11

What We Have Learned

While it may seem paradoxical at first, the more deeply I ventured into the cases—their individual contexts, histories, founders, strategies—the more I found in common. Patterns emerged that contribute to our understanding of civil resistance, genuine democracy, and anticorruption strategies. Similar attributes were evident across varying situations, and from the multitude of lessons learned, recurrent themes jumped out. I summarize these findings in this chapter.

Notable Patterns

Corruption Breeds Corruption

Many of the civic leaders expressed dismay that endemic corruption never seems to taper off; it just gets worse. Why is this so? A systemic approach offers an explanation. In Chapter 2, I presented a systemic, macro definition of corruption as a system of abuse of entrusted power for private, collective, or political gain—that involves a complex, intertwined set of relationships, some obvious, others hidden, with established vested interests, that can operate vertically within an institution or horizontally across political, economic, and social spheres in a society or transnationally. The implications are twofold. Not only are systems of graft and abuse unlikely to reform from within, they are prone to growing ever more venal because more and more graft is needed in order to maintain vested interests and the crooked status quo.

Conditions Are Not Determinants

The cases add to the historical record and ever-growing body of scholarship illustrating that structural conditions do not play determining roles in the success of people power. The connotations for the anticorruption and development realms are clear; the time has come to set aside the myth that a set of conditions needs to be in place in order for citizens to have "voice," for the grass roots to mobilize, and for people power to have an impact (see Chapter 1). Bottom-up nonviolent campaigns and movements to curb corruption and gain accountability, rights, and justice can be found in virtually every part of the world and across the spectrum of governments, from democracies to dictatorships and various permutations in between. No particular region, racial or ethnic group, or religion has a monopoly on civil resistance efforts. They are prevalent in societies enduring poor governance, poverty, low levels of literacy, and severe repression, the latter perpetrated by the state, organized crime, or paramilitary groups. I would even contend that the most innovative, effective, grassroots civic initiatives now come from the Global South, not the Global North, where populations generally enjoy higher levels of civil liberties and rule of law. Citizens in mature democracies who are increasingly alarmed over the connection between corruption and a host of serious challenges—such as financial crises, special interest politics, and poor governance—would do well to learn from their counterparts who are making strides in far less congenial settings.

Bottom-Up Democracy

What distinguishes these people power manifestations from traditional antidictatorship or occupation movements is that the goals are not to remove an authoritarian government or an occupier, but to change an overall system of graft, abuse, and impunity—be it vertically within one entity or horizontally across multiple institutions and societal sectors. In some instances, a civic initiative may have an interim target, as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this is couched within a broader struggle with far-reaching goals, and the immediate objective is to unsettle the status quo.

In transitions from violent conflict (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina) or authoritarian rule (Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey) to democracy and peace, we should not assume that corruption will dissipate. More often than not, venality persists. Many of the same players retain influence and power, and systems of graft and abuse reconfigure as vested interests adapt to the new situation. A civic leader and aca-

demic in Korea explained, "Politicians and institutional political parties have had a strong power to resist the reform and could continue to distort the reform itself to keep their status-quo interests untouched."[1] Thus, one of the greatest challenges to the consolidation of fledgling democracies is the persistence of such malfeasant, self-serving powerholder systems.

When voters have limited choices beyond obstructive politicians backed by corrupt parties, representative democracy alone cannot deliver accountability and justice, and can even lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Consequently, both top-down and bottom-up strategies are needed. "Political will means from the top. People power is from the bottom up. We need both if we want democracy," observed Dadang Trisasongko, one of the Indonesian civic leaders of the first Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption Commission (CICAK) campaign (see Chapter 5).[2] Top-down strategies include building mechanisms, legislation, and capacity within state institutions. Bottom-up strategies maintain extrainstitutional pressure to create political will, support honest powerholders, back genuine reform efforts, and creatively disrupt the corrupt status quo. How long do transitions take? Reflecting on Indonesia's experience since the end of the Suharto regime, Trisasongko said, "We are still in a transition. It is not completed yet. It depends on the effectiveness of people power. If we have more pressure from people, the transition may be shortened."[3]

