ORANGE REVOLUTION
Study Guide
Table of Contents

An Election Provides the Spark ....................... 2
A Planned Spontaneous Revolution .................. 4
Major Characters ...................................... 6
Other Players .......................................... 7
Ukraine Then and Now ................................. 8
Ukraine Historical Timeline ............................ 9
Not the First Time (Or the Last) ..................... 10
Epilogue .................................................. 11
Additional Resources ................................. 12
Questions for Further Discussion .................... 14
Suggested Group Exercises ............................ 16
Before a single vote was cast, Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election had grabbed a worldwide audience. Television and print media reported every dramatic twist beginning in September, when Viktor Yushchenko, a reform-minded presidential candidate, was mysteriously poisoned and flown to Austria for emergency treatment. Yushchenko survived but before-and-after pictures of the candidate’s once handsome face, now severely scarred, led the news around the world. The drama continued in November when the second round of voting was marred by blatant election fraud. Millions of outraged citizens surged into the streets of Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and other Ukrainian cities, in a massive protest that paralyzed the country for weeks. It was the greatest upheaval in Eastern European politics in nearly two decades — the most spectacular of the post-communist rebellions in favor of democracy which had already spread through Slovakia, Serbia and Georgia.

Named for Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign color, the Orange Revolution of 2004 was the culmination of a crisis begun three years earlier. In 2001, massive protests had briefly convulsed the country when the Ukraine Without Kuchma (UWK) movement demanded the resignation of the deeply unpopular president, Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma’s unresponsive and corrupt leadership had already driven his popularity into the single digits by December 2000 when recordings made by Kuchma’s bodyguard were publicized by a member of parliament. Kuchma’s voice is heard recommending the abduction of Georgiy Gongadze, an investigative journalist who had accused Kuchma of corruption. The so-called cassette scandal sparked the creation of UWK. The movement was unprecedented in modern Ukraine, supported by groups across the political spectrum.

Gongadze had been missing since September 2000. His headless body was discovered near Kyiv two months later. Hearing the tape recordings, which not only tied Kuchma to Gongadze’s murder, but revealed Kuchma to be at the center of a criminal regime, the population took to the streets. UWK declared itself to be a strictly nonviolent movement, but was unable to control its radical members, who attacked riot police in March 2001 at a rally in Kyiv. When police responded, dozens of protesters were injured. Middle class supporters of UWK deserted the movement overnight, fearful of further violent incidents.
Ineligible to serve a third term, Kuchma anointed the sitting prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, to succeed him. Although Yanukovych lacked charisma, he’d been a faithful servant of the country's wealthy business interests, and was expected to maintain or even strengthen Ukraine's ties to Russia. With the entire machinery of the government supporting the Yanukovych candidacy (at taxpayer expense), Kuchma was confident his man could win. But the Kuchma/Yanukovych forces underestimated the opposition. For months, every stump speech reminded voters of Kuchma's failures. Viktor Yushchenko spoke out repeatedly against corruption, calling Kuchma's government a "criminal regime." Even when opinion polls pointed to a decisive Yushchenko victory, the Orange coalition kept up the pressure. They assumed Kuchma's party would do anything -- including vote fraud -- to maintain power, so they worked with civic groups to organize voter education campaigns and a vast election monitoring system. The Orange forces hoped to prevent voter fraud, but as a backup, they prepared to document, expose, publicize and protest the fraud if it occurred.

In the initial round of voting on October 31, Yushchenko finished first of the twenty-five candidates, but since no candidate won over 50%, a second round of voting was set for November 21. In this round, the fraud was blatant and pervasive. Yushchenko's Orange coalition was ready; popular outrage gave them the mobilizing tool they needed. At 2 a.m. on November 22, Orange leaders broadcast an appeal to all citizens to gather in the heart of Kyiv at Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), known simply as Maidan.
By noon on November 22, 2004, nearly 100,000 angry demonstrators had converged on Maidan and in other cities to protest the previous day’s election fraud. As the crowds mushroomed, even the organizers were surprised. Suddenly, Maidan became a symbol of the revolution, resistance, and opposition. The word “maidan” itself took on several meanings; it was not just a place, but a movement, and a medium of communications. This was exactly what the Yushchenko campaign and Orange coalition had intended. They had correctly anticipated a stolen election -- and prepared for it -- with Maidan as the focal point of their mass action.

