

# 10

## Highlights from Five Cases: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, Turkey

Chapters 3–9 presented seven in-depth case studies of how nonviolent civic initiatives and social movements have impacted graft and abuse with remarkable results. In the course of this research project, so many other examples came to light—all innovative and rich with lessons. This chapter summarizes five such cases. The One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light campaign (Turkey), [shayfeen.com/Egyptians Against Corruption](http://shayfeen.com/Egyptians%20Against%20Corruption), Dosta! (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and DHP\* (Mexico) all began at the same starting point. A small group of citizens—youth, women, professionals—decided to take action. Like 5th Pillar (India), they wanted to tackle the systemic corruption and impunity that were destroying their countries. But their existential dilemma was to ascertain where to begin when facing something so nebulous and pervasive. In contrast, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) in Kenya—like Integrity Watch Afghanistan and NAFODU (Uganda)—specifically focused on empowering communities. Both [shayfeen.com](http://shayfeen.com) and MUHURI created grassroots monitoring tactics, the former at the national level and the latter at the local level.

### **Weakening the Crime Syndicate in Turkey**

It's called the crime syndicate. It refers to the links between the Turkish state and organized crime—more specifically, a nationwide network involving politicians, elements of the police, *gladios* (paramilitary groups connected to state security institutions), the mafia, and the private sector.<sup>1</sup> By 1996 the country was beleaguered by this nefarious, intertwined underworld, which was exerting influence throughout the state.<sup>2</sup> Cor-

ruption was endemic, an “entrenched pillar of a system that makes billions of dollars for ‘deep state’ personages who influence both the economy and the politics of the country,” according to filmmaker and civic activist Ezel Akay.<sup>3</sup> Extrajudicial murders were common, either linked to mafia battles or political in nature. “Everybody suffered from this in Turkey: the working class, the financial sector, and the ordinary people—because this gladio-mafia combination affected all walks of life,” said Ergin Cinmen, a prominent lawyer.<sup>4</sup>

The gravity of the situation came to a head through an unexpected turn of events. On November 3, 1996, a speeding luxury car collided into a truck on a highway between the Aegean coast and Istanbul, near the town of Susurluk. The passengers in the car were

- Sedak Bucak, a parliamentarian allied with the Right Path Party (which at the time was the coalition partner in the government) and the leader of a large landowning Kurdish clan in the southwest of the country.
- Huseyin Kocada, a police chief and police academy director.
- Abdullah Çatl, an escaped criminal, hit man, and drug smuggler associated with gladios, classified as “most wanted” by the Turkish courts, Swiss police, and Interpol.
- Gonca Us, a former beauty queen and Çatl’s mistress.

Çatl was found with a fake diplomatic ID signed by Mehmet Ağar, the minister of internal affairs and a member of Parliament with the Right Path Party, who had previously authorized the document when he was chief of police. The car contained cocaine, arms, ammunition, silencers, and a horde of cash. The sole survivors were Bucak and Hasan Gökçe, the hapless truck driver. Only Gökçe was arrested.<sup>5</sup> After the news broke, students spontaneously protested around the country. They were harshly repressed—the government’s usual reaction to citizen dissent. In fact, that same day another group of students was standing trial for having broken the Demonstrations Law because they held up a banner in the Parliament concerning their right to education. They were sentenced to fifteen months in prison.

Ağar resigned from his ministerial post but held on to his legislative seat, which afforded him parliamentary immunity. Thus, the Susurluk crash was not merely a symbol of the crime syndicate. It was a real, tangible manifestation of it—from actual individuals to the interrelationships among the state, gladios, and the mafia; to corruption, abuse of power, and impunity; and finally to the perversion of justice.

*Establishing the Building Blocks: Strategy and Planning*

All over Turkey, people were outraged and began to talk independently about what to do. That December in Istanbul, a group of fifteen professionals and activists who personally knew one another decided that the scandal provided an opportunity to overcome citizens' fear and apathy, tap public disgust, mobilize people to action, and push for definable changes that would expose and weaken the crime syndicate. Key members of the group included Ezel Akay, the aforementioned filmmaker and civic activist; Ergin Cinmen, a leading lawyer; Yüksel Selek, a professor of sociology; and Mebuse Takey, a lawyer. In spite of the repressive political climate, they began meeting regularly to strategize and plan. They formed an informal group called the Citizen Initiative for Constant Light.

Some weeks later, Ersin Salman, a public relations professional, came on board. Prior to the Susurluk crash, Salman's firm had won a contract from the National Broadcasters Association to repair its credibility and image. The mafia had started to gain control over a major broadcasting corporation through business links and manipulating legislation. In general, the mass media had been complicit in the expansion of the crime syndicate into its midst. Salman saw Susurluk as a focal point around which the media could assert its independence. The core message was, "Nothing will be the same after Susurluk!"<sup>6</sup> It ran from November 1996 to January 1997. "The [media] campaign called on people to meet their duties [as citizens], and then the [One Minute of Darkness for] Constant Light campaign was an answer," he observed.

Decisions were made by consensus, while different people chaired meetings. Salman recalled, "It was a big school for everyone. We had never worked in NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], only political parties or other organizations with a hierarchical order, but we had to function in a horizontal way." Rather than rushing to action, the group carefully planned the campaign through informal discussions. First, members identified clear objectives that were legitimate and legal, Akay reported, in order to "move the majority."<sup>7</sup> Their overall goals were to reveal crime syndicate and deep state relationships, to begin breaking them apart, and to accomplish these ends without undermining democracy. To this end, members identified three clear, definable objectives. First, they sought to remove parliamentary immunity, which provided corrupt cabinet ministers and lawmakers, such as Açar and Bucak, with iron-clad protection from investigations and prosecution. Second, they wanted the founders of the criminal groups to stand trial and face justice. Finally, judges trying these cases should receive protection in case they faced reprisals.

Strategic choices were made from the outset. The group adopted a leaderless organizational structure to defend against reprisals and to underscore the message that the campaign was driven by citizens. Furthermore, the Citizen Initiative would be nonpolitical in nature, and regular people should feel a sense of ownership in the effort—in order to protect against smear attacks, build a broad alliance, and attract the widest possible base of the public in the mobilization. Some political parties wanted to support the effort. “We told them no, but you can join us as citizens,” said Salman. Understanding the necessity to build unity, the group systematically forged an informal coalition by approaching non-political organizations, including the Bar Association, the Istanbul Coordination of Chambers of Professions, unions, professional associations (such as pharmacists, dentists, civil engineers, electrical engineers, architects, and doctors), and civil society organizations (CSOs). According to Tekay, “For the first time, groups that had never joined forces before in Turkey found themselves participating side by side—from the business community to the slum-dwellers.”<sup>8</sup>

The organizers mulled over how to harness the voices and aspirations of the public into a collective act of defiance that would generate overwhelming social pressure on powerholders and the political will to tackle the crime syndicate. Hence, they endeavored to create a nonviolent tactic that would overcome real obstacles, such as imprisonment, violent crackdowns, and public fear and feelings of powerlessness. The organizers had several strategic considerations. The action should be legitimate and legal, simple to carry out, and low-risk, and create a national sense of unity. “People didn’t want to get involved in political action, so we chose something that couldn’t get them in trouble but could be seen,” explained Salman. Cinmen’s teenage daughter came up with the idea of the synchronized turning off of lights. “It was something very simple for people to say that they didn’t want to live like this anymore,” he added. The next consideration was who would make the call to action. “We felt the campaign idea should appear to come not from an intellectual or an elite group but from a street person, a kid, an aunt on a pension, etc. The last one had a good ring to it,” said Akay. The “anonymous aunt” became the symbol of the campaign enjoining every Turk to turn off the lights. Therewith came into existence the One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light campaign.

### *Time for Action*

The Internet was not yet ubiquitous in Turkey, and of course, social media did not exist in 1997. Nevertheless, the group creatively maxi-

mized use of the technologies at hand. A chain of mass faxes got the word out and called every citizen of Turkey to action. The unifying message of the outreach measures was, "Listen to the voice of the silent majority!" The one-pagers were faxed to all the organizations in the informal coalition. They in turn sent them to their respective members, urging them to disseminate the message as widely as possible—to relatives, friends, neighbors, and others. As a result, the call to action went viral, so to speak. Moreover, the fax had a dual purpose. It not only got the word out, it incorporated a signature drive in support of the One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light campaign. To the delight of the organizers, within one week 10,000 people responded by signing their

### **The Citizens Initiative for Constant Light Manifesto and "Call to Action"**

Sürekli aydınlık için 1 dakika karanlık!  
[1 Minute of Darkness for Constant Light!]

Suç örgütlerini kuranların ve onlara görev verenlerin, mutlaka yargı önüne çıkarılması konusundaki kararlı isteğimi göstermek; [To show my determination to bring to justice the ones who assembled crime organizations and the ones who hired their services;]

olayı soruşturan kişi ve mercilere destek vermek; [to support the persons and authorities who investigate the events in question;]

demokratik, çağdaş, şeffaf hukuk devleti özlemimi duyurmak için, [to make my yearning for a democratic, contemporary, and transparent state of law be heard;]

1 Subat 1997 Cumartesi gününden başlayarak, [Starting Saturday, February 1, 1997;]

her gün saat 21.00'de ışığımlı BİR DAKİKA süreyle karartıyorum. [at 9:00 pm every day I'll turn my lights off for ONE MINUTE.]

Ve bu ülkede yaşayan herkesi, bir ay süreyle, her gün saat 21.00'de ışıklarını karartmaya çağırıyorum! [And I call everyone who lives in this country for a one-minute blackout every day at 9:00 pm for one month!]

Bu çağrı, YURTTAŞTAN YURTTAŞA yapılmıştır. [This is a call from CITIZEN TO CITIZEN.]

Lütfen Yaygınlaştırın! [Please spread!]

Adı-Soyadı Mesleği İmzası [Name-Surname Profession Signature]

CITIZENS INITIATIVE For CONSTANT LIGHT

[Address, phone and fax numbers . . .]

Source: Ezel Akay and Liam Mahoney, *A Call to End Corruption* (Minneapolis: Center for Victims of Torture, 2003), 2.

name to the call to action and faxing it back to the campaign. In essence, it was the first grassroots mass action of the campaign. The next one, however, far surpassed everyone's expectations.