Anticorruption civic initiatives can either be the precursors to national democracy movements (Egypt) or the successors of them (Brazil, Indonesia, Korea). In the first instance, shayfeen.com gave birth to Egyptians Against Corruption and catalyzed the judges' campaign. In turn, Egyptians Against Corruption was one of the currents of organized civic dissent that merged into the mighty river of the January 25 Revolution that brought an end to the Mubarak regime. In the second instance, civic leaders—who witnessed how graft and abuse were hindering development, harming citizens, and undermining their hard-won victories—decided to take action. The Indonesian and Korean campaigns illuminate another factor that impacts democratic transitions. Leaders and activists of social movements develop lasting bonds through nonviolent struggles to end authoritarian rule. During what can be called the second phase, namely, the aftermath, they often remain activists and civil society leaders, committed to consolidating democracy, transforming the venal system inherited from the dictatorial regime, and building just societies. They continue to work together—sometimes formally, other times informally. When common threats are perceived, they

activate long-standing relationships, networks, and organizations to fight corruption and impunity, and to mobilize their fellow citizens.

Civic anticorruption initiatives are incubators of democracy. First, they can build democracy at the grass roots through action—via informal elections (Afghanistan), surveys (Afghanistan, Uganda, Korea), reporting to fellow citizens (Afghanistan, Kenya), and even voting for anticorruption heroes (Egypt). Second, as witnessed in Afghanistan, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, Korea, and Uganda, they are "exercises in participatory democracy that challenge the traditional 'rules of the game' in governance."[4] Through people power, citizens have the potential to hold politicians and state officials to account. Among the cases, methods included delegitimizing fraudulent elections (Egypt), pushing for accountability legislation (Brazil, India, Kenya), blacklisting "unfit" candidates (Korea), banning venal legislators from holding office (Brazil), and challenging corrupt practices (India, Kenya, Mexico).

Changing Power Relations

Civic campaigns and movements targeting corruption can redefine the relationship between the bottom and the top. The research found that regular people, even among the disadvantaged, moved from resignation to action. Instead of prostrating before malfeasant powerholders or shrinking in fear, people held powerholders to account through nonviolent actions (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, India, Kenya, Uganda, Korea) and disrupted the corrupt status quo (Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Turkey). They invigorated representative democracies nonetheless plagued by corrupt politics (Brazil, Korea). The latter turned voting into an act of rebellion against having to choose from among unsatisfactory candidates selected by relatively unaccountable political parties. All in all, these cases redefined the role of citizens, who became active interlocutors vis-à-vis their governments and the state, thereby changing the power equation between the bottom and the top. The most profound example came from an unassuming spot—rural southwestern Uganda. Toward the end of a civic campaign to curb police corruption, local officers turned to the grass roots for help to overcome the problems and injustices they faced within their institution.

Through the lens of civil resistance, negotiation is a tactic that can be used both during and at the cessation of a civic campaign or movement. In the anticorruption realm, negotiation can help achieve interim goals and small victories, such as gaining access to information (Afghanistan or Kenya) or establishing a cooperative relationship with

an institution plagued by corruption (Uganda). Negotiation can offer strategic benefits as well, even when the probability for gains is low (Korea). In this instance, it can build legitimacy for both the civic initiative and citizen action by demonstrating that an effort was made to engage with powerholders, which in turn can build support, engage the public, and delegitimize corruptors.

Unity

Civil resistance scholar Peter Ackerman points out that unity of people and goals is critical to citizen mobilization and successful nonviolent campaigns and movements. Anticorruption civic initiatives broaden our understanding of unity. First, they illuminate its psychological and emotional underpinnings. Unity is built upon widely held grievances, collective ownership of the struggle, and what sociologist Lee Smithey calls collective identity, defined as "a sense of 'we-ness' that derives or emerges from shared cognitions and beliefs."[5] Second, the cases shed light on the underlying dynamics of unity, which is fueled by a shared sense of outrage, and sometimes a commonly perceived source of the injustice or oppression—for example, the Mafia (Italy), police (Uganda), political parties/Parliament (Brazil, Mexico, Korea), the public sector (India), or the overall government (Egypt). Through these intangible yet essential elements, individuals can transcend differences—such as gender, age, rural-urban, class, ethnicity, race, religion—not only to feel a sense of sameness, but to take action in concert.

