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## Blacklisting Corrupt Candidates: Korea

If a man rises to high political office, his family will be financially set for three generations.

—quoted in Glenn Manarin, “Striking Where It Hurts”

Corrupt politicians, broken promises for change, backroom deals, cozy relationships with special interests, and abysmal choices on Election Day . . . these familiar complaints can be found in democracies and even in authoritarian systems where dictators often dabble with electoral façades. But what can regular people do beyond fuming, becoming apathetic, or voting for the least rotten apple in the barrel? In 2000, Korean civic leaders and citizens launched their own campaign to hinder venal, often entrenched politicians from running for office, and to improve the overall quality of candidates on the ballot for the Sixteenth National Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

### Context

In 1970, four decades before Mohamed Bouazizi tragically died in Tunisia after setting himself on fire, Chon T’ae-il, a young textile worker in South Korea, took the same action and suffered the same fate.<sup>2</sup> In each instance, their self-immolation marked the onset of a civilian-based democracy movement. Korea’s road to democracy was long and arduous. From 1948 the country endured successive dictatorships for decades. In 1987, led by student and labor groups, millions of people mobilized in what was called the June 10 Citizens’ Democratic Revolt.<sup>3</sup> In the ensuing years, many veterans of this struggle went on to become

leaders of civil society organizations focused on political and economic reforms to dismantle the old, corrupt system; strengthen democratic institutions; and consolidate representative rule. Foremost among these civic organizations were the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM), and Green Korea United (GKU).

As in many other countries emerging out of authoritarian rule, corruption was proving difficult to dent. The country's financial crisis in 1997, followed by an onerous recession, exposed government incompetence and inefficiency and an overall lack of transparency in the political system.<sup>4</sup> "The crisis was the responsibility of the politicians who were pulling the strings of the economic system," according to political scientist Kim Young-rae.<sup>5</sup>

The public was becoming more and more disgusted. As they bore the consequences of the economic downturn, they were outraged by a series of scandals—graft across sectors; abuses of power and privileges; and bribery involving politicians, senior officials, banks, and *chaebols*, the latter referring to large business conglomerates with close ties to political figures and the state.<sup>6</sup> The ruling and opposition parties were both illicitly collecting funds. Legislators thwarted efforts to reform the Election Laws and crack down on political funding. They used—or, rather, abused—their immunity to undermine investigations. Law enforcement seemed to have little appetite to delve into political irregularities.<sup>7</sup> Korea's legislative branch became known as the "bullet-proof" and "brain dead" National Assembly.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, some civic leaders concluded that "corruption in Korea was so serious that it was the foremost obstacle hindering the progress of Korean society."<sup>9</sup> By the time the April 2000 National Assembly (parliamentary) elections were on the horizon, the public was distrustful of politicians, political parties, and the overall political system.<sup>10</sup>

### **Campaign: "Let's Change Old Politics with Citizens' Power"**

#### *Origins*

Political reform and anticorruption have been central to civil society's efforts at consolidating Korea's democracy.<sup>11</sup> "The anti-corruption movement succeeds the democratic movements of the past decades," said Geo-sung Kim, a democracy movement veteran and chairperson of Transparency International Korea.<sup>12</sup>

PSPD, founded in 1994, launched a series of civic initiatives during that decade—from the Transparent Society Campaign in 1996, to pass a strong anticorruption law, to the Sunshine Project in 1998, which sought to modify the existing Freedom of Information Act, maximize its use, and expose budget mishandling.<sup>13</sup> By the early 1990s, civil society organizations began monitoring powerholders, initially for fair elections and “municipal congress watch” initiatives.<sup>14</sup> In 1999 a coalition of forty civil society organizations (CSOs), including the aforementioned PSPD, CCEJ, KFEM, and the Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU), took this tactic to a new level. On September 8, the Citizens’ Solidarity for Monitoring the National Assembly Inspection of Government Offices was launched to record lawmakers’ attendance, evaluate their performance, and scrutinize whether a list of 166 “reform tasks” were sufficiently addressed in committees.<sup>15</sup> When the monitors—civil society experts with relevant professional experience—were blocked from sessions, the coalition added street demonstrations and a phone/fax/email drive to its arsenal, which together generated media attention and public debate. On October 20 the campaign came to a close with the release of a report that ranked legislators on the basis of their performance. However, the initiative did not succeed to gain full access to the National Assembly’s proceedings. This seeming failure had an unanticipated effect. According to Taeho Lee, a democracy movement veteran and deputy secretary general of PSPD, it catalyzed the civic realm.<sup>16</sup> After years of effort, civic organizations such as PSPD came to the conclusion that Korean political parties had not changed and politicians were not representing the population’s interests.

The legislators’ dismissive behavior became a public issue. Citizens were angered by their justifications, ranging from trivial excuses such as a lack of space in meeting rooms to arguments that civil society didn’t have the expertise or even the right to monitor elected representatives. PSPD realized that there was a “need for more powerful action.”<sup>17</sup> But what? Then, in October 1999, during a major television debate featuring National Assembly members and Lee, he declared that not only do citizens have the right to monitor lawmakers, they have the right to make them lose elections. After the program, a poll of viewers found that over 80 percent agreed with him. On that day, the seed for the Citizens Alliance for the General Elections (CAGE) 2000 was planted.

As 1999 drew to a close, fifteen civic organizations created a task force to explore the viability of a grassroots campaign to turn this new idea into reality—namely, a blacklist initiative. PSPD served as secretariat of the group. The idea of a blacklist originated from the aforemen-

tioned Transparent Society Campaign, which created a list of state powerholders—legislators, ministers, and deputy ministers—who were involved in massive corruption scandals that rocked the country.<sup>18</sup>

### *Strategic Analysis*

From the outset, Lee reported, the task force strategically assessed the overall situation. The analysis was completed by December 18. Members assessed their potential strengths and weaknesses. They concluded that, in general, their strength was having the support of the general public, while their main weakness was that they did not have a nationwide network and would quickly need to create one. They also identified two principal obstacles. First, as the entire campaign to blacklist and defeat corrupt politicians would violate Article 87 of the Election Law, they needed to be prepared for the consequences and overcome qualms on the part of civic groups and citizens to become involved.<sup>19</sup> To address this challenge, they decided to systematically gauge the public's views and willingness to take action. Thus, in early January 2000, a survey of a representative group of 500 people from around the country was conducted. Respondents were asked three key questions, which Lee paraphrased as follows:

1. Is it legitimate for civil society (CSOs and citizens) to evaluate, disqualify, and seek to defeat candidates for the National Assembly? (Result: 79.8 percent were in favor.)<sup>20</sup>
2. Although these activities are illegal under Article 87 of the Election Law, would you support a defeat campaign? (Result: 71.8 percent said they would support the effort, even if it is illegal.)<sup>21</sup>
3. Do you think this law should be changed? (Result: 65.1 percent said restrictions in the law should be changed because citizens have the right to conduct a blacklist.)<sup>22</sup>

As well, the survey garnered people's views about criteria for the blacklist. The task force concluded that people wanted the blacklist campaign, they wanted an amendment to the Election Law, and if that was not possible, they wanted civil disobedience and nonviolent direct action. The survey crystallized Lee's thinking that had been stirred during the TV debate. "Voters are the means to have rights," he reflected. Moreover, the survey gave civic leaders the ammunition needed to quickly convince CSOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and citizen groups to join the alliance. Finally, the survey enabled CAGE's planners to approach civic organizations, uncomfortable about breaking

the Election Law, with reassurances that regular people supported mass civil disobedience.

