

Why Civil Resistance Works

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The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict

Implicit in recent scholarly debates about the efficacy of methods of warfare is the assumption that the most effective means of waging political struggle entails violence.¹ Among political scientists, the prevailing view is that opposition movements select violent methods because such means are more effective than nonviolent strategies at achieving policy goals.² Despite these assumptions, from 2000 to 2006 organized civilian populations successfully employed nonviolent methods in-

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1. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror* (New York: Random House, 2005); Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5–38; Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric V. Larson, *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1999); Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917–1999," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 147–173; Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 42–78; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 1992); Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136; Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Sanctions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff, "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 608–618; A. Cooper Drury, "Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 1998), pp. 497–509; Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Donald Stoker, "Insurgencies Rarely Win—And Iraq Won't Be Any Different (Maybe)," *Foreign Policy*, No. 158 (January/February 2007).
2. See Pape, *Dying to Win*; and Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*.

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cluding boycotts, strikes, protests, and organized noncooperation to challenge entrenched power and exact political concessions in Serbia (2000), Madagascar (2002), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004–05), Lebanon (2005), and Nepal (2006).³ The success of these nonviolent campaigns—especially in light of the enduring violent insurgencies occurring in some of the same countries—begs systematic investigation.

Extant literature provides explanations as to why nonviolent campaigns are effective means of resistance.⁴ Little of the literature, however, comprehensively analyzes all known observations of nonviolent and violent insurgencies as analogous resistance types.⁵ This study aims to fill this gap by systematically exploring the strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent campaigns in conflicts between nonstate and state actors using aggregate data on major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006.⁶ To better understand the causal mechanisms driving these outcomes, we also compare our statistical findings with historical cases that have featured periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance.

Our findings show that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance campaigns.⁷ There are two reasons for this success. First, a campaign's com-

3. Robert L. Helvey defines nonviolent methods as “the specific means of action within the technique of nonviolent action” including protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. See Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals* (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), p. 147.

4. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 3 vols. (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973); Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2005); Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Paul Wehr, Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess, eds., *Justice without Violence* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Stephen Zunes, “Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World: A New Kind of Revolution,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 403–426; Stephen Zunes, Lester Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, eds., *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999); and Vincent Boudreau, *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

5. A notable exception is Karatnycky and Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won*.

6. Our use of “resistance” designates major nonstate rebellions, either armed or unarmed. Instead of using event count data, we identify campaigns—a series of repetitive, durable, organized, and observable events directed at a certain target to achieve a goal—as the main unit of analysis. We measure “effectiveness” by comparing stated group objectives to policy outcomes (e.g., states’ willingness to make concessions to opposition movements). This analytical distinction is imperfect, but others have used it with success. See Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.”

7. Terrorist groups have fared much worse. See *ibid.*, p. 42; and Stoker, “Insurgencies Rarely Win.” Our study does not explicitly compare terrorism to nonviolent resistance, but our argument sheds light on why terrorism has been so unsuccessful.

mitment to nonviolent methods enhances its domestic and international legitimacy and encourages more broad-based participation in the resistance, which translates into increased pressure being brought to bear on the target. Recognition of the challenge group's grievances can translate into greater internal and external support for that group and alienation of the target regime, undermining the regime's main sources of political, economic, and even military power.

Second, whereas governments easily justify violent counterattacks against armed insurgents, regime violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backfire against the regime. Potentially sympathetic publics perceive violent militants as having maximalist or extremist goals beyond accommodation, but they perceive nonviolent resistance groups as less extreme, thereby enhancing their appeal and facilitating the extraction of concessions through bargaining.⁸

Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that violent resistance against conventionally superior adversaries is the most effective way for resistance groups to achieve policy goals. Instead, we assert that nonviolent resistance is a forceful alternative to political violence that can pose effective challenges to democratic and nondemocratic opponents, and at times can do so more effectively than violent resistance.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section presents our main argument. The second section introduces the data set and reports our preliminary empirical findings. In the third section, we evaluate three case studies of nonviolent and violent campaigns in Southeast Asia. We conclude with some theoretical and policy recommendations derived from these findings.

What Works? The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Resistance

Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both.⁹ Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods—including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-

8. See Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." This is especially true of terrorism, but we argue it can also apply to other forms of political violence. Sometimes violent movements restrain themselves to selective targeting, but such restraint requires high levels of campaign control. For a discussion of these issues, see Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

9. Gene Sharp, ed., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005), pp. 41, 547.

cooperation, and nonviolent intervention—that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power.¹⁰ Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.

Strategic nonviolent resistance can be distinguished from principled nonviolence, which is grounded in religious and ethically based injunctions against violence. Although many people who are committed to principled nonviolence have engaged in nonviolent resistance (e.g., Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.), the vast majority of participants in nonviolent struggles have not been devoted to principled nonviolence.¹¹ The conflation of nonviolent struggle with principled nonviolence, pacifism, passivity, weakness, or isolated street protests has contributed to misconceptions about this phenomenon.¹² Although nonviolent resisters eschew the threat or use of violence, the “peaceful” designation often given to nonviolent movements belies the often highly disruptive nature of organized nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent resistance achieves demands against the will of the opponent by seizing control of the conflict through widespread noncooperation and defiance.¹³ Violent coercion threatens physical violence against the opponent.¹⁴

Scholars often assume that violent methods of resistance are the most coercive or the most likely to force accommodation, thereby producing desired policy changes.¹⁵ For instance, some have argued that terrorism is an effective strategy, particularly in forcing democratic regimes to make territorial concessions.¹⁶ In contrast, Max Abrahms has shown that terrorists' success rates are

10. See Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, vol. 2, in which Sharp lists 198 methods of nonviolent action and gives historical examples of each method.

11. George Lakey, ed., *Powerful Peacemaking: A Strategy for a Living Revolution* (Philadelphia, Pa.: New Society, 1987), p. 87. See also Doug Bond, “Nonviolent Direct Action and Power,” in Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess, *Justice without Violence*.

12. Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 3 vols.; Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*; and Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*.

13. Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 3 vols. The maintenance of a disciplined, deliberate campaign involves significant collective-action problems, which are the subjects of other studies. See Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*; and Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

14. Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pp. 30, 50.

15. Pape, *Bombing to Win*; Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”; and Horowitz and Reiter, “When Does Aerial Bombing Work?”

16. Pape, *Dying to Win*; Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 120 (September/October 2000), pp. 66–73; David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century,” *Dialogue-IO*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 15–29; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Fall 2006),

extremely low, accomplishing their policy objectives only 7 percent of the time.¹⁷ Abrahms nevertheless concludes that actors choose terrorism because it is still more effective than nonviolent resistance.¹⁸

We argue that nonviolent resistance may have a strategic advantage over violent resistance for two reasons. First, repressing nonviolent campaigns may backfire. In backfire, an unjust act—often violent repression—recoils against its originators, often resulting in the breakdown of obedience among regime supporters, mobilization of the population against the regime, and international condemnation of the regime.¹⁹ The internal and external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns are thus higher than the costs of repressing violent campaigns. Backfire leads to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign, creating dissent and conflicts among the opponent's supporters, increasing external support for the resistance campaign, and decreasing external support for the opponent. These dynamics are more likely to occur when an opponent's violence is not met with violent counterreprisals by the resistance campaign and when this is communicated to internal and external audiences.²⁰ The domestic and international repercussions of a violent crackdown against civilians who have publicized their commitment to nonviolent action are more severe than repression against those who could be credibly labeled as "terrorists" or "violent insurgents."²¹

Internally, members of a regime—including civil servants, security forces, and members of the judiciary—are more likely to shift loyalty toward nonviolent opposition groups than toward violent opposition groups. The coercive

pp. 49–80; and Alan M. Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002).

17. Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," p. 42.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

19. "Moral jiu-jitsu," "political jiu-jitsu," and "backfire" are related but distinct concepts. See Richard B. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, 2d ed. (New York: Schocken, 1935), pp. 43–65; Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p. 657; and Brian Martin, *Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), p. 3.

20. Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, *War without Weapons: Nonviolence in National Defence* (London: Frances Pinter, 1974), p. 84. Other scholars have noted that a combination of sustained confrontation with the opponent, the maintenance of nonviolent discipline, and the existence of a sympathetic audience are necessary conditions to trigger jiu-jitsu. See Brian Martin and Wendy Varney, "Nonviolence and Communication," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (March 2003), pp. 213–232; and Martin, *Justice Ignited*. Martin qualifies the effects of backfire by emphasizing the importance of media coverage of security forces engaging unarmed protestors. Furthermore, regimes have developed their own strategies to inhibit outrage, thereby limiting the impact of backfire or preventing its emergence entirely.

21. Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 2006), p. 416.

power of any resistance campaign is enhanced by its tendency to prompt disobedience and defections by members of the opponent's security forces, who are more likely to consider the negative political and personal consequences of using repressive violence against unarmed demonstrators than against armed insurgents.²² Divisions are more likely to result among erstwhile regime supporters, who are not as prepared to deal with mass civil resistance as they are with armed insurgents.²³ Regime repression can also backfire through increased public mobilization. Actively involving a relatively larger number of people in the nonviolent campaign may bring greater and more sustained pressure to bear on the target, whereas the public may eschew violent insurgencies because of physical or moral barriers.

Externally, the international community is more likely to denounce and sanction states for repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns. When nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sympathize with the cause, nonviolent campaigns are more appealing as aid recipients. External aid may or may not advance the cause of the campaign.²⁴ The external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns can be high, however, especially when the repression is captured by the media. External actors may organize sanctions against repressive regimes that repeatedly crack down on unarmed protesters.²⁵ Although sanctions are possible in the case of violent insurgencies as well, they are less likely. Instead, some foreign states may actually aid a regime in crushing the violent insurgents. Other foreign states may lend material support to a violent resistance campaign in an attempt to advantage it against its opponent. Indeed, state sponsorship of violent insurgencies and terrorist groups has been an ongoing foreign policy dilemma for decades.²⁶ Whether state-sponsored violent groups have succeeded in obtaining their strategic goals is unclear.