Common Attributes

Multidimensional Focus

Most of the civic initiatives targeting corruption were linked to other injustices and struggles, such as powerholder impunity and unaccountability (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, Korea, Uganda), poverty (Kenya), development and reconstruction (Afghanistan), freedom from the Mafia (Italy), crime syndicate–state links (Turkey), attacks on honest officials and graft-fighting institutions (Indonesia), police intimidation (Uganda), and a demoralized citizenry (Mexico). Hence, corruption does not function in isolation.

Neutrality

All the cases were politically neutral in terms of their goals, membership, and broader mobilization efforts. The exception was Egypt, where

the target was the Mubarak regime because it was considered the source of injustice, abuse, and graft. In this respect, shayfeen.com and Egyptians Against Corruption were not politically neutral. On the other hand, they directed their mobilization efforts to all Egyptians, including people within Mubarak's National Democratic Party, who were welcome to join and who, in many instances, became members of Egyptians Against Corruption. The logic is clear: when tackling endemic corruption involving the political establishment and the state, no one party has the monopoly on graft. The objective is to disrupt and transform the entire system. From a strategic standpoint, partisanship also hampers unity and undercuts participation as segments of the population can be alienated. Finally, as evident from Brazil, Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, neutrality is essential for maintaining legitimacy and inoculating against opponents' accusations of bias and interference.

Protagonists
Women (Brazil, Egypt, Mexico) and youth/young professionals (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Uganda) played galvanizing roles in several cases. Veterans of nonviolent movements for democracy (Indonesia, Korea) also created and led national campaigns. Interestingly, lawyers (Brazil, Kenya, Turkey) and public relations experts (Egypt, Turkey) were among the core founders of campaigns and movements.

In virtually every case, the catalysts for the civic initiatives were either already connected to the grass roots or deliberately cultivated relationships with regular people through one-on-one interactions or social networking. In Afghanistan, Kenya, and Uganda, civil society organizations (CSOs) were immersed in marginalized communities—sharing experiences and witnessing their circumstances—which in turn approached the CSOs with their grievances and problems. These groups made painstaking efforts to establish credibility and trust, thereby building a foundation upon which to engage and mobilize people.

Strategic Approach
Across the board, the leadership core of these campaigns and movements engaged in strategic thinking, often at a highly sophisticated level. They linked overall goals to defining methods and nonviolent actions. They charted paths to overcoming obstacles and building unity. They deliberated over how to undermine the corrupt status quo, support honest powerholders, and win people over from within corrupt systems.

Most of the movements seeking far-reaching change developed

comprehensive, multidimensional approaches (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Italy, India). The key elements were

- Awareness-raising in order to identify shared grievances and counter apathy.
- Changing attitudes toward the corrupt status quo and instilling values of integrity.
- Targeting youth because systemic transformation ultimately requires a generational change.
- Altering behavior of those engaged in corruption (corruptors, willing corruptees) and those oppressed by it.
- Achieving incremental victories at various levels, from overall movement successes to wins at the community and individual levels—for example, not paying a bribe.

Organization

Most of the cases—from finite campaigns (Afghanistan, Brazil, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Turkey, Uganda) to ongoing movements (Egypt, India, Italy)—engaged in extensive planning, organization, and trial and error to manage the overall initiative, mobilize citizens, and execute nonviolent actions. While, behind the scenes, the campaigns and movements had small leadership cores, only a few faces were highly public (Egypt, India, Kenya, Mexico). Indeed, the image associated with most of the civic initiatives was that of the people.

Civic initiatives can face a variety of leadership and organizational tensions, such as balancing structure and flexibility, core group planning versus decentralization, and core-group authority versus collective decisionmaking. The research reaffirmed the general finding in the civil resistance realm: there is no magic formula. However, almost across the board, small, core leadership groups engaged in much of the primary decisionmaking, strategizing, and planning. At the same time, they encouraged decentralization in terms of decisionmaking, planning, and local autonomy.