With Salman's expertise, the civic initiative also developed a communications plan that capitalized on the Susurluk public relations venture he previously led for the National Broadcasters Association, before having joined the civic initiative. One month prior to S-Day (Susurluk Day), February 1, 1997, they systematically researched and contacted, via personalized letters, almost sixty print columnists who appeared interested in the crime syndicate menace and sympathetic to citizen action to fight it. They sought and got maximum media exposure in order to spread the word of the campaign and mobilize citizens from all walks of life. As a result of the media's sensitization to Susurluk, many television channels started to hold countdowns before the appointed time of action. On January 15, organizers convened an unusual press conference. They staged a theatrical stunt of the car accident, and prominently displayed the names of the citizens who responded to the faxed call to action. There were no official spokespersons; different individuals answered journalists' questions. Yüksel Selek, the Citizen Initiative general secretary, commented, "It was the first press conference held by 10,000 individuals."<sup>9</sup>

At 9:00 p.m. on February 1, 1997, citizens began to turn off their lights for one minute. Each evening more and more across the country joined the mobilization. By the second week, people began adding their own flourishes. They banged pots and pans, flashed lights, honked horns at intersections, circle danced (traditional style), held candlelight vigils and neighborhood marches, and shouted slogans such as, "Don't shut up. If you shut up it will be your turn." As citizens overcame their fear and gathered together, residential squares took on a festive character. In some regions, local initiatives were launched. "People started to remember what they'd forgotten—that they were living in the same building, same neighborhood and city," Salman said. "It was very exciting for them to see their neighbors and people far away [through the media]." Not surprisingly, after the second week, as people power intensified, the reprisals began. Senior members of the ruling coalition attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the campaign and the integrity of all who participated. Their contemptuous, derogatory public statements, some rife with sexual innuendo and accusations of treachery, gravely backfired. Not only did citizens take offense at their insults, civil resistance was undeterred.<sup>10</sup>

What was not anticipated was that the military, which considers it-

self the defender of the post-Ottoman secular state, used the citizen uprising to withdraw its support from the government. According to Akay, the generals and other critics of the senior partner in the ruling coalition, the Islamist-leaning Refah Party, saw an opportunity to undermine it. On February 28, the National Security Council forced the coalition government to resign. The prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, held his post until the Parliament approved the new government six months later. In spite of the political turmoil, the One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light campaign continued. "We tried to emphasize that the campaign was against the organized crime-state syndicate, not the government. The military wanted to steal the movement for their own purposes," asserted Salman. He added that the campaign held a press conference to disassociate itself from the intervention and published ads saying, "We won't let you steal our light." In fact, the military's move was counterproductive to the campaign's goals, which required a working government and sought overall change in the corrupt system, regardless of those who are in power at any given time. In retrospect, the organizers regret not having taken an even more direct stand. "If we had spoken out against what happened, it would have been better. At least the generals couldn't look us in the eye and say that their postmodern coup d'état had the support of the citizen," Tekay conceded.<sup>11</sup>

The mobilization peaked in the latter half of February. Organizers estimated that approximately 30 million people, 60 percent of the population, participated throughout the country. The group decided to end the campaign at a high point rather than wait for it to peter out, thereby producing a sense of victory. They called off the mobilization on March 9. However, as powerholders, including Prime Minister Erbakan, used stalling tactics and legal loopholes to block inquiries, the group maintained pressure well into 1998 in two ways. First was a smaller-scale Constant Light mobilization, accompanied by white ribbons symbolizing the demand for a clean state, and a humorous toy called the "Susurluk Bugger" democracy machine. The campaign challenged the two competing political poles—secularists (backed by the military) and Islamists—with a third vision, encapsulated by the slogan, "Neither the shadow of the Sharia nor the roar of the tanks: For democracy only."<sup>12</sup> The second mode of pressure was a series of nonviolent actions, including a mass mail-in of "stolen" copies of the high court inquiries to all legislators; a signature campaign proclaiming, "I resign from being a slave. Now I'm a citizen!"; public presentation of a "Susurluk Citizen Report"; roundtables for a Civic Constitution Initiative; and a letter-writing effort.

### *Outcomes*

In a short time span, the Citizen Initiative for Constant Light literally mobilized the majority of the population, wielding people power that shook up the corrupt status quo. "It was a civic uprising," avowed Salman. The campaign broke the strong taboo over confronting the crime syndicate, epitomized by its linkages with the state and corruption. It succeeded in bringing to trial suspects associated with Susurluk, including mafia leaders, police, military officials, and businesspeople. The next prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz, continued the case. He authorized an investigative committee that issued a report listing the names of each crime syndicate victim. The Parliament also created an investigative committee that revealed the crime syndicate's activities. Individuals at the tip of the iceberg of this venal system were tried, and verdicts were pronounced. Taken together, these unprecedented measures began exposing some syndicate figures and relationships.

In 2001 Sadettin Tantan, the interior minister, launched a series of investigations in cooperation with the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. Large-scale embezzlement was exposed, resulting in the arrests of several well-known businesspeople. The victory was not complete, because their collaborators in the Parliament and government were left unscathed. The next year, however, voters changed the profile of the Parliament, which may have been punishment against the existing political establishment as well as the military. In the November 2002 elections Akay reported that 70 percent of those elected were incumbents, the old-guard party leaders were voted out, and the new democratic Islamist AK (Justice and Development) Party won by a landslide. Mehmet Ağar, the former police chief and interior minister, continues to elude justice, though the net is closing in. Until 2007 he was protected from prosecution by parliamentary immunity, but in September 2011 he was sentenced to five years in prison "for forming an armed criminal gang involving state actors and mafia."<sup>13</sup> He won an appeal and is still free.

The Citizens Initiative never came to a formal end. Some of the organizers moved on; for example, Selek is the co-spokesperson of the Green Party. At critical junctures, the organizers joined forces with other civic organizations and the public to wield people power. After the devastating 1999 earthquake, they cooperated with the Human Settlements Association to build a civic coalition and organize citizens to provide disaster relief. In February 2003, another One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light campaign was launched to oppose Turkish collaboration with the US Army for the war in Iraq. With surveys indicating that



94 percent of the population opposed the war, the mass mobilization turned dissent into action. On March 1 of that year, by a slim majority, parliamentarians voted against a measure allowing US troops to use southern Turkey as a base for attacks—in spite of expectations it would pass.<sup>14</sup> The Constant Light mobilization has not faded from the public's memory. Fourteen years later, from May 1 to June 12, 2011 (general elections day), citizens raised their voices to candidates on a series of issues, including corruption in university entrance exams; privatization of water; construction of hydroelectric dams, nuclear reactors, and coal-fired power plants; labor rights; journalists' rights; and the assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink.<sup>15</sup>

The Citizens Initiative for Constant Light altered the relationship between Turkish citizens and powerholders. “The system changed; nobody could question the state before, nobody could question what the government does, what ministers do. Now even the generals are answerable to the people.” Have the crime syndicate and deep state machinations completely ended? No. For Salman and the leaders of the original Citizens Initiative for Constant Light, the struggle for accountability, justice, and democracy is ongoing. But looking back, Salman reflected, “We rocked Turkey so that the rocks cannot be in the same place anymore.”

### **From Outrage to Action: Women Launch Monitoring Movement in Egypt**

Egypt's momentous January 25 Revolution in 2011 for democracy and justice did not happen in a matter of weeks. Contrary to widespread misconceptions, the nonviolent struggle against the almost thirty-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak began in 2003. First came the Egyptian Movement for Change (2003–2006) known as Kefaya (“enough” in Arabic), and then in defiance of a wave of ruthless regime repression, the April 4 youth movement (2008), the “We Are All Khaled Said” youth campaign (2010), and the ElBaradei campaign for reform (2010).<sup>16</sup> In the midst of this tumult emerged another grassroots force for change, shayfeen.com, which combines a play on the Arabic words “we see you” or “we are watching you” with the group's website address.<sup>17</sup>

On May 25, 2005, in what would infamously become known as Black Wednesday, female journalists and protesters were molested by unofficial regime forces during protests over a questionable constitutional referendum that in practice would make it difficult for candidates to run against President Mubarak. In spite of videos of the attacks on

YouTube and other websites, the government denied responsibility. When the global news outlet Al Jazeera broadcast on a split screen a press conference with the minister of the interior denying the attacks had occurred together with footage of these very incidents, people reacted with disbelief and outrage. In Egyptian society, the violation of the women became a matter of the victims' honor, and dishonor on those who did not stop the assaults. As the Association of Egyptian Mothers (Rabetat al-Ummahat) organized silent protests, another small group of women—including Engi Haddad, a public relations consultant; Bothaina Kamel, a popular television host in the region; and Ghada Shabender, an English-language university instructor—decided they had to take further action. Tapping the prevailing public sentiment that “we have turned a blind eye for so long that the government must think we are blind,” the group founded shayfeen.com in August 2005. Their aim, according to Haddad, was to build a grassroots “people’s monitoring movement.”<sup>18</sup> “When elections are corrupt, we’re watching you. When you rig votes, we’re watching you. When you torture prisoners, we’re watching you. This is our mission statement,” declared Kamel.<sup>19</sup>

#### *Low Risk, High Visibility*

The women began by providing a phone number to which anyone could call or text and by launching a website to monitor government irregularities and provide citizens with a platform to register complaints. In this context, the website had multiple functions. It served as shayfeen.com’s initial recruitment method; within one month, approximately 500 people signed up to the campaign.<sup>20</sup> Second, the website was the medium through which citizens could engage in a low-risk tactic. Rather than gather on the street, which would inevitably meet with violent repression, people en masse could publicly and safely expose regime abuse, impunity, and malfeasance. Finally, people could express their sentiments about it, a further nonviolent act of defiance in a country that crushed dissent. The women quickly found that corruption was one of the major grievances of citizens who contacted them. They strategized that each action chipped away at Mubarak’s reign of fear and contributed to building a sense of collective responsibility for change. “Once they’re rid of the fear they’ve had so long, change won’t come suddenly; it will be step by step,” explained Kamel. “Our first step was to open our eyes, to see where we are now and where we are going next, to see what our government is doing to us, and to understand what we are doing to our country,” she added.