Knowing they might have to occupy the city for many days or weeks, organizers distributed food, tents, and blankets. They blocked all important government buildings and effectively shut down day-to-day government functions. All their actions were planned to prevent bloodshed. Knowing their supporters would come face-to-face with police and security forces, Yushchenko and his senior staff had established back channel contacts with commanders of security forces to keep them informed of opposition planning and to reassure them the protest would remain nonviolent.

During the first days, as protesters and security forces looked each other in the eye, something remarkable happened. As one protest leader observed, “They got acquainted and they got used to each other. Within a few days, they began sharing food and tea with each other.” Meanwhile, at night, Maidan leaders met with officers from the armed services to share information.

Members of Parliament constructed the stage at Maidan with their own hands. Because they enjoyed parliamentary immunity, the police were not allowed to arrest them. The stage was the platform from which Yushchenko and the Orange leaders could speak to the people, explain their plans, and give instructions. Twenty-four hour television coverage of the stage kept all Ukrainians informed about events of the revolution.
A member of the campaign staff who helped organize the events on Maidan explained, "I imagined this campaign as a war. I couldn’t think of it any other way, and we couldn’t organize it any other way. We would have to work in a strict discipline, otherwise it would be impossible to win."

The regime assumed that after a few days the frigid temperatures would force protesters to go home. But as one of the organizers observed, "These people were really prepared to do anything, to give everything, to be rid of this criminal government." Night after freezing night, they stayed.

To manage the mass of people in the tent cities, in Maidan, and around the Parliament and Presidential administration buildings, strict rules were established. Members of Pora!, the youth resistance organization, were the enforcers. Alcoholic beverages and drugs were prohibited in the tent camps. Trash was hauled away daily. Pora volunteers controlled the check points, patrolled the encampments, and kept order.

Away from Maidan, a less visible battle was being fought. Lawyers for Yushchenko and his political party filed over a hundred court cases citing election irregularities. Three hundred lawyers worked without pay to prepare the legal cases. The key action was at Ukraine’s Supreme Court where the pressure of mass action and the rule of law converged. In the end, recalls Mykola Katerynchuk, the lawyer who supervised the cases, "We proved that the results of the second round were falsified, and revealed the methods and participants in these falsifications. The judges realized that the people in the streets might try to seize power at any moment, and this may have prompted them to make their decision quickly – in just a week. Because the Supreme Court performed its historic role, a violent scenario was avoided. It transformed the revolution from a crisis of illegitimacy into one of legality. It legitimized a transition from fraud to the establishment of democratic elections. It was a ruling that favored politicians, favored voters, and favored the democratic future of Ukraine. And this one case washed away all the dirty money and the power of those oligarchs."
All of Ukraine’s senior politicians were born, educated, and began their careers when Ukraine was a Soviet republic.

Viktor Yushchenko. Born 1954, in northeastern Ukraine. By 1991, when Ukraine became independent, Yushchenko had earned degrees in economics and finance, and established himself as a respected economist, employed by local, regional, and national banks. In 1994, he became the first governor of Ukraine’s central bank, where he earned high praise for stabilizing the currency and reducing inflation. President Kuchma appointed him prime minister in 1999, but his aggressive anti-corruption programs made him unpopular and he was pushed out of the prime minister’s office in 2001. Within a year, he became leader of Our Ukraine, a reform-oriented political coalition. Our Ukraine won more parliamentary seats than any party or coalition in 2002. His run for president in 2004 energized the millions who saw it as a chance to break, or at least loosen, the oligarchs’ grip on their country. Yushchenko has been married since 1998 to Kateryna Chumachenko, the daughter of Ukrainian immigrants to the U.S.

Leonid Kuchma. Born 1938, in north central Ukraine. Educated as an engineer, Kuchma was successful in Soviet industry, and recognized for his design and development of rocket and space technology. He entered politics in 1990, first as a member of parliament, then briefly as prime minister. He was elected president in 1994 promising to reverse a serious economic decline through closer cooperation with Russia. Targeted by accusations of criminality and corruption throughout his presidency, he maintained close ties to the wealthy oligarchs who controlled much of Ukraine’s economy. As his popularity plummeted, he lashed out at the media, especially television. Tape recordings allegedly made in his office were widely accepted as evidence of his involvement in the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and other crimes. Following the fraudulent election of 2004, he was pressured to declare a state of emergency and inaugurate Viktor Yanukovych, but he refused to do so.

