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Citizens Protect an Anticorruption Commission: Indonesia

By the 1990s the Indonesian people's dissatisfaction with the brutal regime of General Suharto was increasing.¹ Political and military repression was relentless, and Suharto's extravagant enrichment of himself and his family members and cronies, related economic scandals, and overt malfeasance angered many Indonesians. During this decade, a new generation of human rights and prodemocracy groups began to develop. They established ties with student organizations and found common cause with other sectors in society, including displaced peasants, suppressed workers, and community leaders.² In 1997 election-related fraud and brutality reached new heights, adding to popular discontent.³ When the Asian financial crisis hit in 1998, the kleptocracy was ill-prepared to cope. The Indonesian currency, the rupiah, plummeted in value. Inflation soared, hitting regular people particularly hard as prices of basic goods became exorbitant, the national banking system collapsed, the industrial sector declined, and unemployment escalated.⁴

On May 21, 1998, after thirty-two years in power, General Suharto was forced to resign. His downfall was the result of a civic alignment involving student groups and religious organizations; months of student-led protests around the country in what became known as the *Reformasi* (reformation) movement against "corruption, collusion/cronyism and nepotism"; and internal pressure from political elites.⁵ One year later, multiethnic Indonesia began a new chapter of governance when the first free parliamentary elections were held since 1955.⁶ The fledgling democracy inherited a multitude of ills not unlike those of postwar contexts, from widespread poverty to a thirty-year armed conflict in Aceh that resulted in close to 15,000 deaths, dysfunctional state institutions,

security force impunity, and endemic corruption. The latter was embedded into the power structures of government institutions, security forces (military and police) and public administration, and the economy and social fabric of the country.

Context

Into this thorny mix was born the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), best known by its acronym, KPK. In 2002 the Indonesian House of Representatives passed the KPK law, instituting the legal basis for its creation. This marked a milestone for the country's post-Suharto Reformasi—namely, the effort to bring forth political and institutional change and to consolidate democracy. The anti-corruption body became operational in 2003, armed with several crucial capacities. It has the authority to investigate, prosecute, and convict wrongdoers in its own anticorruption courts independent of the attorney general's office.⁷ It has quite broad jurisdiction, encompassing all branches of the government, police (excluding military), and the private sector when coaccused in public sector cases. Finally, the KPK has surveillance and investigative powers, namely, the ability to conduct wire-tapping, intercept communications, examine bank accounts and tax records, issue hold orders, enforce travel bans, and even make arrests.⁸

While many anticorruption commissions are dismissed as window dressing to satisfy donors and multilateral institutions, a few are at the forefront of fighting corruption and gaining transparency. The KPK is one of these trailblazers. It has exposed corrupt behavior and relationships in the national and subnational government, Parliament, the administration, the private sector, and the police, the latter having a particularly negative reputation with the public. According to Transparency International Indonesia's biannual Corruption Perceptions Index, in 2006, 2008, and 2010, the police were considered to be the most corrupt institution.⁹ From 2004 onward, the KPK achieved a 100 percent conviction rate, including cabinet ministers, provincial governors, judicial figures, legislators, Election Commission members, ambassadors, and business executives.¹⁰ As a result, the KPK overcame the public's initial cynicism and earned its respect and admiration. People saw it as "the hope to fix a broken country," said Illian Deta Arta Sari, an anticorruption activist and the public campaign coordinator of Indonesia Corruption Watch.¹¹

By impacting the entire tangled system of influence and graft involving the executive and legislative branches, judiciary, central bank,

and private sector, the KPK soon became a target. This shift included police criminalization of some of its activities, bomb threats, a Constitutional Court ruling in 2006 that the law establishing the KPK and the counterpart Corruption Court was unconstitutional, and subsequent parliamentary attempts to cut the institution's budget and authority, as well as to alter the Corruption Crimes Courts. These attacks are ongoing.¹² The situation came to a head in 2009, in the wake of the KPK's investigations of embezzlement in the infamous Bank Century bailout.¹³ Wire-tapping unveiled attempts by the police's chief detective, Susno Duadji, to influence legislators' decisions and unfreeze Bank Century accounts.¹⁴ Another KPK case launched that January involved Aulia Pohan, the deputy governor of the central bank, who is also the father-in-law of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's son. In June 2009 the Corruption Court sentenced him to four and a half years in prison.¹⁵ Later that month, the president signaled his displeasure with the commission. He said, "The KPK holds extraordinary power, responsible only to Allah. Beware!"¹⁶

Not surprisingly, efforts to weaken if not destroy the commission intensified. On May 2, 2009, the police arrested the KPK's chairman, Antasari Azhar, for a murder conspiracy in a love triangle.¹⁷ Exactly two weeks later, while in detention, he alleged that two deputy commissioners, Bibit Samad Rianto and Chandra Hamzah, were involved in extortion and corruption.¹⁸ None other than Chief Detective Susno produced the handwritten testimony. Without delay the police launched investigations. On September 11 they began questioning Bibit and Chandra, and on the fifteenth of the month formally declared them suspects.¹⁹ On September 21 President Yudhoyono issued a decree to temporarily dismiss Bibit and Chandra, requesting a presidential team to recommend new commissioners.²⁰ The removed officials fought back by challenging the decree in the Constitutional Court.²¹

Campaign

Objectives and Strategy

That July, well before Bibit and Chandra were arrested, a core group of civil society leaders already "saw the signs," recalled Deta Arta Sari. Many of them had been young activists for democracy and human rights during the 1990s and then veterans of the Reformasi movement against the Suharto regime. They met informally and decided it was necessary to proactively develop a strategy and plan to protect the

KPK—the institution, its mandate, and its authority—before it was too late. “It’s now a very dangerous time for the KPK. Whether it’s the police, attorney general’s office, or parliament, there is a systematic agenda to destroy the KPK,” asserted Teten Masduki, a prodemocracy veteran who was the executive director of Transparency International Indonesia at that time.²² They concluded that the only way to defend the commission was to apply extrainstitutional pressure. That pressure, according to Deta Arta Sari, was people power. “We realized that no government institution would protect KPK, so the people had to protect it.”

The campaign’s overall strategy was to generate firm political will to safeguard the KPK through overwhelming popular pressure on President Yudhoyono, who had decisively won a second term in office based on a strong anticorruption platform. Initially, activists demanded that the president publicly take a stand in support of the commission and force those intent on destroying it within the police, attorney general’s office, and Parliament to back down. As unforeseen events unfolded, the campaign made specific requests: the establishment of an independent commission to quickly examine the case and legal proceedings against the two anticorruption deputy commissioners, their reinstatement at the KPK, and urgent reform of the attorney general’s office and the police.