22. Defections are the withdrawal of support from the incumbent regime. Security forces and civil servants are defecting, for example, when they stop obeying orders and defect from their positions in the state.

23. See Zunes, "Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World"; Ralph Summy, "Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent," *Pacifica Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May 1994), pp. 1–29; and Lakey, *Powerful Peacemaking*.

24. External aid may harm the campaign, but this can be true for violent or nonviolent campaigns. See Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

25. We use the list of sanctions identified in Hufbauer, Scott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

26. Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Jeffrey Record, "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success," *Parameters*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2006), pp. 36–49.

Second, nonviolent resistance campaigns appear to be more open to negotiation and bargaining because they do not threaten the lives or well-being of members of the target regime. Regime supporters are more likely to bargain with resistance groups that are not killing or maiming their comrades.

Correspondence inference theory suggests why nonviolent campaigns may be more appealing to the mass public and more persuasive to regime supporters. The theory posits that a person makes judgments about how to respond to an adversary based on the adversary's actions, which advantages nonviolent resistance in two ways.²⁷ First, public support is crucial to any resistance, but publics view nonviolent campaigns as physically nonthreatening and violent campaigns as threatening.²⁸ Nonviolent campaigns appear more amenable to negotiation than violent campaigns, regardless of how disruptive they are. In the face of regime repression, the public is less likely to support a violent campaign that is equally repressive or, at best, careless about civilian casualties. Given a credible alternative, the public is more likely to support a nonviolent campaign.²⁹

Second, when violent insurgents threaten the lives of regime members and security forces, they greatly reduce the possibility of loyalty shifts. Abrahms finds that terrorist groups targeting civilians lose public support compared with groups that limit their targets to the military or police.³⁰ Surrendering or defecting to a violent movement involves greater risk, because the group could kill or torture members of the regime and the regime could violently punish deserters. Because explicitly nonviolent methods do not physically threaten members of the security forces or a regime's civil servants, members of the regime are more likely to shift loyalties toward nonviolent movements rather than toward violent ones. When the regime can no longer rely on the continued cooperation of its security forces or other groups crucial to its control, its grip on power is undermined.

Of course, regime repression of violent insurgencies may backfire as well. Cruel treatment by British military forces in Northern Ireland provided a long-term strategic benefit to the Provisional Irish Republican Army by increasing

27. Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."

28. James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).

29. This argument may depend on the "social distance" between resistance movements and their opponents, as social, cultural, religious, and linguistic differences between them could reduce the resistance group's leverage. See Johan Galtung, *Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 19.

30. Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."

the number of its supporters. We argue, however, that backfire against violent campaigns is rarer, and that despite temporary setbacks, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to gain additional long-term benefits from regime repression than are violent campaigns.

The aggregate total of the internal and external costs of continued repression may force a regime to accommodate nonviolent campaigns more often than violent ones. The next section tests these assertions.

Testing the Theory

Ronald Francisco and others have found that regime crackdowns produce backfire and increase mobilization, whereas other scholars have found variation in the effects of repression on mobilization.³¹ Tolerance of government crackdowns may depend on whether the resistance campaign is nonviolent or violent.³² This dynamic is reflected in hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 1: The willingness of the regime to use violence will increase the likelihood for success among nonviolent campaigns, but disadvantage violent campaigns.

Challenging or disobeying orders is abnormal behavior for members of security forces. Evidence of defections within the ranks of the military would suggest that the regime no longer commands the cooperation and obedience of its most important pillar of support. Nonviolent challenges should be more likely to evoke loyalty shifts in the opponent's security forces, whereas armed resistance is more likely to encourage a closing of the ranks against the insurgency. Hypothesis 2 captures this prediction.

Hypothesis 2: Nonviolent resistance has a relative advantage over violent resistance in producing loyalty shifts within security forces.

31. The seminal work is Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 132–152. See also Ronald A. Francisco, "After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression," *Mobilization: An International Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 107–126; Ruud Koopmans, "The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 58, No. 5 (October 1993), pp. 637–658; and Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 50, No. 10 (June 2007), pp. 1370–1394.

32. Future studies should investigate whether a regime's ability to discriminate between insurgents and civilians during repression enable it to avoid backfire. For a related inquiry, see Ronald A. Francisco, "The Dictator's Dilemma," in Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller, eds., *Repression and Mobilization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

In addition to receiving sympathy and a possible increase in legitimacy, a nonviolent campaign that is violently repressed may enjoy support from external actors. While it goes beyond the scope of this study to catalogue all forms of external assistance, the conventional wisdom suggests that international sanctions targeting a repressive regime should help nonviolent campaigns. Hypothesis 3 predicts that nonviolent campaigns benefit from external support.

Hypothesis 3: International sanctions and overt state support for the campaign will advantage nonviolent campaigns over violent campaigns.

Finally, external support for the target regime is likely against violent campaigns, given that they are seen as illegitimate challengers to the established order. Target regimes may also receive allied aid against nonviolent resistance campaigns.³³ We expect these dynamics will reduce the likelihood of success among the campaigns because of the disproportionate resources obtained by the state.³⁴ Hypothesis 4 captures this factor.

Hypothesis 4: External state support for the target regime will disadvantage both violent and nonviolent campaigns.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Our research goals are threefold: first, to determine whether nonviolent or violent resistance campaigns have a better record of achieving stated objectives; second, to explore which variables matter in contributing to campaign outcomes; and third, to discern whether structural factors influence nonviolent campaign failure or success. To these ends, we constructed the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) data set, which includes aggregate data on 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006.³⁵

33. For instance, Russia overtly supported the incumbent Ukrainian and Georgian governments during their nonviolent “color revolutions.”

34. Other studies have found a strong positive correlation between nonviolent civil resistance and durable democratization. Karatnycky and Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won*.

35. The NAVCO data set contains a sample of resistance campaigns based on consensus data of scholars of both violent and nonviolent conflict. Resistance campaigns include campaigns for domestic regime change, against foreign occupations, or for secession or self-determination. Omitted from the data set are major social and economic campaigns, such as the civil rights movement and the populist movement in the United States. To gain inclusion into the NAVCO data set, the campaign must have a major and disruptive political objective, such as the ending of a current political regime, a foreign occupation, or secession. About ten campaigns (four nonviolent and six violent) did not fit into any of these categories but were nevertheless included in the data set. The coding scheme assumes that each campaign has a unified goal, but most campaigns have multiple factions. The dynamics created by these circumstances will be further explored in a later study.

We define a resistance campaign as a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts.³⁶ Usually campaigns have recognizable beginning and end points, as well as distinct events throughout their history. Our selection of campaigns and their beginning and end dates are based on a consensus sample produced by multiple sources.³⁷

Labeling one campaign as “nonviolent” and another as “violent” is difficult. In many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously among different competing groups. Alternatively, some groups use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the African National Congress in South Africa. Characterizing a campaign as nonviolent or violent simplifies a complex constellation of resistance methods.

To address these difficulties, we established some standards of inclusion for each of these categories. The list of nonviolent campaigns was initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. Then we corroborated these data using multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle.³⁸ Finally, the cases were circulated among experts in nonviolent conflict who were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, and also which notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used. The resultant data set includes major resistance campaigns that are primarily or entirely nonviolent. Campaigns that committed a

36. Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 10–11; Pape, *Dying to Win*; and Horowitz and Reiter, “When Does Aerial Bombing Work?”

37. There are some challenges with this method. First, it is difficult to assess the strength of the movement and its activities over time. Second, without specific events data, it is theoretically difficult to compare all campaigns as equal when we know that some are much more disruptive than others. There are good reasons, however, to analyze campaigns rather than events. First, events data are difficult to gather, so making generalizations about conflict is virtually impossible. By analyzing campaigns rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities. Using events as the main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaigns allows us to consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.

38. April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle, eds., *People Power and Protest since 1945: A Bibliography on Nonviolent Action* (London: Housmans, 2006). See also Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide* (New York and London: Garland, 1997).

significant amount of violence are coded as violent. The data on violent campaigns are derived primarily from Kristian Gleditsch's 2004 updates to the Correlates of War database on intrastate wars (COW), as well as from Kalev Sepp's list of major counterinsurgency operations for information on conflicts after 2002.³⁹

The unit of analysis is the country year in which a campaign peaked. The campaign observation is the country year that captures the campaign's "peak." In many cases, a campaign lasted only a year, so the peak year is obvious. On the other hand, some campaigns lasted many years, in which case the peak of the campaign is determined by one of two criteria: (1) the year in which the most members participated in the campaign; or (2) in the event that membership information is missing, the peak is coded as the year the campaign ended due to suppression, dispersal of the campaign, or success.

The outcomes of these campaigns are identified as "success," "limited success," or "failure." To be designated a "success," the campaign must have met two criteria: (1) its stated objective occurred within a reasonable period of time (two years) from the end of the campaign; and (2) the campaign had to have a discernible effect on the outcome.⁴⁰ A "limited success" occurs when a campaign obtained significant concessions (e.g., limited autonomy, local power sharing, or a non-electoral leadership change in the case of dictatorship) although the stated objectives were not wholly achieved (i.e., territorial independence or regime change through free and fair elections).⁴¹ A campaign is coded a "failure" if it did not meet its objectives or did not obtain significant concessions.⁴²

39. Kristian Gleditsch, "A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002," *International Interactions*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July–September 2004), pp. 231–262; and Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (May–June 2005), pp. 8–12. The COW data set requires 1,000 battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the conflict between armed combatant groups. We also checked our data against Jason Lyall and Isaih Wilson III's data on insurgencies. See Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," unpublished paper, Princeton University, 2008.