The second obstacle was that powerholders would undoubtedly accuse civic leaders of political partisanship in order to undermine the campaign. To counter such attacks, they decided upon a policy of transparency. In practice, this involved publishing the blacklist criteria, basing assessments on publicly available information and releasing them on the CAGE website, involving citizens in the deliberations, and making no exceptions to the blacklist—regardless of the politician’s seniority, power, or party affiliation.

### *Objectives, Strategy, Vision, and Plan of Action*

With a little over three months until the elections, the task force quickly set to work on a campaign plan. They identified three objectives: (1) amend Article 87 of the Election Law, (2) improve the quality and integrity of candidates running in the April elections, and (3) remove “corrupt and incapable politicians” from the National Assembly.<sup>23</sup> The overall strategy consisted of a “de-nomination and de-election campaign by voters”—that is, discouraging corrupt politicians from being nominated and defeating those who still were selected as candidates.<sup>24</sup>

Ultimately, their vision was twofold. First, they sought to change the values of the political establishment, corrupt practices of political parties, and malfeasance of elected representatives. Second, they wanted to attain genuine participatory democracy in Korea, as enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution, which states, “The Republic of Korea is a democratic republic. The sovereignty of the Republic of Korea resides in the people, and all state authority emanates from the people.”<sup>25</sup> In other words, “We need to change the system and public consciousness,” as Geo-sung Kim asserted.<sup>26</sup>

The task force devised a campaign plan centered on a defining method—blacklisting unfit candidates—around which a host of nonviolent tactics revolved.<sup>27</sup> The central elements were building a coalition, defining criteria for blacklisting, and breaking down the civic initiative into two phases: (1) Nakchon (Denominate)—including transparent assessment of potential party nominees, initial blacklist of unfit politicians likely to seek nomination, people power pressure on political parties to not nominate them, people power on parties to denominate—that is, withdraw those names from party lists who were nevertheless nominated; and (2) Naksun (Defeat)—releasing second blacklist of unfit candidates and mobilizing citizens to defeat these candidates in the April 14 parliamentary vote.

*A Is for Alliance*

Between December 1999 and early January 2000 the task force approached scores of national and local civic networks; NGOs; civil society groups; educational, professional, and religious organizations (Buddhist, Protestant, and Catholic); student and youth groups; cultural groups; community associations; and citizen groups.<sup>28</sup> It included such diverse groups as families of political prisoners to the entire YMCA/YWCA, and later on, a celebrity network and a cartoonists' association. "We proposed to them to join the campaign and presented the poll results and campaign plan," said Lee. Task force members pointed out the possibility of imprisonment and fines for breaking the Election Law and asked the heads of those organizations coming on board to sign an acknowledgment that they accepted these risks. In order to maintain a coherent focus and grow the alliance, it was decided to focus solely on corruption. "We needed to identify one issue everybody agreed on, and corruption is something that everyone is angry about," explained Lee. On January 12, 2000, amid fanfare at the Seoul Press Center, 470 organizations launched the Citizens Alliance for the General Election 2000 (CAGE).<sup>29</sup> The alliance presented a "Civil Manifesto for Political Reform" that declared, "Politics in Korea still remains in the time of the past century when the society and the people therein prepare their way into a new century as well as a new millennium. Political corruption in general is the worst obstacle hindering the progress of reform in Korean society that must no longer be tolerated."<sup>30</sup>

CAGE's very creation sent shock waves through the political establishment. The next day the headline of a major newspaper, *Dongg Ilbo*, was, "Political Parties Are Trembling: What If I Am on the List?"<sup>31</sup> Once the campaign got under way, the coalition grew to an astounding size—1,104 civic networks and groups.<sup>32</sup> "It became bigger than we expected," Lee stated.

*B Is for Blacklist*

Central to the campaign was the defining method of the blacklist, through which corrupt politicians would be identified as unfit to run for office while citizen mobilization and nonviolent actions would motivate voters to defeat them in the elections. Considerable effort was made to develop the criteria. Based on input from the January 2000 survey and discussions with citizens, the task force drafted a set of criteria that was reviewed and finalized by CAGE's Executive Committee, explained Lee. The criteria, as translated by PSPD into English, were

- Corrupt activities.
- Violation of the Election Law.
- Anti-human rights activities and destruction of democracy and constitutional order.
- Insincerity in lawmaking and activities against the (National) Assembly and electorate.
- Positions on reforming bills and policies.
- Suspect behaviors reflecting on the basic qualification for politicians.
- Failure of civic duties, such as military service and paying taxes.<sup>33</sup>

The first three criteria were considered the most important and decisive in determining the blacklists.<sup>34</sup> Politicians' track records were investigated for the following: convictions for taking bribes and violating Election Laws, serving in the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan as a member of the National Security Council's Legislative Committee, inciting "regional animosity" in order to acquire voter support from a particular area, recurrent switching of party affiliation, speculative real estate investments, going on costly overseas trips, or issuing statements "unbecoming to a lawmaker."<sup>35</sup>

Assessments were based on publicly available documentation, including National Assembly reports, mass media coverage and reports over the past ten years, judicial reports, reports from legislators, related books and pamphlets, and comparison of campaign pledges to actual activities while in office.<sup>36</sup>

In some cases, CAGE successfully pressured the government for the mandatory release of candidates' past criminal, tax, and military service records.<sup>37</sup> Anticipating opposition attacks from politicians named by the blacklist, campaign organizers built into the evaluation process three counteractive strategies: using public record information; sending politicians copies of negative documentation and giving them the opportunity to rebut; and reviewing legal matters, such as libel, via CAGE's expert Lawyers Advisory Team.<sup>38</sup> An intricate, participatory framework was created for the blacklisting process. PSPD's anticorruption team coordinated the assessments, which were conducted by a voluntary investigative group of civic experts, including lawyers and activists from such realms as anticorruption, environment, and women's rights. The results were given to several CAGE committees, teams, and organizational bodies.

Furthermore, CAGE deemed it essential to incorporate regular citizens into the blacklisting process, not only to remain true to the initia-

tive's civic nature, but also to increase the blacklists' legitimacy and counter powerholder accusations of partisanship and inaccuracy. Task force members came up with an innovative solution: the 100 Voters Committee. The task force asked a polling company to help formulate the criteria for creating a nationally representative group of 100 Koreans (see table below). A matrix was created to outline the composition of the committee and guide the identification of potential participants. The next step was to randomly choose lay members from among the task force CSOs, who were regular citizens volunteering in the civic organizations rather than activists or staff. Out of this group, a cohort of individuals was identified according to the matrix criteria. The task force divided up the work to approach these people and invite them to join the Voters Committee. The committee "functioned as a jury," Lee reported.<sup>39</sup> Using the investigative team's results, the committee made recommendations for the blacklist to CAGE's Representative Board.

