waste and unoccupied lands" to colonial authorities	Establishment of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) to campaign against a bill that would establish British control over unoccupied lands	Nonviolent intervention/ *Creative*	1897	Long	High	Strengthened unity among the colony's chiefs and local educated elite In 1898, under the pressure of local nonviolent mobilization the bill was withdrawn	
	Growth of voluntary associations and benevolent societies, including charitable organizations; professional associations; trade unions; youth, women's, and farmers' groups; cooperatives; and political parties	Nonviolent intervention/ *Creative*	1902 onward	Long	High	The organizations became a force against the colonial status quo and for nationalist mobilization They spread political awareness that encouraged resistance against colonial authorities	
Campaign against Waterworks Bill and Ordinance 21	Delegations sent to London to petition British government to annul the Waterworks Bill and Ordinance 21 that curbed freedom of the press	Protest and persuasion	1934	Short		Local mobilization and organization skills were tested and developed	Nonviolent resistance showed that withdrawing cooperation leaves colonial forces powerless while cooperation reinforces colonial control Nonviolent resistance facilitated the process of nation building
	Farmers and traders refused to sell cocoa and boycotted imported goods in opposition to the European cartel's price-fixing	Noncooperation/ *Economic*	1930–1931	Medium		Precursor to boycotts in the future	
1937 cocoa boycott	Coalition of local brokers, market women, and chiefs organized boycott of European goods and refused to sell cocoa	Noncooperation/ *Economic*	1937	Medium	High	Under the pressure of the indigenously led noncooperation, the British governor refused to follow London's orders to protect the European cartel and convinced the government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to defuse the tensions The cocoa boycott was seen as a major inspirational event in the political history of nonviolent resistance in Ghana	
	Native tribunals did not press cases against farmers for repayment of debts	Noncooperation/ *Political, Economic*	1937	Medium	High		
	Truck drivers refused to deliver goods and fishermen refused to fish	Noncooperation/ *Economic*	1937	Medium	High		
	Protests of ex-servicemen motivated equally by economic grievances and desire for an independent country	Protest and persuasion	February 28, 1948	Short	High	Police opened fire and riots broke out Telegrams were sent to the United Nations, and the world press said the riots showed that the British could no longer rule the country effectively Nationalist leaders, including Nkrumah, urged nonviolent discipline that for the most part was maintained throughout the independence struggle Arrest of the nationalist leaders backfired, raising their popularity	
Positive action campaign	Convention People's Party (CPP) was set up and youth political movement was formed	Nonviolent intervention/ *Creative*	1949–1950	Long			
	Newspaper and education campaigns launched	Protest and persuasion	1949–1951	Long		Spread of the nationalist message and fostering of unity Newspaper editors arrested	
	Establishment of independent schools and colleges	Nonviolent intervention/ *Creative*	1949–1951	Long			
	Rally and Kwame Nkrumah's speech	Protest and persuasion	January 8, 1950	Short	High	Call for nonviolent mobilization and noncooperation	
	March to Christiansburg	Protest and persuasion	January 17, 1950	Short	High	Police provoked violence British arrested Nkrumah	
	Economic boycotts, closing of stores, sit-downs at home, strikes	Noncooperation/ *Economic*	1950	Long	High	British control over the country was shaken	
	CPP built its organizational capacities and established its branches in all parts of the country	Nonviolent intervention/ *Creative*	1951			CPP election campaigns used the skills and experience of innovative organizing and mobilization learned from past nonviolent actions CPP victories in municipal and parliamentary elections Nkrumah released from prison	Nonviolent resistance showed that withdrawing cooperation leaves colonial forces powerless while cooperation reinforces colonial control Nonviolent resistance facilitated the process of nation building Ghana gained its independence on March 6, 1957
	Political compromise	Nonviolent intervention/ *Creative*	1952–1956	Long	High	A new constitution was adopted; Nkrumah became a prime minister; main focus was on economic reforms and development of infrastructure	