40. See Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*; and Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." The two-year threshold accounts for necessary logistical or operational delays in bringing about the outcome.

41. There is real concern, especially regarding nonviolent campaigns, that our data set is biased toward success, because large, mature campaigns are most commonly reported. Would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed in their infancy (and therefore fail) cannot be included in the data set. This is the major limitation in this study that is difficult to avoid. To address this concern, we circulated the data among leading authorities on nonviolent movements to make sure we accounted for failed movements. Moreover, we ran multiple tests both across nonviolent and violent cases and within nonviolent cases alone to ensure robustness on all results. There may be significant campaigns missing from the data set if we simply did not know about them.

42. When a campaign is ongoing, the campaign observation is noted for 2006 and is coded as a

To test the four hypotheses, we collected data on multiple independent variables. We created a dummy variable for regime violence, which is a dichotomous variable identifying whether the regime used violence to crack down on the campaign.⁴³ We argue that backfire is most likely to occur when a regime violently represses a nonviolent campaign and that this is due to the production of domestic and international outrage that results from such activity.⁴⁴ Therefore, regime repression should have a positive effect on the probability of success among nonviolent campaigns and decrease the chances of success among violent ones.

We generated another dichotomous variable identifying defections among the regime's security forces. This measure does not include routine individual defections, but rather large-scale, systematic breakdowns in the execution of a regime's orders.⁴⁵ We consider security defections a strict measure of loyalty shifts within the regime, not capturing civil servant or bureaucrat loyalty shifts. This strict measure includes defections occurring up to the end of the campaign, and we expect it to have a positive effect on the probability of campaign success.

The next independent variables are the degree of external support for the resistance campaign and for the opponent regime. External support for the resistance campaign can be captured by two separate variables: foreign state sponsorship of a campaign, and international sanctions. Therefore, we included a variable that indicates whether a campaign received overt material aid (military or economic) from states to fight a regime; and another variable that indicates whether a regime is the target of international sanctions specifically regarding its behavior toward a resistance movement.⁴⁶ Additionally,

failure. An example is the West Papuan campaign against the Indonesian occupation from 1964 to the present, which is coded as a failure as of 2006.

43. Dupuy Institute, *Armed Conflict Events Database, Release Version Beta 1.2.1*, <http://www.onwar.com/aced/index.htm>; Zunes, "Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Regimes"; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*; Karatnycky and Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won*; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements*; Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess, *Justice without Violence*; Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006); Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency"; and Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest since 1945*.

44. The availability of information through media coverage may cause variable effects. See, for example, Martin, *Justice Ignited*.

45. Data are gleaned from Dupuy Institute, *Armed Conflict Events Database*; Zunes, "Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Regimes"; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*; Karatnycky and Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won*; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements*; Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess, *Justice without Violence*; Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, 2007*; and Carter, Clarke, and Randle, *People Power and Protest since 1945*.

46. The variable on external aid excludes covert support, which is impossible to determine unless support is leaked to the public. This measure also excludes tacit state support through public state-

we created a dichotomous variable indicating whether the regime received overt military aid from an outside state to fight against the campaign.⁴⁷

Finally, we included several control variables. Some scholars have argued that democratic regimes should have greater tolerance for dissent, a greater aversion to using violence to crack down on domestic opposition, and a more easily coercible public. Thus, both violent and nonviolent struggles should be more effective against democratic targets than authoritarian targets.⁴⁸ To assess these effects, we used the target's Polity IV score lagged one year prior to the campaign's end.⁴⁹ Next, we controlled for duration of the conflict (the logged conflict duration in days), because duration may affect the outcomes of the campaign.⁵⁰ Cold War and post-Cold War dummies were also included, with the Cold War dummies identifying the period 1949–91, and the post-Cold War dummy identifying the period 1992–2006.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

To estimate the effects of each independent variable on the likelihood of campaign success, we employed multinomial logistic regression (MLR), which compares the probabilities that different independent variables will result in each respective outcome: success, limited success, or failure.⁵¹ The hypotheses

ments or diplomatic pressure, support from NGOs, support from diaspora groups, support from other nonstate actors, or the influence of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), about which a literature has emerged. See, for instance, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

47. This variable is coded a 1 if the aid was explicitly aimed at supporting the regime vis-à-vis the campaign, as made explicit in official statements or multiple accounts. Data for the regime repression and external support variables are from Dupuy Institute, *Armed Conflict Events Database*; Zunes, "Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Regimes"; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*; Karatnycky and Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won*; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements*; Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess, *Justice without Violence*; CIA, *The World Factbook*, 2007; Carter, Clarke, and Randle, *People Power and Protest since 1945*; and Hufbauer, Elliott, and Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

48. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577–592; and Pape, *Dying to Win*.

49. The Polity IV score equals the country's autocracy—democracy score on a scale of –10 to 10 (–10 meaning autocratic, 10 meaning fully democratic). See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, *POLITY IV Project: Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2004* (College Park: Center for International Development, University of Maryland, 2005).

50. Dupuy Institute, *Armed Conflict Events Database*; Karatnycky and Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won*; Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest since 1945*; Gleditsch, "A Revised List of Wars Between and Within States"; and Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency."

51. Additional results, variables, and data for replication can be obtained from Erica Chenoweth. The MLR allows researchers to estimate the relative probabilities of each outcome given a specific set of independent and autonomous variables when compared with the other potential outcomes. This is the preferred estimation method for several reasons. First, researchers can examine the

above theorize the effects of the primary resistance type of the campaign, targeted violence toward the campaign, international sanctions, state support of the campaign, and state support of the target regime on the probability of campaign success.⁵²

Table 1 demonstrates the effects of resistance type on the outcomes of campaigns in cases where the target regime responded violently. The results in table 1 yield several interesting observations. First, in the face of regime crackdowns, nonviolent campaigns are more than six times likelier to achieve full success than violent campaigns that also faced regime repression. Repressive regimes are also about twelve times likelier to grant limited concessions to nonviolent campaigns than to violent campaigns. These findings support hypothesis 1.

Second, defections more than quadruple the chances of campaign success, justifying further examination of hypothesis 2.

Third, although campaigns that receive external state support are more than three times likelier to succeed against a repressive opponent, international sanctions have no effect on the outcomes of the campaigns. Hypothesis 3 therefore receives partial support. Because state support of the target regime is insignificant, hypothesis 4 receives no support. As expected, target polity has a positive effect on the likelihood of campaign success. Campaign duration has no effect on the chances of full success, but longer campaigns have increased chances of limited success. Campaigns occurring since the Cold War have been more likely to succeed than campaigns occurring prior to the Cold War—perhaps because of learning effects among insurgents.⁵³

To test hypothesis 2 more carefully, we used a logistic regression to estimate the effects of nonviolent resistance methods on the probability of security force defections. Table 2 demonstrates that nonviolent resistance methods have insignificant effects on security force defections, which deviates from our ex-

probabilities of multiple outcomes drawn from the same sample, whereas independent logistic regressions estimate results based on independent samples. Second, MLR is preferable to ordered logistic (OLR) regression, because OLR assumes that the outcomes are qualitatively ranked. Reestimating the models using OLR, however, does not significantly alter the results. See Stata, "Logistic Regression," <http://www.stata.com/capabilities/logistic.html>.

52. Some final caveats are in order. First, many of our variables are inexact categorizations of complex social phenomena. The dichotomous nature of our variables excludes much sensitivity. Moreover, using the peak year as the unit of analysis omits the temporal component of the causal relationship, necessarily limiting us to tentative causal claims. Such omissions were a function of data unavailability rather than carelessness. There are good reasons to use dichotomous variables, however, because they provide useful organizing principles to assess the effects of each individual factor on the outcomes. Such measures draw attention to systematic, general relationships that can be further addressed using qualitative comparisons.

53. Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines."

Table 1. Effects of Resistance Type on Campaign Outcomes in Cases of Violent Regime Crackdown

	Success	Limited Success
Use of nonviolent resistance	6.39***	11.78***
Security force defections	4.44***	1.05
Foreign state support of target	-0.80	1.10
International sanctions against state	1.32	-0.60
Overt state support of campaign	3.36**	1.76
Target polity	1.07**	1.01
Duration (logged)	-1.00	1.47**
Cold War	2.97**	1.25
Post-Cold War	6.10***	7.88**
<i>N</i>	234	234
Chi ²	56.62	56.62
Prob > chi ²	0.00	0.00
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.17	0.17

NOTE: RRR (relative risk ratio) coefficients reported for ease of interpretation; coefficients are relative to campaign failure. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; and *p < 0.10. Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests are applied for robustness.

pectations. The strict measure of security force loyalty shifts may not capture alternative mechanisms of change, such as civilian or bureaucratic loyalty shifts. Such loyalty shifts may occur when security force defections do not, as in many of the 1989 revolutions in Europe.⁵⁴ Of the successful violent campaigns, however, defections occurred about 32 percent of the time, and of the successful nonviolent campaigns, defections occurred about 52 percent of the time.

Finally, to determine which variables matter most for nonviolent and violent resistance, we parceled out their effects by campaign type. Table 3 reports the findings. First, hypothesis 1 is qualified given that regime violence against the campaigns has no statistical effect on their outcome.⁵⁵ Although neither nonviolent nor violent campaigns benefit from repression, table 1 reports that nonviolent campaigns are likelier than violent ones to succeed in the face

54. Elisabeth Jean Wood has discovered the importance of economic elites in determining the course of campaigns. Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

55. An important question is why regime violence backfires in some cases and not in others. See Martin, *Justice Ignited*, for some preliminary observations.