Coalition Building

An early step was to build a strong coalition from the civic realm. At the core were the members of the Judicial Monitoring Coalition (KPP). It was made up of key civil society democracy guardians: Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW); the Centre for Policy and Law Studies (PSHK); Indonesia Institute for Independent Judiciary (LeIP); Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI); Indonesian Legal Roundtable (ILR); Indonesia Transparency Society (MTI); Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH); the National Law Reform Consortium (KRHN); and Transparency International Indonesia.

Deta Arta Sari and Emerson Yuntho, a fellow anticorruption activist and a law and justice monitoring coordinator with ICW, reported that campaign planners approached organizations and initiatives around the country to enlist their support, including women’s groups, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), student groups, the religious communities, local civic anticorruption initiatives, and organized labor. Among the civic entities were KontraS (Commission for “the Disappeared” and Victims of Violence), a major human rights organization; RACA (Institute for Rapid Agrarian Conflict Appraisal), which miti-

gates agrarian conflicts; and FAKTA (Jakarta Citizens' Forum), focusing on the urban poor. A few unions, on the left of the ideological spectrum, also joined the coalition. Over one hundred groups came on board, some at the national level and others at the provincial and local levels.

Gecko vs. Crocodile

The civic leaders officially launched the Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption Commission (CICAK) campaign on July 12, 2009, through a *deklarasi*, a public declaration supported by several respected national figures, including Abdurrahman Wahid, the first elected president in 1999, and two former KPK commissioners, Taufiqurrahman Rukie and Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas. They chose a Sunday so that more people could come to the launch, which also featured a huge draw, the famous rock band Slank. The name "CICAK" has a dual meaning. It's an acronym for Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption Commission (Cintai Indonesia Cintai KPK). It also refers to the gecko lizard, turning a police insult into a symbol of defiance. In an April interview with a major news magazine, Chief Detective Susno said he knew the KPK was investigating and wiretapping him, but added, "It's like a gecko challenging a crocodile," the latter referring to the police.²³ His comment angered the public, as he made no effort to veil his contempt for both the antigraft body and the overall struggle against corruption, which allowed those in power to benefit while the average person was cheated.

In the ensuing weeks through to September, CICAK groups formed in twenty of the country's thirty-three provinces. Indonesian students studying in Cairo even established a diaspora branch.²⁴ Well-known statesmen, celebrities, artists, and religious figures took a stand in support of the anticorruption commission. The CICAK organizers were ready to channel popular anger into mass civic mobilization—to a level unprecedented since the Reformasi movement against Suharto.

Meanwhile, the situation was growing more and more ominous for the antigraft body. In August the media reported that the country's chief prosecutor, Hendarman Supandji, boasted that if the police and attorney general's office joined forces on the Bank Century case, there would not be a crocodile but a Godzilla.²⁵ Nevertheless, the KPK was not cowered. It intensified inquiries and announced on September 9 the investigation of Chief Detective Susno in multiple corruption cases. Shortly thereafter, it made a daring move, leaking wiretappings to the media, implicating him and other police officials in corrupt activities, including at-

tempts to manipulate legislators' decisions and unfreeze Bank Century accounts.²⁶ The police announced that Deputy Chairman Chandra was a suspect of power abuse and extortion on August 26, followed by Deputy Chairman Bibit on September 15. Two weeks later, the KPK hit back, filing corruption charges against Chief Detective Susno, recalled Dadang Trisasongko, a civic anticorruption leader and veteran of the Reformasi movement.

Interim Demands

On October 29 the police arrested Bibit and Chandra on charges of abuse of power. The arrests came a day after President Yudhoyono ordered an investigation into the KPK's wiretapped telephone conversations involving a senior attorney general's office official, in which one of the speakers alleged that the president supported efforts to suppress the KPK. On October 30 the president gave a televised address, stating that he would let the police continue with the case. He argued that the arrests of Bibit and Chandra needed to move through law enforcement procedures and the judicial process, finally reaching the courts. Given that all three institutions involved—the National Police, the attorney general's office, and the judiciary—were corrupt and part of what was commonly known as the “judicial mafia,” CICAk's leaders demanded the establishment of an independent commission to examine the arrests of the KPK deputy commissioners. The police had a flimsy case, the activists asserted. They also insisted that this inquiry be conducted within a short time frame in order to prevent stalling tactics, indefinite incarceration of the two men, and irreparable harm to the antigraft institution.

Upping the People Power Ante

People were furious with the police and embittered with their leader, who had won a landslide reelection based on an anticorruption platform. The repression against the KPK deputy commissioners backfired. Usman Yasin, a young university lecturer conducting postgraduate studies, took the initiative to create a CICAk Facebook group called “A Million Facebookers in Support of Bibit-Chandra.” It soon played a role bigger than anyone imagined.²⁷ Twitterers used the hashtags “#dukungkpk” or “#support KPK” to express solidarity and views.²⁸ People were urged to change their Facebook profile picture to the CICAk symbol. The Facebook group grew so quickly that television news ran hourly updates of the numbers. Within several days it reached the 1.4-million mark, becoming a key tool through which to communicate with and rally citizens.

Popular singers added their support and composed an anticorruption song, with the refrains, “Gecko eats crocodile” and “KPK in my heart.” Citizens could download the song and ringtones free of charge.²⁹ Campaigners organized actions in Jakarta. Local chapters, civil society organizations (CSOs), university students, and high school students, supported by their teachers, initiated their own events across Indonesia’s far-flung archipelago. Some university students built a tent in front of the KPK and went on a hunger strike. In East Java and Central Java, teenagers held competitions to throw small stones at alligator puppets. While the latter tactic may not sit well with principled nonviolence adherents, these actions were symbolic, signifying that regular people were no longer fearful or intimidated by the police, who were considered to be corrupt and deserving of punishment. At one high school in Jakarta, pupils fashioned a banner in support of the KPK and 1,000 classmates signed their names on it, while at another, students drafted a joint statement that was also posted on the blog of one of the teachers.³⁰

Campaign tactics included petitions, leafleting, hanging banners, sit-ins, gathering in front of police stations, concerts, street theatre, and stunts, such as dressing up like mice. Thousands adorned themselves with pins, stickers, black ribbons symbolizing the death of justice, and T-shirts with the CICA logo. Bandanas proclaiming “I am gecko” reportedly “spread like wildfire.”³¹ An account by an Australian scholar observed, “Bibit and Chandra—who, with the gecko, are stars of millions of posters and T-shirts.”³² Campaign leaders also worked with mural painters and singers, resulting in eye-catching street graffiti still visible in Jakarta and the aforementioned popular anticorruption songs.³³ The campaign also created attention-grabbing acts they termed “happening art,” which often involved humor and garnered national media coverage—for example, jumping off the KPK building with parachutes to symbolize that the KPK faced an emergency and needed protection.

