

# 9

## Curbing Police Corruption Through Engagement and Disruption: Uganda

The idea to start the campaign originated with the citizens according to the complaints they raised against the police. . . . Citizens were much involved in the campaign, and they will never cease to deal with the police as it is there to protect their lives and property. The campaign came into being when the police itself were aware that citizens had lost trust and confidence in its work. So the campaign saved both citizens and the police.

—*Joseline Korugyendo*<sup>1</sup>

**P**olice corruption is a particularly destructive form of injustice and oppression that undermines the rule of law, human rights, and the legitimacy of the state. Police corruption harms the lives of regular people, creating conditions of fear and impunity in dictatorships and fragile states, as well as in emerging and established democracies. It is a source of violence, not only when police abuse their established authority and power to physically repress, but also when citizens lose confidence in the institution and take the law into their own hands through vigilante groups. The three broad types of law enforcement graft are street-level bribery and extortion, bureaucratic corruption within police forces, and criminal corruption that can involve organized crime collusion and infiltration.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of efforts to tackle such venality, by national governments and donors, it appears to be increasing. Transparency International's 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, involving respondents in eighty-six countries and territories, found that since 2006, payoffs to police are said to have doubled.<sup>3</sup> Daunting as it may seem, a grassroots civic organization based in southwestern Uganda decided to confront police

bribery, extortion, and impunity, but with an unusual strategy of nonviolent action and engagement.

### **Context**

The National Foundation for Democracy and Human Rights in Uganda (NAFODU) is a civil society organization (CSO) initially founded by youth in 2000. Its vision is for a “democratic Uganda where government is accountable to its citizens and in which all the citizens freely and willingly participate in the social, political, and economic affairs of the country.” NAFODU’s strategic objectives are to “strengthen and consolidate instruments, institutions, and the operation of democracy in Uganda, and to consolidate the respect and observance of human rights and tenets of good governance in Uganda.”<sup>4</sup> In addition to documenting human rights violations and monitoring national, local, and village council elections, Joseline Korugyendo, the CSO’s former head of programs, stated that by 2007 the group was promoting local awareness and enforcement of human rights in partnership with relevant law enforcement agencies and human rights groups. NAFODU also focused on political, social, and economic disputes and concomitant violence in communities—through public debates, workshops, general civic education, and institutional capacity enhancement. Corruption was increasingly understood to be linked to all these challenges. Consequently, NAFODU launched “Fight Corruption” radio programs; formed a network of volunteers trained in monitoring; and provided advice, support, and recourse to victims of malfeasance.<sup>5</sup>

In the course of its anticorruption activities, NAFODU found that complaints about police demands for “fees” (i.e., bribes) were widespread and increasing in three main areas: registering cases, which typically affect the poor; finding so-called lost or transferred case files; and payment for police bonds, which is actually a public service that incurs no monetary charge.<sup>6</sup> As a result, citizens in the region lost confidence in the authorities. “Police were feared by the general public as they had turned into armed robbers in uniform and police stations were converted into extortion and exploitation grounds,” said Korugyendo. Rather than going to the authorities, people were approaching NAFODU and other CSOs to report criminal cases, including murder and rape. To the alarm of civic leaders, locals were resorting to mob violence to seek redress and justice. In September 2008 NAFODU conducted an Integrity Survey in southwestern Uganda. Not surprisingly, the survey found that the police were considered the most corrupt institution, followed by traffic police.<sup>7</sup>

The results dovetailed with a national report, released by the Inspectorate of Government in October of that year, that also identified the police as the most corrupt institution in the country.<sup>8</sup> The 2011 Transparency International East Africa Bribery Index found that the “Uganda police lead the pack of the most bribery-prone institutions in the region.”<sup>9</sup>

## **Campaign**

The impetus for the campaign thus originated from local people, out of which was born the NAFODU-Police-Community Partnership Forum. Deliberations and planning began in 2009, and the initiative came to a formal close at the end of 2010. NAFODU received a grant of approximately US\$44,547 from the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF), which had previously provided the organization with modest funding for anticorruption projects. Notwithstanding this financial support, the campaign was made possible through the efforts of local volunteers and citizens.

### *Objectives and Initial Challenges*

The overall objectives of the civic initiative were to improve police community service, reduce corruption, and build a culture of integrity among law enforcement in the southwestern region. These aims were derived from people’s grievances and the public’s loss of trust in police officials and overall confidence in the institution. The long-term vision is for law enforcement institutions in Uganda to fulfill their constitutional roles, which is considered necessary for the country to secure the rule of law and move forward.