Table 2. Effects of Resistance Type on the Likelihood of Major Security Force Defections

	Major Security Force Defections
Use of nonviolent resistance methods	0.41 (0.28)
Target polity	-0.00 (0.02)
Foreign state support of target	-0.00 (0.31)
International sanctions against state	0.66 (.42)
Cold War	0.30 (0.35)
Post-Cold War	-0.19 (0.48)
Constant	-1.48*** (0.29)
<i>N</i>	267
Chi ²	6.86
Prob > chi ²	0.3343
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.03

Significance levels: ****p* < 0.01; ***p* < 0.05; **p* < 0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

of repression. Second, hypothesis 2 receives support, as the security force defections make nonviolent campaigns forty-six times more likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns where defections do not occur. For violent campaigns, however, the effect of security force defections on campaign outcomes is insignificant. Third, hypothesis 3 receives little support. Overt external state support for a campaign has no effect on the success of nonviolent campaigns. For violent campaigns, however, it nearly triples their chances of success.⁵⁶ Our findings are similar regarding international sanctions, which have no effect on the probability that a nonviolent campaign achieves success. They more than double the probability, however, that a violent conflict achieves its objectives. Fourth, hypothesis 4 again receives no support. Direct aid to a target regime does not disadvantage nonviolent or violent campaigns.

A possible explanation for these variations is that external support to a non-

56. This finding is consistent with the arguments of many scholars of insurgency, who have argued that obtaining external support can be decisive for insurgencies. See Record, "External Assistance."

Table 3. Effects of Regime Violence, Security Force Defections, and External State Support on Campaign Outcomes

	Nonviolent Campaigns		Violent Campaigns	
	Success	Limited Success	Success	Limited Success
Regime violence	-0.39	-0.90	-0.71	-0.50
Security force defections	46.51***	2.63	2.10	1.34
Foreign state support of target	1.31	1.86	-0.99	-0.86
Foreign state support of campaign	-0.19	-0.10*	2.81*	1.53
International sanctions against state	-0.31	-0.43	2.56*	-0.39
Target polity	1.23**	1.17	1.07**	-0.97
Duration (logged)	-0.51*	-0.70	1.07	2.03**
Cold War	-0.03**	-0.02**	2.91**	1.19
Post-Cold War	-0.16	0.13	4.09*	8.05**
<i>N</i>	94	94	173	173
Chi ²	45.88	45.88	39.55	39.55
Prob > chi ²	0.0003	0.0003	0.0024	0.0024
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	.27	.27	.12	.12

NOTE: RRR (relative risk ratio) coefficients reported for ease of interpretation; coefficients are relative to campaign failure. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests are applied for robustness.

violent campaign—either overtly through material support from a state or through international sanctions—can undermine efforts to mobilize local public support because of the free-rider problem, wherein campaign activists rely too heavily on foreign support rather than local support and thereby lose their power base. Receiving foreign direct assistance may also contribute to a delegitimization of the local nonviolent movement. Another likely explanation is that international sanctions can reduce the resources available to campaign activists—which can include massive numbers of the civilian population—forcing them to redirect their tactics to compensate.⁵⁷ Violent campaigns may be less affected by international sanctions, because armed combatants can forcibly extract resources from their controlled territories. Furthermore, armed campaigns are not as dependent as nonviolent campaigns on the active participation of the broader population. Thus, the delegitimizing effects of foreign

57. Compared to blanket sanctions, targeted or “smart” sanctions may decrease this effect. See David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

backing would influence nonviolent movements more than they would armed resistance movements.⁵⁸ Another concern is that the statistical insignificance of external support in nonviolent campaigns reflects strict coding procedures rather than actual insignificance of NGO support, media coverage, and diplomatic pressure.

An analysis of the control variables reveals some interesting results as well. First, the target polity has variable influence on campaign outcomes. Substantively, a one-unit increase in the polity score increases the chances of success for a nonviolent campaign by 23 percent and for a violent campaign by about 7 percent. This finding is consistent with the literature on the domestic costs of war, which argues that democratic regimes are sensitive to constituent demands.⁵⁹

Second, the longer the campaign endures, the less likely the resistance is to achieve full success. This is especially true for nonviolent campaigns, although the substantive effects are not sizable. Violent campaigns are more likely to achieve partial success the longer the conflict endures, but duration does not influence their chances of full success.

Third, nonviolent campaigns occurring during the Cold War were less likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns occurring prior to or after the Cold War. Conversely, violent campaigns have been increasingly effective against their state opponents during and after the Cold War.⁶⁰

In sum, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed in the face of repression than are violent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns seem to benefit more from domestic pressures (i.e., defections), whereas violent campaigns benefit more from external pressures (i.e., sanctions and aid from foreign sponsors). While the defection variable is always positively correlated with the probability of campaign success, more analysis is necessary to determine whether nonviolent resistance methods are more likely than violent methods to produce widespread civilian defection, as distinct from security force defections. At this point, however, these findings are constrained by the research design, which prohibits the establishment of causality because of a lack of accounting for the temporal dimension. Our variables are mostly categorical, omitting sensitivity to different degrees of repression, defection, and mass support. We explore these issues further through qualitative analysis.

58. We thank Hardy Merriman for raising this point.

59. See, for instance, Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*; and Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes."

60. See Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines."

Case Studies

To tease out the causal relationship between resistance type and level of effectiveness, we examined three cases where both nonviolent and violent resistance was used by campaigns in Southeast Asia: the Philippines, Burma, and East Timor. These three cases were selected for several reasons. First, we chose two antiregime cases (the Philippines and Burma) and one campaign against foreign occupation (East Timor) to maximize the variation on campaign goals. Second, these cases represent both successful and failed nonviolent campaigns. Third, the case selection is driven by a most-similar case study design, in which each case compares campaigns within the same region during the same period.⁶¹ Moreover, none of the campaigns examined received outside material aid from a state sponsor, allowing us to hold constant this factor and examine other variables in isolation.

This comparative method serves several purposes. First, it provides a rigorous method of case selection for theory testing that avoids critiques of selection bias, because both expected (campaign success) and deviant (campaign failure) observations are compared. Second, the method helps to improve theoretical models, given that deviant observations beg further explanation. Nested analysis involves selecting both expected cases of nonviolent campaign success (the Philippines and East Timor) and deviant cases of nonviolent campaign failure (Burma). In-depth analysis of deviant cases (failures) can reveal where variables in the data set require more sensitivity and where omitted variables are required to explain more of the variation in outcomes.

EAST TIMOR, 1988–99

East Timor's path to independent statehood, nearly thirty years after the half-island nation located in the Indonesian archipelago was invaded and annexed by Indonesia in 1975, was rough and bloody. The former Portuguese colony, rich in timber and offshore natural gas, failed to undergo successful decolonization before Indonesian President Suharto ordered a massive aerial bombardment and ground invasion of East Timor in November 1975. Suharto justified the invasion by claiming that the left-leaning nationalist group that had declared independence for East Timor a month earlier, the Revolutionary Front

61. According to the logic of nested analysis, large-*n* scholars should test and modify their causal claims by selecting both predicted and deviant observations from their sample for case study analysis. Among observations that fit the predicted regression line, case study analysis can reveal whether the causal relationship is accurate or spurious. Among deviant cases, case study analysis can reveal which omitted variables can account for the residual error.

for an Independent East Timor (known by its Portuguese acronym FRETILIN), was a communist threat to the region. Indonesian intelligence exploited intra-Timorese divisions and helped foment a civil war between Timorese factions. Leaders from the Timorese Democratic Union and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association, rivals to FRETILIN that enjoyed little public support, signed an agreement with the Indonesian government calling for East Timor to be integrated into Indonesia. The Balibo Declaration was held up by the Suharto regime to legitimize the invasion and annexation, which resulted in the deaths of close to a third of Timor's indigenous population.

Despite UN Security Council resolutions condemning Indonesia's actions, enforcement was absent and Western governments treated the annexation of East Timor as a *fait accompli*.⁶² Meanwhile, Indonesia installed a puppet government in Dili dominated by the Indonesian military and East Timorese factions that opposed FRETILIN. More than 100,000 Indonesian Muslims were given financial incentives to settle in East Timor, whose population is overwhelmingly Catholic, and the island came under the grips of a brutal foreign military occupation. International press coverage of the situation in East Timor was state regulated.⁶³

Early resistance to Indonesian occupation took the form of conventional and guerrilla warfare led by FRETILIN's armed wing, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (known by the Portuguese acronym FALANTIL). Using weapons left behind by Portuguese troops, FALANTIL forces waged armed struggle from East Timor's mountainous jungle region. Despite some early successes, by 1980 Indonesia's brutal counterinsurgency campaign had destroyed the armed resistance along with nearly one-third of the East Timorese population.⁶⁴ A major strategic transformation of the East Timorese resistance followed.

The leader of the transformation, Kay Xanana Gusmão, was a surviving FALANTIL commander. Gusmão traversed the island by foot to meet with

62. Two UN Security Council resolutions, 384 (1975) and 389 (1976), affirmed East Timor's right to self-determination and called on Indonesia to halt its invasion of East Timor and withdraw its military forces without delay. See Richard Falk, "The East Timor Ordeal: International Law and Its Limits," in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom, eds., *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 150.

63. Geoffrey C. Gunn, *A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor* (Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1994), p. 1.