#### The 100 Voters Committee

Variable	Number in Committee
Gender	
Male	51
Female	49
Age	
20s	27
30s	28
40s	19
> 50	26
Region	
Seoul	25
Busan and Kyungnam	16
Daegu and Kyungbuk	11
Incheon and Kyungkido	25
Honam	11
Daejeon	2
Chungbuk	2
Chungnam	4
Gangwon	3
Jeju	1
Occupation	
Farmer	11
Self-employed	12
Factory worker	17
Office worker	14
University student	5
Houswife	33
None	8

*Source:* Eunyoung Kim, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, powerpoint presentation, n.d. Obtained by the author from Kim's colleague Taeho Lee.



The final blacklists were determined through voting by CAGE's General Assembly.<sup>40</sup>

In the denominate phase, a total of 102 politicians were blacklisted. On January 24, with unprecedented live television coverage from the major channels, CAGE released the names of sixty-six legislators in the National Assembly who were deemed "unfit to be nominated by any party."<sup>41</sup> Many of them were bigwigs in both the ruling and opposition parties. CAGE's objective was to pressure the parties to refrain from nominating these individuals as candidates. The campaign released a second list of forty-six politicians on January 27, of whom forty-one were not presently serving in the National Assembly but were former legislators or senior cabinet members, as well as governors and mayors who were expected to seek nomination.<sup>42</sup> Out of this list, Lee recalled, ten individuals decided not to run, some because of their political situations and others because of the campaign—the latter constituting CAGE's first victory. The reaction of powerholders was what CAGE leaders expected—vitriol and charges of partisanship, conspiracies, and interference. Some political parties likened the campaign to "political terrorism."<sup>43</sup>

On April 3, ten days before the election, at a major press conference, CAGE released the final defeat blacklist, consisting of eighty-six candidates, including sixty-four from the original denominate blacklist. As the names were announced, CAGE members waved red cards, similar to those used by referees in soccer games, to signal the ejection of a player who committed a foul.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, the Seoul core identified twenty-two strategic districts in which concentrated efforts would be made to defeat particularly powerful and corrupt candidates. Campaign leaders were each assigned to be in charge of efforts in one of these precincts.<sup>45</sup>

### *C Is for Citizen Engagement*

With the release of the first blacklist, CAGE launched a massive national signature drive that would continue until the elections. While the alliance did not come close to meeting its goal (10,000 voters from each of the country's 227 precincts), approximately 250,000 people pledged in writing that they would vote in the elections, but not for blacklisted candidates. It was a brilliant low-risk mass action tactic. It created a justification to interact with regular people and gather information about their views, educate them about the campaign, potentially win their support, encourage their involvement, and garner their commitment to reject corrupt candidates. In the run-up to voting day, local chapters inten-

sified contact with citizens. Members—who chiefly were civically active citizens rather than paid staff—made personal calls to voters in their localities. Lee stated that they don't know how many calls were made in total, but in some districts, such as Incheon, local members called every single voter. The Seoul organizers also emailed local CAGE chapters with information about the blacklisted candidates in their districts, which some chapters forwarded directly on to voters.

### *D Is for (Civil) Disobedience*

CAGE publicly declared a “principle of disobedience” against the aforementioned Article 87 of the Election Law. Civic leaders argued that people had the right to evaluate candidates. “Basically, the election is for voters as well as candidates, and freedom of expression of voters is guaranteed [under the law],” asserted Lee. CAGE pointed out that lawmakers also broke this law; the difference was that they were not punished for such violations, while the campaign did not hide what it was doing and was willing to suffer the consequences.

The basic principle, Lee stated, was that the national leadership would develop countrywide outreach initiatives and organize nonviolent actions in the capital designed to attract national media coverage, while local chapters would conduct their own activities. Shortly after the first blacklist of unfit candidates was released, the leadership core launched activities in Seoul that continued through the elections. From March 2 to March 6, organizers staged a Political Reform Plaza at Myongdong Cathedral, a symbol and site of citizen dissent since the 1970s.<sup>46</sup> Other tactics ranged from sit-ins at political party offices, demanding that unfit politicians not be nominated, to demonstrations, marches, a candlelight rally (March 5), hanging a huge banner on a building, street theatre, and humorous stunts such as fishing red soccer cards from a barrel of water.<sup>47</sup> Women's groups organized actions, including a broom demonstration, and also a rally on March 31. Youth held demonstrations and activities at schools and universities. Pickets were frequently used, and leaflets, red balloons, yellow and red soccer cards, buttons, and badges were handed out at many of the street actions. The latter two items featured the campaign's soccer card symbol or slogans, including “Out,” “I Vote,” and “Change/Change.” CAGE secured the rights from a famous pop idol, Jeong-hyun Lee, to use her upbeat song, also titled “Change, Change!” Since street actions constituted acts of civil disobedience, activists created an adroit tactic to flummox the Election Law—one-person street rallies.<sup>48</sup>

In practice, as the timeline was so compressed in light of the April

election date, the Seoul planners decided they had to step in to generate momentum on the ground and design tactics that energized local chapters, empowered their members, and engaged citizens. On January 30, CAGE orchestrated its first national mobilization—the Recovery Day of People’s Rights. Rallies were held in Seoul and six major cities. As each name was read from the nominees’ blacklist, people waved yellow soccer cards. Then on March 1, Korea’s official day of independence from Japanese annexation in 1910, CAGE held a People’s Sovereignty Day. Organizers released a citizens’ Independence Charter and once more convened rallies in six major cities.<sup>49</sup> Again, yellow cards were distributed, and people waved them as the name of each blacklisted politician was called out. By mid-March, Lee recalled, the campaign conducted the first of two cross-country bus tours, stopping in nineteen cities to win support of citizens and collect their signatures for the blacklist pledge. Finally, core organizers developed an inventive tactic. To each of the twenty-two strategic districts, the campaign sent “a famous civil movement leader to act like a shadow candidate, someone who was a logical counterpart but a symbolic rival,” explained Lee. For example, a candidate who was a corrupt prosecutor was shadowed by a respected human rights lawyer. In one district, it was a “macho male versus a diplomatic and petite female civic leader,” he added.

In addition to these nationwide tactics organized by the Seoul core, some of the campaign’s “departments” or special groups also initiated activities. Professors involved in CAGE held talks for students at universities, while teachers conducted special classes in elementary and secondary schools. The second week of March, the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union was reported to have convened Democracy Classes in all schools across the country, garnering national attention in the process.<sup>50</sup> The youth department organized the Red Festival, a massive event for young people modeled on the legendary 1969 Woodstock festival. Proclaiming, “Go, Play, Vote, and Change the World,” it held various activities, the highlight being a concert with popular singers.<sup>51</sup> At the end of the performance, the audience waved a sea of red cards, chanting “Out” to the rhythm of the music. With an estimated 50,000 people, it was the largest on-the-ground mobilization of the campaign.<sup>52</sup>

By March, local chapters began initiating their own tactics, including candlelight rallies, local marches in cities, signature drives, and youth protests, for example, in the city of Incheon. In the southwest region, citizens organized a bicycle rally and farmers launched convoys. Rallies were held in the eastern provinces. In Daegu, a large city in

southeastern Korea, a campaign event featured a children's protest along with a huge banner on which citizens left their palm prints.