Their next step was audacious. The newfound activists decided to

monitor the September 2005 presidential elections, although the regime denied requests for international election observers. They ran a campaign ad in *al-Masri al-Yawm*, an independent newspaper, announcing, "This is your election, you have eyes, you can see."<sup>21</sup> They listed over twenty types of irregularities on the shayfeen.com website and encouraged the public to report violations through text messages, phone calls, and the Internet. The response was overwhelming. By the second day of the polls, they improvised a tracking system to deal with the traffic and onslaught of information. Within three days they received 28,000 calls.<sup>22</sup> Even before the election was over, state-controlled television alleged that they were spreading rumors, and an official from the Ministry of the Interior called to complain. Undeterred, shayfeen.com subsequently released its findings along with criticism of the government. The group was inundated by local, regional, and international media.<sup>23</sup> It was their first victory. Every citizen who sent information played a role in exposing the fraudulent electoral practices to the entire world. Even the US State Department used the data for its 2005 annual human rights report.<sup>24</sup>

### *Eyes on the Parliamentary Elections*

The group next set its sights on the December 2005 parliamentary elections. In the space of a few months the women executed a highly organized campaign to mobilize citizens to actively monitor the voting and expose wrongdoing. Once again, shayfeen.com developed creative, low-risk, mass-action tactics to raise awareness, gain visibility, and garner support. Approximately 100,000 tea glasses with the movement's logo were distributed, bringing the campaign into homes and coffee and tea houses around the country. The group printed more than 250,000 plastic bags carrying the slogan, "We see you, and at the elections we are observing you," which in Arabic happens to rhyme. The bags were used and reused so much that the minister of trade dubbed those carrying them the "supermarket activists."<sup>25</sup>

Prior to the elections, shayfeen.com implemented a meticulous monitoring plan. They outfitted cars with digital photography equipment, laptops, and GSM and trained members and volunteers to use them.<sup>26</sup> Two hundred monitors each received a packet containing badges, instructions, and a violations checklist. They fanned out across Egypt's governorates, meeting up with local movement coordinators. Their assignment was to film the three phases of the voting process, document fraud via video, and disseminate the images by uploading to websites in real time, as well as by sharing with the media and even

projecting footage onto building walls in public squares. They cooperated with the aforementioned Kefaya movement, which distributed CDs of the videos. The polling was marred by police brutality, violence, and eleven deaths. Shayfeen.com recorded over 4,200 reports of violations, of which 80 percent concerned corruption, and women were the source of people power at the grass roots.<sup>27</sup>

*“Long Live Justice!”*

Undeterred, in spring 2006 the leaders sent the findings to the Supreme Election Committee, which refused to conduct an investigation, as well as to the Ministries of Interior and Justice, and the media.<sup>28</sup> Among the violations was judicial fraud. The report identified the eighteen judges allegedly involved in such activities, including an instance that Haddad witnessed. “I saw a judge change the results. I walked to the judge and said, ‘What you’re doing is wrong.’ He said, ‘You go out or I throw you in jail!’”<sup>29</sup> The leaders met with two honest judges, Hesham Bastawissi and Mahmoud Mekki, who then took up the findings within their professional association, the Judges Club (also known as the Judges Syndicate). They examined the eighteen cases and confirmed judicial fraud. Not surprisingly, the regime counterattacked and launched investigations against the two. The intimidation backfired. Shayfeen.com, Kefaya, and human rights and prodemocracy youth activists launched street actions, from rallies to a tent city outside of the Judges Club. The latter tactic is notable as it foreshadowed the occupation of Tahrir Square approximately six years later. Emboldened by their fellow citizens, by late April fifty honest magistrates maintained a three-day sit-in at the Judges Club. They were attacked daily, resulting in the hospitalization of Judge Mahmoud Hamza.

Out of these actions emerged the campaign for an independent judiciary and the demand for a new law to enshrine this fundamental liberty. Street protests continued in spite of violent repression. On May 25, on the anniversary of Black Wednesday, nonviolent actions were held in Egypt and around the world. In addition to shayfeen.com, youth and labor groups, Kefaya, the El Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood rallied around the judges. In Cairo, demonstrators cried out, “Have courage, judges. Rid us of the tyrants” and “Long live justice!” while 300 magistrates staged a silent protest. Shayfeen.com members took part, engaging with security forces and even interjecting themselves between the two sides to prevent violence. Kamel recalled telling them, “When you approach these kids, be gentle. They’re Egyptians like you. We’re one people, don’t forget.” Offering a sticker to riot

police, her outstretched hand was displayed in news reports all over the world. In May of that year, Judge Mekki was cleared of charges. However, Judge Bastawissi was “reprimanded” and denied a promotion.<sup>30</sup>

### *Winning Support: Egyptians Against Corruption*

The female activists strategized their next move. In September 2006 a new movement was created to complement shayfeen.com. While the website maintained a more daring profile, Egyptians Against Corruption broadened the struggle by creating an inclusive social platform designed to win over regime supporters and wide swaths of the public. In general terms, shayfeen.com activated the disruption dynamic of people power, while Egyptians Against Corruption focused on shifting loyalties and pulling people to its side. Indeed, they reported that members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party wanted to join. Egyptians Against Corruption reframed the struggle discourse, zeroing in on everyday matters that resonated with citizens by demonstrating the links between graft and tragedies resulting from calamities such as train crashes, contaminated food, and collapsed buildings. They developed communication strategies targeting both the public and various sources of support for the corrupt status quo, such as parts of the government, political and policy elites, and the media. The core messages were that

- Corruption is a societal problem that needs to be dealt with from the bottom up as well as from the top down.
- Every day, in every way, everyone is a victim of corruption.
- It’s up to people to claim their rights.
- The movement is for any citizen who cares about and loves Egypt and believes he or she is entitled to justice, equality, and a life free from corruption.

They launched an innovative educational website, designed to target youth in particular, along with a civic education campaign called Claim Your Rights (Eksab Ha’ek). Imaginative mass actions were a hallmark of the civic initiative. Members sold the new badge in the thousands, mostly through one-on-one interactions. The tactic forged a sense of social identity with the movement, and the proceeds were used to fund activities. As importantly, in buying and wearing the pin, citizens joined thousands of others in a low-risk act of dissent similar to 5th Pillar’s use of the zero-rupee note in India (see Chapter 7). “It is clear that a badge will not fix corruption,” explained Haddad. “But by buying and wearing the pin, and the conversations that ensue, you are

giving the other person a chance to enter into and generate a discussion. It is that dialogue that we are trying to achieve.”<sup>31</sup> Before the end of the year, the activists initiated a popular anticorruption contest on December 9, International Anti-Corruption Day, whereby the public could vote for anticorruption heroes via SMS or on the movement’s website. The tactic not only reinforced integrity but bestowed the honor through the collective actions of thousands of fellow Egyptians, which was broadcast before millions via Arab satellite television.

### *Countering Repression with Legal Instruments*

By 2007, elements of the regime grew uncomfortable as shayfeen.com and Egyptians Against Corruption gained momentum. That March, security forces ransacked Haddad’s public relations company. Shayfeen.com was charged with incitement, corresponding with a foreign entity, possessing documents challenging government policy (one of which was the Transparency International Toolkit), and propagating negative information about Egypt. They successfully sued the government by demonstrating that their activities were legal because Egypt was a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). As a result, the government was forced to publish UNCAC in Egypt’s official legal chronicle, which was essential to render it binding in courts of law.

### *The Anticorruption Legacy*

In 2008 shayfeen.com was dismantled and Egyptians Against Corruption assumed the overall struggle. The next turning point came during the internationally criticized November 2010 parliamentary elections.<sup>32</sup> “What we witnessed was a charade; there was no legality to the Parliament,” asserted Haddad. The anticorruption movement joined together with the April 6 youth movement, the We Are All Khaled Said campaign, the youth wing of the El Ghad party, labor, and democracy activists to mobilize people in a nonviolent insurrection against the dictatorship. As citizens rose up against the regime, Haddad and some colleagues launched efforts to freeze the ill-gotten gains amassed by the Mubarak family and its cronies. In 2013 they embarked on a new struggle to recover the country’s stolen assets.

Haddad recently reported on another extraordinary development. In 2011, during the early days of the January 25 Revolution, shayfeen.com seemed to resurface. She discovered that a group of youth activists had adopted the name and updated the logo. They formally resurrected the movement in March 2011. The young people approached Kamel and her

for help to monitor the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections in November of that year. In 2012 the young people came back and asked to work with them on corruption. The women are now on the group's fifteen-member Board of Trustees, which is made up of nine youth and six elders. The youngsters, many of whom are affiliated with We Are All Khaled Said, have established chapters in each of the country's twenty-seven governorates. The new shayfeen.com, like its predecessor, is neutral in ideology. It wants to instill anticorruption values among its peers; empower them through educational initiatives such as workshops to use UNCAC; activate the public, for example, through a toll-free call center for reporting corruption; and disrupt graft and abuse of power through monitoring. According to Haddad, by August 2012 the new shayfeen.com had over 150,000 members. "It's now bigger than any political party other than the Muslim Brotherhood." Looking back, Haddad reflected, "There is a latent energy inside youth. We and other predecessors such as Kefaya helped to plant this consciousness in them to rise up and demand their rights."

In just a few years, the outrage and courage of a few women spawned two remarkable initiatives that took corruption out of the shadows and into the public domain, channeled people's anger and indignation into civil resistance, sparked a judicial revolt for independence, pressured authorities, and utilized the Internet and emerging social media to communicate, educate, mobilize, and directly disrupt corrupt practices. They not only dented the regime's reign of fear but turned the power relationship upside down. After twenty-five years of the state's monitoring the populace, citizens used nonviolent tactics to keep an eye on the regime.

### **Social Audits Pressure Powerholders: Kenya**

Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) is a civil society organization based in Mombasa, Kenya, working at the grass roots with marginalized communities in the Coast province, as well as advocating for human rights, rule of law, and accountability at the national level. Its vision is "a just society anchored on human rights and good governance."<sup>33</sup> The organization's goal is the promotion of good governance that respects human rights and the rule of law.<sup>34</sup> Back in 2005, similarly to NAFODU's experience in Uganda, citizens began coming to MUHURI with complaints. In this instance, they told the group that money was being spent for development in their communities, but they were not being consulted, nor were they seeing any changes or benefits. "We

were focusing on human rights, and people started asking, ‘Why are we so poor?’” recollected Hussein Khalid, the youthful executive director.<sup>35</sup> By listening to those with whom they worked, MUHURI realized that the struggle for human rights was linked to tackling poverty, and graft was at the nexus. “In order to decrease poverty levels, we had to start fighting corruption and increasing accountability and transparency,” he added.