Several challenges were common among the twelve cases. For long-term movements with transformative societal goals, recruitment and sustainability required ongoing attention. Funding was an issue for virtually all the civic initiatives. However, equally significant is that these campaigns and movements were not constrained by their limited funds. In fact, because of their grassroots, voluntary nature, expenditures were modest. They employed creative methods to cover expenses, often pooled their own personal resources, and relied on monetary donations

and other contributions from citizens. In a few cases (Afghanistan, Italy, Kenya), they had financial support from external actors or state institutions. In only one instance was a civic initiative completely dependent on donor support (Uganda). The outcome is instructive. In spite of remarkable success, the effort in Uganda came to an end after one year, partly because no second grant was awarded.

Intangible Qualities

If one overall quality can describe these civic initiatives, it is dynamism. In each instance, civic leaders, activists, and even regular citizens displayed creativity, ingenuity, and adaptability to changing circumstances. This was often accompanied by ongoing assessments; rapid responses to unexpected events, the latter an inevitable part of people power; and maximizing opportunities, large and small, that arose from such occurrences.

Success can be contagious, as witnessed in Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, and Kenya. It inspires new applications of tactics, overall defining methods, knowledge-sharing, and campaigns—domestically (Italy) and even across borders (India to Yemen, Palermo to Germany, Korea to Japan).

General Lessons Learned

Readers are urged to review the lessons learned at the end of each case study. While this section consolidates the material into fifteen general lessons, their breadth, applicability, and value to curbing corruption, gaining accountability, and, more generally, effectively wielding people power are more apparent in the longer discussions.

The first lesson highlights the multiple benefits of *unity*. Unity of people often involves coalitions of various sorts, comprising groups and prominent individuals. In addition to affording higher levels of participation, protection through numbers (of people), credibility, and legitimacy, such alliances are a font of creativity, ideas, and talent, as well as increased resources, relationships, and contacts—all of which the civic campaign or movement can use. Unity also increases diversity of dissent, from tactics to messaging and conduits through which messages are communicated. For instance, the involvement of popular musicians, street artists, television personalities, and others can lead to innovative nonviolent actions, such as anticorruption songs and ringtones, and reach an untapped swath of the public through entertainment media outlets covering celebrities. Finally, winning people over from within the corrupt system—a key people power dynamic that

weakens the corrupt status quo and removes support for oppressors—can also produce practical and even tangible benefits for the movement or campaign, as was found in Afghanistan (access to project information and contacts), Brazil (tracking the Ficha Limpa bill's journey through Congress), Italy (background on Mafia extortion), and Kenya (access to information).

Second, clear, *definable objectives* are essential to engage citizens, produce visible outcomes, gain incremental victories, and build an overall track record of success. While identifying relatively tangible goals when targeting overall systems of graft and abuse may seem difficult, the twelve cases demonstrated that it is indeed possible.

Third, beyond the building blocks of nonviolent campaigns and movements—objectives, strategy, tactics, organization, and planning—this investigation demonstrated the impact of *intangible qualities* on people power and how they can be strategically cultivated:

• *Honest image*. The association of individuals or groups in society perceived as incorruptible and upright builds credibility and can stimulate support and participation.

• *Resonance*. Resonance of the civic initiative with regular people and their experiences. This involves shifting from abstract exhortations against corruption or legalistic and administrative jargon (too technical and removed from citizens' lives) to discourse, tactics, and objectives derived from the social and cultural realities of the grass roots in the particular struggle context.[6]

• *Collective responsibility*. The personal sense that "I am needed in this effort, and my efforts will contribute to our success."

• *Legitimacy.* Legitimacy of the civic initiative, in the eyes of the people as well as the corruptors. Legitimacy is vital to people power. It can counter smear campaigns by oppressors (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Korea, Turkey), prevent or thwart intimidation (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, India, Italy, Uganda), and make attacks backfire (Kenya, Turkey). As well, movements and campaigns emanating legitimacy can embolden honest individuals inside the system (Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico), weaken the resolve of corruptors to maintain the status quo (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, Korea, Uganda), and cumulatively garner support within venal systems as well as from the public.