The CSO’s leaders understood that they needed to overcome several fundamental challenges from the outset. From the people’s side, there was fear of the police, a sense of resignation that curbing their corruption was impossible, and the belief that extortion and bribery were actually “part and parcel of their work.”<sup>10</sup> From the law enforcement side, there was mistrust about NAFODU’s intentions—namely, fear that it wanted to confront the authorities combatively, interfere in their work, and make officers lose their jobs. A delicate balance was needed. The CSO discerned that change would not be possible without the readiness of citizens to engage in nonviolent action targeting corrupt forces, yet they felt that a minimal basis of police cooperation would be conducive to emboldening the public. What may at first seem incompatible—getting the police to acquiesce to citizen mobilization designed to thwart their own graft—was remarkably bridged.

*Memorandum of Understanding*

At the behest of the PTF, NAFODU pursued a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with law enforcement authorities, outlining the elements of cooperation. To this end, they first organized meetings with officials in all five districts (Kabale, Kisoro, Kanungu, Rukungiri, and Ntungamo), building upon contacts already established through previous police involvement in the CSO's workshops and other activities. During all these interactions, the group leveraged the solid evidence it had compiled of police corruption from the 2008 Integrity Survey, community meetings with victims of extortion, and citizen input about police corruption from call-ins to its *Iraka Ryawe* (Your Voice) radio program. People would call in with complaints even when this was not the topic of the show. "After a meticulous explanation about the project, they [police] welcomed the idea, and this was the beginning of the MOU," recalled Korugyendo. It was finally signed in all five districts in July 2009.

The agreement was the initiative's first interim success. The MOU included the following elements: police participation in community radio programs, community monitoring of police behavior, ethics training workshops for local police, and public information initiatives about law enforcement. Moreover, the memorandum empowered NAFODU and citizens. Whether every police officer was on board was immaterial; it gave the campaign an official stamp of approval, clearly authorized certain activities and measures, and made it more difficult for corruptors within the institution to thwart the initiative or intimidate NAFODU and locals.

NAFODU did encounter initial skepticism among some in the communities, who felt that the police were compromising the organization and the initiative. As a result, part of the campaign's communications included messaging about the benefits, principally promoting police integrity and curbing abuses against innocent civilians.<sup>11</sup> When asked whether it had been easy to interact with the police and get their agreement, Korugyendo smiled and said, "Of course it was difficult, but we kept going to them and didn't give up." When the time came to sign it, "So many questions and excuses came up; in other words, they wanted to participate without the agreement, but we insisted," she added.

If signing an MOU with law enforcement authorities had proved untenable, would the initiative have folded even before it got off the ground? When asked this, Korugyendo maintained that NAFODU was prepared to move forward in a partnership with citizens, while undertaking the civic initiative's other actions to engage with police at various levels as much as possible. NAFODU had already provided a platform for citizens to air grievances about graft, which constituted public

evidence that the region's top brass found difficult to ignore completely, even in the absence of an MOU. NAFODU also observed differences between the top brass and the rank and file that could be utilized; the former were more willing to cooperate than the junior officers, who were most involved in bribe-taking from citizens.

### *Information Gathering*

NAFODU conducted a baseline survey in the region in January 2010 by convening community meetings in the five districts. A total of 200 people were asked if they or anyone they knew had paid a bribe to the police in the past six months. NAFODU reported that of the 101 respondents who reported a police station experience, 86 had to pay for a bond (which should be free of charge), and 58 case files were transferred. Korugyendo explained that case file transfers are a common method through which additional bribes are extracted as each new officer involved in an investigation (often for trumped-up charges) will make a demand on the citizen.

The survey fulfilled multiple strategic objectives. Information gathering is essential for successful civic campaigns and movements. It provided timely substantiation of corruption that the authorities could not easily refute or ignore. It constituted a reference point that would be used to compare perceptions about police corruption after the campaign. In being systematically consulted, citizens could begin feeling a sense of ownership in the unfolding campaign, and their bond with NAFODU was enhanced. As importantly, the survey offered a low-risk tactic through which regular people could safely make their voices heard about the police, at a juncture when there was much trepidation. As such, the survey could be construed as one of the campaign's early expressions of people power, which in turn empowered NAFODU in its persistent interactions and negotiations with the police at the higher echelons and subsequently on the ground.