Street actions grew across the country with each passing day. The sites were deliberately chosen, explained Trisasongko. In some cities, they were police stations. “This was solidarity against injustice and the corrupt police, and to support the movement and KPK,” he said. In Jakarta, protests were held in front of the presidential palace in order to tell President Yudhoyono that “he had the authority to stop the criminalization of the KPK,” Trisasongko added. On November 2, approximately 3,000 people massed together and then marched to the presidential palace. Activists assert that the mobilization stunned the government.

That very same day, CICA achieved its first victory. The president

acceded to the campaign's demand to create an independent commission tasked with investigating the legal proceedings and the case against Bibit and Chandra. Known as the Team of Eight and led by a respected lawyer and law reform advocate, the commission had two weeks to make its determinations.³⁴ Then came the bombshell. On November 3, during live broadcast hearings over Bibit and Chandra's temporary dismissal, the Constitutional Court played four hours of wiretapped conversations strongly indicating that a conspiracy was under way to frame the deputy commissioners and undermine the KPK.³⁵

Millions around the country heard senior prosecutors from the attorney general's office, a bigtime businessman, and police officials plotting against the KPK. Chief Detective Susno was mentioned numerous times.³⁶ There was even a suggestion that Deputy Commissioner Chandra could be murdered once in detention, and an unidentified woman was heard saying that the president supported the plan.³⁷ The public uproar was immediate. By midnight, Chandra and Bibit were released from prison, although the charges were not dropped. Chandra avowed, "Let's take it as strong momentum to improve the fight against corruption, because in this situation, the loser is the country and the winner is the corruptor."³⁸ The next day, approximately 500 people rallied in front of the Constitutional Court and along Thamrin Street, a major thoroughfare. They demanded that Susno be fired. CICAk used SMS, Twitter, and Blackberry Messenger to mobilize citizens overnight, said Trisasongko.

On November 8 the campaign organized its biggest action to date, again utilizing social media such as Facebook and Twitter. The date was chosen for practical and symbolic reasons. It was a Sunday and one of the city's festive "Car Free Days," which not only facilitated a mass convergence but was a day associated with fitness and well-being. Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 people gathered from early morning—including a special CICAk Facebook group contingent—for a rally and concert with the billing, "For a Healthy Indonesia, Fight Corruption." Starting with a mass group exercise for the country's well-being, the action combined humor, entertainment, and appearances by public figures.³⁹ Slank performed a concert. Speakers included Usman Yasin, the CICAk Facebook group creator; Effendi Gozali, a TV personality and University of Indonesia lecturer; Yudi Latif, chairman of the Center for Islam and State Studies, and media commentator; and former KPK deputy commissioner Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta city, local activists held a concert featuring traditional Javanese music.

Campaign Attributes

Unity

Citizens of all ages, socioeconomic groups, and religions participated in the campaign. CICA leaders reported that the upper-middle and middle classes joined in street actions; professionals reportedly took time off from work and could be seen standing together with students and poor people. According to Yuntho and Deta Arta Sari, it was highly unusual for the upper classes to participate, but “they realized the KPK was in danger and we needed to save the KPK to save Indonesia from corruption.” Many prominent figures from different walks of life affirmed their support, from Bambang Harymurti, a leading journalist and head of the investigative news magazine *Tempo*, to Akhadi Wira Satriaji (otherwise known as Kaka), the lead singer of Slank.

Senior clerics of Indonesia’s five faiths and respected public figures paid solidarity visits to the KPK. Former president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) urged the KPK and citizens to question the arrests.⁴¹ He declared, “I came to add more support for their release from detention. I am prepared to put my name on the line in this case.”⁴² Jimly Ashid-diqe, a former Constitutional Court chief justice, publicly expressed support and advised the KPK to hand over wiretaps to the Constitutional Court rather than to the police.⁴³ In Malang in the East Java province, academics and a network of human rights and state administrative law lecturers publicly prevailed upon President Yudhoyono to stop the “criminalization” of the KPK officials.⁴⁴

Leadership and Organization

CICA formed through the cooperation and coordinated efforts of a small group of civil society activists, lawyers, and law scholars. “They came together to make a grand strategy,” recalled Deta Arta Sari. The core organizers, constituting the leadership of the campaign, were based in the capital. They met on a daily basis to plan, organize, communicate, and carry out activities, all while maintaining their professional and personal responsibilities. They worked out a division of labor based on expertise and capacities. Generally, their efforts fell under two complementary categories: (1) legal analysis and activities; and (2) civic actions, campaign messaging and communication, media outreach, and behind-the-scenes contact with government officials among the police, attorney general’s office, and president’s staff.

Decisions were made through consensus. The key organizing entities were Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and the Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK), although they did not direct the campaign nor were they the face of it. “We wanted to be separate from ICW and others, in order to get broader involvement and support,” said Deta Arta Sari. The campaign had no leader—another strategic move to build citizen ownership. Rather, it was led by “cicaks,” the little lizards symbolizing regular people, who together could peacefully overpower the mighty crocodile (police).

CICAK’s leadership group also deliberated over how to quickly expand the campaign to the national level, not an easy feat considering Indonesia’s geography of far-flung islands as well as multiple cultures and ethnicities. They decided on a strategy of decentralization. Pooling their considerable contacts and networks cultivated since the Reformasi movement, they cooperated with grassroots civic actors to initiate, expand, and sustain local mobilization and nonviolent actions around the country. According to Trisasongko, regional and local activists went on to “do their own thing, and we just distributed Jakarta’s press releases to them.” In tandem, the Jakarta core also contacted and coordinated with student groups in universities across Indonesia.

The campaign was based on voluntary participation. Activists, legal experts, and citizens contributed their time and even money. Street actions were characterized by spontaneous acts of generosity. For example, during the November 3 march to the presidential palace, which took place on a particularly hot day, protestors collected money from one another in order to buy water for those in need.

Strategic Analysis and Information Gathering

The Jakarta core conducted a strategic analysis of parts of the president’s cabinet and the judicial mafia. They mapped the National Police and high-ranking personnel of the attorney general’s office in terms of who was clean and who was corrupt. This mapping was shared with some honest interlocutors inside the system. Throughout the campaign, the civil society network invited experts from universities to analyze legal issues concerning the KPK in order to provide legal interpretations that could be offered to officials and lawyers in the antigraft body, as well as related government institutions. This activity underscores two often overlooked yet essential dimensions of civil resistance movements: the need for ongoing education and information gathering, and empowering those within the system who support accountability, honesty, and justice.

Communications

CICAK's communications strategy had three main components: objectives, messaging, and medium. The objectives were to ignite public concern, convey a sense of urgency, mobilize citizens, and attract media coverage. Communications were also designed to build unity of grievances, people, and goals. Core messages included, "I'm a gecko, fight corruption"; "Don't stay silent"; and "Say no to crocodiles." Together, the campaign's acronym of CICAK (gecko) and full name (Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption Commission) brilliantly encapsulated the struggle: the problem (corruption), the positive target (KPK), the objective (save KPK), the protagonists (cicaks, symbolizing regular citizens), and motivation (love of country).