Viktor Yanukovych. Born 1950, in the Donetsk province in eastern Ukraine. After eight years as an electrician at a local bus company, he earned an engineering degree by correspondence course. Later he held management positions in the transport sector. He was vice-governor, governor, and head of the province council of Donetsk between 1996 and 2001. His political career has been marred by charges of criminality and corruption. He was convicted of robbery in 1967 and of rape in 1970, crimes for which he served a total of five years in prison. President Leonid Kuchma named him prime minister in 2002, and supported his run for president in 2004. Coming from a Russian-speaking region, Yanukovych has favored close relations with Russia. During the campaign he advocated making Russian an official language of Ukraine.

Yulia Tymoshenko. Born 1960, in south-central Ukraine. During a successful and controversial business career, she joined the ranks of Ukraine’s oligarchs, doing business with many of the country’s most famous (and infamous) tycoons. As president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine, the main importer of Russian natural gas at that time, she was accused of selling large volumes of stolen gas and of evading taxes; her nickname became “the gas princess.” She was elected to parliament in 1996, and served two years as Deputy Prime Minister for fuel and energy. As a leader in the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma movement, Tymoshenko was known for her passionate, sometimes inflammatory, rhetoric. That same year, she formed the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, a political coalition which joined the Orange forces working for Yushchenko’s presidential campaign in 2004. She became Ukraine’s first female prime minister in early 2005. Many Ukrainians accept her as a reformer, ignoring or forgiving her problematic history. She speaks for the rule of law, against corruption, and for a balance of relations with Russia and the EU. In 2009, she announced her intention to run for president of Ukraine.
**Other Players**

**Pora!** (‘It’s Time!’), appeared in late 2002, as a youth organization modeled loosely on the student groups which played visible roles in the defeat of Milosevic in Serbia (Otpor, 1998-2000) and Shevardnadze in Georgia (Kmara, 2003). Pora was really two separate organizations, known informally as Black Pora and Yellow Pora for the colors of their banners, stickers, and leaflets. Despite some rivalry, they worked together especially in late 2004. Pora was smaller than Otpor, not as tightly organized, and could only estimate its membership – at about 10,000. Many were students, and many had been active in the Ukraine Without Kuchma movement of 2001. Beginning in 2003, Pora activists consulted with, and received training from, veterans of the Otpor and Kmara groups. Pora activists were called terrorists and criminals by their government, and they were sometimes physically attacked. They were the first to erect tents in Maidan, on the night of the fraudulent runoff election, and they played a key role in organizing and maintaining order for the tent cities and crowds on Maidan throughout the revolution.

**Electronic Media in Ukraine**

**Temnyky** is the name given to secret email messages sent daily by Ukraine’s presidential administration to television stations, telling them what to report, how to report it, and what to ignore. This system of media censorship was inaugurated in 2002 by Russian political consultants employed by then-President Kuchma. During the 2004 election campaign, TV news programs were ordered to portray the president, the pro-presidential parties, and Viktor Yanukovych in a positive light, to give minimal coverage to the Yushchenko campaign, and to discredit him whenever possible. In covering Yushchenko’s first campaign rally, one temnyk ordered: “…do not show wide shots of the rally and shots of the crowd; show only groups of drunk people with socially inappropriate, deviant behavior.”

**Ukraine’s TV stations** UT1 is the state controlled broadcaster. 1+1 and Inter are networks owned by Viktor Medvedchuk, an oligarch who headed President Kuchma’s presidential administration in 2002-2004. Three other TV channels are owned by Kuchma’s son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk: STB, ICTV, and Novy Kanal. During the 2004 presidential campaign, all these stations showed a strong bias towards Yanukovych. Only two stations produced balanced news. The first was Channel 5, a small station with a weaker signal, covering only about 15% of the country, with no coverage at all in eastern Ukraine. Channel 5 is owned by Petro Poroshenko, an oligarch friendly to Yushchenko. ERA-TV provided similar coverage, but was only on the air for portions of the day, and not in the evening. After the electoral fraud was revealed, journalists and the news staff at UT1 and 1+1 threatened a strike to protest censorship. They declared to management, “Either you let us broadcast what’s happening in the country, or we all walk out.” Management gave in, and at 9pm they carried the first uncensored news reports.