### *Police Engagement*

Throughout the duration of the initiative, a variety of meetings were conducted with the top brass, street officers, NAFODU, and very often, citizens. After the MOU was signed, NAFODU conducted meetings with officers in their respective districts. The CSO found that quite a few among the police actually wanted to improve the institution's image and to address corruption—critical information for designing the civic initiative's strategy and tactics. These discussions also gave NAFODU the opportunity to convey people's grievances and in turn allay police suspi-

cions that people wanted to go after them as individuals. NAFODU organized a regional meeting in Kabale for police commanders and other top officers from the five districts, held on February 17, 2010.<sup>12</sup>

The CSO also convened district forums in which top officials, the CSO, and local citizens came together. The objectives were to share experiences and views about police corruption, how authorities can build public trust and confidence, and next steps—all of which helped to cultivate a sense of ownership in the initiative. These interactions were quite unusual; senior authority figures and regular people do not normally communicate in a relatively egalitarian manner. Finally, NAFODU was invited to participate in community policing meetings; it was seen as a bridge between the two. Law enforcement authorities had previously launched this initiative, but it had not been particularly effective because citizens were apprehensive to attend. Consistent with its grassroots character, NAFODU's representatives at these meetings were district volunteers and volunteer monitors, invited through the police-community liaison office and local community leaders. They created a safe setting that helped to allay citizens' fears about speaking up directly to the police.

Strategically, these meetings began activating a key dynamic of civil resistance—winning people over to the campaign or movement, including from the oppressors' side. Their experience also confirms one of the tenets of civil resistance theory: support and allies can be drawn from within corrupt institutions and systems, and sometimes can become a source of information, access, and constructive negotiations.

### *Tactics*

NAFODU designed a series of mutually reinforcing actions, in part built upon their previous experiences with radio broadcasts, public education, training, and public sector monitoring.

- *Radio.* Weekly one-hour programs on local stations in each of the districts, in which police officers were on hand to talk with and respond to callers. The programs had multiple aims: educating people about laws against police corruption, and raising awareness about the linkages between police behavior on the one hand, and justice, transparency, accountability, and social concerns on the other hand. The content included news headlines about police corruption; state and civic efforts to promote integrity; cases reported by the public on police abuses, and problems citizens face when they seek services to which they are entitled from law enforcement authorities; call-ins for listeners to ask questions of NAFODU or officers, comment on the cases, or share experi-

### Police Integrity Pledge

We the Police Officers who have participated in this training workshop on Police Ethics organized by National Foundation for Democracy and Human Rights in Uganda (NAFODU) with the financial support from PTF

Bearing in mind that the Uganda Police force shall be nationalistic, patriotic, professional, disciplined, competent, and productive;

Acknowledging that the members of the Police Force in Uganda shall be citizens of Uganda of good character;

Recognizing that the Uganda Police force shall perform functions of protecting life and property, preserving law and order, preventing and detecting crime, and cooperating with the civilian authority and other Security organs established under the Uganda constitution of 1995 and with the population generally;

Now agree as follows

1. We shall not engage ourselves in any corrupt acts that are likely to tarnish our Images.
2. We shall ensure that our role of fighting corruption, promoting transparency and accountability in Uganda is upheld.
3. With immediate effect, we have stopped Police abuses of demanding bribes, demanding mobilization fees to register cases, misuse of the police bond, illegal frequent transfer of case files between Police Officers with the aim of demanding payment of extra fees by the complainants and continued loss of case files.
4. We shall continue to maintain higher ethical standards for Police Personnel in Uganda.
5. We shall respect the code of conduct for Police Officers in Uganda.
6. We shall work to address the factors negatively influencing Police ethics like changing moral standards, working environment, among others.
7. We shall work towards achieving necessary standards of Police integrity, having a policy of zero tolerance to corruption. And we agree to sign this resolution.

*Source:* Orishaba Bagamuhunda Justus, "Project Completion Report: Corruption Prevention and Saving the Integrity Within Police in South Western Uganda: NAFODU-Police-Community Partnership Forum," December 2010, [www.ptfund.org](http://www.ptfund.org).

ences about the police; and police responses and advice to callers; and reports regarding actions they took to address citizens' complaints from the previous week's show.