Like Integrity Watch Afghanistan (see Chapter 8), the group initially had no program or funding to expand activities. It had to improvise. But MUHURI was committed to following up on the complaints because “they [complaints] were dear to the people,” said Khalid. Most of the grievances concerned constituency development funds (CDFs), which are annual allocations of approximately \$1 million to each member of Parliament (MP) for his or her district, ostensibly to conduct needed public works projects and improve the lives of residents. CDF is the result of a noble and fashionable idea in the development world; devolve power, and give communities resources for their own development schemes. However, without meaningful independent oversight and with endemic corruption, the end result is often mismanagement and graft, even if on paper the program is structured to involve local participation in the selection of development projects and management of funds.<sup>36</sup>

### *Origins of the Social Audit*

Taking their lead from citizens, the civil society actors initially tried to find out more about the CDF-supported projects in the Coast province. Although Kenyan legislators list CDF projects on a website, the information is general and limited.<sup>37</sup> For over a year MUHURI sent letters and approached CDF offices and officials, but to no avail. Yet they refused to take no for an answer, and were even beaten by assailants, according to Khalid. All the while they began holding community forums on the CDF, to educate people about how it works, to collect their input about local needs, and to gather information about projects, such as whether they were completed, the quality of materials used, and so on. Equally important, these meetings were designed to overcome psychological barriers to action. “There was a general apathy. People were hopeless, corruption and impunity were at a maximum, and poverty levels were increasing,” he recalled.

Their first break came in the Mvita constituency. MUHURI discovered that a well actually built by a wealthy individual was listed as a CDF project in an official report. Then they found another well on the list that was built through private sector support. Locals also informed



the group that ten computers slated for district schools were instead acquired by the MP. The latter example epitomized the extent of graft and mismanagement; the children never received the equipment, and in any case, it would have been of little use since most of the schools do not have electricity. “It got us thinking: In how many other projects was this happening?” Khalid said, adding, “We realized this could be huge.” MUHURI released the information and sent the MP a letter inviting him to a community forum. Through these preliminary activities, the parameters of the social audit were sketched.

In 2007, after two years of canvassing powerholders, MUHURI achieved a major breakthrough. The CSO convinced the MP of Changamwe to release the CDF records for his constituency, arguing that he would be the first legislator in the country to act with such transparency, which would enhance his public image at a critical time, given that it was an election year. The group only received a partial set of records, for fourteen projects that the Changamwe CDF Committee deemed the best. However, this proved more than enough for a start. A pilot social audit soon followed.

#### *International Actors: Constructive Support*

That same year the young civic actors were contacted by two international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), the Open Society Initiative’s East Africa program (OSIEA) and one of its partners, the International Budget Partnership (IBP). Through an OSIEA grant, in August 2007 MUHURI organized an intensive weeklong national CDF training for sixty participants from fifteen civil society organizations across Kenya. IBP brought a training team, including veterans from the Right to Information social movement in India, who were also affiliated with the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS; Union for the Empowerment of Peasants and Laborers), the civic entity that catalyzed this landmark nonviolent struggle and effectively utilized community monitoring in its arsenal of tactics.<sup>38</sup> The objectives of the workshop were threefold. First, organizers sought to build know-how about the CDF process, budgets, data collection, analysis and compilation of user-friendly information, and site visits. Second, they wanted to facilitate peer-to-peer learning. Finally, through practical experience, they endeavored to empower Kenyan civic leaders and activists to develop their own plans of action. During that week, participants conducted their first social audit using the fourteen Changamwe CDF reports. OSIEA also worked with the International Budget Partnership to produce an educational handbook on the CDF and social audit process.<sup>39</sup>

*MUHURI's Six-Step Social Audit*

Out of this innovative collaboration, MUHURI honed a defining nonviolent method in the six-step social audit.<sup>40</sup>

1. *Information gathering.* Gathering of records from the local CDF office. Trained MUHURI representatives are sent, because it is daunting for ordinary citizens to approach officials and obtain tightly guarded information.

2. *Training local people.* Training men and women to become community activists. They learn how to decipher documents and budgets, monitor expenditures, and physically inspect public works.

3. *Educating and mobilizing fellow citizens.* Educating about the CDF and their rights to information and accountability of powerholders. Concurrently with the second step, community activists and MUHURI attract attention, directly engage people, and encourage them to attend a “public hearing” through nonviolent tactics such as street theatre, trumpet and drum processions, community radio, and leafleting by volunteers. Information about CDF misuse and graft is shared, and people’s reactions and input are gathered.

4. *Inspecting the CDF project site.* Citizen-activists conduct systematic, meticulous documentation, comparing records to the reality on the ground. They also use site visits to speak with residents in order to share CDF project records, generate interest in the social audit, encourage them to attend the public hearing, and gather additional information about corruption and abuse. For instance, an inspection of a market center built with CDF money revealed that inferior roof sheeting was used in contrast to what was recorded in CDF documents. Moreover, by talking with people in the area, activists learned that materials from the old market center were reused in the new structure, although the records stated that all new materials had been purchased.<sup>41</sup>

5. *Holding the public hearing.* Local CDF officials, members of the CDF committee, the MP, district administrators, and the media are invited. MUHURI’s theatre team first leads a procession through the community, complete with slogans, chanting, and a youth band. It gathers adults and dancing, singing children as it goes along. “What do we want? We want our money!” they exclaim. Various MUHURI representatives open the forum by pointing out that the audit was done by local residents, that everyone there shares the responsibility of ensuring that CDF money is benefitting “our” communities, and that the goals of the audit are not political.<sup>42</sup> Once the session begins, local citizen-activists present the results of their investigations, CDF

officials are questioned by both the activists and attendees, and the community demands accountability of them. In full view of citizens, MUHURI first secures promises from the officials to address the problems and then obtains their signatures on an “accountability charter” outlining their commitments.

6. *Following up with officials.* MUHURI prepares a report of the community’s findings and recommendations to members of the local CDF committee, and then checks on their implementation.

At MUHURI’s first ever public hearing on August 26, 2007, conducted during the above-mentioned training workshop, approximately 1,500 to 2,000 residents of the Changamwe slum participated, many standing in the rain for much of the day because there were not enough seats. Even three opposition candidates showed up. Although not all invited officials attended, three from the CDF came, carrying fifty files. Faced with the community’s documentation of mismanagement and apparent corruption, they soon made a frantic call to the MP, who quickly arrived. After a few hours, the MP finally agreed to register their complaints and charges against the concerned contractors. The two MKSS activists from the training reported,

It marked the first time that CDF officials in that constituency (and probably in the entire country) had felt the need to present information on CDF-supported projects before the residents of their constituency at a forum that was initiated, organized, and supported by the local community members, at a time and venue chosen by them as opposed to a rally organized by the MP or his supporters.<sup>43</sup>

### *Creativity, Nonviolent Discipline, Countering Intimidation*

MUHURI employs a variety of creative actions derived from local contexts to communicate messages, mobilize citizens, and wield people power during the social audit process. Humor is often used to lighten tension and address serious matters in a nonthreatening manner. Tactics from puppet plays to a ten-foot-tall masked man dressed in traditional attire garner attention, generate enthusiasm, and overcome people’s fear to speak up and face powerholders. At the Changamwe public forum, MUHURI rolled out a fifty-meter-long cloth banner petition demanding the addition of accountability and transparency measures to the CDF Act and passage of the Freedom of Information law. The MP, known to oppose the law, initially refused to support it, but after all the people, including the opposition candidates, signed it (or stamped their fingerprints), he acquiesced to civic pressure and added his name.

Once MUHURI and citizens began to disrupt the corrupt status quo—that is, threaten vested interests—intimidation followed. The group refused to back down. It emphasized the peaceful nature of its struggle. Second, the CSO had taken proactive measures to maintain nonviolent discipline by training youth in what Khalid termed nonviolence: “Youth sometimes want to fight and then they can’t be controlled in huge crowds. We learned that we need our own ‘ushers’ to prevent violence.” Indeed, after receiving threats from a politician, ten young men began to guard MUHURI’s office by sleeping there at night. One evening they were attacked. Khalid recounted, “They were trained to just sit down. They did, and they got a beating.”

Finally, when they faced one of their gravest threats, they triumphed by making a violent attack backfire. In 2009, during the Likoni constituency social audit, two nights before the public hearing, MUHURI’s office was ransacked by a gang of nine, and one of the guards was stabbed in the neck. They understood that the objective of repression was to generate fear and deter them from action. Exemplifying the general mood of defiance, Malfan, a young resident and activist, declared, “If they came to rob the documents we are having, it seems that there is something so big that they are hiding. In fact they are giving us more motivation for us to go for more information.”<sup>44</sup> Rather than retreat in fear, the next day Khalid and Farida Rashid, another citizen turned activist, spoke out on a popular local radio station—a major platform through which to communicate with the public, as well as with those behind the attack. The activists avowed they would not be intimidated, and they emphasized unity and collective responsibility. Khalid told listeners, “They are attempting to scare us. . . . But when the people of Likoni arrived this morning, they said, ‘We are determined to stay and protect this work, so that tomorrow we can present our findings at the public hearing.’” Finally, the two civic leaders turned the attack on its head. Khalid declared on air, “And until the citizens emerge and participate completely in the process—like coming to the meeting tomorrow at the Bomanani grounds at 2:00 p.m.—until they emerge and show their purpose, and their desire to see changes brought forward, we the people will continue to hurt while the politicians continue to profit.”<sup>45</sup>

### *Harnessing the Power of Numbers:*

#### *Collective Identity, Recruitment, Mobilization*

MUHURI, like Integrity Watch Afghanistan (see Chapter 8), views regular people as protagonists of change while its role is to empower communities. “The key actors were the communities, and we were backing

them up,” affirmed Khalid. As with Integrity Watch Afghanistan’s community-monitoring initiatives, the social audits ran on the efforts of citizens—an essential element of people power that solidifies collective identity, collective ownership, and commitment to the cause. “The issues were owned by the communities; they asked us to assist them,” he explained. Through its communications, outreach activities, and creative nonviolent tactics, the group sought to overcome regular people’s apathy, hopelessness, and sense of inferiority vis-à-vis powerholders; foster collective responsibility to address grievances; provide needed information, training, know-how, and coaching; and offer innovative opportunities for citizen action, from serving as volunteer monitors to participating in community forums, the latter activating the power of numbers and helping to overcome fear. An International Budget Partnership report concluded,

Both the MKSS and MUHURI have held social audits in hostile environments. Their experiences show that individuals that would otherwise feel intimidated to speak out against public officials are willing to do so in the context of a well-attended social audit forum—perhaps due to the strength they perceive from being part of a collective evaluation process.<sup>46</sup>

MUHURI is rooted in communities, and initiatives are jointly undertaken. When queried about the group’s relationship to the communities, Khalid replied, “I don’t know where one starts and the other ends. The communities are part of us, and we are a part of them.” Thus, recruitment for the social audits was an organic exercise. The civic leaders had contacts at different levels in the communities and were part of informal local networks. Community members also identified potential citizen-activists. Once involved, these people tended to bring in others, he reported. Engagement in the social audits was sustained because citizens were the impetus for them and they participated on a voluntary basis, all of which fostered a strong sense of collective responsibility. “When they know it’s for their own good, people find a way to do it, especially when they know others are counting on them and want them to be responsible,” said Khalid.