**Russia’s Role in the Election**

Russian leaders saw the 2004 election as a turning point: Would Ukraine take a pro-Russian or a pro-Western direction after Kuchma? A year before the election, they decided to support the candidate picked by Kuchma. Expensive Russian political advisors and spin-doctors managed the Yanukovych campaign, which also received cash contributions from the Kremlin. The total sum is not known. Fifty million is the lowest estimate; the amount most widely cited is $300 million. Russian political consultants used strategies common in Russian elections including putting massive pressure to vote for Yanukovych on state employees, pensioners, and others whose livelihood depends on the state. They developed a pro-Yanukovych advertising blitz which ran prominently in Russia, aimed at the million eligible Ukrainian voters living there. Russian President Vladimir Putin personally visited Ukraine to endorse Yanukovych. Later, Putin congratulated Yanukovych on his victory three times before the votes had even been counted. Altogether, the Russian role came off as heavy-handed, a transparent attempt to re-impose Russian influence in Ukraine. Some analysts believe the Russian efforts actually hurt Yanukovych. Russian leaders were shocked and surprised by the massive protests in Ukraine. In response, they have given a high priority to preventing similar “color revolutions” in Russia or other countries.
Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe, with an area slightly smaller than Texas. Ukraine was by far the most important economic unit of the Soviet Union, after Russia. Ukraine’s farmers provided more than a quarter of Soviet agricultural output. Eastern Ukraine was the Soviet Union’s industrial heartland, mining coal and producing steel and machinery.

Under Soviet rule, Ukraine often suffered. Eight million Ukrainians died during two famines (1921-3 and 1932-3) when Soviet authorities seized Ukrainian grain and transported it to Russia. German and Soviet armies killed at least seven million more in World War II.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, Ukraine became independent. Within a year, former Soviet officials and ex-managers of state-owned enterprises emerged as “oligarchs,” purchasing former state companies such as heavy industry, coal mines, and media outlets, at bargain prices. These overnight tycoons, who owned huge businesses and conglomerates, enjoyed close ties with the president and controlled large factions in parliament. Their political connections allowed them to win such benefits as regional monopolies, tax exemptions, subsidies, and trade preferences.

Despite occasional anti-corruption programs, the oligarchs remain key power centers in Ukraine. As prime minister (2000-01), Viktor Yushchenko withdrew many of the tax exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the oligarchs, while turning Ukraine’s deficit to a surplus and growing the economy for the first time since independence. In 2002, President Kuchma replaced his cabinet with ministers drawn entirely from the oligarchic factions in parliament. In the position of prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko was out, and Viktor Yanukovych was in.

As the presidential election approached in 2004, the oligarchs were dominant – but not unified. Among the more than twenty presidential candidates, only two were true contenders: Yushchenko, the reformer, and Yanukovych, the candidate of the oligarchs and the status quo. To be fair, Yushchenko enjoyed the support of some oligarchs too, but Yanukovych had a unique advantage. He was endorsed by the incumbent president and supported by the entire administrative branch of government. He was also supported by Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land:</th>
<th>Mostly fertile plains and plateaus ● Arable land 53.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural products:</td>
<td>Grain, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, vegetables, beef, milk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources:</td>
<td>Iron ore, coal, manganese, natural gas, oil, salt, sulfur, graphite, timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries:</td>
<td>Coal, electric power, metals, machinery, transportation, chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>46.5 million ● Urban population 68% ● Median age 39.5 ● Life expectancy 68 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity:</td>
<td>Ukrainian 77% Russian 17% Others 6% ● Population below poverty line 37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion:</td>
<td>Orthodox denominations 91% Roman Catholic 2.2% Protestant 2.2% Jewish 0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages:</td>
<td>Ukrainian 67% Russian 24% Other 9% ● Literacy 99.4% above age 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:</td>
<td>$340 billion ● Agriculture 9.3% Industry 31.7% Services 58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment:</td>
<td>9% [2009 estimate, tripled from 2008] Inflation 22.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[These are the most recent figures available, most from 2008.]
During the 18th and 19th centuries, most of Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire.