- *Police ethics trainings.* Conducted four trainings in each of the five districts. A total of 180 officers participated. The objectives were (1) to improve their understanding of codes of conduct, their responsibilities

under the Constitution of Uganda, and their role in fighting corruption and promoting transparency and accountability in society; and (2) to elicit their responses about ethical behavior in various types of situations.

- *Police integrity pledge.* Signed at the end of the ethics trainings. The pledge was designed to create social pressure for ethical behavior and strengthen the sustainability of the initiative. Rather than presenting the police with externally developed codes of conduct, the campaign engaged them in the process, which built their sense of ownership in improving ethics and integrity within the corrupt institution.

- *Public information and advocacy drive.* Through the campaign's network of volunteers, it consisted of biweekly SMS messages encouraging NAFODU volunteers and citizens to report corrupt police.

- *Community monitoring of police through SMS.* The other half of the information and advocacy drive, citizens and volunteer monitors, on a biweekly basis, sent in SMS reports of incidents of police corruption.

## **Campaign Attributes**

### *Mobilization*

NAFODU tapped its network of 600 grassroots volunteers, consisting of local people who were recruited via the CSO's radio, district coordinators, and SMS outreach efforts, and trained to work in their communities. Training involved skills and knowledge to assist victims of police corruption and to monitor, document, and report such practices in communities. They convened local meetings in order to build support for the campaign; educate people about police duties and codes of conduct; get their input at regular intervals; sensitize them to the bigger picture of the relationship between law enforcement corruption and overall abuse, the rule of law, and rights; and as importantly, mobilize them to engage in monitoring tactics. As the civic initiative progressed, human rights activists and other CSOs became involved. "It happened naturally," said Korugyendo, "as the project went on successfully."

NAFODU targeted at regular citizens a communications plan consisting of public awareness, education, and mobilization. Radio and SMS were the main conduits of communication; the former is the most accessible form of media, and the latter an effective, low-cost medium to directly interact with people. The key messages were that people should report police corruption in their communities to NAFODU, and that help was available for victims of police corruption to get redress. The media was both a target for education and coverage, as well as a



conduit for strategic messaging. Local newspapers and radio stations reported about the campaign. In addition to the regular NAFODU radio program, the group also ran announcements.

### *Education*

Woven throughout the tactics of the civic initiative was education—of citizens, victims of corruption, and the oppressors (police). Education had the strategic objectives of empowering communities to take action, winning over elements of the public as well as oppressors from within the corrupt police system, and shifting law enforcement ethics and behavior.

### *Leadership and Organization*

Leadership for the campaign came from NAFODU; decisions were made by consensus through meetings that included police and citizens. NAFODU established small local offices in four districts, each staffed by two local coordinators who ensured a “local presence.”<sup>13</sup> Their roles were to interface with their respective communities, liaise with police in the district, attend the weekly radio call-in programs, participate in the community policing program, and—last but not least—handle complaints of police corruption and misconduct.

## **Outcomes**

### *Citizen Empowerment*

NAFODU shared the results of its monitoring with law enforcement authorities as well as publicly through its radio programs. They also followed up on any complaints that were raised. According to Korugendo, by about the middle of the initiative, the messages started shifting from reports of police misconduct to those of honest behavior. Citizens were also texting their thanks to the police and NAFODU.

During the last week of broadcasting, focus group discussions were organized, consisting of thirty randomly contacted radio station listeners in each of the five districts. Of the 150 participants, 145 reported that they listened to at least one of the programs. All wanted the program to continue and requested that more time be allocated for listener call-ins to officers. The results indicate that, in this context, radio call-ins functioned as a low-risk tactic that generated social pressure for police accountability.

Through NAFODU’s district offices, locals could safely lodge complaints about police personnel and misconduct, and seek redress. Not

only was this a source of assistance for people, it provided valuable information about corrupt practices and served as an ongoing interface between the civic initiative and the grass roots. Citizens submitted a total of 321 complaints of police corruption. Eighty-one were lodged in the Kisoro district, of which local coordinators handled seventy-five to completion and six were referred to authorities such as courts, Legal Aid, the Uganda Human Rights Commission, and the director of public prosecutions. In Kanungu district, there were sixty-three complaints; NAFODU reported that all were successfully tackled by the coordinators. In Rukungiri, seventy complaints were made; sixty-two were handled and eight were transferred to other authorities. Finally, 177 complaints were received in the Kabale locality, of which 166 were dealt with and 11 forwarded to relevant authorities.<sup>14</sup>