• *Unity + credibility + ownership = legitimacy*. While legitimacy may perhaps be the most ephemeral of these intangibles, the twelve cases demonstrate there is no mystery to its cultivation. Legitimacy

stems from unity of people, grievances, and objectives, plus credibility of the civic actors and collective ownership of the struggle.

Another general lesson is that successful bottom-up, civic initiatives targeting corruption are built upon the existing *social infrastructure*, that is, the social structures, social relationships, prevailing culture, and even history of the struggle context. Effective and credible strategies, tactics, discourse, and messaging derive from these home-grown settings, rather than from externally developed, formulaic approaches to citizen engagement.

Fifth, whether the civic action arena is as small as a single community, or a town-, region-, country-, or transnational-level effort, power comes from numbers relative to the particular setting. Thus, *mobilization* is essential. To win public support and engage citizens, three key elements play a role:

• *Framing the struggle*. Linking general concepts or abstract issues to widely held grievances and everyday concerns.

• *Using low-risk mass actions*. Actions that are accessible to many or can help to overcome fear in hostile environments (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Uganda).

• *Emboldening individual acts of defiance.* Through the power of numbers—for example, handing a civil servant the 5th Pillar movement's zero-rupee note when extorted for a bribe (India), providing multifaceted support for each business that refuses to pay Mafia protection money (Italy), and creating collective settings for people to directly speak out (Facebook in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Indonesia, public forums in Afghanistan and Kenya, and radio call-in programs in Uganda).

The sixth lesson focuses on people power *dynamics* and moving from *strategy* to action. When corruption is viewed in a systemic manner, as discussed earlier in the chapter, one learns that it is impossible to discover all the venal interconnected relationships, eradicate the entire system (in the short term), and punish or "convert" to integrity all the corruptors and willing corruptees. The twelve cases demonstrate that people power offers an alternative to this colossal if not impossible feat. Social, economic, political, and psychological pressure exerted by significant numbers of individuals organized around shared grievances and goals, engaging in nonviolent strategies and tactics, can curb corruption through three dynamics. First is disrupting systems of graft and abuse. Second is weakening those systems from the inside by pulling people

within the system toward the civic initiative—shifting their loyalties away from the status quo, and supporting those inside the system who want change but felt outnumbered and fearful to act alone. Cumulatively, this dynamic can produce defections—individuals and groups within the corrupt system who refuse to go along with it. When developing strategies and actions to activate this dynamic, citizens must recognize that not everyone within the corrupt system is equally wedded to perpetuating it. The third dynamic is applying nonviolent pressure through the power of numbers, namely, citizens raising their collective voice over shared demands, on corruptors who refuse to change the venal status quo.

Thus, a strategic approach to citizen empowerment and action involves several elements:

• *Harnessing the power of "no."* That is, noncooperation with corruption. The Gandhian precept of noncooperation with oppressors applies equally well to fighting graft and abuse. Such systems can only function smoothly if people do what they are supposed to do, whether demanding or even offering bribes, paying them, exchanging favors, turning a blind eye to illicit practices, not asking questions, or accepting things as they are. When enough people renounce corruption, refuse to go along with the status quo, and disengage from the system, it starts to break down.

• *Assessing the corrupt system*. To interrupt its smooth functioning in the present, and for social movements, to foster societal transformation in the longer term.

• *Designing nonviolent actions.* Actions that embody noncooperation, actively disrupt the corrupt status quo, or pull people (either out of the corrupt system or from the general public) toward integrity and accountability (the civic initiative).

The seventh lesson is that *tactical ingenuity* is essential for anticorruption civic initiatives. The creativity of nonviolent actions employed by these civic initiatives and social movements—both in the physical and digital worlds—was truly extraordinary. As evident from the twelve cases, tactical ingenuity can be critical to establishing a strategic advantage (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Italy, Korea) or creating dilemmas for oppressors (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Certain types of tactics can also encourage participation by overcoming tough situations (Afghanistan, Egypt, Italy, Mexico, Turkey), apathy or cynicism (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Korea,

Turkey, Uganda), and fear of challenging powerholders (Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, India, Italy, Kenya, Turkey, Uganda). Through tactical ingenuity, social movements can make oppressor attacks backfire (Indonesia, Italy, Turkey) and can maintain resilience in the face of repression (Italy, Kenya, Egypt).