64. Indonesian forces killed most of the FALANTIL commanders, eliminated approximately 80 percent of their bases, and assumed control over approximately 90 percent of the East Timorese population. Taur Matan Ruak, commander of FALANTIL, interview by Maria J. Stephan, Dili, East Timor, January 11, 2005.

different groups and assess the resistance potential of the population.⁶⁵ A well-respected Catholic bishop convinced Gusmão to drop the independence movement's Marxist-communist leanings in order to secure the support of the church and Western governments. Gusmão stepped down as head of FRETILIN and created a new nonpartisan resistance front, known as the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM). CNRM was made up of three pillars: an Armed Front, a Diplomatic Front, and a Clandestine Front.⁶⁶ The nonpartisan character of the new resistance organization was intended to make it as inclusive as possible.

Although the Clandestine Front was originally envisaged as a support network for the armed movement, eventually their roles were reversed and the former became the driving force behind the pro-independence resistance. The Clandestine Front, an outgrowth of the FRETILIN student movement that had formed during the 1970s, planned and led a series of nonviolent campaigns inside East Timor, in Indonesia, and in foreign capitals starting in 1988. With branches inside East Timor and Indonesia, where large numbers of East Timorese youths were enrolled in Indonesian universities, the Clandestine Front developed a large decentralized network of activists who relied on educational campaigns and nonviolent protests to raise awareness about the situation in Timor.

The first major protest occurred in November 1988, when Pope John Paul II was invited by President Suharto to Dili—an act meant to bestow further legitimacy on the forced annexation.⁶⁷ During the pope's mass, which was attended by thousands, a group of East Timorese youths ran up to the altar and began shouting pro-independence slogans and unfurled banners calling on Indonesian forces to leave.⁶⁸ The demonstration, covered by the media, embar-

65. Gusmão described the consultations: "In 1979, I went from house to house, village to village, town to town, and asked my people if they were willing to continue the fight and they demanded that I never ever surrender. My people wish, rather demand and prefer, that I die on the battlefield. Such is the high sense of honor of the people of East Timor. And I am this country's soldier, and servant to those one thousand-time heroic people." See Sarah Niner, ed., *To Resist Is To Win! The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmão* (Richmond, Va.: Aurora, 2000), p. 166.

66. The CNRM was renamed the National Council of Timorese Resistance in 1998. This ideological and organizational transformation expanded the base of supporters by allowing a greater number of East Timorese to participate regardless of ideological or political affiliation. Chisako M. Fukuda, "Peace through Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resistance Movement's Strategy for Engagement," *Pacifica Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 19–20; and Maria J. Stephan, "Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 57–81.

67. Constancio Pinto, "The Student Movement and the Independence Struggle in East Timor: An Interview," in Tanter, Selden, and Shalom, *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*, p. 36.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

rassed Indonesia, showed the face of East Timorese opposition to the outside world, and helped lower the levels of fear among the East Timorese. More nonviolent protests were timed to coordinate with the visits of prominent foreign officials, including a dramatic demonstration during the U.S. ambassador's visit to Dili in 1990 and the smuggling in of an Australian journalist to interview Gusmão in the jungles of East Timor.

The major turning point for the East Timorese independence movement, however, was a massacre. On November 12, 1991, Indonesian troops opened fired on a crowd of East Timorese marching in a peaceful funeral procession, killing more than 200. A British filmmaker captured the massacre on film, and Western journalists who were present provided eyewitness testimony and photos. The massacre was quickly broadcast around the world, causing international outrage and prompting East Timorese to rethink their strategy.⁶⁹ According to one East Timorese leader, "After the Dili massacre, we came to the understanding that the East Timorese and Indonesians had the same enemy, which was the Indonesian Army and the Suharto dictatorship. We needed to bring Indonesians into our struggle because it was their struggle, too."⁷⁰

In 1996 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor, Bishop Carlos Belo, and the leader of the Diplomatic Pillar of CNRM, José Ramos-Horta, for their efforts to bring about a peaceful end to the Indonesian occupation.⁷¹ Upon accepting the award, Belo and Ramos-Horta called on the international community to support a referendum on East Timor's political future.

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 after a largely nonviolent struggle, Indonesia's new leader, B.J. Habibie, quickly pushed through a series of political and economic reforms designed to restore stability and international credibility to Indonesia. There was tremendous international pressure on Habibie to resolve the East Timor issue, which had become a diplomatic embarrassment and a strain on Indonesia's economy. In June 1998 Habibie offered the East Timorese special autonomy in exchange for recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. Following massive demonstrations by East Timorese and more international pressure, Habibie announced that independence was

69. Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian Vickers, "Political Ju-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression: Studying Lower-Profile Nonviolent Resistance," *Pacifica Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 143–156. See also Arnold S. Kohen, *From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of East Timor* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 160–187.

70. Domingos Sarmiento Alves, Clandestine Front leader, interview by Maria J. Stephan, Dili, East Timor, January 5, 2005; and Stephan, "Fighting for Statehood."

71. Michael E. Salla, "Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (November 1997), pp. 449–466.

an option if the East Timorese population rejected autonomy. On May 5, 1999, a tripartite agreement was signed by Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations calling for a UN-supervised referendum on East Timor's final status.

During the referendum, almost 80 percent of East Timorese who voted opted for independence. Indonesian-backed militias then launched a scorched earth campaign that led to mass destruction and displacement. During this postreferendum violence, Gusmão called on the FALANTIL guerrillas to remain inside their cantonments and not to resist with military force. Gusmão later defended this decision, saying, "We did not want to be drawn into their game and their orchestration of violence in a civil war. . . . We never expected such a dimension in the rampage that followed."⁷² On September 14, 2000, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to authorize an Australian-led international force for East Timor.⁷³ One month later the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor was established. After a two-year transition period, East Timor became the world's newest independent state in May 2002.⁷⁴

EAST TIMOR: INTERNATIONAL FACTORS. After the Dili massacre, the pro-independence movement adopted a dual strategy of "Indonesianization" and "internationalization." Underpinning both strategies was a reliance on nonviolent resistance. The goal of Indonesianization was to move the struggle closer to the opponent's heartland by engaging with Indonesian intellectuals, political opposition leaders, and human rights activists. East Timorese activists learned Bahasa, used Indonesia's legal system, studied at its schools and universities, cited from its constitution and state ideology, received financial support from Indonesian NGOs, and protested in its streets. New organizations were created to promote greater cooperation between Indonesian, East Timorese, and international activists; joint protests were common.⁷⁵ Leaders of the Clandestine Front inside Indonesia debated the strategic value of using violence and ultimately decided against it.⁷⁶

Internationalization involved targeting multilateral institutions and for-

72. Quoted in Nora Boustany, "Riding the Tide of History," *Washington Post*, September 20, 1999.

73. "Clinton Demands Indonesia Accept International Force," *Agence France-Presse*, September 9, 1999; "U.S. Cuts Military Ties with Indonesia," *Reuters*, September 9, 1999; and Sanders Thoenes, "What Made Jakarta Accept Peacekeepers," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 14, 1999.

74. Ian Martin, "The Popular Consultations and the United Nations Mission," in James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., *Out of the Ashes: The Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor* (Adelaide, Australia: Crawford House, 2000).

75. In 1995 the Solidarity with the Maubere People organization was created to focus exclusively on East Timor. See Anders Uhlin, *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

76. Joachim Fonseca, Clandestine Front leader, interview by Maria J. Stephan, Dili, East Timor, January 12, 2005.

eign governments whose aid was helping keep the Suharto regime afloat. The most dramatic nonviolent tactic used to advance this strategy was what Timorese referred to as “fence jumping.” This involved jumping over the fences of Western embassies in Jakarta and engaging in nonviolent sit-ins, while distributing information about human rights violations inside East Timor. In 1994, during a major Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Jakarta, twenty-nine Indonesian and East Timorese demonstrators scaled the walls of the U.S. embassy and refused to leave for twelve days.⁷⁷ The dramatic action attracted the media and embarrassed the Indonesian government.⁷⁸

Nonviolent direct action in support of East Timor’s independence assumed a transnational character. In the United States, the East Timor Action Network, a network of human rights organizations, religious groups, and other grassroots organizations created after the Dili massacre, successfully pressured the U.S. government to stop providing Indonesia with military aid and training until it ended the human rights abuses in East Timor and allowed self-determination there.⁷⁹ In 1992 the U.S. Congress passed a resolution cutting International Military Education Training (IMET) funding to Indonesia, despite a strong effort by Jakarta’s corporate allies to block the resolution. The State Department blocked the transfer of F-5s to Indonesia, and in 1994 Congress passed a law banning the sale of small arms to Indonesia. Although the Clinton White House continued to sell arms to Indonesia (and for a period of time reinstated IMET), sustained grassroots pressure made East Timor a central issue in U.S.-Indonesian relations.⁸⁰

Despite state-led massacres and numerous human rights violations, the violent FALANTIL campaign routinely failed to attract sympathy from the international community. In contrast, the nonviolent resistance campaign, which relied on visible public actions, was able to obtain enough sympathy from the international community to produce sanctions against the Indonesian government.

EAST TIMOR: DOMESTIC FACTORS. The violent campaign within East Timor produced widespread suspicion and animosity within the Indonesian security

77. Maggie Helwig, “Students Take Lead in East Timor Resistance,” *Peace News*, No. 2389 (April 1995).

78. Manuela Saragosa, “Summit Light Spills Over on to East Timor,” *Financial Times*, November 11, 1994; Jeremy Wagstaff, “Timorese Protestors Say They Won’t Quit Embassy,” Reuters, November 12, 1994; and Hugh O’Shaughnessy, “Aid Money Goes to Indonesian Regime Despite Massacres,” *London Observer*, November 13, 1994.

79. Brad Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The Transnational Movement for East Timor and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Peace and Change*, Vol. 29, Nos. 3–4 (July 2004), p. 459.