### *Outcomes*

Convincing parliamentarians and CDF officials to release records has been an uphill battle in the absence of a right to information law. Nevertheless, MUHURI did succeed on numerous occasions to gain access to documents. Consequently, over the next three years, it conducted

comprehensive social audits in ten constituencies in the Coast province. Through people power, malfeasance was uncovered and rectified. For example, in 2010 in Kisauni, the civic initiative learned that a dispensary for HIV patients had been indefinitely closed. The CDF committee contended that it was to be upgraded. In reality, citizen-activists discovered that no money had been allocated for this renovation and the land on which the clinic was built had been illegally sold. As a result of the social audit process, the land transaction was cancelled, funds were budgeted for the clinic, improvements were made, and it finally reopened.<sup>47</sup>

Not content with these successes, in 2010 MUHURI made a strategic decision to expand social audit initiatives while increasing the grassroots capacity to conduct them. The overall goal was to create sustainability by empowering others—CSOs, communities, regular people—to hold authorities and politicians accountable, independently of MUHURI. First, it shifted from conducting social audits together with communities to training CSOs and citizens to conduct their own civic initiatives. Second, it has developed the mini-social audit, whereby residents monitor a single project in their immediate locality rather than a large set of projects throughout a constituency.<sup>48</sup> This new defining method calls to mind Integrity Watch Afghanistan's community-monitoring initiatives. Not only is people power devolved to one of the most basic levels of society, each small victory builds confidence and yields a visible outcome that benefits residents in their daily lives. Third, MUHURI is now in discussion with government departments to explore citizen-led social audits conducted in cooperation with authorities.<sup>49</sup>

At the national level, MUHURI's advocacy combined institutional and extrainstitutional sources of pressure. Like DHP\* in Mexico (see below), Ficha Limpa in Brazil (see Chapter 4), and the above-mentioned shayfeen.com in Egypt, MUHURI sought to make use of the judicial system. In 2009 it initiated a lawsuit in the Kenyan courts to challenge the constitutionality of the CDF legislation based on the role of MPs in the fund. While MUHURI did not win, the lawsuit was enough to send shock waves through the ruling establishment. Harnessing the power of numbers, activists from eight constituencies that conducted social audits joined together in a national campaign to change the CDF law. By June of that year, the Kenyan government set up a task force to review it.<sup>50</sup> The report, containing a number of reforms to the law, was finally released in July 2012.<sup>51</sup>

Social audits, generating bottom-up pressure, changed the relationship between powerholders and the public. Legislators and officials

were pressured to interact with regular people as equals, who in turn began to see themselves in a positive light. Through nonviolent action and incremental victories, citizens cultivated a sense of agency, which Khalid believes can lead to even greater justice. “If people are able to be encouraged to go out, today it’s CDF, tomorrow it’s something else, and another day it’s another thing. So CDF is an entry point to the realization of so many rights that people are not getting.”<sup>52</sup> Like the community-monitoring initiatives in Afghanistan, the Kenyan social audits practice democracy from the bottom up. The IBP summarized this dynamic: they are “exercises in participatory democracy that challenge the traditional ‘rules of the game’ in governance.”<sup>53</sup> Perhaps most revolutionary is that in some quarters of the Kenyan government, power-holders have begun to encourage civic action. In February 2013 the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission vice chair, Irene Keino, made the following public appeal: “We are asking Kenyans to be vigilant at the grass roots and report cases of corruption to our offices. . . . Kenyans should monitor leaders and how they manage funds. If they identify cases of misappropriation, they should not hesitate to report them to us.”<sup>54</sup>

As for the Changanwe constituency parliamentarian who was the first to open CDF books to public scrutiny, there was a happy ending. In spite of corruption discovered through the social audit, he touted his transparency during the campaign, and it worked. He won the 2007 elections even though the majority of incumbents lost their seats. As MUHURI representatives were monitoring the constituency’s vote count, a CDF official told them that at least 40 percent of the votes for the MP were due to his having cooperated on the social audit.<sup>55</sup>

### **Youth Say “Enough!” to President’s Abuse of Power: Bosnia-Herzegovina**

Dosta! (Enough!) is a nonviolent youth resistance movement that emerged in 2006 after a small online chat group decided to meet in person rather than simply talk about politics and problems in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).<sup>56</sup> Like Mexico’s DHP\*, Dosta!’s overall goals are transformative. It aims to “promote accountability and government responsibility to the people, and to spark civic participation of all Bosnian citizens, no matter what religious or ethnic group,” said Darko Brkan, one of the movement’s founders.<sup>57</sup> In tandem, the youth identified three core problems to impact: passive citizens, government corruption and crime, and ethnic hatred stoked by political fear tactics.<sup>58</sup>

Dosta! strives to be informal, independent, and what Brkan described as “free-minded.”<sup>59</sup> Initially, the young people simply wanted to protest, to air their concerns. In March 2006 they organized a demonstration against the increase in electricity prices by the energy regulatory commission. To their pleasant surprise, approximately 600 people—most over the age of fifty—gathered in what was then the biggest peacetime civic mobilization in the country. The novelty brought extensive media coverage but no response from officials. Nevertheless, the public’s support confirmed that in spite of a variety of grievances, citizens shared a general dissatisfaction with how the government was running the country.<sup>60</sup> Dosta! understood that it had ignited a small spark of dissent.

In subsequent years, the youth movement became synonymous with grassroots organizing, civic activism, and transcending ethnic and religious divisions. It utilized a diverse range of nonviolent tactics, such as silent marches against corruption, petitions demanding the resignation of crooked local officials, a nonviolent blockade of Sarajevo to protest police brutality, cultural activities, and alternative social services. By 2010 it was well-known to the public, powerholders, and the media. As of August 2012 there were five active chapters. Just as important, Brkan reported that new organizations have sprung from the chapters, and they are active in most of the country across ethnic divisions.<sup>61</sup> The overall vision, strategy, and planning are driven by the Sarajevo-based Coordination chapter, but each chapter functions autonomously. Decisions are consensus-based. This structure evolved over time through trial and error. The movement has no running budget, paid staff, or formal organization. It is completely volunteer driven and funded.

*From Abstract to Concrete:*

*A Prime Minister’s Shady Apartment Deal*

In early 2008 Dosta! decided that a new strategy was necessary to tackle endemic corruption. Similarly to the aforementioned Citizens Initiative for Constant Light, DHP\* (Mexico), and 5th Pillar (India), the activists faced a seemingly insurmountable challenge. They pondered how to impact something so vast—where to start and what to do. Their conclusion was to link corruption to a tangible abuse and to make an example of a public figure rather than a particular form of corruption or institution. When asked why, Brkan explained, “We targeted individuals because with Bosnian institutions it’s very hard to exact accountability. Government jurisdictions are unclear; there are lots of levels within the government, and it’s easy for [powerholders] to dispute things, block decisions, or say it’s not their responsibility.”<sup>62</sup> The leadership core de-



cided to focus on Nedžad Branković, the prime minister of the Federation of BiH, who Brkan asserted was infamous for malfeasance all the way back to 1994, when he served as director general of BiH Railways. “We connected him to the whole [corrupt] system,” he elaborated. Likewise, the young activists reasoned that if one of Bosnia’s heads of state could be held accountable for corruption, the success would impact powerholder venality, and citizens would be emboldened to continue the struggle.

The activists initially postponed the campaign in order to address deteriorating personal safety conditions in Sarajevo, epitomized by the murder of a teenager and callous indifference on the part of the prime minister of the Sarajevo Canton, Samir Silajdžić, and the Sarajevo mayor, Semiha Borovac. After months of civic mobilization in which thousands of people protested every week demanding their resignations, the movement scored another victory. In October 2008 Borovac lost the election and her party lost its majority, according to Brkan. Silajdžić was forced to resign after his party took a drubbing in local elections from which it never recovered, and it is now a small opposition party.

During the final quarter of 2008 the youth turned their attention back to the prime minister, deliberating over what to do. Early in 2009 they floated different corruption scandals to the public and attempted to engage citizens and the media, but to no avail. “Enormous amounts of money were being misused, but regular people could not relate to this,” recalled Brkan. “The public was used to living with the corrupt system, and we needed to find a way for them to see it differently and get engaged.” They zeroed in on an incident that finally resonated with the grass roots. In 2000, when Branković was director of Energoinvest, he acquired from the government, in record time, a large, luxurious apartment in one of the most exclusive parts of Sarajevo, for the equivalent of US\$500.<sup>63</sup> These underhanded transactions literally hit home; families were still struggling to find lodging and reclaim property, while housing purchases were complicated by bribery and extensive red tape. “It was something that people could grasp, it was tangible, and everyone wants one [apartment],” recounted Brkan. “This connected people to the issue,” he added.

A little-known 2007 article and online report by the Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN) originally revealed the arcane deal. The government and a state company bought the residence at huge taxpayer expense, transferred it onto a list of “excess apartments” created after the war for refugees, and then privatized it. Branković subsequently obtained it through cheap vouchers, all within several days.<sup>64</sup> Technically,

each step in the nefarious process was “legal” but could not have happened without flagrant abuse of power. The story started spreading in 2008 when Dubioza kolektiv, a popular alternative band, released a song and video called “Šuti i trpi” (Shut up and take it). It featured spliced parts of CIN’s interview with the prime minister claiming he couldn’t remember how he bought the apartment but that “it was done legally.”<sup>65</sup> However, not until the nonviolent youth movement took up the venal case did it balloon into a political issue finally undermining the prime minister and sweeping away remaining support from within his Party for Democratic Action (SDA).

### *Exactng a Cost for a Bargain-Priced Apartment*

In planning the campaign, the leadership core made strategic decisions over timing, tactics, and communications. They decided to launch the initiative in January 2009 for several reasons. According to Brkan, the 2008 local elections were over, resulting in losses for the corrupt incumbent parties. It was also the middle of Branković’s term, and he was starting to lose support from parts of his party. “We tried to use timing to our advantage,” he said. Second, Dosta! made a strategic determination to take the struggle off the street and engage in digital resistance, in order to catch the prime minister and authorities off guard. “The campaign was the first totally online campaign in BiH, which came as a total surprise to the government, since by 2009, when it took place, they were used to protests from Dosta! and prepared for them,” stated Brkan.<sup>66</sup> A third reason was to increase participation—that is, numbers—hence people power. “You need other actions for those who support you but don’t necessarily come to the street actions,” explained Brkan.