Trisasongko said that the emphasis was on the institution rather than on Bibit and Chandra, although their safety took on primacy after the arrests. "We tried to keep the personal side out of the messages," he said. "Implicitly we protected the two deputy commissioners because the police wanted to crack down on the KPK through them." Campaign activists utilized multiple methods through which to convey messages. They spread news and information for nonviolent actions through the media, Facebook, SMS, and the Internet. Messages were also conveyed through graffiti, posters, leaflets, songs, ringtones, and even individuals in the thousands, who became walking billboards through special CICAK T-shirts, pins, and bandanas.

A concerted effort was made to get media coverage. Organizers sent notices for press conferences, street actions, and "happening art" to journalists through SMS. They reported that the media were very supportive. Deta Arta Sari and Yuntho acknowledged that they weren't sure why. "The KPK is a newsmaker. Whoever hits the KPK is a good news story," they hypothesized. The struggle between the corruptors and the antigraft body, and the escalation of public action—through social networking as well as on-the-ground tactics—resulted in an unfolding story, replete with twists and turns, drama, and suspense. In part, given their proximity to Indonesian and international journalists, Jakarta events were meticulously planned, from advance PR to speakers, posters in Bahasa and English, press conferences, and distribution of leaflets, T-shirts, pins, and stickers.

International Dimension

Campaign leaders sought international attention and support. First, as Indonesia is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)—which recognizes the role of the civic realm in state

accountability—activists approached the relevant body in Jakarta, namely, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). While most Global South capitals have numerous missions representing international institutions, they are not necessarily cognizant or appreciative of grassroots anticorruption initiatives. The UNODC office in Jakarta stands in contrast. To its credit, it did not dismiss the overture.

Instead, on September 16, CICAk's leaders met with Ajit Joy, the country manager, and asked him to inform UNODC headquarters that Indonesia has problems implementing UNCAC, particularly "maintaining and ensuring the independence of the anticorruption authority," said Trisasongko. Following the session, the activists held a press conference in front of the UNODC office. On November 10 the campaigners held another press conference, announcing they would raise the attack on the KPK at UNCAC's Third Conference of States Parties that just began in Doha. CICAk capitalized on the UNCAC conference's timing, gaining even more media attention. As the KPK crisis raged during UNCAC's round of negotiations, the campaign sent daily press releases about the grassroots mobilization to the Indonesian journalists covering them in Doha. "We would get into the headlines," he recalled.

Repression

Notwithstanding the institutional and legal efforts to harm the KPK and detentions of senior officials, no overt repression took place against the CICAk campaign, its organizers, or its protestors. According to Trisasongko, "It would have made things worse." However, anticorruption activists involved in the civic initiative had experienced harassment in the run-up to CICAk. In January 2009 the attorney general's office reported Yuntho and Deta Arta Sari to the police for defamation after they pointed out a multitrillion-rupiah gap in the institution's annual budget and demanded an investigation.⁴⁵ Nothing happened for months; then suddenly in October, during the throes of CICAk, they received a summons from the police. They avoided the order over a technicality: the letter had a mistake in the wording of Indonesia Corruption Watch.⁴⁶ Eventually, the police dropped the case.

Outcomes

The CICAk campaign succeeded in protecting the KPK from a concerted plan to harm, if not destroy, the institution and its anticorruption capacities. A summary of events during the crisis is as follows.

- On November 2, President Yudhoyono established the “Independent Fact-Finding Team on the Legal Proceedings of the Case of Chandra M. Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto,” aka the Team of Eight. It had two weeks to conclude its inquiry. The two deputy commissioners framed for corruption were released from prison on November 3.

- On November 17, the Team of Eight publicly announced that there was no evidence that the two officials had engaged in corrupt activities. It formally recommended that the case be dropped and called upon the president to punish “officials responsible for the forced legal process.”⁴⁷

- Chief Detective Susno subsequently resigned from the National Police, along with Abdul Hakim Ritonga, the deputy attorney general, who was also implicated in the wiretaps.⁴⁸ A couple of months later, Susno testified that the police force had a special team in place to target KPK commissioners Antasari, Bibit, and Chandra.⁴⁹ Susno has since gone on to expose corruption involving police, the attorney general’s office, and businesspeople involved in money laundering and tax evasion.⁵⁰

- On November 23, President Yudhoyono ordered the police and prosecutors to settle the case against the KPK deputy commissioners out of court, publicly affirming that reforms were necessary within the National Police, the attorney general’s office, and the KPK.⁵¹ While taking a stand against corruption, he nonetheless equivocated.⁵² First, he didn’t call for the case to be dropped. Second, at that juncture, it was odd that the antigraft body was considered to be in need of reform, alongside the very same state institutions involved in a plot to damage it. Civic anticorruption advocates saw this as a sign that social pressure must be sustained on the president as well as the judicial mafia of corrupt police, prosecutors, and judges.

- The attorney general’s office officially dropped the case against the KPK deputy commissioners on December 1. Bibit and Chandra resumed their positions on December 7, following a presidential decree.⁵³

- On December 30, 2009, President Yudhoyono appointed a two-year Judicial Mafia task force.⁵⁴ Its responsibilities consisted of “advising, monitoring, and evaluating reform and supervision measures by all law enforcement institutions.”⁵⁵

Civic leaders remain vigilant against new attacks on the KPK. At the Fifteenth International Anti-Corruption Conference in November 2012, Trisasongko described how a new campaign was launched to counter parliamentary delays in approving the KPK’s budget, including funds for a new building. Dubbed the Public Donation for KPK Build-

ing, the civic initiative collected symbolic amounts of money and construction materials from citizens around the country from June to October 2012. As a result of the collective pressure, the parliament finally passed the budget. That same October, the Save KPK campaign carried out a nonviolent intervention. Citizens conducted an overnight vigil to block the arrest of an investigator looking into traffic police corruption.⁵⁶ Digital resistance through Twitter, coupled with real-life protests, questioned President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's silence. Shortly thereafter, he announced that the KPK should conduct the investigation.

Anticorruption activists also exert pressure on the KPK itself in order to keep it clean and accountable. For instance, in February 2010 CICAk submitted an ethics violation report to the KPK concerning one of its officials. When no response was forthcoming, campaigners staged a "happening art" silent protest in front of the building. Chandra Ham-sah, the KPK deputy commissioner targeted by corruptors, said the commission would question its staff about the incident.⁵⁷ Nothing happened immediately, but a few months later some officials were replaced; the activists surmise it was a result of their nonviolent action.