80. Allan Nairn, “U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military: Congressional Support,” in Tanter, Selden, and Shalom, *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*.

forces. Unclassified military documents from the occupation reveal that the Indonesian occupying forces were remarkably optimistic about the potential for victory in East Timor, while impressing upon their troops that the East Timorese population was complicit in guerrilla warfare.⁸¹ The subsequent indiscriminate and repressive counterinsurgency tactics were brutal, producing tacit support for the guerrillas among the domestic population. The violent insurgents, however, were never able to field more than 1,500 active fighters. Their violent reprisals against security forces merely solidified the resolve of the Indonesian military and escalated the conflict.

Contrarily, the nonviolent campaign produced some loyalty shifts. Indonesian students led mass mobilization efforts that ultimately led to a shift in support among business elites and members of the security forces. Business elites, still suffering from the economic crisis, lost their enthusiasm for maintaining the occupation, especially due to increasing international pressure to capitulate.⁸² Within the Indonesian military, divisions emerged between older members of the officer corps who were benefiting from lucrative business deals and promotions in East Timor and younger officers who called for reforms.⁸³ The latter group recognized that Indonesia's attempt to win hearts and minds in East Timor had failed miserably.⁸⁴ East Timorese military commander Taur Matan Ruak explained that whenever Indonesian soldiers were captured by Timorese guerrillas, they were intentionally treated well and sometimes released and allowed to return to their families in Indonesia.⁸⁵ The pro-independence leadership, furthermore, intentionally rejected help from the Free Aceh Movement, which advocated a violent overthrow of the Indonesian government.⁸⁶ As the level of public faith in the Suharto government plummeted, key Indonesian military leaders called for the president's resignation.⁸⁷

Shortly after Belo and Ramos-Horta received the Nobel Peace Prize, the erstwhile rival East Timorese factions united under a new pro-independence orga-

81. Samuel Moore, "The Indonesian Military's Last Years in East Timor: An Analysis of Its Secret Documents," *Indonesia*, Vol. 72 (October 2001), pp. 9–44.

82. Brendan O'Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds., *Rightsizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

83. Benedict Anderson, "Imagining East Timor," *Arena*, No. 4 (April–May 1993).

84. After the Dili massacre, which led to disciplinary actions against soldiers and officers, some segments of the Indonesian military became highly critical of the government's strategy in East Timor. See John B. Haseman, "A Catalyst for Change in Indonesia: The Dili Incident," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 8 (August 1995), pp. 757–767.

85. Ruak, interview by Stephan.

86. *Ibid.*

87. Geoffrey Forrester, "Introduction," in Forrester and R.J. May, eds., *The Fall of Suharto* (Bathurst, Australia: Crawford House, 1998). See also Edward Aspinall, Herb Feith, and Gerry van Klinken, eds., *The Last Days of President Suharto* (Melbourne, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1999).

nization, the National Council of Timorese Resistance. This crucial step allowed the East Timorese to present a united front to the Indonesian government and international community. The Asian economic crisis in 1997 set the stage for mass mobilization inside Indonesia, which forced the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998. East Timorese pro-independence activists demonstrated alongside Indonesian opposition activists to demand an end to the corrupt Suharto military dictatorship.⁸⁸ Whereas violent insurgency campaigns within East Timor fielded a maximum of 1,500 fighters, the nonviolent campaign produced cross-cutting alliances with tens of thousands of participants. The combination of the international and domestic pressure resulting from the efforts of the nonviolent anti-occupation campaign forced the Indonesian government to withdraw from East Timor under supervision.

THE PHILIPPINES, 1986

The “people power” movement that ousted Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 offers a useful counterexample to the failed opposition uprising in Burma a few years later. Despite scholarly predictions that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by either a communist insurgency or a military coup, this is not what occurred.⁸⁹ Instead, a broad-based coalition of opposition politicians, workers, students, businesspeople, Catholic Church leaders, and others nonviolently coerced a regime whose legitimacy was already weakening due to widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, and reliance on violent repression.

After being reelected president in 1969, Marcos declared martial law in 1972, citing threats posed by communist insurgents and Muslim secessionists from the south as justification. With U.S. backing, Marcos consolidated executive power while amassing great wealth through centralization, state monopolies, patronage, aid from the United States, and loans from international financial institutions. Marcos accused the political opposition of allying with the communists, took away their assets, and imprisoned many of them. Mainstream

88. Forrester, “Introduction”; and Aspinall, Feith, and van Klinken, *The Last Days of President Suharto*.

89. Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships.” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 379–400; Richard Snyder, “Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntaristic Perspectives,” in H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 49–81; Mark Thompson, “Searching for a Strategy: The Traditional Opposition to Marcos and the Transition to Democracy in the Philippines,” unpublished paper, Yale University, 1991; and Mark R. Thompson, “Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 179–205.

opposition leaders were either silenced or co-opted, and opposition political parties were in disarray.⁹⁰

The revolutionary opposition led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army (NPA) steadily gained strength in the late 1970s. The NPA was inspired by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies and pursued armed revolution to gain power. State-sponsored military attacks on the NPA dispersed the guerrilla resistance until the NPA encompassed all regions of the country.⁹¹

In part to appease President Jimmy Carter's administration, Marcos agreed to moderate reforms in the late 1970s, including the holding of parliamentary elections in 1978. The most prominent Filipino opposition leader and a political exile, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., participated in the elections, which resulted in only minimal gains for the opposition. Although the huge voter turnout encouraged members of the opposition (except for the CPP) to participate in future elections, some frustrated opposition members also began to involve themselves in arson, bombing, and guerrilla armies.⁹² Crippled by arrests and failures, these oppositionists received no concessions from Marcos and were blacklisted as terrorists by the U.S. government.⁹³

Aquino's assassination in 1983 sparked the mass uprising. Aquino, who was exiled to the United States in 1980, remained in contact with the opposition inside the Philippines while lobbying the U.S. government to withdraw support from Marcos.⁹⁴ By 1983, with Marcos seriously ill, domestic unrest growing following the 1979 financial crisis, the growth of the communist insurgency (along with evidence of human rights abuses resulting from regime-sponsored counterinsurgency operations), and civilian and military elites jockeying for power, Aquino decided to make his return to the Philippines. Although he hoped to negotiate a transfer of power with Marcos, this was not to be. Aquino's assassination at the Manila International Airport by a military escort sparked domestic and international outrage.

After the assassination of Aquino, Marcos tried to divide the opposition

90. Amado Mendoza, "Civil Resistance, 'People Power,' and Democratization in the Philippines," in Adam Roberts, Timothy Garton Ash, and Thomas Robert Davies, eds., *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

91. Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*.

92. Traditional politicians tried to build a small armed band in Sabah, Malaysia, with the help of the Moro National Liberation Front. After the army failed to grow, they turned to arson and bombing to force Marcos to grant electoral concessions. See Thompson, "Off the Endangered List."

93. Mendoza, "Civil Resistance, 'People Power,' and Democratization in the Philippines."

94. Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, p. 69

anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections. While some moderate politicians joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazón “Cory” Aquino) participated and won one-third of the contested seats despite violence, widespread government cheating, and limited media access.⁹⁵

Facing significant domestic unrest, in late 1985 Marcos called for snap elections to take place in February 1986. Confident that he would win (or be able to successfully rig the elections) and believing that he could intimidate an apparently divided opposition, Marcos went ahead with the elections. But by 1986, the opposition was in a better position to challenge the dictator at the polls. In 1985 the reformist opposition was united under the banner of UNIDO (United Nationalists Democratic Opposition) with Cory Aquino as its presidential candidate. In the period leading up to the elections, Aquino urged nonviolent discipline, making clear that violent attacks against opponents would not be tolerated. Church leaders, similarly, insisted on discipline.⁹⁶

Although Marcos controlled the media, the church-owned Radio Veritas and *Veritas* newspaper provided crucial coverage of the UNIDO campaign. Archbishop Jaime Sin meanwhile issued a pastoral letter calling on the population to vote for candidates who were honest and respected human rights. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines called on the population to use nonviolent resistance in the event of stolen elections, while the National Movement for Free Elections trained 500,000 volunteers to monitor elections.

When Marcos declared himself the winner of the 1986 elections despite the counterclaims of election monitors, Cory Aquino led a rally of 2 million Filipinos, proclaiming victory for herself and “the people.” Condemning Marcos, Aquino announced a “Triumph of the People” campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience.⁹⁷ The day after Marcos’s inauguration, Filipinos participated in a general strike, a boycott of the state media, a massive run on crony-controlled banks, a boycott of crony businesses, and other nonviolent activities.⁹⁸

When millions of Americans saw on their televisions the hundreds of thousands of Filipinos, including Catholic nuns, facing down the tanks, it became politically impossible for the U.S. government to maintain its support of the incumbent regime.⁹⁹ President Ronald Reagan’s administration had grown

95. Mendoza, “Civil Resistance, ‘People Power,’ and Democratization in the Philippines.”

96. Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

98. *Ibid.*

99. Stephen Zunes, “The Origins of People Power in the Philippines,” in Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements*, pp. 129–158.

weariness of Marcos and signaled support for the opposition movement. On February 25 a parallel government was formed when Cory Aquino took the oath of office. That evening, U.S. military helicopters transported Marcos and thirty members of his family and entourage to a nearby U.S. air base, where they boarded jets that took them to Hawaii. Aquino took over as president. Although there have been problems related to democratic consolidation in the Philippines since 1986, the people-power campaign successfully removed the Marcos dictatorship.

THE PHILIPPINES: INTERNATIONAL FACTORS. No states formally sanctioned the Philippines to punish Marcos's behavior. Aquino's assassination, however, prompted the U.S. State Department to assist the moderates in the opposition, pressure Marcos for reforms, and later ensure his safe departure from power. Marcos agreed to leave power only after the U.S. government made clear that it would no longer provide the massive amounts of military and economic aid that kept his regime in power—making this a primary example of how a non-violent uprising could prompt effective sanctions from external actors, even if such sanctions were not codified in an official issue of sanctions in the United Nations or another international body.