Finally, the campaign also produced resource materials for voters on such key topics as political and judiciary reforms. The purpose was not only to arm voters with meaningful information but to drive the point home to the political establishment that the parties should include discussion about policy proposals during their election campaigns.<sup>53</sup>

### *Intimidation*

As soon as the initial blacklist was released, the major political parties pursued legal action for defamation of character and violation of Article 87 in the Election Law.<sup>54</sup> On February 17, Park Won-soon, CAGE's Standing Committee chairman, along with a PSPD colleague, was summoned to the public prosecutor's office for breaking the Election Law. Lee recounted that a number of CAGE leaders were fined, arrested, and in some cases, both fined and arrested. Some civic organizations and activists faced "negative social pressure for standing up to blacklisted candidates," and some suffered "emotional difficulties," he added. However, overt violence was rare. On a couple of occasions, CAGE street actions and bus-tour activists were physically intimidated by campaign workers of blacklisted candidates,<sup>55</sup> but CAGE was prepared. Lee explained, "Tactically, we used our whole network and all our influence to blow up exposure about the events, in order to protect others, and then the candidates understood that violence will backfire." Their strategy proved to be correct. Not only was violence against the campaign muted, blacklisted candidates began to copy CAGE. "They tried to counter us with similar [nonviolent] tactics." When asked for examples, he cited mothers demonstrating in support of sons who were blacklisted candidates.

### *CAGE 2004*

After the 2000 elections the alliance disbanded, having achieved its immediate objectives (see "Outcomes" below). CAGE's leaders thought that the nationwide mobilization was a singular phenomenon, a phase in Korea's overall political reform movement that would be difficult to repeat. However, new political scandals erupted before the 2004 National Assembly elections. Consequently, a group of civic leaders decided to conduct the blacklisting process once again. On February 4, CAGE 2004 was launched with 354 organizations on board. The difference, said Lee, was that this time around, the civic leaders did not plan for a grand coalition and massive citizen mobilization. Rather, the alliance

launched a pioneering Click N Clean online initiative that focused on “Blacklisting, Money-Election Monitoring, Political Party Evaluation, and Voters campaign,” according to a PSPD report.<sup>56</sup> It released two denominated blacklists (total of 109 individuals), and a final defeat blacklist consisting of two categories: 106 candidates who were deemed “unfit to run” and 100 legislators who voted for the impeachment of the president, Moo-hyun Roh.<sup>57</sup> The latter decision was not fully endorsed by alliance members, and the divisions over this issue weakened the group.<sup>58</sup>

## Campaign Attributes

### *Leadership and Organization*

CAGE had a highly developed leadership and organizational structure at the national and subnational levels, all the more extraordinary given the extremely short time frame available for planning, the pace at which the alliance coalesced, and the finite duration of the campaign. At the core was the Executive Committee. Comprising forty civic organizations (each represented by one person) with twelve cochairs at the helm, it constituted the leadership and made critical decisions throughout the campaign. At the next tier was the Representatives Committee, consisting of ten members from other civic organizations in the alliance. These two bodies worked in tandem, engaging in deliberations and planning. They presented plans to a wider body, the General Assembly (also called the Representative Board), consisting of 500 nationwide representatives of the coalition. In spite of the short time frame, a few meetings were held for the assembly. According to Lee, most decisions were made by consensus, with the exception of the first blacklist, which was put to a vote in the General Assembly.

At the subnational level, CAGE also had ten provincial/major urban units, and fifty-three county/local cities chapters. They operated autonomously, carrying out their own activities, communications, and citizen outreach and engagement. The central core provided the chapters with a campaign manual—a stage-by-stage, how-to guide for local activists. For the final ten-day push to defeat blacklisted candidates, CAGE’s planners devised an additional organizational component. Each of the leaders of the civic organizations in the alliance was designated as a “marksman-in-charge,” tasked with running the defeat campaign in an assigned election district.<sup>59</sup>

CAGE also had several functional departments or groups. Lee re-

called groups for media monitoring; public relations, performances, events, posters, and symbols; online outreach; organized religion; and youth mobilization. Young people were considered a key group to activate, given that they represented 65 percent of the voting population.<sup>60</sup> An “expert professionals” group organized seminars, spoke on television programs, and generally provided expertise on relevant topics, such as elections and civil disobedience. There was also a lawyers group composed of legal professionals, including the former chair of the Korean Bar Association. It engaged in advocacy, provided assistance and counsel for arrested campaigners, and developed a legal manual for activists. During the one hundred days leading up to the elections, major civic organizations in the alliance assigned a total of forty members of their staff to work full-time on the campaign.

### *Image*

CAGE cultivated two principal attributes that cumulatively had broad-based appeal among the population.

1. *Independence*—of corrupt politicians and of politics. “It builds on our notions of independence from Japan,” explained Lee.
2. *Youthfulness*—in contrast to the entrenched, old-guard political establishment that clung to positions and privileges while hindering new young leaders from emerging.

### *Unity*

For PSPD, the civil society organization that jump-started the campaign, unity was considered essential in order to achieve social change and was indeed founded upon this premise. By the end of 2001, in addition to fifty employees, it had 300 volunteer-experts and 14,578 citizen-members. Two of its leaders asserted, “Civic groups must not only attract and respond to the interests of the middle class but help mobilize laborers, farmers, and students to seek reform that will benefit them. In this way, civic movement and opposition mass movement can work together to create a more just society.”<sup>61</sup> Hence, CAGE’s planners considered unity a strategic necessity in order to confront the corrupt political establishment head-on and counter accusations of political partisanship. The massive alliance and the Internet were the pathways to engage regular people across multiple dimensions—geography, urban versus rural settings, age groups, gender, occupation, and socioeconomic status.

The coalition also energized individuals who then became active in the campaign. For instance, according to Hee-Yeon Cho, then chair of

PSPD's Policy Committee, strong support came from doctors, academics, teachers, clergy, lawyers, businesspeople, actors, and artists. They worked to involve their peers, in some cases individually and in other instances through respective professional organizations or unions. As well, a number took part in people power actions to defeat blacklisted candidates. For instance, some Catholic clergy formed a CAGE group and actively worked in Bucheon, targeting a candidate who was known for having committed human rights abuses during the dictatorship.<sup>62</sup>

Surveys confirmed that a large proportion of regular citizens supported CAGE. Gallup Korea carried out three polls, reportedly with almost the same questions regarding views of the civic initiative. When asked if the campaign was desirable or legitimate, 59 percent responded "yes" on January 12, 70 percent answered affirmatively on March 17, and 78 percent on April 14, the day after the elections.<sup>63</sup>

### *Funding*

The campaign was funded through contributions from citizens, who largely responded through advertisements placed in newspapers and the CAGE website. PSPD stated that a total of KRW 350,191,652 (US\$291,826) was collected from 5,667 donations, a fund-raising record for a civic initiative.<sup>64</sup> Leaders reported that citizens personally came to the headquarters to give money, while others made direct bank deposits or contributed via the Internet. The overall expenditures were KRW 328,851,681 (US\$274,043), another milestone as donations surpassed final expenditures.<sup>65</sup>

### *Negotiation*

At the outset, CAGE's leaders attempted dialogue and nonviolent persuasion with the political establishment. They reportedly had discussions with political party representatives and heads of the nominating committees in order to encourage them to "listen to civil society demands."<sup>66</sup> However, when the parties were unresponsive, the Seoul core was ready to launch its strategic plan of nonviolent action.