Sometime during the early hours of January 10, 2009, mysterious graffiti proclaiming, “Give back the apartment, you thief!” appeared on the building containing Branković’s apartment. The prime minister was livid over this civic defiance. He publicly insisted on quick action from law enforcement, resulting in interrogations and arrests, patrols all over Sarajevo, and police protection outside the building.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, he called on the judiciary for swift proceedings against the perpetrators and for the Parliament to launch an investigation.<sup>68</sup> And in a gift to Dosta!, he accused the movement of molesting him, Brkan said. His heavy-handed reaction backfired spectacularly and created momentum for the campaign.<sup>69</sup> Not only did all of BiH hear about the graffiti, the shady apartment acquisition was elevated to national prominence, generating widespread outrage. The establishment media, not particularly known for taking venal powerholders to task, covered the action and character-

ized his response as arrogant.<sup>70</sup> The youth pounced on the opportunity.<sup>71</sup> The movement mobilized the public in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina through imaginative, low-risk, humorous tactics all united by one demand: Branković's resignation.

### *Innovative Tactics*

The resourceful activists created a Facebook group called, "I Wrote the Graffiti," which launched digital dilemma actions. Within two days, over 7,000 people joined, each posting a photo along with his or her name.<sup>72</sup> It was a phenomenal number for the small country. The Facebook group then encouraged citizens to flood police stations with phone calls and emails declaring, "Arrest me, I wrote the graffiti."<sup>73</sup> The authorities received over 4,000 electronic messages alone.<sup>74</sup> Consequently, they were put in an awkward, lose-lose situation, while the movement gained publicity and mobilized the grass roots. Meanwhile, through Facebook, thousands of citizen-members were communicating, sharing, and brainstorming. Out of the digital grass roots came a new dilemma action: billboard "advertisements." With Dosta!'s blessing, some Facebookers collected donations. "We looked at what we could rent with the money, and the company gave us four more because they liked us," said Brkan. On January 24, ten billboards in highly prominent spots around Sarajevo proclaimed, "Apartment for only KM 920! Get real estate in accordance to the law."<sup>75</sup> Within forty-eight hours the Cantonal government quickly ordered most of the billboards to be razed, maintaining that they were illegal and had been marked for removal the previous July, though Brkan reported they had been up for years.<sup>76</sup> As is common with dilemma actions, the authorities' efforts to muzzle dissent rebounded. According to Brkan, "All the media, even international, covered it, and they [the government] were totally disgraced."<sup>77</sup>

Around the same time, the movement added another dilemma action to the arsenal—clothing. Through its chapters, members distributed approximately 2,000 T-shirts emblazoned with the words, "I wrote the graffiti." They were so popular that many citizens fashioned their own, while personalities wore them on television, including the band leader of Dubioza kolektiv. "You could see people wearing them on the street," recalled Brkan. The activists also disseminated roughly 2,000 badges and 25,000 stickers, all with the same message.

As soon as the civic initiative was under way, the activists sought to maximize media coverage in order to reach and engage those who weren't digitally active, and to ratchet up social pressure. Brkan summarized, "Once it [the campaign] got started we established a communica-

tions strategy in terms of what media to approach and how to use the Internet. We set up a plan to be present as much as possible and get [media] focus on the graffiti and T-shirts. Also, we had a communications plan for [civic] groups on the ground and potential allies who could support us.” Dosta!’s key messages were as follows: the prime minister is corrupt and misusing his position, he should resign, he should give back the apartment, and “I wrote the graffiti.” The latter message, according to Brkan, “was the most important for public engagement.” It was short, simple, and inclusive. Implying that any Bosnian could have written the graffiti built a sense of mutual outrage and collective identity.

### *Outcomes*

As a result of the civic mobilization, Branković was left with few supporters within his own party. Its members worried about his negative impact on the October 2010 elections. In civil resistance parlance, they shifted loyalties. Consequently, at the May 2009 SDA congress, he was asked to resign. He complied one month later, a year and a half before the end of his term. Meanwhile, in April of that year, the prime minister, along with former prime minister Edhem Bičakčić (who signed off on the apartment scam while in office), were charged with abuse of office and authority.<sup>78</sup> They stood trial before the Municipal Court of Sarajevo but were acquitted in 2010 on the grounds that it was done “in accordance to the law,” Brkan explained. “The law was meant for people to buy the publicly owned apartments which they had been living in, and not for the government to make an apartment ‘public’ by buying it in cash from an individual and then ‘selling’ it to the prime minister for 1 percent of its value a few days later,” he said. Brkan doesn’t dispute the ruling but sees this as an example of how the judicial system is flawed and is susceptible to abuse by those in power. “The judges were right that it was done ‘in accordance to the law,’ but exactly that fact that it could be done that way and that the guy who has everything used this to get the apartment actually forced him to resign in the end.”

Dosta!’s campaign had two less tangible but equally important outcomes. For Brkan, it built up the movement’s credibility and membership, thereby increasing its numbers and enhancing its sustainability. Second, civil resistance changed the nature of the relationship and the balance of power between the government and politicians, on the one hand, and the civic realm on the other. The young activist explained,

It created different connections between civil society and citizens, civil society and politicians, and between citizens and the political

system. Once you accomplish something like this, this creates a new set of rules in the political system. By impacting the political system and basic structures in their [powerholders'] decisionmaking process, civil society and citizens have more power in society.

In conclusion, not only did relationships change, the campaign created a new, bottom-up link between powerholders and the people that is qualitatively different from elections, the traditional medium through which the populace exerts power and gains accountability. "They have to calculate this into their decisionmaking," he concluded. A potent example of this altered dynamic was soon evident. Two days after the new prime minister, Mustafa Mujezinović, took office, he showed up at a Dosta! protest "to talk with us and try to meet our demands," Brkan recollected. On the spot he invited Dosta! to join him on a television program to discuss his mandate. A Dosta! member, Demir Mahmutćehajić, was plucked from the street and went off with the prime minister to the TV station.

### **Changing Citizens to Change Mexico**

Back in November 2008 a group of ten friends felt that they could no longer ignore the harsh reality: "México no va bien" (Mexico is on the wrong track), said Maite Azuela, one of DHP\*'s founders.<sup>79</sup> Narcoviolence was claiming the lives of thousands of civilians following President Felipe Calderon's so-called war on drugs. The global financial crisis had triggered a deep economic slump, the worst since the 1930s. Last but not least, powerholder corruption and impunity were endemic.<sup>80</sup> For example, some surveys have found that lower-income households spend 33 percent of their monthly income on bribes.<sup>81</sup> The group decided they needed to act to save their beloved country, and they could only do this together with fellow citizens who shared their concern. To gauge interest for a civic movement, they launched a chat on the website of *El Universal*, one of the most influential and widely read newspapers in the country. To their astonishment, 6,000 people participated. "We learned that people wanted to join, to do something, but they didn't know how to start," Azuela recalled.

They also tested a controversial name—*Dejemos de Hacernos Pendejos* (aka DHP\*)—meant to be provocative and fun, yet serious and inclusive. While the literal translation is, "Quit being an ass/Quit being an idiot," the actual meaning is, "Let's stop fooling ourselves." She explained that the name itself is a "call to action" that connotes collective responsibility for Mexico's situation, as "pendejos" is phrased in both

the first person and the plural. “There is a tendency in Mexico to blame the government, but we said that we citizens are not doing our work to fight corruption and improve our country,” avowed Azuela. “What Mexico needs is for citizens to start organizing themselves.”

The group quickly hashed out the parameters for the nascent movement. DHP\*’s vision is to get Mexico back on track politically, socially, and economically. Its mission is to “produce an effective change in the way people understand their citizenship. Being a citizen does not imply only the exercise of our rights, it also means assuming responsibilities.”<sup>82</sup> This encapsulates overcoming general public apathy and channeling citizen aspirations for change into organized action. DHP\*’s overall objectives are to

- Generate civic initiatives that catalyze changes in the everyday life of citizens.
- Break the cultural paradigm of complicity, so that society rejects corruption, apathy, and irresponsibility.
- Channel anger over graft and impunity by empowering citizens to assume their responsibility to hold powerholders to account and ensure that public services, resources, and budgets are used in an honest, transparent, and effective way for the common good rather than for powerholder gain.
- Support efforts of state and nonstate institutions and organizations to foster citizen responsibility.

After having generated interest through the newspaper chat, the group started a Facebook page that quickly grew to 4,000 friends. Azuela recalled, “We thought that in Facebook people would spontaneously form smaller groups around the country and do their own campaigns. But people here are waiting to be told what to do. It’s a paternalistic culture after decades of nondemocratic government.” Hence, the original group of ten realized that abstract exhortations, what Azuela called “a beautiful discourse,” in and of itself would not spur citizens. DHP\* would have to be the catalyst for action. The group decided to zero in on legislators in the Mexican Congress, who are generally viewed as holding office to advance their political parties, special interests, and personal agendas rather than serving the people.<sup>83</sup>

They identified an issue—Christmas bonuses—that would not only rankle the public but symbolize the corruption and impunity embedded in the political system. Employees in Mexico customarily receive a holiday bonus equivalent to one month’s salary, which is taxed as income.

Mexican deputies (members of Congress) also receive this benefit, but, unbeknownst to the public, abuse their authority to get a tax refund. After the 2008 bonus, only 4 of the 500 deputies returned their refund to the Treasury. First, DHP\*'s leadership core examined the "Transparency and Access to Information" law to see if it could be used, but the fit was not right. A lawyer in the group then studied the Mexican constitution and discovered that citizens have the right to petition the state. According to Azuela, not only are public authorities obliged to respond within three months, they must also address the alleged wrongdoing or face sanctions. The lawyer concluded that the deputies' refund was illegal, and DHP\* had the foundation upon which to utilize the Citizen Petition Law.

### *Testing the Waters*

During December 2008 the core group planned its first campaign, named Operation DHP\* 001. Its goal was to stop the Christmas bonus tax refund by combining institutional (legal) measures and extrainstitutional pressure—that is, people power. In addition to legal measures taken through the Citizen Petition Law, during January and February 2009, DHP\* conducted a citizens' petition drive with a catchy, humorous slogan based on a colloquial expression—"Diputados coludos, ciudadanos rabones" (Long-tailed deputies, short-tailed citizens), meaning, "While the deputies take public money, the citizens lose it." In addition to using Facebook, the movement's website, and emails, it organized on-the-ground signature collections in Mexico City, while Facebookers in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Merida, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, Tuxtla, and Yucatán organized their own actions. The leadership core provided them with a one-page petition and guidelines on collecting signatures and "citizen language" to explain the campaign, said Azuela. The activists made a strategic decision to combine digital and on-the-ground resistance. First, it wanted to get the attention of traditional media, in order to broaden public dialogue and garner more support. Second, explained Azuela, "We needed to go out of Facebook to see if people wanted to do more than click." All in all, DHP\* gathered a total of 4,000 handwritten and electronic signatures and submitted the petition to the Congress.