- **1921**: Ukraine joins the Soviet Union
- **1941-45**: Ukraine occupied by Nazi Germany
- **1960s**: Covert opposition to Soviet rule grows
- **1986**: Nuclear reactor at Chernobyl explodes
- **1991**: Ukraine declares independence
- **1994**: Leonid Kuchma becomes second president of Ukraine
- **1996**: Democratic constitution adopted
- **1997**: Ukraine signs Friendship Treaty with Russia
- **1999**: Leonid Kuchma re-elected president

**Sept. 2000**: Journalist Georgiy Gongadze murdered

**Dec. 2000**: Ukraine Without Kuchma movement demands resignation of President Kuchma and investigation of Gongadze murder

**Mar. 2001**: Violence erupts at protests organized by Ukraine Without Kuchma; the movement dissolves

**2002**: Viktor Yushchenko becomes leader of political coalition, Our Ukraine

**2004**

- **July 1**: Presidential election campaign begins
- **Sept. 5**: Following dinner with director of Ukrainian Security Service, presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko feels ill
- **Sept. 10**: Yushchenko seeks medical treatment in Austria. Rumors of poisoning begin to circulate
- **Oct. 15-16**: PORA youth movement offices raided by special police
- **Oct. 20**: Government freezes assets of pro-opposition TV Channel 5. Employees of Ch. 5 go on hunger strike
- **Oct. 31**: Presidential election - first round. Telephone records indicate fraud by Yanukovych
- **Nov. 1**: Central Election Commission [CEC] announces no candidate exceeded 50% and a runoff election will be necessary
- **Nov. 21**: Runoff election, marked by fraud and irregularities
- **Nov. 22**: Massive protests begin in Kyiv and other major cities. International election observers (OSCE) declare election unfair. Russian President Putin congratulates Yanukovych on victory
- **Nov. 24**: Election results announced: Yanukovych 49%, Yushchenko 46%. Ukrainian opposition calls for general strike
- **Nov. 25**: Supreme Court prohibits publication of election results until Yushchenko's appeal of CEC vote count can be heard
- **Nov. 26**: Negotiations begin, mediated by EU, Russia, Poland
- **Nov. 27**: Parliament expresses "no-confidence" in CEC, orders Kuchma to disband CEC
- **Nov. 28**: [11pm] Ukraine's Interior Minister orders 10,000 armed troops to disperse protesters in Kyiv. They begin driving toward Maidan, but Ukraine's Security Service successfully intervenes to stop them
- **Nov. 29**: Kuchma proposes a new election. Yushchenko demands that Kuchma dismiss Yanukovych as prime minister. The Supreme Court begins hearing Yushchenko's case against the CEC
- **Dec. 2**: Kuchma flies to Moscow to consult Russian President Putin. They reject a re-run of Nov. 21 election, favoring entirely new elections instead
- **Dec. 3**: Supreme Court hears final arguments, begins private deliberations. At 6 pm, the Court invalidates the Nov. 21 election results and orders a repeat election not later than Dec. 26
- **Dec. 5**: Opposition demands electoral law reforms, appointment of new CEC members
- **Dec. 6**: Kuchma announces he will accept electoral reforms in exchange for constitutional amendments to limit the power of the president
- **Dec. 8**: Parliament passes constitutional changes and electoral reform
- **Dec. 26**: Second round of presidential election is repeated. Yushchenko receives 52% of votes; Yanukovych, 44%

**Jan. 23, 2005**: Viktor Yushchenko is sworn in as president
The Orange Revolution was the third time in just four years that a nonviolent civil resistance movement defeated corrupt or authoritarian regimes in central Europe. The first was in 2000 when Slobodan Milosevic was toppled in Serbia. Next was Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003 which removed Eduard Shevardnadze from power. In all three countries, the spark was a fraudulent election followed by massive civil resistance.