### *Nonviolent Discipline*

CAGE leaders anticipated that their people might get harassed or attacked by political party supporters during the campaign, yet they vigorously rejected the use of violence under any circumstances. When asked why, Lee answered, "It was not necessary. We believed that violence is not helpful to our campaign because voting is a peaceful procedure, and even if we were hit, our opponents would use any violence to

say we are generating campaign violence.” The campaign took a series of proactive steps to maintain nonviolent discipline, including drafting a Peace Charter that affirmed that CAGE would practice nonviolence, even though there was a strong likelihood that opponents would use violence. The national leadership as well as local CAGE chapters held multiple press conferences to announce it. CAGE also developed a non-violence manual that was distributed to campaign participants. It included instructions on dealing with opponents. For example,

- In the case of physical fighting, sit down.
- In the case of people taking your campaign materials and petitions, let them do it.
- In the most serious cases, run away from the confrontation.

### *Digital Technology*

The campaign sought to maximize the use of emerging communication technologies. For the first time, Lee stated, the Internet was rigorously factored into a civic initiative in Korea. It was used particularly to engage and mobilize young people. On M-tizen, a digital community, youth discussed the campaign, the elections, and political reform.<sup>67</sup> CAGE set up a website that literally became a big hit. The site was visited 856,090 times leading up to the April elections; the average number of daily hits was 10,569. Eight thousand emails were sent to the webmaster, and 45,674 messages were posted on the bulletin board.<sup>68</sup> The website featured the blacklists and documentation about the “unfit” nominees and candidates; for instance, on April 6, three days after the defeat blacklist was released, CAGE posted candidates’ criminal records, generating 300,000 hits. The website also featured endorsements from popular music, television, and film personalities.<sup>69</sup> And in one of the earliest, if not the first, cases of digital resistance, 28,319 people posted their names in support of the campaign and signed up to receive e-information. CAGE capitalized on this unprecedented outcome by publicizing the results.

CAGE utilized SMS to communicate messages and developed a presence on Cyworld, an early social networking site created in Korea. Lee reported that mobile phone ringtones were also used, but they did not have a significant impact because “the technology was not so good then.” Finally, media attacks by a few hostile newspapers backfired. They gave impetus to the fledgling alternative media and online citizen journalist initiatives, which began covering CAGE and digitally broadcasting key press conferences, thereby building momentum at critical points.



### *Communications*

CAGE drew up a communications strategy and plan involving multiple divisions of the campaign. “It was very important,” asserted Lee, “and not just part of the PR team, but also part of the main communications and planning staff.” The plan included several components: key messages, targeted messaging, media relations, communication outlets, press conferences, and tie-ins with nonviolent actions. Core messages included “It’s time for change!” “Withdraw Corrupted Politics,” and “Banish Corruption.” The yellow and red soccer cards—two culturally relevant symbols—encapsulated the entire campaign. The yellow card was used during the denominated phase and the red card during the final push to defeat blacklisted candidates.

Specialized messaging was developed for the four main targets of the campaign: citizens, the political establishment, media, and the National Election Commission. Citizens were urged to participate in the elections, to not vote for corrupt candidates, and to show “the power of voters—only the people power can change politics,” Lee recalled. Political parties and lawmakers were urged, on the one hand, to not select corrupt, blacklisted nominees and to refrain from inflaming regional sentiments, and on the other hand, to make the candidate selection process more democratic and transparent.<sup>70</sup> The message to the National Election Commission was to make information available concerning candidates’ criminal and tax records, and to exercise its power to stop the flow of illicit party funding rather than silencing citizens’ voices.

Lee reported that campaign planners secured meetings with “main press staff to ask for coverage of the information on the blacklist.” Central messages to the media were, “Do not manipulate the regional sentiment; help enrich political debates, broadcast the dark sides of candidates, and deliver full information about candidates to citizens,” he added. Overall, the press was interested in CAGE and generally not hostile. Three major press conferences were held, two during the nominating process and one on April 3 to launch the defeat drive. In conjunction, they were bolstered by rallies, television appearances, expert meetings, local chapter publicity activities, posters, and graffiti.

### **Outcomes**

*Revision of election law.* Prior to the 2000 elections, President Dae-jung Kim and the National Assembly amended the Election Law, thereby making CAGE legal.<sup>71</sup> Some provisions were changed, allowing press conferences, websites, and in-house newsletters, but printed materials and many forms of street actions were still forbidden.<sup>72</sup> As a result,

while the campaign itself was no longer unlawful, it continued to engage in civil disobedience.

*Denominating nominees.* Ten individuals from the original blacklist of unfit politicians decided not to seek nomination. Of the remaining 102 blacklisted nominees, according to Lee, forty-eight failed to be selected as candidates by their political parties. Thus, in total, almost 52 percent of blacklisted politicians (58 out of 112) didn't get on the ballot.

*Candidate pledges.* Prior to the election, CAGE launched a drive to get candidates to promise to enact political reforms should they be elected. Between April 3 and 13, approximately 450 candidates signed the pledge.<sup>73</sup>

*Candidate defeats.* In the final elections, 69 percent of the blacklisted candidates (fifty-nine out of eighty-six) were defeated, including 68 percent (fifteen out of twenty-two) of the "most problematic" candidates in the strategic precincts.<sup>74</sup> There were some notable regional differences. In the Seoul area, nineteen out of twenty on the blacklist were defeated, and in Chungchong, fifteen out of eighteen lost. However, in Youngnam, only sixteen out of thirty-five candidates were defeated, reflecting the impact of strong regional loyalty linked to particular political parties.<sup>75</sup>

*Improved caliber, new blood.* The blacklists had an immediate impact on the overall nominations. Political parties generally screened nominees more carefully, and a large number of incumbents from the two major parties did not get selected.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, many new, younger faces, with no records of corruption, were elected.<sup>77</sup> On the whole, 80 percent of the new assembly consisted of first- and second-term legislators, including a sizeable number in their thirties and forties.<sup>78</sup>

*Readjusted electoral districts.* An attempt to gerrymander districts, based on bargaining by legislators of the major parties, was prevented.<sup>79</sup>

*Disruption of the corrupt system; internalization of integrity.* For Korean civil society, CAGE "dealt a serious blow to the structure of corruption and collusion among old parties and considerably weakened the influence of their corrupt bosses."<sup>80</sup> First, political parties started changing the ways in which candidates were nominated and selected to run. The process shifted from what sociologist Sun-Chul Kim summarized as "a top-down mechanism in which party bosses held sweeping power to the gradual adoption of primary elections where party grass roots gained a bigger voice."<sup>81</sup> As well, most political parties, even including those vehemently opposed to CAGE, incorporated nearly all of the blacklist criteria into their selection process. According to Lee, four years later, during the 2004 elections, each political party set up a com-

mittee to nominate candidates, utilized assessment criteria similar to those developed by CAGE, and even retained “relatively independent” experts to assess the qualifications of nominees. This was the most significant and lasting outcome of all, as the political establishment internalized values and standards of integrity and accountability set by civic leaders and supported by citizens.