The next step was to ratchet up civic pressure. By then, the media had started taking notice, and DHP\*'s team conducted radio and newspaper interviews. Adding an element of international pressure, they wrote an article for the online site of *El Pais*, the highly influential and largest-circulation daily newspaper in Spain. The activists produced an online guide for citizens—publicized through Facebook, its website,

and in the media—on how to send e-mails and make calls to legislators about the Christmas bonus tax refund. Of the 150 emails and thirty reported calls, not one reply came back from a member of Congress.

In spite of efforts behind the scenes to thwart the petition and stall the process of inquiry, DHP\* achieved what Azuela termed a “larger victory.” Following the 2009 legislative elections, the incoming members of the LXI Legislature (2009–2012) stopped refunding themselves the Christmas bonus tax. “It was more important than a legal victory because we changed the corrupt practice,” asserted Azuela.<sup>84</sup>

### *DHP\* in Full Swing*

As the Operation DHP\* 001 campaign progressed, the budding movement joined a coalition of seventy civic organizations—the National Citizens Assembly—that called on voters to boycott the 2009 parliamentary elections on July 5 by submitting blank ballots. The purpose was to withdraw cooperation from the political system in which all the parties were viewed as corrupt. As a result, 5 percent of the ballots were annulled, she reported. The campaign sent a message that a sizeable number of citizens were dissatisfied with the political parties and no longer intimidated to collectively raise their voices. The experience proved invaluable for DHP\*. It discovered shared concerns, established contact with many CSOs, and perhaps most importantly, helped to crystallize its priorities.

Impunity—defined by Azuela as “no consequences, no accountability, no punishment for wrongdoing”—characterizes both the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as state institutions. Rather than attempt to tackle the problem in its entirety, DHP\* made a strategic decision to limit its focus on the Congress, for three principal reasons. First, there generally was more scrutiny of the president than the legislature. Second, the latter decides on the budget and spends public money. Third, all the major parties are represented in the Congress. Consequently, challenging politicians can impact the entire corrupt political system rather than one party, as would be the case with the president. In the ensuing years, DHP\*’s campaigns have focused on

- Decreasing the publicly financed budgets of political parties.
- Empowering citizens to exercise their right to information about congressional activities and spending through tactics such as monitoring.
- Changing the Freedom of Information act to apply to political parties.



- Impeding political corruption.
- Holding legislators accountable.
- Instituting participatory democracy mechanisms into the legislative branch—for example, independent candidacies, federal referendums, and citizen-initiated legislation.

### *Attributes*

Social media provides essential tools for DHP\* to build unity, raise public awareness, and mobilize citizens. Facebook helped jump-start the movement. It provided an easy, inexpensive medium to reach people, which was particularly important for the emerging movement because it did not have access to traditional media. Twitter soon became indispensable for communication with the public and the media, including its capacity to share videos from nonviolent actions, which can increase citizen participation in real time. Humor has been a hallmark of the movement since its inception. Most of its campaigns incorporate catchy names, attention-getting stunts, and nonviolent actions characterized by levity and fun—a strategic decision on the part of DHP\* to engage citizens, overcome fear, and balance somber messages about corruption, impunity, violence, and hopelessness. The movement's founding core is largely made up of young professionals, including a lawyer, an advertising and public relations expert, editors, a media intellectual, and graduate students and professors. The friends meet monthly in the capital to strategize, plan, and carry out actions. Decisions are jointly made. Local DHP\* groups in other parts of the country operate semiautonomously. They develop their own initiatives while cooperating with the founding core on national campaigns.

### *Highlights*

Since 2009 DHP\* has carried out multiple campaigns, intended to incrementally build a nationwide discourse that citizens have the responsibility to save Mexico. The process has been one of experimentation and trial and error. Among the initiatives DHP\* has conducted are the following:

*Ya Bájénle (Right Now, Go Down)*. From October to December 2009, DHP\* challenged legislators to cut the budget for political parties rather than funding for infrastructure and social services. The movement called on citizens to contact their legislator through the DHP\* website; 3,000 e-mails were sent. Once again, not one person received a reply. Using Twitter and Facebook, the activists organized a twenty-four-hour activity at El Ángel, a prominent park and memorial site in Mexico

City. Called the Citizens Light, they hooked up a light on a stationary bicycle that would turn on when people pedaled. Azuela reported that there was a line of 200 people waiting to ride the bike when they started. People from other states around the country sent in messages of solidarity. Sympathetic journalists and a few members of Congress also joined the action to show their support. Some media coverage and DHP\*'s live video, broadcast through their website and Twitter, brought out hundreds throughout the night. A deputy from the right-of-center PAN (National Action Party) took DHP\*'s proposal to the Congress and secured a *transitorio* (temporary provision) stipulating that the amount of any reduction of the political parties' budget should be allocated to the infrastructure and social services budget. Two months later, a senator from the left-of-center PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) presented the movement's proposal to the Senate. In spite of these efforts, Azuela stated that nothing happened as the rest of the political parties did not support the measure.

*Aventon Ciudadano (Citizen Ride)*. Building upon input from citizen meetings in the capital, Guadalajara, Tlaxcala, and Monterrey in January 2010, DHP\* began planning a new campaign to decrease the budget of political parties. During April and May, DHP\* volunteers began a hitchhiking trek toward Mexico City from four different parts of Mexico (north, northwest, southwest, southeast). Each group carried part of a letter addressed to the Chamber of Deputies, containing the movement's demands. They relied on citizens, asking for their assistance if they supported the initiative. Their journeys were filmed in real time and transmitted via mobile phones and Twitter. At a public gathering, the four groups met at El Ángel park, whereupon they put together the letter and presented it to the Chamber of Deputies. The campaign garnered significant media coverage and increased public support for DHP\*.

*Operación 003/500sobre500 (500over500)*. Focusing on the new Congress, in February 2010 DHP\* initiated a monitoring campaign through an interactive platform on its website. Five hundred citizens were invited to "adopt" their respective deputy. The objectives were to empower regular people to track and evaluate their representatives' work, in order to improve congressional transparency and accountability. As well, DHP\* sought to pressure legislators to respond to constituent email and phone requests for information about their activities, budgeting, and voting. Citizens were equipped with a special guide and instructions on requesting information through the digital platform. Azuela stated that over 2,000 people took part, four times the anticipated num-

ber. Initially, some deputies responded to constituents but soon reverted to business as usual—ignoring those they were supposed to serve.

*Diputómetro.* As a result of the deputies' disregard, the leadership core went back to the drawing board. It subsequently launched the *Diputómetro*, an interactive digital monitoring platform that aggregates information about legislative activities—for example, attendance at sessions and in committees, numbers of initiatives approved, and the quantity of committee meetings. Volunteers, mainly students recruited from universities, maintain the platform.

*No al Chapulizano (No to the Jumping Crickets).* Begun in August 2011 the campaign wants to change state and federal legislation and political party statutes in order to stop elected officials who have not finished their term from running for another office that would overlap with their current position. DHP\* activists carry out highly visible and humorous stunts—for example, traversing the Senate wearing masks resembling the politicians who jump elected positions. They succeeded in generating media coverage and public awareness. “Nowadays, many people talk about the crickets,” recounted Azuela.

*Café DHP\*.* Initiated in January 2012, DHP\* convenes monthly group discussions on such issues as active citizenship, civic responsibility, anticorruption, civil liberties, access to justice, and social networking. They are held in multiple locations, from the capital to Puebla, Querétaro, and Yucatán. Each local group organizes its own events and decides on the topics and format. The inaugural café in Mexico City focused on Internet censorship and included Senators Javier Castellon (PRD); Oscar Mondragon, the social media strategist for 2012 presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador; and Antonio Marvel, a digital activist.

### *Outcomes*

DHP\* is maintaining momentum, building a base of local chapters, and experimenting through creative campaigns to generate civic responsibility and citizen action for transparency, accountability, and participatory democracy. Azuela reported that citizens have started to shake off apathy—by 2010, regular people began taking the initiative to contact DHP\* to report about corruption, and as importantly, to ask what they themselves could do to tackle problems. “It’s an enormous achievement for us, that we are awakening citizens’ minds to not let things go to the same old, corrupted way, but to want to change them and create new ways of acting,” she said. DHP\* chapters around the country are not only initiating their own actions, they are developing solutions for local

problems. Last but not least was the Christmas bonus success. It serves as a potent example of how, when institutions—in this case the Congress and judiciary—fail citizens, citizens can still carry the day.

### Conclusion

The five cases illustrate the many different approaches that grassroots, bottom-up initiatives can take to what ultimately are common challenges. The groups' objectives stem from how to undermine corruption when it is entrenched and pervasive, while the public is resigned, indifferent, and often fearful to express dissent. The long-term goals are usually transformative in nature, enveloped within a vision of a just society whereby citizens assume collective responsibility, recognize their inherent power, and wield it strategically in order to hold to account those at the top. While, on the surface, this approach may seem abstract or even utopian, in each instance these people power initiatives have made visible strides toward these ends.

In Chapter 11, I move from the individual cases to the wider application of people power to curb corruption and gain accountability, rights, and justice. I distill common attributes, general lessons learned, and noteworthy patterns that expand our understanding of civil resistance, people power, the practice of democracy, and citizen engagement.

### Notes

1. The Turkish gladios are far-right, ultranationalist paramilitary squads. They were active during the civil war between the state and Kurdish separatists in the southeastern part of the country that began in 1984 and raged during the early part of the 1990s. The gladios and the mafia took control of lucrative drug-trafficking routes from eastern producers for the large European market. They grew in size and influence as they amassed huge, illicit fortunes (Ezel Akay and Liam Mahoney, *A Call to End Corruption* [Minneapolis: Center for Victims of Torture, 2003]).

2. This section is based on an interview with Ersin Salman, one of the leaders of the Citizen Initiative for Constant Light, on June 20, 2010, and the following resources: Akay and Mahoney, *Call to End Corruption*; Ümit Kıvanç, *Action for Constant Light: Turkey, 1997* (documentary film), <http://www.gecetreni.com>.