### *Police Behavior*

Korugyendo reported a perceptible change in police behavior during the course of the civic initiative, based on the radio call-ins, SMS monitoring, and citizens' input to NAFODU, including the district offices. In November 2010 NAFODU conducted a second survey to compare the results with the baseline survey. It convened a meeting in each of the five districts with volunteer community monitors. Of the 200 respondents, 167 stated that the "integrity and behavior of the police changed and that people now who visit the police stations find it easier interacting with the police." However, twelve monitors reported instances of police corruption. A significant weakness of the two surveys is that they were not conducted in the same manner and thus cannot be compared directly. The questions were different, and the respondents were not drawn from the same cohort.

### *Transforming Power Relations*

Little by little, over the course of 2010, the civic initiative was shifting power relations between the police and the grass roots. Authorities were acknowledging people's complaints live on the radio and interacting on an equal footing with NAFODU, local coordinators, and citizens. As well, they were asked for and provided input about how to improve their own integrity and gain public trust. Finally, community policing meetings were improving. In follow-up interviews to assess the aforementioned regional commanders' consultation, officials "noted that it was their first ever meeting for them to interact and discuss their work and how it affects the community."<sup>15</sup>

An unanticipated turn of events provided the most telling indication

that the civic initiative was not only impacting corruption but upending the power equation between law enforcement and regular people. As the campaign progressed, the police began to share with NAFODU their own grievances, such as low salaries, shortages of trained manpower, lack of computers and vehicles, and overall poor working conditions. They contended that due to inadequate budget allocations, the police force remained small in ratio to the population, resulting in their being overextended and overworked.<sup>16</sup> They made the often heard claim that corruption was linked to these poor working conditions.<sup>17</sup> Whether that is true is arguable. What is most salient, however, is that during autumn 2010, officers approached the CSO with an extraordinary query. According to Korugyendo, they asked for NAFODU's help and for citizens to "give police a voice and make recommendations to the government to enable the police leadership to improve the welfare and morale of the police force." Essentially, law enforcement officials, having experienced people power firsthand, turned to the grass roots to help overcome the problems and injustices police faced within the institution.

## Case Analysis

### *Program or People Power*

Several elements distinguished this civic initiative from NAFODU's past programmatic anticorruption activities. Previous efforts focused on the public administration and private sector rather than on the police. Volunteers were recruited and trained to become monitors, but regular citizens did not actively take part in disrupting the corrupt status quo beyond participating in radio call-ins. In the NAFODU-Police-Community Partnership Forum, people power was generated through the sustained actions of citizens—serving as community volunteers monitoring and reporting police corruption via SMS, and expressing their grievances and observations directly to senior officials.

NAFODU understood that citizens were the drivers of the civic initiative. "They were part of the partnership and had power and the will to curb police corruption as they are the real victims with experience in their daily encounters with the police," explained Korugyendo. Taken together, the citizen baseline survey, top commanders' meeting, community policing meetings, complaints desk, radio programs, and police ethics training workshops functioned as complementary forms of engagement among the three pillars of the campaign: NAFODU, citizens, and law enforcement (senior officials and street officers). Collectively,

they provided opportunities—for winning people over to the campaign from the side of the police as well as from the public, wielding social pressure on the corruptors, and extracting accountability. Citizen monitoring of police corruption activated a second fundamental dynamic of civil resistance—disruption of the status quo, in this case, the system of bribery and extortion among law enforcement in the southwestern region.

### *Contention and Cooperation*

The NAFODU-Police-Community Partnership Forum presents what may seem at first glance to be a paradox. The initiative clearly sought to change corrupt police behavior and institutional practices, yet it was a collaborative venture. On the one hand, the strategy rested on empowering the grass roots to challenge established authority; on the other hand, it included engagement with the oppressor. In nonviolent struggles, contention does not preclude cooperation. First, civil resistance entails “constructive confrontation”; that is, the conflict shifts from the negative to the positive. Second, civil resistance seeks to change power relations and undermine abuse rather than target particular individuals. Even in antidictatorship movements, the objective is not simply for the tyrant to go, but also to end the regime and transform the system of governance and relations between the state and citizens. Third, because those within oppressive systems and institutions are not all equally supportive of the status quo, interaction is often possible.