All in all, the CICAk campaign shook up the horizontal system of graft involving state institutions and the private sector. It "forced the government to scrutinize indictment procedures and prosecutors," observed Trisasongko. People power pressured Indonesia's leader to take specific measures targeting corruption and impunity. It encouraged transparency and won a degree of accountability from government and economic powerholders. After CICAk, the Bank Century case was investigated by the Parliament. The findings and recommendations sent to the president were also made public. Finally, CICAk put the systemic transformation of law enforcement institutions on the national agenda, creating a degree of political will to push for serious internal reform of the judicial mafia.

In a country that in previous decades had suffered violence from genocide, political repression, armed insurgency, and ethnic strife, anger and outrage were productively channeled through civil resistance. Through CICAk, citizens overcame cynicism and apprehension to raise their voices against corruption and impunity. "I am a gecko and am not afraid to fight a crocodile," was a common refrain.⁵⁸ By participating in the campaign, they refused to be observers and victims of the machinations of powerful political and economic families, officials, legislators, and bureaucrats. They rediscovered their collective power in the largest social mobilization since the anti-Suharto movement. Through this process, citizens became actors in their democracy. For Masduki, "The pillar of democracy is people power, so without it, democracy could not work for the people."⁵⁹

Case Analysis

Intangibles

CICAK transformed public anger toward the police into grassroots solidarity against injustice. “We wanted to cultivate a sense of ownership,” recalled Trisasongko. Through this sense of collective responsibility to save the KPK, ordinary people experienced a shared social identity—that of empowered “cicaks”—which became a strong motivator of civic action. “We tapped the sentiment of being victims of corruption and violence and directed it toward protecting the KPK, which many knew about and supported,” he stated.

CICAK’s leadership strategically infused the campaign with humor for several reasons. According to Trisasongko, “Humor is a universal language here for people. . . . It also cuts across social and economic classes.” Thus, humor is an effective way to communicate with citizens. It also mitigates a common form of powerholder repression in Indonesia—accusations of defamation made by state institutions and lawsuits initiated by individuals. Through humor, messages can be shared that would otherwise put people at risk. Finally, humor separates outrage from anger, preserving the former and transforming the latter from a negative into a positive—saving the antigraft institution through nonviolent action. “We don’t just have to show anger to protest something,” he added.

Neutrality

CICAK’s organizers deliberately chose to maintain a nonpolitical, non-ideological character, and did not approach political parties for support. According to a Harvard report, “Distrust of politicians is so deep and widespread that one gets the sense that any politician who had attempted to identify him- or herself as a gecko would have been laughed off the political stage.”⁶⁰ In any case, there was no danger that any would jump on the anticorruption bandwagon. “All of the political parties were silent because they all have cases in the KPK,” commented Yuntho.

Backfire Phenomenon

The CICAK campaign constitutes a compelling example of how an injustice can be made to backfire. According to nonviolent action scholar Brian Martin, powerful perpetrators of injustice—such as corruption—typically use one or more of five methods to reduce public outrage.⁶¹ First, they cover up their actions, as nearly all corrupt operators do—including the Indonesian police, who tried to keep their plotting out of

the public eye. Second, perpetrators try to devalue their targets and critics, exactly what the police did in seeking to discredit the KPK by charging and arresting its leading figures. Third, perpetrators reinterpret events by lying, minimizing the effects on targets, blaming others, and reframing the narrative. The state's narrative—namely, its reinterpretation of events—consisted of an intransigent KPK, dishonest officials, and delivery of justice through administrative and legal measures. Fourth, powerful perpetrators of injustice use official channels to give an appearance of justice without the substance. This normal operation of the corrupt judicial system served this purpose. The KPK was the exception, being an honest and effective official channel, and hence was seen as a serious threat to powerholders. Fifth, powerful perpetrators attempt to intimidate targets, their supporters, and witnesses, as did the police.

The police used all five methods to reduce public outrage over corruption, but on this occasion their efforts were unsuccessful. Campaign organizers intuitively countered each of the police's five outrage-reduction tactics. With the aid of KPK wiretaps, they exposed the police plot, countering the cover-up. They validated the KPK targets, countering devaluation. They emphasized the injustice of the attack on the KPK, countering reinterpretation. They mobilized public support, avoiding ineffectual and time-wasting official channels. Finally, they nonviolently resisted in the face of intimidation.

The result was that the attack on the KPK backfired on the police. The planned effort to quash the antigraft body, culminating in the arrest of senior officials, backfired as a result of a nonviolent civil resistance campaign. Not only was this plot thwarted, there were negative consequences for some of the most visible attackers.

Digital Resistance

The CICA Facebook group played multiple roles in the campaign. It was used to win public sympathy and transmit information, news, and calls to action around the country, thereby contributing to the formation of a national initiative that overcame geographical and socioeconomic barriers. Second, street actions around the country were organized through Facebook. Third, the social media platform created a sense of unity and enthusiasm as members became part of a group that grew from 0 to 1.2 million in just ten days (from October 30, the day of the Bibit and Chandra arrests, to November 8, the day of the big demonstration and concert).

CICA members had at their fingertips an instantaneous method of communicating with one another that reinforced a sense of shared out-

rage and collective identity. “If KPK is being put to death, that’s really nice for the corruptors who are clapping as they see what has happened,” said a posting.⁶² Finally, online tactics—for instance, changing one’s profile photo—were translated into street actions, such as the organized Facebook contingent in the November 8 rally.

Unconventional Allies

The involvement of artists, such as street muralists and singers, had multiple benefits. Strategically, such popular figures contributed to unity because their association gave the campaign credibility and created excitement among regular people, explained Danang Widoyoko, coordinator of Indonesian Corruption Watch. Tactically, the artists enabled the campaign to reach the masses, because their support of the KPK and involvement in CICAk were covered by entertainment media, such as TV programs, gossip magazines, and fan websites.

Lessons Learned

Civil Resistance

The CICAk campaign provides a clue as to why research has found that civil-resistance transitions from authoritarianism are more likely to result in democratic governance and civil liberties than violent or elite-led, top-down changes. Leaders and activists of nonviolent social movements develop close-knit bonds and often go on to become the (unsung) defenders of democracy in their countries. Most in the Jakarta leadership group were veterans of the Reformasi movement. These civic actors, some having experienced imprisonment and abuse under the Suharto regime, have since 1998 worked tirelessly—as individuals and through CSOs—to advance the reformasi process. Over the years they have maintained an effective, informal network of communication and coordination. While each organization has its own mandate, they collectively function in a complementary manner.⁶³ Their shared objectives resemble a strategic blueprint for consolidating democracy in Indonesia: dismantle the venal authoritarian system, transform the corrupt military and keep it out of politics, reform the constitution and the justice system, gain powerholder accountability, improve human rights, tackle widespread poverty in a country bestowed with vast natural resources, and prevent sectarian strife.