The eighth overall lesson concerns *tactical variety*. Civic anticorruption initiatives expand the overall tactical repertoire of civil resistance. While several ways are available to classify these actions in the civil resistance realm, I propose four categories that correspond to the functions of the tactics: disruption, engagement, empowerment, and an additional delineation for defining methods. The Appendix compiles all the nonviolent actions documented in the research.

Once tactics are classified in this manner, it becomes apparent that many nonviolent actions fall under more than one category. Depending on the struggle context at hand, a tactic can actually have multiple functions, which reflects the reality that tactics are not static; their functions and impact are derived from the struggle context. For example, public pledges can constitute tactics of disruption as well as engagement. Behavioral pledges to desist from corrupt activities can potentially disrupt the systems of graft and abuse. They also can produce engagement as the tactic involves close interaction with the public, gains support for the movement or campaign, and can increase recruitment. Taken together, several related lessons emerge.

Surveys, of one sort or another, are a tool that can yield strategically useful information for civic anticorruption initiatives (Afghanistan, Kenya, Korea, Uganda). On the one hand, they serve as a mechanism to gather people's views, which helps in planning the campaigns. On the other hand, they generate information that can be directed to powerholders, the media, or the public. Moreover, the process of conducting a survey constitutes a nonviolent tactic that can involve regular people as the information-gatherers, and provides opportunities for awareness-raising, active recruitment, and acquiring support from citizens.

Inventive civic initiatives take advantage of top-down, *institutional tools and mechanisms*—such as legislation, judicial processes, and anticorruption bodies—in order to secure information and repel attacks. They are often combined with nonviolent tactics in a complementary manner, thereby creating synergy between institutional and extrainstitutional forms of pressure. The cases included the Right to Information Act education in conjunction with Right to Information petitions (India), exercising constitutional rights for citizen-sponsored legislation

together with a grassroots movement to submit it to Congress and digital resistance to pass it (Brazil), public accountability hearings in conjunction with legal efforts to change laws (Kenya), boycotting blacklisted candidates while voting in elections (Korea), and thwarting a government crackdown by invoking the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Egypt) in court.

Monitoring constitutes an entire group of nonviolent tactics that can disrupt the corrupt, unjust status quo. It can take limitless forms, from digital scrutiny (Egypt, Mexico, Uganda) and blacklisting candidates (Korea), to ongoing, defining methods such as community monitoring (Afghanistan) and social audits (Kenya).

With imagination, commonplace activities can be turned into *low-risk mass actions*, which civil resistance scholar Maciej Bartkowski describes as "ingenious benevolent protests of everyday defiance."[7] Examples include turning lights on and off (Turkey), drinking tea and coffee (Egypt), regular shopping (Egypt, Italy), tourism (Italy), downloading mobile phone ringtones (Indonesia), wearing clothes (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Italy), and even voting (Korea).

Nine, effective tactics can offer inspiration to civic actors targeting corruption, not to be blindly copied, but to stimulate new ideas or serve as examples to be adapted and contextualized. Consequently, a critical lesson is that *tactics are not inherently effective or ineffective*—because their efficacy depends on the situation and the parameters of the struggle, such as objectives, strategies, unity, organization, overall tactical repertoire, social infrastructure, and intangibles (see Chapter 12). The distinction between transplanting versus adapting tactics was amply illustrated in the Afghan community-monitoring initiatives (see Chapter 8) and the Kenyan social audits (see Chapter 10).

As so vividly demonstrated by the Ficha Limpa movement in Brazil, the tenth lesson is that *digital resistance*—in which people power is wielded through actions involving information and communication technologies—does indeed exist (see Chapter 4). Digital resistance can shift power relations and usher in real-world outcomes. Online tactics can cultivate intangibles such as collective identity and ownership, provide an ongoing struggle narrative, expand the overall repertoire of nonviolent actions, and offer strategic advantages as well as economies of scale (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico). However, across these cases, the astute combination of online and offline tactics created potent nonviolent pressure on powerholders.