Each of these stories featured an unpopular leader, a large and well-organized opposition, and a system to detect and rapidly publicize vote fraud throughout the country. Student and youth resistance groups also played a crucial, although not identical, role. All three opposition movements were influenced and inspired by successful nonviolent struggles of the 1980s – the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, and the “People Power” movement which defeated Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

Many political scientists consider these episodes to be “democratic breakthroughs,” whose common goals were free and fair elections, responsive and transparent democratic institutions, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights, a free media, and judicial independence.

In Serbia, opposition political parties squabbled and fought among themselves for at least a decade, finally uniting behind a single candidate to run against Milosevic in 2000. Along the way, Serbian youth, led by university students, acquired organizational and strategic skills over a period of several years, which led them to found Otpor! (the Serbian word for resistance), a movement which established branches in over seventy cities and towns. Known for their clenched-fist symbol, spray painted on walls, and printed on t-shirts, posters, and stickers, the group mobilized not just young people, but the whole population. Relying on humor, ridicule, and rock music, Otpor members helped people overcome fear, the key to building participation. Many young people were arrested, which mobilized their previously apathetic parents. Otpor was also effective in undermining police and security force loyalty to the regime. Many of its techniques were adopted by youth resistance groups in Georgia, Ukraine, and other countries, where Otpor activists sometimes acted as advisors and trainers.

Otpor’s strategies and tactics couldn’t simply be copied by other movements, but the mere fact that Milosevic, a man widely believed to control all conventional sources of power, was removed by a civil resistance movement without resorting to violence, inspired and empowered others. In Georgia, the Kmara (“Enough”) movement was modeled on Otpor; in Ukraine, the movement was called Pora! (“It’s time!”). By late 2004, the phrase “color revolution” had entered the popular vocabulary, and potential for a well-organized nonviolent movement to succeed against an entrenched authoritarian had been widely accepted. Lebanon experienced the Cedar Revolution; Kyrgyzstan, the Tulip Revolution; Iran, the Green Revolution. While none of these brought the conclusive or satisfactory breakthrough achieved in Serbia, Georgia or Ukraine, nonviolent movements are at the forefront of bringing change in the world today.
In a matter of months, the Orange Revolution seemed to have transformed Ukraine irreversibly. Electoral reform brought free and fair elections; a lively and independent media emerged, and constitutional reform brought a healthier balance between executive and legislative power. These achievements were soon overshadowed by personal power struggles, and the continuing domination of parliament by the oligarchs. By late 2005, the Orange coalition had splintered. Yulia Tymoshenko, who had been a Yushchenko ally during the revolution, became his rival. He dismissed her as prime minister in September 2005; she was succeeded by Viktor Yanukovych for 16 months. The Orange camp reunited to win parliamentary elections in 2007, which brought Tymoshenko back as prime minister.

Disappointed by Yushchenko’s weak leadership, Ukrainians have become cynical about politics. A devastating economic downturn in 2008 contributed to the despair. At the end of his presidential term in late 2009, Yushchenko’s popularity slipped below 5%, leaving Tymoshenko and Yanukovych as the only viable candidates to succeed him in 2010. It could be said that unrealistic expectations guaranteed the Orange Revolution would disappoint its followers, but weak leadership, a polarized country, persistent corruption, and Russian efforts to reassert regional supremacy have played their parts.

Ukraine’s democratic transition remains incomplete, but since the Orange Revolution, no elections have been stolen, and no journalists have been killed by the state. While the goals of those who forged the revolution and endured the cold and snow have yet to be reflected in policy, the political system and the rules by which political decisions are made have been transformed -- to one that, despite its flaws, is more democratic and respectful of the rule of law than it was under Kuchma’s rule.
Ukraine and the Orange Revolution


Nonviolent Revolution in Serbia and Georgia


General - Civil Resistance and Social Movements


Resources on the Internet

Articles, Papers & Study Guides

http://www.cfr.org/publication/9259/


http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1059220.html


http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=bcr&l=EN&s=f&o=155269


http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1209/p01s04-woeu.html

Websites


The Albert Einstein Institution is a nonprofit organization advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world. The website includes downloadable material in forty languages. www.aeinstein.org

The Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) website contains articles about nonviolent movements and strategies of the past decade. www.canvasopedia.org

The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict is an independent, non-profit, educational foundation that develops and encourages the study and use of civilian-based, nonmilitary strategies to establish and defend human rights, democracy and justice worldwide. Their website contains news about nonviolent conflicts around the world, as well as links to articles, podcasts and other resources of relevance. www.nonviolent-conflict.org


Maidan.org describes itself as “an internet hub for Citizens Action Network in Ukraine.” It was founded in December 2000 to circumvent government suppression of information on opposition activities, and to protest misinformation on the disappearance of the murdered journalist, Georgiy Gongadze. The English language version can be found at http://eng.maidanua.org.