CICAk also affirms a central tenet of civil resistance scholarship: systems of graft and oppression, incorporating state and nonstate institutions and actors (pillars of support for the system or oppressor), are

not monolithic. One can identify allies and supporters, shift loyalties, and quietly communicate with them, as did the CICAk campaign with individuals in the National Police and attorney general's office. Masduki encapsulated this approach:

I believe not all government officials are corrupt. The anticorruption movement should be decided by collective action, by people, the government, and also the business sector. It is very important for me that anticorruption [work] includes confidence building among and inside government, business, and the whole of society. Everyone involved should also be aware of and reap the benefits of anticorruption work. Without these, we could not get support from the population.⁶⁴

Corruption Dynamics

The CICAk campaign offers valuable lessons regarding how systems of corruption function. First, the plan to delegitimize and irreparably weaken the KPK illustrates, in real terms, the machinations of a system of corruption that spans across multiple realms—in this case, various state institutions, the executive branch, the private sector, families, and enablers in the professional realm, such as lawyers. The myriad malfeasant relationships in Indonesia's judicial mafia had mutually dependent interests, thereby revealing how such relationships are not always between a corruptor and corruptee but between two or more corruptors who are all deriving benefits by abusing their power and authority.

In order to change a corrupt system, such as Indonesia's judicial mafia, Trisasongko highlighted the lesson that a "dual track" is necessary: extrainstitutional demand for change coupled with internal reform measures and implementation capacity.

Finally, corruption breeds corruption. Not only are systems of graft and abuse unlikely to reform from within, they are prone to growing ever more venal because more and more graft is needed to maintain vested interests and the crooked status quo.

Unity and Civil Resistance

Unity is understood to be an essential element of civil resistance, as documented by scholars in the field. Why it is so critical (beyond citizen mobilization) and how it plays out in nonviolent campaigns and movements—that is, its dynamics—have received less attention. The CICAk campaign offers instructive lessons.

In addition to unity of people, grievances, and goals, there must be a shared sense of outrage and a common adversary, reflected Trisa-

songko. In the case of CICAk, there was overwhelming and widespread dislike of the police, which was necessary for mobilization and, as importantly, for long-term momentum and civic pressure to achieve real reform of corrupt institutions and systems.

Unity often involves coalitions of various sorts, comprising groups and prominent individuals in the particular struggle context, that afford higher levels of participation, protection through numbers (of people), credibility, and legitimacy. Such alliances are also a font of creativity, ideas, and talent, as well as increased resources, relationships, and contacts—all of which can be utilized by the civic campaign or movement. A third lesson is that unity also increases diversity of expressions of dissent, from tactics to messaging and even the channels through which messages are communicated. For instance, the involvement of popular singers and street artists led to innovative nonviolent actions, such as anticorruption songs and ringtones, and reached an untapped swath of the public through entertainment media outlets.

CSOs that already have well-developed, on-the-ground networks and relationships with local community-based organizations (CBOs) and citizens bring the added value of grassroots ties. Such CSOs have done the painstaking work of establishing trust and credibility with locals. Thus, their endorsement and involvement in a civic campaign or movement can pull into the fold small-scale, bottom-up civic initiatives and mobilize people who would not have otherwise been reached. According to Trisasongko, some of the CSOs in the CICAk coalition already had ties to local Muslim CBOs through cooperation on civic projects, such as budget advocacy, internal accountability, and anticorruption. As a result, through the CSOs' network of on-the-ground community groups, the campaign was able to rally citizens across the country.

Organization and Strategic Planning

The CICAk campaign demonstrated that an effective division of labor is essential for civic initiatives, particularly ones involving a coalition or alliance of multiple groups. Leadership groups can methodically plan divisions of labor that minimize duplication, maximize resources and capacities, and maintain a well-functioning, harmonious endeavor.

As well, leadership is more than the strategies and decisions of individuals heading a civic initiative. For Trisasongko, "It is important, not just in terms of persons but of ideas." His insight adds a new dimension to a fundamental element of social movement formation—movement discourse—which civil-resistance scholar Hardy Merriman defines as "the

narratives, cognitive frames, meanings, and language” of the movement or campaign.”⁶⁵

Balancing is an ongoing consideration for civic initiatives, including what is planned versus what is spontaneous, what is centralized versus what is decentralized, who makes strategic decisions and represents the campaign at the core versus the periphery, and what degree of independence there should be between the core and local groups and activists. As with Addiopizzo in Italy, CICAk’s leadership group took care to strategically address such issues rather than ignore them or allow them to haphazardly unfold on their own accord.

Fourth, the CICAk campaign offers another demonstration of the critical roles that information gathering and education play in civil resistance. The Jakarta core invited legal experts from universities to conduct interpretations of laws and proceedings. For example, the police said it was illegal for two out of five KPK commissioners to be making decisions, thereby having an excuse to impede the institution’s functioning. CICAk and legal scholars countered with legal opinions and arguments that foiled the police’s plans, and as importantly, gave KPK officials confidence to continue working.

Tactics

Humor can bring multiple benefits to a campaign or movement. It can function as a low-risk tactic in some contexts, communicate serious messages, and dispel fear. Humor often cuts across social and economic divisions, thereby building social identity and enhancing unity.

Street actions such as protests, rallies, and marches are not merely symbolic actions, but strong tactics as well. They can generate social pressure on powerholders. In CICAk’s case, “The government had to consider them; otherwise they would keep getting bigger and bigger,” said Widoyoko. “It was like 1998 [Reformasi movement]; they started small and when there was no response, they grew.”

As with Ficha Limpa in Brazil, information and communication technology tools were used to foster a sense of ownership and social identity. Online activism, even through participation in an enormous Facebook group, is a digital form of citizen mobilization that, coupled with on-the-ground actions, can create formidable social pressure.

Third-Party Actors

In contrast to systems of graft—comprising overt and covert sets of corrupt relationships embedded with vested interests—the CICAk case shows how nonviolent social movements and campaigns can build alter-

nate systems of cooperative relationships based on unity of people, grievances, shared outrage, objectives, and a common opponent(s). This insight points to a fundamental lesson, namely, that such interconnected people power systems cannot be manufactured or stimulated by external third parties, including well-intentioned anticorruption and development actors and human rights advocates. Nonetheless, external actors can provide solidarity, as did the UNODC mission in Jakarta when it received CICA leaders to discuss Indonesia's compliance with the UNCAC.

Second, the dynamics of unity and the organic emergence of people power systems through civil resistance have critical advice for external third parties interacting with internal CSOs and CBOs:

- Do not ignore networked, often low-profile CSOs in favor of elite-based NGOs, as the former have credibility, networks, and relationships with the grass roots.
- Do not create situations whereby such CSOs find themselves in competition with one another, as this can harm essential relationships, cooperation, potential unity in a civic initiative, and systems of people power.

In the next two chapters, I move from finite campaigns to ongoing social movements that have both long-term transformative goals and shorter-term objectives, such as the youth-led Addiopizzo movement in Palermo, Italy, and the citizen-empowering 5th Pillar in India.