In this particular context, Korugyendo suggested that the police came on board partly because some top officials and rank and file genuinely wanted to address corruption and build public trust. One could hypothesize that others within the institution may have viewed the initiative as a public relations exercise rather than a meaningful effort, or they did not expect the campaign to take off, or they could not contemplate that regular people have the capacity to wield power. While it was beyond the scope of this project to research the motivations, deliberations, and strategies of the police, such a line of inquiry would provide valuable insights for the field of civil resistance in general and for its application to corruption in particular.

NAFODU viewed curbing police corruption in a holistic manner, to be embedded within a larger framework of law enforcement accountability through social pressure, systemic change, and building awareness of the relationships between police reform, democracy, rule of law, and social justice among the public and law enforcement.

### *External Support*

The Partnership for Transparency Fund's engagement is an example of the constructive role external actors can play vis-à-vis a bottom-up initiative. PTF provided modest funding directly to local actors to turn ideas into action and amplified the voices of the protagonists by inviting NAFODU to speak about the campaign on a panel it organized at the Fourteenth International Anti-Corruption Conference. It was the impetus for the MOU, which proved to be a valuable element of the civic initiative in this particular context. However, in most cases, PTF funding is contingent on such formalized cooperation.<sup>18</sup> Notwithstanding the value of the NAFODU-Police MOU in this particular case, it is an example of an external actor directly influencing a grassroots civic initiative. (For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 12.)

### *Longevity*

In the ensuing months of 2011, after the initiative formally ended, Korugyendo reported that the partnership informally persisted. Locals are aware that local law enforcement pledged to stop engaging in corrupt practices, and the people now know "what to do to get police services without paying bribes," she said. Volunteer monitors continued scrutinizing police conduct in communities. Korugyendo has since left NAFODU, but police continue to pay her visits. They tell her how proud they were of participating in the campaign, how it has improved their image in their respective communities, and how they would like to engage in more partnerships with the civic realm. In the long run, without additional efforts, progress may backtrack, as some clean officers get transferred to other posts while new ones come into the districts, bringing with them the prevailing culture of corruption in Uganda's police forces. Integrity workshops are needed for newcomers while monitoring is essential to maintain people power pressure and thwart graft when it rears its head.

## **Lessons Learned**

### *Extraintitutional Pressure and Shifting Loyalties*

The NAFODU case illustrates that security forces are not immune to people power and offers valuable lessons. First, citizens can play a proactive role to reform the police, reduce corruption, and increase accountability through the application of extraintitutional pressure. NAFODU eschewed conventional street actions to engage regular peo-

ple through a planned set of largely low-risk tactics such as community-based surveys, radio call-ins, complaint mechanisms, and SMS monitoring. Second, democratic policing concepts and practices can be introduced and cultivated through people power as well as through top-down, administrative measures.

Third, traditional approaches to addressing police corruption include building ethics and developing codes of conduct.<sup>19</sup> Such interventions tend to be top-down and often externally derived, and then imposed on the recipients. This initiative turned the process upside-down. The grass roots played the catalytic role, and the targets—police officers—were involved in designing their own integrity training, thereby building ownership of it.

While the process was not easy, the NAFODU case demonstrates how a grassroots civic organization was able to find allies within the police system and capitalize on differences within the ranks, which bears out the tenets of civil resistance theory that power is not monolithic. In the anticorruption context, not everyone within a corrupt system has the same loyalties to maintaining it. As well, it points to the importance of powerholder engagement in order to discern such allies, positions, and loyalties. Fifth, even within a corrupt institution, personnel can nevertheless have grievances. There can be strategic advantages for civic campaigns to address the legitimate complaints of those people, particularly the rank and file. This move can disrupt the status quo, reduce the propensity to target the public, win support for the civic initiative, and cultivate respect for citizens.

A sixth lesson is that negotiation proved useful to gain a baseline of cooperation, strategically strengthening the civic initiative by giving it an official stamp of approval, clearly authorizing certain activities and measures, and making it more difficult for corruptors within the police to ignore or thwart the initiative and intimidate NAFODU and citizens.

### *Legitimacy and Trust*

Like Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), NAFODU used a credible method to bolster the legitimacy of the civic initiative. In IWA's case, each community selected the development project it wanted to monitor (see Chapter 9). In NAFODU's case, the baseline survey had the strategic benefits of corroborating citizens' grievances, providing credible documentation that was used to engage police officials, creating leverage to secure cooperation with the authorities, systematically interacting with citizens, fostering their sense of ownership in the initiative, and bolstering the civic group's credibility to be an intermediary between an inimical public and abusive police.