Mirror Weekly (Zerkalo Nedeli) is among Ukraine’s most influential print weeklies, specializing in political analysis, interviews, and opinion, in Russian and Ukrainian. Founded in 1996, the independent, non-partisan publication is funded by Western (non-governmental) sources. The English language archives can be accessed at www.mw.ua.
1. Early in the protests, Yulia Tymoshenko, whose party supported Yushchenko’s candidacy as part of the Orange coalition, wanted demonstrators to storm government buildings in an attempt to seize power. Was that a good idea? Why or why not? What do you think would have happened if the demonstrators had done this?

2. People refer to the events around the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine as the “Orange Revolution.” Why do you think they call it a “revolution” instead of just an “election”? Talk about your definition of the term “revolution.”

3. What were some key moments of danger or risk to the demonstrators in the Orange Revolution? How did the demonstrators and leadership behave in these moments? Do you agree with the choices they made?

4. The Orange movement made a strategic choice to try to mobilize thousands of people in the Maidan (Independence Square) in Kiev, for as long as necessary. In the end it was seventeen days. Their strategy of mass civil resistance worked. However, in other cases of nonviolent resistance, holding mass demonstrations has not always been effective. What do you think the risks and benefits are of attempting to mobilize so many people publicly?

5. What do you think propelled thousands of people out of the comfort of their homes and everyday lives, to stay in the cold for days and risk possible violence by the government? Did people occupy Maidan simply to support Yushchenko, or were there other reasons? How might a Ukrainian on Maidan in December of 2004 explain his or her reasons for being there?

6. The Orange Revolution was galvanized by feelings of injustice and oppression, as well as hope for a better future. People took risks and sometimes defied the law. Are there circumstances under which you would consider participating in acts of civil disobedience in response to injustice or state repression?

7. Do you think your government should play a role in supporting and encouraging nonviolent citizen movements struggling for human rights or democracy, such as the Orange Revolution? If so, what should that role be? What actions could your government take that would be constructive?

8. There were two acts of violence discussed in the film: the murder of journalist Georgi Gongadze, and the poisoning of Victor Yushchenko. Both acts appear to have been carried out by the regime. Do you think these acts of violence benefitted the regime, or did they backfire against the regime? How?

9. Did you notice any similarities between the Orange Revolution and other political or social movements of the past? Can you think of any similar movements going on today? In what parts of the world or situations do you think civil resistance, of the kind seen in Ukraine, could be applied effectively today?

10. During the Orange Revolution, demonstrators stayed on Maidan for seventeen days. Why and how were they able to sustain their actions on Maidan? What preparations went into this? Do you think it was important for the supporters to remain on Maidan for that long? What message did it send? What do you think would have happened if they had left after only four days?

11. There was no violent repression against demonstrators during the Orange Revolution. Why? What factors do you think the Kuchma regime considered when thinking about how to stop the protest? Why do you think members of the military and police may have been unwilling to use violent force?

Questions for Further Discussion

Suggested activity: Break into small groups, each of which selects (or is assigned) one or two questions to analyze in depth, and then return to larger group format where the small groups lead the discussion on their questions.
12. How much credit for the final outcome of the Orange Revolution should be extended to the Supreme Court? What factors do you think influenced the Court’s decision? What role, if any, did the Maidan demonstrations play?

13. Throughout the election and the Orange Revolution, both Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters appealed to Ukrainians’ sense of patriotism and national identity. Why? How did each side define patriotism and national identity? How would you describe Kuchma’s view of what it means to be Ukrainian? How would you describe Yushchenko’s view? Was there any special significance in choosing Maidan as the focal point of the Orange movement?