Notes

1. Naming customs in Indonesia are complex, and people commonly have only one name.

2. Adalburtus Irawan Justiniarto Hartono, "State-Business Relations in Post-1998 Indonesia: The Role of Kadin" (PhD thesis, University of Groningen, 2011).

3. Suharto came to power in 1965, part of the military's intervention against President Sukarno, the previous authoritarian ruler who originally galvanized defiance against Dutch colonial rule. The country essentially lurched from a left-wing autocracy to a right-wing military dictatorship. When Suharto took power, an estimated 500,000 to 1 million people belonging to fully legal leftist and communist groups were killed from 1965 to 1966 in what scholars deem a genocide, and over 1 million were imprisoned without trial, from writers, artists, and poets to teachers and regular citizens; see *Derailed: Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Suhaerto*, ICTJ and Kontras, March 2011, <http://ictj.org>.

4. Hartono, "State-Business Relations in Post-1998 Indonesia."

5. *Ibid.*, 58.

6. I. N. Bhakti, "The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems," in *The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition*, ed. Jim Rolfe (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 195–206; Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (New York: Freedom House, 2005).

7. Dadang Trisasongko, a veteran of the Reformasi democracy movement and a civil society leader, explained that the Anti-Corruption Court Act of 2009 mandated that the Supreme Court establish anticorruption courts in all districts of the country (over 400) and in all thirty-six provinces. As of May 2012, anti-corruption courts have been established in the capital cities of thirty-three provinces.

8. Emil Bolongaita, "A New Model for an Anti-Corruption Agency? Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission" (presentation at the Symposium on the Fundamentals of an Effective Anti-Corruption Commission, Asian Institute of Management, Makati City, May 6, 2011).

9. "Attacks After Reports on Police Corruption in Indonesia," Deutsche Welle, July 20, 2010, www.dw-world.de.

10. Bolongaita, "New Model for an Anti-Corruption Agency?"; Tim Lindsey, "Indonesia's Gecko-Gate," *The Australian*, November 20, 2009, www.theaustralian.com.au.

11. The case study on CICAk is based on interviews conducted in April 2009 with Dadang Trisasongko, then with Kemitraan and presently executive director of Transparency International Indonesia, and Illian Deta Arta Sari, Danang Widodo, and Emerson Yuntho of Indonesia Corruption Watch, who were all directly involved in the campaign. They spoke with me in a personal capacity, not reflecting their institutional affiliations.

12. For example, in the wake of its ruling, the Constitutional Court gave the Parliament until 2009 to create a new law establishing the KPK and the Corruption Court. Representatives delayed passing new legislation, which was seen as an attempt to extinguish it. In September 2009 an anticorruption bill was drafted that would have severely curtailed the KPK's powers by abolishing its authority to conduct wiretaps and prosecute corruption suspects. As of August 2011, efforts to pass a KPK provision bill continued. According to Transparency International Indonesia, "The initiative has been much criticized as unnecessary and a move to strip the KPK of its authority"; Ilham Saenong, "Indonesian NGOs Protest an Unnecessary Revision of Anti-Corruption Laws," Transparency International, <http://www.ti.or.id/en>; Norimitsu Onishi, "Corruption Fighters Rouse Resistance in Indonesia," *New York Times*, July 26, 2009, www.nytimes.com; Christian von Luebke, "The Politics of Reform: Political Scandals, Elite Resistance, and Presidential Leadership in Indonesia," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2010): 79–94.

13. The government spent US\$710 million in a rescue of Bank Century, a small bank reportedly comprising shareholders and depositors from among the country's wealthiest families. The collapse was due to embezzlement of funds. The bailout amount—ultimately five times greater than what the Parliament had authorized—was not used to recapitalize the bank but was distributed directly to shareholders and depositors; Tom Allard, "President Swept Up in Indonesian

Corruption Scandal,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 21, 2009, www.smh.com.au.

14. Von Luebke, “Politics of Reform.”

15. Irawaty Wardany, “SBY’s In-Law Aulia Pohan Gets 4.5 Years for Corruption,” *Jakarta Post*, June 17, 2009, www.thejakartapost.com; on August 17, 2010, Indonesia’s Independence Day, President Yudhoyono gave a remission and pardon to Pohan, who ended up serving less than two years of the four-and-a-half-year sentence, which had already been reduced to three years. “Govt to Cut Graft Convicts Prison Terms for Idul Fitri,” *Jakarta Post*, September 9, 2010, www.thejakartapost.com.

16. Michael Buehler, “Of Geckos and Crocodiles: Evaluating Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Efforts” (presentation, CSIC/USINDO, Washington, DC, November 23, 2009), <http://csis.org>; “Released KPK Officers Bibit and Chandra Overwhelmed by Public Support,” *Jakarta Globe*, November 4, 2009, www.thejakartaglobe.com.

17. Antasari was an ambiguous figure in the KPK, seen by some as an anti-corruption champion but found to engage in questionable practices, such as meeting outside his office with witnesses under investigation. Indonesia Corruption Watch objected to his appointment in 2007. In November 2009 a police precinct chief, Williardi Wizard, testified that he was ordered to take part in a conspiracy to frame Antasari. Nevertheless, in June 2010 the former commissioner was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. In February 2012 the Supreme Court rejected a case review request. The murder victim’s own brother previously testified that there were irregularities in the accused former antigraft chief’s conviction; Haryanto Suharman, “Supreme Court Turns Down Antasari’s Case Review,” *Indonesia Today*, February 13, 2012, www.theindonesiatoday.com; Rangga Prasoka, “Brother of Victim in Antasari Trial Tells the Court About His Doubts,” *Jakarta Globe*, September 23, 2011, www.thejakartaglobe.com; Andreas Harsono, “The Gecko vs. the Crocodile,” *Reporter’s Notebook: Indonesia, Global Integrity Report*, 2009, <http://report.globalintegrity.org>; “Antasari ‘Framed,’” *Jakarta Post*, November 11, 2009, www.thejakartapost.com; Illian Deta Arta Sari and Emerson Yuntho, Indonesia Corruption Watch, interview, April 2009.

18. In Indonesia, Susno Duadji is referred to as Susno, Antasari Azhar as Antasari, and Bibit Samad Rianto and Chandra Hamzah as Bibit and Chandra. This chapter refers to them in this customary manner.

19. Arry Anggadha and Desi Afrianti, “Bibit dan Chandra Diperiksa Sebagai Saksi,” vivanews.com, September 15, 2009, <http://korupsi.vivanews.com>.

20. Harsono, “Gecko vs. the Crocodile.”

21. Ibid.; Suhartono, “Ternyata, Perppu No. 4/2009 Ada Penjelasannya,” [KOMPAS.com](http://kompas.com), September 24, 2009, <http://nasional.kompas.com>.