Eleven, *information plus action equals power*. In some contexts, asking questions and requesting documents can function as nonviolent

tactics and begin to disrupt the corrupt status quo (Afghanistan, India, Kenya). Acquiring information on budgets, spending, and powerholder assets can be an interim victory in the struggle. However, information on its own may not be enough to challenge corruption. For instance, a foundation manager shared observations that in some parts of Africa, donors have encouraged the practice of publicly posting school budgets. But school-related corruption continued when citizens, particularly parents, were disengaged or passive and did nothing with the information. In contrast, research in Uganda found that a key feature in the success of publicizing school budget information to reduce leakage of funds was the existence of parent-teacher groups at the village level that could engage in monitoring. In this case, "Parents were already organized and able to exert pressure. Mere publicity will not work in isolation."[8] The combination of information (access, collection, and dissemination) plus nonviolent direct actions—public forums, community meetings, monitoring, petitions, leafleting, stunts, street theatre, and creative, humorous, or fun mobilizations—can be a compelling source of people power.

The twelfth lesson is that bottom-up campaigns and movements can support those inside corrupt systems who are not necessarily venal through two overall strategies. First is generating the political will to *support powerholders who are inclined to push for reforms and change*, and bolstering integrity champions within state institutions and other entities who are actually attempting reforms and change. All too often, lone figures or agencies cannot challenge or dismantle entrenched systems of graft and unaccountability. Nonviolence academic Brian Martin has compared such attempts to the actions of political dissidents who stand in singular defiance before an entire undemocratic system and are therefore easily suppressed.[9] Such was the fate of John Githongo, a former Kenyan anticorruption chief, who fled the country in 2004 after threats to his life. Contrast this outcome to Indonesia, where the CICAK campaign mobilized citizens to successfully defend the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and two falsely imprisoned deputy commissioners (see Chapter 5). Indonesian people power has on more than one occasion stimulated political will at the highest echelons, all the way to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

A second way to support those within corrupt systems who seek change is to *offer them a way out*. Not all individuals within horizontal or vertical systems of graft and abuse are dishonest, nor are they equally wedded to perpetuating the status quo. This dynamic expands upon the traditional civil resistance concept of shifting loyalties vis-à-vis the oppressor. Countless decent people are caught in the system, but individu-

ally they feel outnumbered and powerless and fear retaliation. If they act alone, their options are either to disobey (that is, refuse to engage in graft) or to expose corruption (become a whistle-blower). In either instance, as with honest powerholders attempting change, they are one standing against all the venal vested interests. Not surprisingly, they—and even their families—are likely to experience grave consequences, from harassment, demotion, and dismissal to violence and even death. Anticorruption campaigns and movements can empower honest insiders by offering them a way out of malfeasant systems (Italy), providing tangible support to resist or expose graft and abuse (India, Italy), publicly honoring their courage to speak up (Egypt), and rewarding their integrity at election time (Brazil and Korea).

In both of these contexts, grassroots campaigns and movements wield the *power of numbers*—people—so that individuals and even entities challenging corruption within the system are no longer sole dissenters facing a large cohort of corruptors. They, in turn, are backed by many from the public, making it more difficult for vested interests to harm them and subdue their efforts. And when corruptors do retaliate, their vile actions are more likely to backfire (Indonesia, Italy).

Thirteen, *planning and tactical sequencing* are essential elements to wielding people power, and this investigation reveals that anticorruption campaigns and movements are no exception. Even when a civic initiative jump-starts from an impulsive act (Italy) or through initial pilot activities (Afghanistan, Kenya), strategizing, planning, coordination, and sequencing are necessary to consolidate the civic initiative and maintain momentum.

Often neglected in nonviolent struggles, another lesson is that *education and training* are nonetheless vital to building capacity, resilience, and citizen confidence, courage, and hope. Education and training featured prominently among the twelve cases and varied from workshops (India, Kenya) to skills and capacity building (Afghanistan, Egypt, Kenya), overall programs targeting young people (Egypt, India, Italy), and last but not least, instruction in nonviolent discipline (Kenya, Korea).