THE PHILIPPINES: DOMESTIC FACTORS. Guerrilla warfare aimed at toppling the Marcos regime was largely unsuccessful at compelling security force defections. Without the guarantee of physical safety, security forces were unlikely to sympathize with violent movements such as the NPA and the CPP. Therefore, it is not surprising that Marcos was successful at commanding the security forces to crack down on such movements, resulting in human rights violations among guerrillas and civilians in nearby villages.

In the midst of the nonviolent civil disobedience, however, disaffected members of the military who had earlier formed the Reform of the Armed Forces Movement, led by Gen. Juan Ponce Enrile, planned an attack on the Malacanang Palace to force Marcos out of office. When Enrile's plan was discovered by the regime, the plotting officers and soldiers mutinied and barricaded themselves in two military camps outside Manila. General Enrile was joined by Gen. Fidel Ramos, who announced his defection from the Marcos regime and his support for Aquino. In a remarkable turn of events, Archbishop Sin called on the population to support the military defectors. Tens of thousands of pro-democracy supporters assembled and refused to leave the military bases where the defectors were barricaded, while hundreds of thousands of unarmed nuns, priests, and civilians formed a human barricade between Marcos's tanks and the defectors. In this internationally televised standoff, the government troops ultimately retreated and a nationwide mutiny of soldiers and officers ensued.

The popular nature of the opposition resistance legitimized defection among the security forces.¹⁰⁰ When the regime could no longer rely on major segments of its military, maintain economic solvency, appease the powerful church, or maintain the economic and military backing of the U.S. government and other international financial institutions, Marcos was forced to accept defeat.

Although the violent CPP had supporters within the church (notably among lower-ranking priests), had a major following among the population, and formed occasional alliances with the reformist political opposition, the CPP was eventually marginalized due to its reliance on armed struggle, ideological rigidity, insistence on party rule, and decision to boycott elections.¹⁰¹

Marcos's repression of nonviolent opposition backfired, however. Benigno Aquino's assassination in 1983 made him a martyr for the anti-Marcos cause. Approximately 2 million Filipinos from all socioeconomic strata gathered to witness his funeral procession. The Catholic Church, whose hierarchy had engaged in "critical collaboration" with the Marcos regime during the period of martial law (even though parts of the church openly opposed Marcos from the start), began to denounce the regime's human rights abuses. The powerful Makati business community organized weekly anti-Marcos demonstrations and rallies in business districts of Manila.

Meanwhile, nonviolent resistance involving all societal groups continued to challenge Marcos's grip on power using noninstitutional means. "Lakbayan" (people's freedom marches), mass demonstrations that became known as "parliaments in the streets," and "welgang bayan" (people's strikes) were only a few of the nonviolent tactics used during this escalatory phase of the struggle. In 1984 popular strikes shut down the cities, notably the transportation sector. Meanwhile, peasants marched into the urban areas and launched sit-ins. Church officials actively brought together noncommunist opposition politicians and members of the business community.¹⁰² The more progressive elements of the church allied with grassroots groups and organized Basic Christian Communities in the rural areas, strengthening the church-based mobilization effort and drawing away potential recruits from the guerrilla resistance.¹⁰³

As in East Timor, therefore, media coverage of the state repression of nonvi-

100. Mendoza, "Civil Resistance, 'People Power,' and Democratization in the Philippines."

101. Ibid.; and Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*.

102. Mendoza, "Civil Resistance, 'People Power,' and Democratization in the Philippines"; and Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*.

103. Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, p. 72.

olent campaigns backfired against the regime, resulting in mass mobilization, civilian and security force loyalty shifts, and international pressure on the regime to concede defeat.

BURMA, 1988–90

In 1988 Burmese opposition groups launched a mass civilian uprising that posed an unprecedented challenge to a military dictatorship that came to power following a coup d'état in 1962. What began as spontaneous student-led protests against police violence in Rangoon quickly grew into a nationwide campaign to dismantle the twenty-six-year dictatorship and restore democracy. Despite a few temporary concessions granted by the regime, including multiparty elections in 1990, which were won by the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), the 1988 campaign is best characterized as a failure, given that Burma remains a highly repressive military dictatorship.¹⁰⁴

Burma's postindependence democracy was crushed in 1962 following a military coup that brought Gen. Ne Win to power. The military has since dominated Burma's politics and economy. Corruption and economic mismanagement have been rampant, and sporadic protests have been met with massive firepower. In 1988, after a Burmese student was killed by riot police, mass student-led demonstrations broke out in Rangoon. Hundreds of students were killed, thousands were arrested, and the universities were shut down. Students took to the streets again to demand the reopening of the schools and punishment for those responsible for the student massacres. Clashes broke out between the students and security forces, resulting in more deaths and a government-imposed ban on public gatherings.

Following a bureaucratic shuffle in which Gen. Ne Win announced he

104. This case study does not include the August–October 2007 Saffron Revolution. This popular uprising was sparked by high fuel prices, resulting in the largest and most sustained protests against the SPDC since 1988. Regime crackdowns against the peaceful protests prompted harsh criticism from human rights groups, governments, the UN Security Council, and regional bodies, which intensified political, diplomatic, and economic pressure against the junta. The UN special envoy to Burma has called on the SPDC to engage in meaningful dialogue with detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to release all political prisoners, and to draft a new constitution via a transparent, inclusive process. The SPDC established a national convention to draft a new constitution, which is subject to a nationwide referendum in May 2008, followed by ratification and multiparty democratic elections in 2010—the first general election in twenty years. The political repercussions of the Saffron Revolution are undetermined. For more information on this campaign, see Daya Gamage, "Latest Visit to Burma Yielded No 'Immediate Tangible Outcome,' Gambari Tells UN Security Council," *Asian Tribune*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 21, 2008), <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/10128>. For an analysis of the 2007 Saffron Revolution, see International Federation for Human Rights, "Burma's 'Saffron Revolution' Is Not Over: Time for the International Community to Act," December 2007, <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/BURMA-DEC2007.pdf>.

would step down as president and chair of the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), the Burmese Congress installed the man responsible for the Rangoon massacre as the new party chairman. The opposition responded with a nationwide strike and massive protests on August 8, 1988. Hundreds of thousands of youths, monks, workers, civil servants, unemployed people, and members of all different ethnic groups and segments of society demonstrated, calling for an end to the military regime and the installation of an interim government in order to prepare for multiparty elections.

Burmese military units responded to the general strike by opening up fire with automatic weapons, killing hundreds in Rangoon. Similar crackdowns took place in other parts of Burma, killing more than 1,000 demonstrators in three days.¹⁰⁵ During this uprising, Buddhist monks joined students and factory workers in the demonstrations; in some places, monks took over the administration of towns and villages.

In 1990 multiparty elections were held in Burma and the opposition NLD won 80 percent of the vote, despite continued repression. The military-led State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was stunned by the election results and refused to honor them. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest in July 1990, and many young NLD activists were killed or arrested. The guerrilla resistance in the border areas, meanwhile, gained no traction. Instead, the armed zones once held by ethnic guerrilla armies were largely conquered by the Burmese military.¹⁰⁶

The opposition was largely demobilized and not in a position to resist the stolen elections through campaigns of noncooperation. There were few signs of regime defections, despite the brief defection of several hundred air force troops in 1988.¹⁰⁷ Aung San Suu Kyi unsuccessfully pursued a dialogue with military leaders on instituting democratic reforms. Many NLD leaders were imprisoned or exiled. Occasionally a few political prisoners were released, often coinciding with the visits of foreign dignitaries or UN officials. The SLORC, which renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), remains in control.

BURMA: INTERNATIONAL FACTORS. The Burmese pro-democracy cause attracted significant international attention. For example, Aung San Suu Kyi received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. Although the United States sanctioned

105. Demonstrators in Rangoon fought back with whatever weapons they could improvise. Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, pp. 246–247.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 249; and Michael Beer, “Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a Unified Strategy Workable?” in Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements*, pp. 174–185.

107. Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, p. 248.

Burma for its human rights abuses against opposition leaders, the sanctions did not produce sufficient advantages for the nonviolent opposition. In fact, where the United States imposed sanctions, the Burmese regime simply substituted imports from other foreign donors, including China and India, which undermined the effects of the sanctions on the regime's willingness to reform. Also, one could argue that the U.S. sanctions were actually weak, given that they did not include subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Consistent with our large-*n* findings, therefore, international sanctions did not raise the political costs to the Burmese regime of repressing the nonviolent opposition.

BURMA: DOMESTIC FACTORS. The Burmese anti-SLORC campaign did not adequately raise the internal costs of regime repression. Among other things, the nonviolent campaign was ineffective in producing loyalty shifts within the security forces (as well as among bureaucrats within the regime) in any meaningful sense. The nonviolent opposition failed to present itself as a viable political alternative to the junta, and it failed to significantly alter the self-interest equation of the security forces, which did not perceive incentives to challenge or disobey regime orders. The regime, furthermore, successfully divided and co-opted groups of Buddhist monks, preventing them from presenting a unified front. Some violent ethnic insurgencies have benefited from defections from the Burmese military—including the notable defection of Col. Sai Yee, a Shan State National Army commander, in 2005.¹⁰⁸ Such rare but notable defections, however, did not influence the outcomes of the violent insurgencies either, as their operations against the Burmese regime were largely futile.