3. According to Salman, the “deep state” refers to a network that is part of the state but operates clandestinely to thwart genuine democracy, public debate of sensitive issues, and citizen dissent. It is said to engage in repression against whatever and whomever it deems a threat to its interests and nationalist agenda. Akay defined the “deep state” as “those in the establishment who use state power and authority illegally to maintain corruption and prevent reforms to-

ward democratization, the rule of law, transparency and accountability of the administration.” A BBC report stated that Turks suspect that the deep state is composed of groups linked to the security forces, originally formed in the 1950s, to carry out illegal activities, including assassinations, in order to “protect” the republic. See Akay and Mahoney, *Call to End Corruption*, 6; Sarah Rainsford, “‘Deep State’ Trial Polarises Turkey,” BBC World News, October 23, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

4. Akay and Mahoney, *Call to End Corruption*, 8.

5. Gökçe was the first to be tried in court, receiving a three-year sentence, which was later reduced to a fine, allowing his release; “Rally on First Anniversary of Susurluk Scandal,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 3, 1997, [www.hurriyetdailynews.com](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com).

6. Akay and Mahoney, *Call to End Corruption*, 10.

7. *Ibid.*, 9.

8. *Ibid.*, 13.

9. *Ibid.*, 2.

10. There was one fatality, due to police violence. Forty-five-year-old Celal Cankoru was out on an evening walk with his wife. Upon reaching Cumhuriyet Square, where a demonstration was under way, he asked a police officer what was going on. In response, he was hit on the head with a two-way radio and shoved into a minibus (“The Dangers of Being a Citizen,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, January 17, 1998, [www.hurriyetdailynews.com](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com)).

11. Akay and Mahoney, *Call to End Corruption*, 14.

12. Zafer Yoruk, “One Minute of Darkness—Back for Democracy,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, April 4, 1997, [www.hurriyetdailynews.com](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com).

13. “World Report 2012: Turkey,” Human Rights Watch, January 2012, 3, [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org).

14. Dexter Filkins, “Threats and Responses: Ankara—Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops,” *New York Times*, March 2, 2003, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

15. “Turkish Protesters to Hold ‘One Minute of Darkness’ on Various Issues,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, May 1, 2011, [www.hurriyetdailynews.com](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com).

16. Sherif Mansour, “Enough Is Not Enough: Achievements and Shortcomings of Kefaya, the Egyptian Movement for Change,” in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 205–218; Mansour, “From Facebook to Streetbook,” webinar, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, February 17, 2011, [www.nonviolent-conflict.org](http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org).

17. This section is based on interviews with Engi Haddad, one of the founders of shayfeen.com and Egyptians Against Corruption, on November 12, 2009 (in person), and August 11, 2012 (via SKYPE), subsequent written communications, and the following resources: Shaazka Beyerle and Arwa Hassan, “Popular Resistance Against Corruption in Turkey and Egypt,” in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 265–280; Sherief Elkatshas, *Shayfeen.com: We’re Watching You*, Independent Television Service International film, 2007, [www.itvs.org](http://www.itvs.org); Robin Wright, *Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East* (New York: Penguin, 2008).

18. Beyerle and Hassan, “Popular Resistance,” 270; Elkatshas, *Shayfeen.com*.

19. Elkatshas, *Shayfeen.com*.
20. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*.
21. Beyerle and Hassan, "Popular Resistance," 270.
22. Ibid.
23. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*.
24. Ibid.
25. Beyerle and Hassan, "Popular Resistance," 271.
26. GSM phones are mobile devices using the global system for mobile communications.
27. Shayfeen.com website, <http://www.shayfeencom.org/pageView.aspx?pageid=4> (accessed January 28, 2013); Beyerle and Hassan, "Popular Resistance."
28. Elkatshas, *Shayfeen.com*.
29. Ibid.
30. Christine Spolar, "Egypt Court Rejects Appeal," *Chicago Tribune*, May 19, 2006, <http://articles.chicagotribune.com>.
31. Beyerle and Hassan, "Popular Resistance," 273.
32. "Egypt's Parliamentary Election a Farce: ElBaradei," BBC News, December 8, 2010, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).
33. "Background of MUHURI," MUHURI website, <http://www.muhuri.org/index.php> (accessed February 1, 2013).
34. Ibid.
35. This section is based on an interview with Hussein Khalid, executive director, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), on November 12, 2010, and the following sources: Vivek Ramkumar and Sowmya Kidambi, "Twataka Pesa Zetu (We Want Our Money): A Public Budget Hearing in Kenya," International Budget Partnership, n.d., [www.internationalbudget.org](http://www.internationalbudget.org); Damani Baker, *It's Our Money: Where's It Gone?* International Budget Partnership documentary film, [www.youtube.com](http://www.youtube.com).
36. Ramkumar and Kidambi, "Twataka Pesa Zetu."
37. "Social Audits in Kenya: Budget Transparency and Accountability," International Budget Partnership Impact Story, 2008, <http://internationalbudget.org>.
38. For an excellent case study on the Indian Right to Information movement, see Sowmya Kidambi, *Right to Know, Right to Live: Building a Campaign for the Right to Information and Accountability* (Minneapolis: Center for Victims of Torture, 2008).
39. To download the handbook, see Wanjiru Kikoyo, *The CDF Social Audit Guide: A Handbook for Communities* (Nairobi: Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, February 2008), [www.opensocietyfoundations.org](http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org).
40. The previously cited twenty-minute documentary on the MUHURI social audits captures on film this defining method, as well as parts of the 2007 CDF training.
41. Ramkumar and Kidambi, "Twataka Pesa Zetu."
42. Baker, *It's Our Money*.
43. Ramkumar and Kidambi, "Twataka Pesa Zetu," 3.
44. Baker, *It's Our Money*.
45. Ibid.

46. Manuela Garza, "Social Audits as a Budget Monitoring Tool," International Budget Partnership, Learning from Each Other Series, October 2012, 6, <http://internationalbudget.org>.

47. Rocio Campos, "Kenya's Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) Takes Its Success with Social Audits to the Next Level," International Budget Partnership newsletter, no. 58, January–February 2011, <http://internationalbudget.org>.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Baker, *It's Our Money*.

51. The delay was due to the groundbreaking new constitution ratified by voters in 2010, which enshrines the right to information and the right to petition for enacting, amending, and repealing legislation under Article 119. For information about the new Kenyan constitution, see "Countries at the Crossroads: Kenya," Freedom House, 2012, [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org); Faith Muiruri, "New Law Guarantees Right to Information, Representation," *The Link*, Special Report, November 2012, [www.kas.de](http://www.kas.de).

52. Baker, *It's Our Money*.

53. Garza, "Social Audits as a Budget Monitoring Tool," 6.

54. Faith Ronoh, "Commission to Investigate Kenyan MPs over CDF Use," *The Standard*, February 3, 2013, [www.standardmedia.co.ke](http://www.standardmedia.co.ke).

55. "Social Audits in Kenya."

56. Bosnia was engulfed in the ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995. The ethnically divided Bosniak, Serb, and Croat country is characterized by organized crime infiltration of the state, endemic corruption, politicization of the public sector, complex power-sharing structures, disjointed administration, and venal political elites that collude with criminal and informal economic networks that have persisted since the war. Marie Chêne, "Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)," U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, November 23, 2009, [www.u4.no](http://www.u4.no).

57. Darko Brkan, recorded interview: Dosta! Movement, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, June 24, 2010, [www.nonviolent-conflict.org](http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org).

58. Darko Brkan, "Civil Resistance in Bosnia: Pressure by the People for Accountability and Social Change," PowerPoint presentation, June 24, 2010, [www.nonviolent-conflict.org](http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org).

59. Brkan, recorded interview.

60. This section is based on SKYPE interviews with Darko Brkan, one of the founders of Dosta! on May 3, 5, and 19, 2011, and June 12, 2011.

61. For additional information about Dosta!'s activities, innovations, and outcomes beyond the campaign profiled in this chapter, see Brkan, recorded interview; Brkan, "Building a Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Movements.org*, Build Awareness post, n.d., [www.movements.org](http://www.movements.org).

62. Bosnia-Herzegovina's postwar constitutional and institutional structures were put in place through the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. It is confusingly complex, leaving governance open to corruption vertically within the executive and legislative branches and state institutions, as well as horizontally. The country comprises two entities, the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska. They both have their own parliaments, and the Federation of BiH has ten cantons, each with its own parliament. In addition, there is the self-governing Dis-

trict of Brčko and an overall “House of People.” Essentially, there are a total of fourteen parliaments—all for a population estimated at 3.8 million in 2012 (there has been no official census in the aftermath of the war). For further background, see “Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, March 15, 2012, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov); Brkan, recorded interview.

63. According to the Center for Investigative Reporting, which uncovered the graft, Branković paid 900 KM (BiH Marka) for the apartment, which had a market value of 500,000 KM. For further details, see “A Lucky Real Estate Deal,” Center for Investigative Reporting, September 4, 2007, [www.cin.ba](http://www.cin.ba); “Branković—From a Tenant to a Rich Man,” Center for Investigative Reporting, December 22, 2009, [www.cin.ba](http://www.cin.ba).

64. Rosemary Armao, *Covering Corruption: The Difficulties of Trying to Make a Difference* (Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, National Endowment for Democracy, July 21, 2010), 9.

65. “Branković, Bičakčić Indicted,” Center for Investigative Journalism, April 17, 2009, [www.cin.ba](http://www.cin.ba). Youtube has the video: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oXobejzkijo>.

66. Brkan, “Building a Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

67. *Ibid.*

68. Armao, *Covering Corruption*; Brkan, “Building a Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

69. After the furor subsided, no evidence emerged and there were no trials.

70. “Anatomy of a Resignation,” Center for Investigative Reporting, July 15, 2009, [www.cin.ba](http://www.cin.ba).

71. To this day, Brkan maintains he doesn’t know who was behind the graffiti and Dosta! was not officially the instigator. This assertion doesn’t preclude that someone or some individuals in or affiliated with the group took the action.

72. Brkan, “Building a Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

73. Brkan, recorded interview.

74. “Branković Apartment Billboards Gone,” Center for Investigative Journalism, January 30, 2009, [www.cin.ba](http://www.cin.ba).

75. *Ibid.*

76. *Ibid.*

77. Brkan, “Building a Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

78. “Branković, Bičakčić Indicted.”

79. This section is based on interviews with Maite Azuela, a cofounder of DHP\*, on February 11 and November 11, 2010, and email correspondence during December 2011.

80. “Mexico Country Profile,” BBC News, July 4, 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

81. Max Heywood, “Wanted: A Replacement for ‘Petty,’” Transparency International, Space for Transparency blog, June 28, 2012, <http://blog.transparency.org>.

82. DHP\*, unpublished document, n.d.

83. The Mexican National Congress is bicameral, consisting of the Senate (Camara de Senadores) and the Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Diputados).

84. The legal track did not succeed. According to Azuela, the argument against the citizens’ petition was that there wasn’t enough evidence to prove the deputies were guilty. She stated that they went all the way to the Supreme Court and finally lost the case.