*Political reform.* CAGE created an impetus for reforms in the political system, including election laws, funding of political parties, right to information about legislators’ assets and legislative activities, and parliamentary transparency. It began almost immediately, as the incoming National Assembly formed a special committee on political reform and the amendment of political laws.<sup>82</sup>

*CAGE 2004.* In spite of the campaign’s much smaller scale compared to 2000, it had a significant impact on the Seventeenth National Assembly elections. Among those judged unfit to run, 78 out of 106 (73.6 percent) lost. Of the one hundred legislators who voted to remove President Roh from office, fifty-one lost. In total, 63 percent of the combined lists were defeated. Scholars and Lee do not attribute the results solely to CAGE, given that the election became “a referendum on the impeachment of President Roh,” according to sociologist Eui Hang Shin.<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, when one examines the outcomes for unfit-to-run candidates, the results are striking and suggest that citizens had been primed as a result of their success in 2000.

*Transnational inspiration and exchange.* News of CAGE’s success spread quickly throughout Asia.<sup>84</sup> On April 18, five days after Korea’s National Assembly elections, one of Japan’s most influential newspapers, *Asahi Shimbun*, reported, “The South Koreans’ resolve not to let incompetent and corrupt politicians get elected holds a lesson worth learning.”<sup>85</sup> Soon after, a group of Japanese civic actors traveled to Korea to learn more about CAGE; in May, several members of CAGE visited Japan to share their experiences. Subsequently, in the run-up to the June 25, 2000, Lower House elections, seven key Japanese civic organizations and networks produced their own blacklists and together constituted the Movement to Expel Political Misfits.<sup>86</sup>

## Case Analysis

*Changing power relations, bottom-up democracy.* “After the success of the campaign,” Lee stated, “politicians became afraid of the voters’ collective power. We could see changes in political parties and political processes for nominations. They were taking voters into consideration.”

In essence, CAGE created conditions for bottom-up democracy. The campaign transformed citizens from passive voters, merely choosing from a fait-accompli set of politicians, to a dynamic force. They reclaimed their power to demand of political parties worthier representatives and defeat those candidates who had not acted in the interests of the people they were obligated to serve. In doing so, CAGE exacted accountability from both the political establishment and the individuals within that corrupt system.

*People power dynamics.* An excerpt from a publication by the Korea Democracy Foundation concluded, “The movement [CAGE] rode on a wave of citizens’ anger at crooked politics and created a crisis in the political establishment.”<sup>87</sup> It echoes the insights of Martin Luther King Jr., who said in 1963, “Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”<sup>88</sup> In Korea, after the civic alliance’s efforts to negotiate with political parties were snubbed, voters collectively wielded power. They shook up a corrupt system to the extent that it could no longer smoothly function; it had operated as a political party-centered election system imbued with undemocratic political practices that limited the participation of the civic realm in the election process.<sup>89</sup>

CAGE also demonstrates an adroit application of people power that combined mass civil disobedience—through the defining method of blacklisting and its associated nonviolent tactics—with a lawful, institutionalized mass action: targeted voting. The linking of technically illegal and legal actions had a synergistic effect. First, each on its own would not have been as disruptive. Second, casting a ballot was transformed into an act of defiance that was low-risk, highly participatory, and easy to carry out.

*Ownership, collective identity, and legitimacy.* CAGE’s leadership meticulously cultivated a sense of ownership among citizens. The campaign employed multiple paths—from its very name, Citizens’ Alliance; to the broad range of national and local civic organizations participating in it; to nonviolent tactics involving regular citizens, such as the voters’ blacklist pledge, slogans and messaging, and reliance on thousands of volunteers. Citizen views, as well as local and regional input, were valued and systematically incorporated into strategy and planning, through representative polling and CAGE’s organizational structure. Rather than dictate to the periphery, the leadership core encouraged—if not nurtured—local decisionmaking and initiatives. Finally, CAGE’s fund-raising strategy was truly ingenious. By making a

broad public appeal to citizens for financial support, each donation, however modest, became an act of resistance against the corrupt political establishment, bonding the donor's allegiance to the campaign and reinforcing his or her feeling of being a part of a larger struggle for reform, accountability, and democracy. All in all, these measures created a powerful quality of legitimacy that was difficult for corrupt politicians and political parties to damage, in spite of their concerted efforts.

*Proactive approach and education.* While it is impossible for any civic initiative to formulate every single step in advance and predict all outcomes, CAGE's strategists nonetheless proactively anticipated key challenges and took measures to address them. For example, it preempted violent skirmishes between parliamentary candidate supporters and CAGE citizen-members through the Peace Charter and a strict demand for nonviolent discipline. CAGE deflected hostile media and political party attacks through transparency, negotiation, and the legitimacy of citizen mobilization in the exercise of political rights. Education was also considered an essential step—hence the development of activist manuals on nonviolence, legal issues, and effective campaigning, as well as resource manuals for citizens on political reform that countered the political establishment's rhetoric and smears.

*Positive framing.* CAGE's leaders recognized that building the campaign around blacklisting corrupt candidates risked creating an overly negative character that could put off the public and dampen citizen action. As a result, the leaders sought to lighten the negativity through several approaches. They adapted popular symbols associated with positive activities, for instance, the soccer cards. They balanced serious tactics, such as candlelight vigils, with symbolic, humorous, fun, and upbeat actions, for example, the broom demonstration, satirical cartoons, and the Red Festival. The focus on unfit candidates was offset by support from pop stars and respected public figures. Messages and slogans largely emphasized empowerment and change, while the blacklisting process was framed in terms of positive outcomes.

*Kingian nonviolence methodology.* This civic initiative provides yet another affirmation that the nonviolent action methodology developed by practitioners of Kingian nonviolence is robust and effective.<sup>90</sup> Although CAGE's leaders had not been exposed to this particular set of practices, they intuitively adopted similar elements, including commitment to nonviolence, education (of campaign activists and the public), information gathering (about potential candidates), negotiation (with political parties and targeted politicians), and when that was not fruitful, citizen mobilization and direct action.

*Learning from others.* CAGE's core planners took inspiration from some well-known as well as unlikely sources. The overall strategy of a civil disobedience campaign that in its entirety broke an unjust law, and the adoption of sit-ins as a tactic were generally inspired by the US civil rights movement. The candlelight vigils were inspired by the East German nonviolent uprising against the communist regime in 1989. Dramatic images of this form of mass action captured the attention of many Koreans, who just two years earlier had won their own freedom from dictatorship. Lee recalled that they also learned from Bill Clinton's engagement of young people in the 1992 presidential campaign, which at the time was groundbreaking in American political circles. And finally, as evident from the name, the youth group took inspiration from the legendary Woodstock music festival.

## **Lessons Learned**

### *Political Corruption and Bottom-Up Democracy*

The CAGE 2000 campaign offers valuable lessons about political corruption and building bottom-up democracy. First, reform is not automatic after the transition from dictatorship to a democracy. Korean civic leaders described their emerging representative system as institutional politics "managed by strong cartels of politicians."<sup>91</sup> As a result, when voters end up having limited choices beyond obstructive politicians backed by corrupt parties, representative democracy alone cannot deliver accountability and justice, and can lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Second, as in Indonesia (see Chapter 5), the leaders and activists of Korea's civic democracy movement became driving forces to transform the state and break down the intransigent remnants of the corrupt authoritarian system. Nonviolent struggle veterans form enduring relationships forged during the antidemocracy phase, based on common hardships, goals, and a vision for their country. Third, when the political establishment ignores the plight of citizens while engaging in self-enrichment, abusing authority, and protecting itself from justice, citizens have options beyond getting angry, abstaining from elections, or becoming radicalized. Through people power, they can pressure political parties to change, collectively block corrupt politicians from power by supporting honest counterparts, and set in motion a chain reaction that builds integrity. However, when facing an entrenched system of political graft and abuse, public consciousness of the problem on its own

may not be enough to yield change. When this awareness is coupled with a nonviolent campaign or movement, social pressure can exact a toll on powerholders—in this case, losing an election.