Fifteen, well-developed *communications* are strategically important to build awareness, win support, and actively involve citizens. Depending on the audience(s) and goals of the messaging, there are multiple mediums of communication, ranging from traditional media outlets, music, street theatre, stunts, humor, graffiti, leaflets, clothing, badges, stickers, everyday objects (such as reusable shopping bags), websites, online videos, SMS, social media, and in the case of 5th Pillar, the antibribery

currency called the zero-rupee note. A particularly innovative element of messaging is providing an ongoing, real-time narrative through information and communication technologies that people can closely follow, day by day, as the civic initiative unfolds (Brazil, Indonesia).

Finally, anticorruption struggles by nature involve a negative. Thus, a paramount lesson for civic initiatives is to *reframe the discourse* by balancing negatives (oppression, injustice, suffering) with positives (collective empowerment, tangible outcomes, hope, incremental victories, and affinity for one's community, country, or entities and groups fighting corruption and seeking accountability).

Conclusion

Twelve civic initiatives, millions of regular people in countries around the world, engaging in nonviolent actions, wielding people power, impacting corruption and impunity, and gaining accountability, rights, and justice. These cases expand the application of civil resistance to new arenas, enhance our understanding of the dynamics of people power, and demonstrate the linkages between curbing corruption, strengthening democracy, and redefining the relationship between governments and citizens. I propose five takeaways from this study:

1. Corruption is a form of oppression that harms people in their everyday lives. For the originators of these nonviolent civic initiatives, ultimately the struggle is for human rights, dignity, and freedom.

2. Regular citizens bring numerous capacities and a wellspring of courage and resolve to the anticorruption struggle. This includes the disadvantaged and marginalized, whose potential contributions should not be overlooked. "We believe that poor people think, and think as well as the literate do. In fact their ideas are rooted in a common sense from which literacy alienates the schooled, because the theory subsumes the reality very often," avowed Sowmya Kidambi, a veteran of the Indian Right to Information movement.[10]

3. People who are organized in civic initiatives, campaigns, and social movements have agency and the potential to wield power.

4. People power is a positive force that constructively confronts injustice while seeking engagement. It applies extrainstitutional, nonviolent social pressure on corruptors who refuse to change the venal status quo, disrupts systems of graft and abuse, and empowers integrity champions pursuing accountability, reform, and change from within the system.

5. External actors can support, defend, and enable homegrown ini-

tiatives in a variety of ways (see Chapter 12). But third parties are not the drivers of bottom-up change; nor can they produce genuine citizen engagement and action through monetary incentives and standardized projects. Citizens are the protagonists who chart the course, make the decisions, take the risks, propel the struggle, and own the victories.

Notes

1. Hee-Yeon Cho, "A Study on the Blacklisting Campaign Against Corrupt Politicians in South Korea—Focused on the 'Naksun Movement' in April 2000" (paper presented at the Civil Society in Asia, Today and Tomorrow conference, South Korea, December 5, 2003), 2–3.

2. Dadang Trisasongko, "After the Transition: The Role of People Power in Dismantling Entrenched Corruption, and Consolidating Democratic, Accountable Governance and Sustainable Peace" (presentation, Fifteenth International Anti-Corruption Conference, Brasilia, November 9, 2013).

3. Ibid.

4. Manuela Garza, "Social Audits as a Budget Monitoring Tool," International Budget Partnership, Learning from Each Other Series, October 2012, 6, http://internationalbudget.org.

5. Lee Smithey, "Identity Formation in Nonviolent Struggles," in *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles,* ed. Maciej Bartkowski, 31–47 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013).

6. "Discourse" refers to the narratives, cognitive frames, meanings, and language used by nonviolent movements and campaigns; Hardy Merriman, "Forming a Movement" (presentation, Fletcher Summer Institute for the Advanced Study of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, Tufts University, June 20, 2011).

7. Maciej Bartkowski, ed. *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013).

8. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption," Copenhagen Consensus 2004 Challenge Paper, Copenhagen 2004 Consensus Project, 2004, 18, www.copenhagenconsensus.com.

9. Brian Martin, "Whistleblowing and Nonviolence," *Peace and Change* 24, no. 1 (January 1999): 15–28.

10. Sowmya Kidambi, *Right to Know, Right to Live: Building a Campaign for the Right to Information and Accountability* (Minneapolis: Center for Victims of Torture, 2008), 8.