14. Nonviolent resistance, such as what took place during the Orange Revolution, has sometimes been referred to as passive resistance. Do you think passive resistance is an appropriate term to describe the actions of the demonstrators during the Orange Revolution? Why or why not?

15. Yushchenko constantly reminded people to be disciplined and nonviolent. He even told his supporters that his “presidency is not worth even one person’s life.” Why do you think Yushchenko and many other leaders of the Orange Revolution felt strongly about avoiding violent confrontations between demonstrators and the police? What effect do you think this had on the regime and its supporters, as well as on the Orange movement itself?

16. Technology—the internet, mobile phones, and other forms of communication—was helpful in organizing people during the Orange Revolution. In the future, do you think that new forms of communications and information technologies will be more likely to favor civil resistance movements or repressive regimes?

17. Why did so many different kinds of people from different regions of Ukraine—men and women, young and old, students, laborers, bureaucrats, small business owners, and others—participate in the Orange Revolution? What kinds of messages do you think appealed to and united these people? Would the movement have been as effective if it were less diverse, for example if drew its support mainly from one group, such as students, or one geographic region such as Kiev?

18. What does this story teach us about elections and democracy? Is the act of holding elections sufficient to make a country a democracy? If so, why? If not, what other components are necessary for a country to be a democracy?

19. Why did the Orange movement appeal to young people? How did it get them interested and motivated? What role do you think young people and youth culture played in the Orange Revolution?

20. Music was a consistent presence in Maidan and throughout the country during the Orange Revolution. What role did it play and how can music be used in promoting political action?

21. What efforts did the Orange movement make to shift the loyalties of members of the police and military in support of the movement? In what ways did it appeal to their sense of patriotism, professionalism and humanity?

22. What effect do you think the use of color (orange) and the slogan “Tak!” (“Yes!”) had? What did you notice about the way these symbols were used? Why do you think they were selected to symbolize the movement?

23. Opposition managers privately predicted that the regime would resort to vote fraud to secure a Yanukovych victory in the second round, and that the margin of victory in the crooked vote count would be 3%. In the end, this is what happened. If the opposition had gone public with its prediction, how might things have changed? What effect did the movement’s insights into their opponent have on the movement internally?

24. In many countries, election results are manipulated, but only in some countries do we hear about movements like the Orange coalition. Why do you think this is? Do you think people are choosing not to mobilize in other countries, or do you think the media are failing to report it? Why do you think there was not a similar response to the 2000 Presidential election results in the United States?
1. Force Field Analysis: This exercise helps participants to understand the different forces in conflict during the Orange Revolution. A force field analysis identifies all of the forces for and against change in a situation, and assesses the strength of each. This can be drawn on a piece of paper (see example), with all forces for change on one side and all forces against change on the other. The magnitude of the force can be shown by drawing a large arrow (strong) or small arrow (weak) and/or assigning a number (1-10) to each arrow.

In small groups, participants draw two force field analyses. The first focuses on the situation outlined in the beginning of the film, before the revolution when the election campaign has just started. The second focuses on the situation at the end of the film, when the revolution was successful. Participants then discuss how these two force field analyses are different, and why some forces strengthened, weakened, or shifted direction during the course of the revolution.

![Force Field Analysis Diagram]

2. One of the ways that movements are able to gain supporters is by listening to ordinary people talk about what is important in their lives, and focusing on the particular words and phrases they use. Pick a local, regional, or national political issue, and ask five people how they feel about that issue. Listen closely to people’s opinions and to how they express themselves on the subject. Then, create a slogan, symbol, and short statement about how you would address this issue if you were attempting to organize in your community.

3. Choose a scenario from People Power: The Game of Civil Resistance that shares some of the specific objectives seen in Orange Revolution. Strategize and apply tactics demonstrated in the film to the scenario. What have you learned about how to plan, create, and disseminate a message, and carry out a tactic?

4. Ask students to make a list of areas of conflict in the world today. They can find this information in the newspaper, newsmagazines, or online news reports. Divide the students into groups and ask each group to choose one of the conflicts and analyze it in terms of its "readiness" for nonviolent action. The students should identify the following:

- The parties in the conflict
- The conflicting groups which might take the lead in applying nonviolent tactics
- One clear objective of the nonviolent conflict
- Suggested methods of nonviolent action they would use