Fourth, powerholder disrespect of citizens is frequently part of the core grievances that unite people and can be a potent mobilizer. In the case of Korea, PSPD asserted, “These corrupt political parties and politicians have had no respect for voters. Voters need to show their power to politicians by making use of their voters’ rights, even if legal hurdles were [*sic*] put in front of voters.”<sup>92</sup> Fifth, citizen mobilization and action can empower civic actors to frame the agenda for change in a corrupt system, instead of merely asking for reform and allowing powerholders to define the measures to be taken.

### *People Power*

For civic leaders and concerned citizens, tackling political corruption might seem daunting, since it functions in a horizontal system that can involve dishonest politicians, multiple political parties, the executive branch, and the private sector, organized labor, or other nonstate interests. However, CAGE revealed a potent strategy:

- Tap widely held sentiments and grievances, in CAGE’s case, public anger vis-à-vis unaccountable, venal legislators and discontent over the poor quality of candidates presented to voters.
- Link such legislators and candidates to a tangible issue with measurable outcomes.
- Zero in on a visible aspect of the corrupt system—for example, the opaque, undemocratic, crooked nomination process.
- Articulate clear demands—in this instance, withdrawal of unfit nominees and candidates from party lists and defeat of blacklisted candidates.
- Identify one or more mass actions—in this case, pledges and rejecting blacklisted candidates at the ballot box—that are low-risk and participatory in the given struggle context.

When confronting political corruption, CAGE 2000 demonstrated that political neutrality is particularly important in order to maintain the civic initiative’s legitimacy and counter opponents’ claims of partisanship and interference. Furthermore, as with other nonviolent campaigns and movements targeting corruption, legitimacy is vital. CAGE derived legitimacy through its civic, grassroots nature—in this case, the vast alliance and participation of regular citizens.

Like the community-monitoring initiatives in Afghanistan, surveys were a tool that yielded strategically useful information. On the one hand, they served as a mechanism to gather people's views, which was necessary for planning the campaign. On the other hand, they generated information that could be directed to the targets—in this instance, the political parties, nominees, and candidates.

As in many nonviolent struggles, most notably the US civil rights movement, civil disobedience can be strategically used to directly confront an unjust law—either as a tactic or, in the case of CAGE, by the entire campaign itself. When backed by public support and citizen mobilization, civil disobedience harnesses the power of numbers, thereby making the directive difficult to enforce and justify.

A strategic benefit of tactical diversity is that it can potentially engage a larger number of people. When a civic initiative relies heavily on one or a few tactics, it cannot fully involve a broad swath of people, and hence is less likely to maximize mobilization.

Social and cultural references can heighten the impact of a tactic, for example, through symbols, humor, and music. In CAGE's case, as Koreans are impassioned soccer fans, red and yellow referee cards became the predominant campaign symbols. In turn, waving the cards became a popular nonviolent action.

CAGE expanded the notion of the right to information. In addition to the right to “demand information held by government bodies,” people also have the right to acquire relevant information about their elected representatives.<sup>93</sup> PSPD elaborates, “The citizens have a right to know what their representatives do in the National Assembly. The citizens have a right to know whether their lawmakers have been related to corruption.”<sup>94</sup>

### *Organization and Unity*

Both CAGE and CICA in Indonesia addressed the need to balance core decisionmaking with internal campaign democracy, and centralization of planning with local autonomy. The choices are not mutually exclusive. An organizational structure can create multiple decisionmaking and planning options that incorporate elements of core leadership authority, consensus, majority voting, and core versus periphery action.

As with CICA, one of the benefits of a broad coalition is that different groups can bring different talents and resources to the campaign or movement. For example, the involvement of the cartoonists' association in CAGE had a unique impact. Many members created satirical cartoons that were posted on the Internet. “They [cartoons] had a catalytic



role in increasing the online campaign,” said Lee. Lastly, endorsements and support from respected or popular public figures can be enhanced by dissemination through different channels, from ringtones to websites, concerts, and public statements.

## Notes

1. Korea has a parliamentary system, with the unicameral National Assembly. The voting system is mixed: 246 members are elected by simple majority direct vote, and 54 are elected through proportional representation. In this book, Korea refers to the Republic of Korea, or South Korea.

2. Chon T’ae-il committed suicide on November 13, 1970, and Mohamed Bouazizi, on December 17, 2010.

3. In 1986 military strongman Chun Doo-hwan attempted to change the constitution to give himself a third term as president. After a public outcry he handpicked Roh Tae-woo as his heir apparent. Student and labor groups formed alliances with opposition parties to block this authoritarian succession. In early 1987 violent repression backfired when security forces killed a number of students. The middle class joined in mass demonstrations, and people power forced Chun to agree to an amendment allowing direct presidential elections. See Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (New York: Freedom House, 2005), 41; Gi-Wook Shinn and Paul Chang, eds., *South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

4. Eui Hang Shin, “The Role of NGOs in Political Elections in Korea: The Case of the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election,” *Asian Survey* 43, no. 4 (2003): 697–715.

5. Manarin, “Striking Where It Hurts,” 38.

6. *Ibid.*

7. “Elections and Civil Society,” Korea Democracy Foundation, April 16, 2012, [www.kdemo.or.kr](http://www.kdemo.or.kr).

8. *Ibid.*, 10.

9. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD): “Using documentation to draw up a ‘blacklist’ of unacceptable political candidates and moving the public to vote against them”; see *New Tactics in Human Rights*, [www.newtactics.org](http://www.newtactics.org).

10. Shin, “Role of NGOs.”

11. The phrase in the section title was the CAGE 2000 campaign slogan.

12. Manarin, “Striking Where It Hurts,” 37.

13. *PSPD’s Campaign for Transparent Society*, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Seoul, November 2001.

14. Hee-Yeon Cho, “A Study of the Blacklisting Campaign Against Corrupt Politicians in South Korea—Focused on the ‘Naksun Movement’ in April 2000” (paper presented at the Civil Society in Asia, Today and Tomorrow conference, Seoul, South Korea, December 5, 2003).

15. Samuel Kim, ed., *Korea’s Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

16. This chapter is based on interviews conducted in January 2010 plus sub-

sequent written communications with Taeho Lee, deputy secretary general of the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), who was directly involved in the campaign.

17. Eunyoung Kim, "CAGE 2000" (PowerPoint presentation provided to author, n.d.).

18. These included the Hanbo Steel scandal in 1997, involving former presidents Cheon and Roh in 1997, and construction project calamities, in which citizens lost their lives (*PSPD's Campaign for Transparent Society*).

19. Article 87 of the Election Law bans civic organizations from "election-related" campaign activities, which, according to Lee, include evaluating candidates and making recommendations to voters; Shin, "Role of NGOs," 703.