Initially, nonviolent mobilization against the Burmese regime was massive and cross-cutting. But overreliance on single personalities, the inability to reconcile across competing factions, and a lack of consistent information about human rights abuses left the nonviolent opposition campaign in disarray. Violent campaigns have been unsuccessful in Burma because of their inability to mobilize the masses at all, fielding small guerrilla units with a passive support base divided along ethnic lines.

Following the August 8, 1988, massacres, political space opened: the government lifted martial law, released some political prisoners, and withdrew the military from cities. The pro-democracy movement took advantage of the increased political space, as more than 1 million Burmese protested in Rangoon and other cities. Thousands of Burmese quit the BSPP and burned their mem-

108. Tin Maung Maung Than, "Myanmar: Challenges Galore but Opposition Failed to Score," in Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar, eds., *Southeast Asian Affairs, 2006* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 186–207.

bership cards. Students, monks, and workers organized “General Strike Committees” and “Citizens Councils” to run day-to-day affairs in dozens of cities and towns, which became a form of parallel government at the local level. Even some air force soldiers broke ranks to join the protests, although the defections were the exception.¹⁰⁹ A day later, the ruling party and the parliament called for general multiparty elections.

Just when victory seemed imminent for the pro-democracy movement, opposition leaders bickered over leadership of the new democratic government. As opposition elites were distracted by infighting, the Burmese military launched another coup, establishing the SLORC on September 18. The SLORC reimposed martial law, banning gatherings of more than five people. Unarmed protestors were shot in the streets, and thousands more were arrested or “disappeared.”

As the SLORC ramped up the violence, the opposition demonstrations ceased and the general strike ended. Thousands of students fled to border areas controlled by ethnic rebels and tried to start a military struggle against the dictatorship.¹¹⁰ Media publicity of enduring human rights abuses was unexceptional.

A small group of prominent opposition leaders came together to form the National League for Democracy and registered it as a political party. The NLD’s General Secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi, toured the country calling for multiparty democracy in defiance of the ban on public meetings, advocating for national unity and nonviolent discipline. By mid-1989, however, the SLORC had stepped up its intimidation campaign against Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership. Refusing to recognize the 1990 NLD election victory, the SLORC placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, effectively decapitating the nonviolent resistance campaign.

CASE STUDY SUMMARY: EXPLAINING CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AND FAILURE

This analysis of three cases reveals several insights about campaign outcomes. First, in all three cases, violent campaigns were largely unsuccessful in heightening the political costs of repression. Although some people may sympathize with violent insurgents, none of our cases reflect material support or international sanctions on their behalf. Although the quantitative section revealed little support for the notion that sanctions or external aid assists nonviolent

109. Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, p. 248.

110. *Ibid.*

campaigns, our case studies show that well-timed pressure or withdrawal of support by major international actors changed the course of the campaigns in the Philippines and East Timor.

Second, campaigns that fail to produce loyalty shifts within the security or civilian bureaucracy are unlikely to achieve success. Our large-*n* study suggests that nonviolent campaigns are more likely than violent campaigns to succeed in the face of brutal repression, probably because they are more likely to produce backfire. Also in our large-*n* study, we found that although security force defections are often crucial to the success of nonviolent campaigns, they do not necessarily occur during nonviolent campaigns. And among our case studies, significant loyalty shifts within the security forces did not occur in Burma. This deviant case provides useful insights into important variables not analyzed in the large-*n* study. Three such variables are mass mobilization, campaign decentralization, and media communication strategies.

Mass mobilization—particularly mobilization where participation is broad based and the campaign is not dependent on a single leader—occurred in both cases of campaign success. Such mobilization was more common among the nonviolent campaigns than the violent campaigns, whose membership was smaller and more homogeneous. Indeed, in the cases of East Timor and the Philippines, repression against nonviolent resistance backfired to produce mass mobilization, which in turn heightened the political costs of regime repression. In both cases, the regimes paid dearly: security forces shifted their loyalty to the nonviolent resistance campaign, and the international community came down heavily against the regimes.

In Burma, on the other hand, both violent and nonviolent campaigns failed to raise the costs of regime repression to such an extent that regime control was threatened. Although Burma has suffered sanctions, the domestic costs of repression were inadequate to produce the desired results, and mobilization was selective and leader dependent.¹¹¹

These results suggest the need for important additions to our large-*n* study: the inclusion of variables about the degree and nature of mass mobilization, as well as the role of the media and communications strategies. Mobilization may be the critical determinant of success, given that a widespread, cross-cutting, and decentralized campaign may be more effective in raising the political costs of repression because of its operational resilience, mass appeal, and anonym-

111. Martin, *Justice Ignited*. In the backfire model, media coverage reflects the regime's failure to cover up its most discreditable actions.

ity. Our findings also suggest that media coverage is a crucial means of causing backfire, as others have argued.¹¹²

Conclusions and Implications

The central contention of this study is that nonviolent resistance methods are likely to be more successful than violent methods in achieving strategic objectives. We have compared the outcomes of 323 nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006, and we have compared these large-*n* findings with comparative case studies of nonviolent campaigns in Southeast Asia.

Based on the combined statistical and qualitative research, we can make several claims. First, resistance campaigns that compel loyalty shifts among security forces and civilian bureaucrats are likely to succeed. Such operational successes occur among violent campaigns occasionally, but nonviolent campaigns are more likely to produce loyalty shifts. Although in the quantitative study these findings are qualified by data constraints, our case studies reveal that three violent campaigns were unable to produce meaningful loyalty shifts among opponent elites, whereas such shifts did occur as a result of nonviolent action in the Philippines and East Timor. In addition, repression against nonviolent campaigns in the Philippines and East Timor resulted in well-timed international sanctions against the opponent regime, which proved instrumental in the success of these nonviolent campaigns. The domestic and international political costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns are higher than for repressing violent campaigns.

Our case studies also suggest that violent and nonviolent campaigns that fail to achieve widespread, cross-cutting, and decentralized mobilization are unlikely to compel defection or evoke international sanctions in the first place. Broad-based campaigns are more likely to call into question the legitimacy of the opponent. The political costs of repressing one or two dozen activists, easily labeled “extremists,” are much lower than repressing hundreds or thousands of activists who represent the entire population.

More research is needed to develop measures of the degree and nature of mass mobilization over time. It should be possible to measure the level of participation in a nonviolent campaign, including how broad based the resistance is regarding geographical region, sector, and demography. The degree of unity in the nonviolent opposition is another important internal factor that could be

112. Martin and Varney, “Nonviolent Communication.”

assessed empirically.¹¹³ Furthermore, the diversification of nonviolent tactics could be measured to determine whether expanding the repertoire of nonviolent tactics or their sequencing enhances the success of nonviolent movements.¹¹⁴

In addition to these recommendations for future research, our findings also suggest several policy implications. First, although there is no blueprint for success, nonviolent campaigns that meet the criteria identified above are more likely to succeed than violent campaigns with similar characteristics. Second, targeted forms of external support were useful in the East Timorese and Philippines cases. Although there is no evidence that mass nonviolent mobilization can be successfully begun or sustained by external actors, organized solidarity groups that maintained steady pressure on governments allied with the target regimes were helpful, suggesting that international groups can enhance the campaign's leverage over the target.¹¹⁵ External assistance, however, may be counterproductive if, by association, it hurts the credibility of a movement. Third, given the critical role played by the media in facilitating backfire, supporting the creation and maintenance of independent sources of media and technology that allow nonviolent actors to communicate internally and externally is another way that governmental and nongovernmental actors can support nonviolent campaigns. Fourth, technical capacity-building in elections monitoring and human rights documentation are other useful tools for nonviolent activists. Fifth, the provision of educational materials (e.g., books, films, DVDs, and videogames) that highlight lessons learned from other historical nonviolent movements has been cited by nonviolent activists as critical to their mobilization.¹¹⁶ Mounting evidence of nondemocratic regimes using internet surveillance, prohibitive laws targeting local and international NGOs, and more traditional threats and intimidation directed at civil society groups will likely pose added challenges to those committed to political change through nonviolent means.¹¹⁷

113. We thank Howard Clark for his suggestions regarding additional internal variables.

114. Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*; and Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*.

115. See, for example, Liam Mahoney and Luis Enrique Eguren, *Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights* (Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian, 1997).

116. For example, the Serbian opposition movement used the writings of Gene Sharp during trainings of activists in the period leading up to the 2000 nonviolent ouster of Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milošević. The documentary film *Bringing Down a Dictator* (about the Serbian movement) was shown on public television in Georgia and Ukraine before and during the electoral revolutions in those countries.

117. National Endowment for Democracy, "The Backlash against Democracy Assistance," report prepared for Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,

Ultimately, it is worth recalling Thomas Schelling's writings about the dynamics of a conflict between violent and nonviolent opponents: "[The] tyrant and his subjects are in somewhat symmetrical positions. They can deny him most of what he wants—they can, that is, if they have the disciplined organization to refuse collaboration. And he can deny them just about everything they want—he can deny it by using the force at his command. . . . They can deny him the satisfaction of ruling a disciplined country, he can deny them the satisfaction of ruling themselves. . . . It is a bargaining situation in which either side, if adequately disciplined and organized, can deny most of what the other wants, and it remains to see who wins."¹¹⁸

June 8, 2006; Carl Gershman and Michael Allen, "The Assault on Democracy Assistance," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 2006), p. 38; Thomas Carothers, "The Backlash against Democracy Promotion," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March–April 2006), pp. 55–68; and Regine Spector and Andrej Krickovic, "Authoritarianism 2.0: Non-Democratic Regimes Are Upgrading and Integrating Globally," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, California, March 26, 2008.

118. Thomas C. Schelling, "Some Questions on Civilian Defense," in Adam Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Nonviolent Action against Aggression* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1967), pp. 351–352.