22. Onishi, “Corruption Fighters Rouse Resistance in Indonesia.”

23. Ibid.

24. Rusian Burhani, “Number of ‘Facebookers’ Supporting KPK Reaches One Million,” *Antara News*, November 7, 2009, www.antaranews.com.

25. Pandaya, “Gecko, Crocodile, Godzilla, and the Politics of Brute Force,” *Jakarta Times*, August 11, 2009, www.thejakartapost.com.

26. Von Luebke, “Politics of Reform.”

27. Usman Yasin was at the Muhammadiyah University in the province of Bengkulu on Sumatra.

28. Carolina Rumat, "Indonesia: Criminalizing the Graft Fighters," *Global Voices*, November 3, 2009, <http://globalvoicesonline.org>.

29. The artists were the band Slank as well as Fariz M, Once From Dewa, Jimo Kadi, Cholil, and Netral; Rina Widiastuti, "Indonesian Artists Create a Song to Support KPK," *TEMPO interactive*, November 4, 2009, www.tempointeractive.com.

30. The teacher's blog was from the Senior High School of Northern Jakarta (SMA 13 Jakarta); Retnolistyarti's Blog, "Pernyataan Sikap Antikorupsi Siswa SMAN 13 Jakarta," blog entry, March 4, 2012, <http://retnolistyarti.wordpress.com>.

31. Anthony Saich, David Dapice, Tarek Masoud, Dwight Perkins, Jonathan Pincus, Jay Rosengard, Thomas Vallely, Ben Wilkinson, and Jeffrey Williams, *From Reformasi to Institutional Transformation: A Strategic Assessment of Indonesia's Prospects for Growth, Equity, and Democratic Governance* (Boston: Harvard Kennedy School Indonesia Program, 2010), 147.

32. Lindsey, "Indonesia's Gecko-Gate."

33. I saw some of the graffiti at major intersections while doing field research in Jakarta during April 2010.

34. The lawyer was Adnan Buyung Nasution.

35. A portion of the wiretap recordings was originally leaked to the media on October 29, but the contents were not made public until November 3.

36. The businessman was Anggodo Widjojo (also spelled Widjaja). His brother Anggoro, who escaped to Singapore, was under a KPK investigation for bribing forestry department officials over contracts and in order to cut down protected mangrove forests in South Sumatra for a seaport development. Harsono, "Gecko vs. the Crocodile."

37. Allard, "President Swept Up."

38. "Released KPK Officers Bibit and Chandra Overwhelmed by Public Support."

39. Videos from the rally can be found at www.engagemedia.org/search?SearchableText=cicak.

40. Proditia Sabarini, "Thousands of People Rally for 'CICAK,'" *Jakarta Post*, November 9, 2009, www.thejakartapost.com.

41. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. It also recognizes the following religions practiced in the country: Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Hinduism.

42. Jafar Sidik, "Gus Dur vouches for Two KPK Deputy Chiefs' Innocence," *Antaranews.com*, October 31, 2009, www.antaranews.com/en.

43. Irawaty Wardany and Erwida Maulia, "Support Mounts for Arrested KPK Deputies," *Jakarta Post*, November 1, 2009, www.thejakartapost.com.

44. *Ibid.*

45. The defamation article in the Indonesian Penal Code is used by officials to clamp down on activists and reformers, and to restrict dissent and freedom of expression. For additional information about various cases, including those of Yuntho and Deta Arta Sari, see Urgent Appeals Programme and Indonesia Desk, "Indonesia: Two Activists Are Accused of Criminal Defamation by the Attorney General After Questioning Gaps in His Annual Budget," Asian Human Rights Commission, November 4, 2009, www.humanrights.asia.

46. There are other cases of intimidation and violence toward anticorruption activists and journalists. In 2010 the office of *Tempo*, a leading investigative newsmagazine, was firebombed. An ICW activist was also hospitalized following an ambush by four assailants with metal rods; Bagus Saragih, "Joint Team to Investigate Assault," *Jakarta Post*, July 13, 2010, www.thejakartapost.com.
47. "'Gecko vs. Crocodile,' 2009," *Jakarta Post*, November 24, 2009, www.thejakartapost.com.
48. Karishma Vaswani, "Indonesia Fights Corruption with People Power," BBC, November 6, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
49. "Susno: Police Had Special Team to Target Antasari, Bibit, Chandra," *Jakarta Post*, December 11, 2010, www.thejakartapost.com.
50. "An Unlikely Indonesian 'Hero,'" *Asia Sentinel*, April 5, 2010, <http://alicepoon.asiasentinel.com>.
51. Von Luebke, "Politics of Reform"; Harsono, "Gecko vs. the Crocodile."
52. For an in-depth examination of President Yudhoyono's contradictory signals and actions vis-à-vis the KPK, see Buehler, "Of Geckos and Crocodiles."
53. Von Luebke, "Politics of Reform."
54. Bagus BT Saragih, "Until the Bitter End, SBY Mum on Task Force," *Jakarta Post*, December 31, 2011, www.thejakartapost.com.
55. At the very end of 2010 President Yudhoyono indicated he would extend the tenure of the task force for two additional years. However, he did not. Assessments of the Task Force's impact are mixed. For an analysis, see Rendi Witular, "Judicial Mafia Task Force: The Unsung Crusader," December 29, 2011, www.thejakartapost.com.
56. Footage of the "Save KPK" nonviolent intervention can be viewed at <http://vimeo.com/51039023>.
57. Arghea Desafiti Hapsari, "Zero Tolerance for 'Judicial Mafioso': CICAK," *Jakarta Post*, February 24, 2010, www.thejakartapost.com.
58. Pandaya, "Gecko, Crocodile, Godzilla."
59. Teten Masduki, "A Conversation with Teten Masduki," part 3, *Voices*, ANSA-EAP Online Channel, February 13, 2011, <http://voices.ansa-eap.net>.
60. Saich et al., *From Reformasi to Institutional Transformation*, 147.
61. Brian Martin, *Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); Brian Martin, April 20, 2013, personal communication with the author.
62. Achmad Sukarsono and Agus Suhana, "Indonesians Hit Facebook, Streets to Protest Anti-Graft Arrest," *Bloomberg.com*, November 1, 2009, www.bloomberg.com.
63. Among the reformasi organizations, all founded in 1998, are Indonesia Corruption Watch, the human rights group KontraS (the Commission for "the Disappeared" and Victims of Violence), the National Law Reform Consortium, and the Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK).
64. Teten Masduki, "A Conversation with Teten Masduki," part 2, *Voices*, ANSA-EAP Online Channel, February 6, 2011, <http://voices.ansa-eap.net>.
65. Hardy Merriman, "Forming a Movement" (presentation at the Fletcher Summer Institute for the Advanced Study of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, Tufts University, June 20, 2011).