20. Kim, "CAGE 2000."

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Manarin, "Striking Where It Hurts," 38.

27. The term "defining method" was developed by Kurt Schock.

28. According to Lee, the task force also approached unions, but at that time they supported a progressive political party and didn't join the nonpartisan task force or CAGE. The Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) also declined to join the civic initiative. It only wanted to disclose information about corrupt candidates and did not support a civil disobedience campaign, which it viewed as an interruption to the elections, said Lee.

29. The alliance included Korea's major civic and religious organizations. In addition to PSPD, KFEM, GKU, and KWAU, it involved the Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media, the YMCA/YWCA, Citizens' Solidarity for Participation and Self-Governance, the National Association of Professors for Democratic Society, the National Council of Churches of Korea, Catholic Priests' Association for Justice, and the National Association for the Practice of Buddhism; "Elections and Civil Society."

30. Hee-Yeon Cho and Park Won-soon, "The Democratic Reform and Civic Movement in South Korea—Focused on PSPD," *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies* 12 (2003): 1–17, 13, <http://dnsm.skhu.ac.kr>.

31. Sun-Chul Kim, "Power of Movement: Defiant Institutionalization of Social Movements in South Korea" (paper presented at the Politics and Protest Workshop, City University of New York [CUNY] Graduate Center, March 26, 2009, 2), [www.jamesmjasper.org](http://www.jamesmjasper.org).

32. Lee confirmed that the correct number is 1,104, although various publications cite the coalition as reaching 1,053 and 1,101 members. After the elections, while preparing a white paper on the campaign, the CAGE secretariat conducted a final count of members that came to 1,104.

33. *PSPD's Campaign for Transparent Society*.

34. "Elections and Civil Society."

35. Shin, "Role of NGOs," 702.

36. *PSPD's Campaign for Transparent Society*, 2; Kim, "CAGE 2000," 3.

37. Manarin, "Striking Where It Hurts."

38. "Elections and Civil Society."
39. For additional information about citizens' juries, see Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, *Random Selection in Politics* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).
40. Information about CAGE's Executive Committee, Representative Board, and General Assembly can be found on p. 49 of this chapter.
41. Shin, "Role of NGOs," 703.
42. *Ibid.*; Cho, "Study of the Blacklisting Campaign."
43. Shin, "Role of NGOs," 705.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Cho, "Study of the Blacklisting Campaign."
46. *Ibid.*
47. As soccer aficionados know, the yellow card stands for caution and signifies a warning to the player, while the red card indicates a foul and the expulsion of the player from the game.
48. "Elections and Civil Society."
49. March 1, 1919, is said to be the day that the twenty-eight-year Korean movement for independence began, when a group of cultural and religious leaders released a "Proclamation of Independence" and organized a mass demonstration; Bae-ho Hahn, "Korea," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2012, [www.britannica.com](http://www.britannica.com).
50. Cho, "Study of the Blacklisting Campaign."
51. *Ibid.*, 13.
52. Shin, "Role of NGOs."
53. *Ibid.*
54. Hyuk-Rae Kim, "Dilemmas in the Making of Civil Society in Korean Political Reform," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 34, no. 1 (2004): 55–69.
55. Shin, "Role of NGOs."
56. "Blacklisting Campaign 2004," PSPD, January 19, 2004, [www.peoplepower21.org](http://www.peoplepower21.org).
57. President Moo-hyun Roh was the leader of a tiny splinter party. In the midst of the run-up to the legislative elections, a political and democratic crisis erupted. On March 12, the National Assembly passed a motion to impeach him by a vote of 193–2, involving all the major parties. The grounds included violating the Election Law, accusations of illegal campaign fund-raising, and mishandling the economy. A large percentage of the public was opposed. It perceived the vote as a parliamentary coup against a democratically elected president by the entrenched political establishment and a concerted effort to thwart Roh's political agenda, which included rapprochement with North Korea. On May 14 the Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment, and he returned to power. For a detailed examination, see Eui Hang Shin, "Political Demography of South Korea: Cohort, Gender, Regionalism, and Citizens' Movement in Election Democracy" (paper presented at the Twenty-Fifth International Population Conference, Tours, France, July 18–23, 2005), <http://iussp2005.princeton.edu>.
58. "Elections and Civil Society."
59. Shin, "Role of NGOs."
60. Kim, "Dilemmas in the Making of Civil Society in Korean Political Reform."
61. Cho and Park, "Democratic Reform and Civic Movement in South Korea," 3.
62. The candidate was Sacheol Lee; Cho, "Study of the Blacklisting Campaign."

63. Sun-Chul Kim, "Power of Movement."
64. The South Korean currency is the won. Its currency code is KRW.
65. Kim, "CAGE 2000"; Cho and Park, "Democratic Reform and Civic Movement in South Korea."
66. Cho, "Study of the Blacklisting Campaign," 10.
67. Kim, "Dilemmas in the Making of Civil Society in Korean Political Reform."
68. Kim, "CAGE 2000."
69. Manarin, "Striking Where It Hurts."
70. Regional differences and biases have long-standing historical roots, dating back to the Three Kingdoms period (57 BC to AD 668). In the postdictatorship era, regional ties became influential determinants of voting behavior; David Kang, "Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," in *Korea's Democratization*, ed. Samuel Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 161–180.
71. Manarin, "Striking Where It Hurts."
72. "Elections and Civil Society."
73. Shin, "Role of NGOs."
74. *Ibid.*, 710.
75. *Ibid.*
76. *Ibid.*
77. Kim, "Dilemmas in the Making of Civil Society in Korean Political Reform."
78. Manarin, "Striking Where It Hurts."
79. Kim, "Dilemmas in the Making of Civil Society in Korean Political Reform."; Sun-Chul Kim, "Power of Movement."
80. "Elections and Civil Society," 12.
81. Sun-Chul Kim, "Power of Movement," 3.
82. "Elections and Civil Society."
83. Shin, "Political Demography of South Korea."
84. Cho, "Study of the Blacklisting Campaign."
85. David Johnson, "A Tale of Two Systems: Prosecuting Corruption in Japan and Italy," in *The State of Civil Society in Japan and Italy*, ed. Frank Schwartz and Susan Pharr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 277.
86. Murakami Mutsuko, "A Gift from Korea: Japan's Election Process May Never Be the Same Again," *Asiaweek*, June 9, 2000, <http://edition.cnn.com>.
87. "Elections and Civil Society," 11.
88. Martin Luther King Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," April 16, 1963, <http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu>.
89. Shin, "Political Demography of South Korea."
90. The Kingian nonviolence methodology was developed during the US civil rights movement and is now encapsulated in a framework that is taught by Kingian practitioners around the world. It consists of a nonlinear, six-step strategy involving personal commitment, education, information gathering, negotiation, direct action, and reconciliation. The author participated in a Kingian Training of Trainers, led by Dr. Bernard Lafayette, at the University of Rhode Island, 2008.

91. Cho and Park, "Democratic Reform and Civic Movement in South Korea," 15.
92. *PSPD's Campaign for Transparent Society*, 1.
93. David Banisar, "The Right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts" (working paper, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011), 5.
94. "Blacklisting Campaign 2004," PSPD, [www.peoplepower21.org](http://www.peoplepower21.org).