As well, NAFODU was ensconced in local communities, serving as a resource for people's problems. The CSO was seen as a trusted interlocutor both by communities and the police, which in turn emboldened citizens to challenge the form of corruption most egregious to them.

In spite of positive feedback from citizens and law enforcement, and actual demand for additional police integrity trainings, NAFODU has not been able to maintain momentum after the Partnership for Transparency grant. Unfortunately, in the ensuing years, the status of the CSO and its activities is not clear. Whatever the reasons in this particular situation, sustainability of positive outcomes is a challenge for civic anticorruption initiatives that aim to curb actual corrupt practices and transform cultures of malfeasance within institutions. The key question for civic actors, policymakers, and external actors is no longer whether citizens have the power to impact graft and abuse; it is how to preserve and amplify hard-won change.

The next chapter highlights the five civic initiatives that complement the in-depth case studies examined thus far. I illustrate the applicability of people power to diverse contexts and forms of corruption, as well as the adaptability and creativity of nonviolent methods, from digital resistance to surveys, monitoring, low-risk mass actions, humor, and street tactics.

## Notes

1. This chapter is based on a personal conversation and email communications with Joseline Korugyendo, formerly the head of programs for NAFODU, in November 2010 and from March to June 2011.

2. Marie Chêne, "U4 Expert Answer: Anti-Corruption and Police Reform," U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, May 31, 2010, [www.u4.no](http://www.u4.no).

3. *Global Corruption Barometer* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2010), [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org).

4. Joseline Korugyendo (panel presentation, Fourteenth International Anti-Corruption Conference, November 11, 2010, Bangkok).

5. Orishaba Bagamuhunda Justus, "Project Completion Report on NAFODU II Rwanisa Oburibwenguzi (Fight Corruption) Project," NAFODU, 2009, <http://ptfund.org>.

6. Police bond refers to the guarantee to citizens to not pay a fee if they have been arrested; they are entitled to be released while the authorities conduct their investigation or when they close the case. This link is to a posting on a Ugandan newspaper website, in which a citizen traumatically recounts how he was forced to pay a bond: <http://www.sunrise.ug/opinions/letters/2398-i-though-police-bond-was-free.html>.

7. Korugyendo, panel presentation.

8. "Third National Integrity Survey," *Inspectorate of Government Final Report* (Kampala: Republic of Uganda, October 2008), 119, [www.igg.go.ug](http://www.igg.go.ug).

9. "East African Bribery Index (EABI) 2011 Launch: Burundi Most Corrupt Country in East Africa as Uganda Police Heads List of Most Bribery Prone

Institutions,” press release, Transparency International, October 20, 2011, [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org).

10. Korugyendo, panel presentation.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Turinawe Cleophas, “PTF Quarterly Report 2010—Jan, Feb, March,” NAFODU, 2010.

13. Orishaba Bagamuhunda Justus, “Project Completion Report: Corruption Prevention and Saving the Integrity Within Police in South Western Uganda: NAFODU-Police-Community Partnership Forum,” December 2010, [www.pfund.org](http://www.pfund.org).

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, 6.

16. According to official figures from 2007, the ratio of police officers to population was approximately 1 officer per 1,880 inhabitants, but there are variations by district, ranging from 1:100 in the capital city, Kampala, to 1:8,000 in some outlying districts (“Uganda: Overview of the Police Force, Including Structure, Size, and Division of Duties; Police Militarization; Existence of Police Complaints Authority and Recourse Available to Individuals Who File Complaints Against the Police,” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, June 3, 2008, [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org)).

17. Debate is ongoing in the anticorruption world about whether a linkage exists between low remuneration and corruption in the public sector, including law enforcement. The Ugandan Inspectorate of Government’s Second National Integrity Survey in 2003 concluded, “A main cause of corruption is still attributed by all those interviewed to low salaries and delay in payment of salaries.” However, research from other countries casts doubt on a causal relationship. For instance, a study from Indonesia found that public officials can be comparatively well paid at the lower end of the scale (close to three-quarters of all civil servants), even though there is widespread corruption in the public sector. See [www.u4.no/themes/health/healthsalaries.cfm](http://www.u4.no/themes/health/healthsalaries.cfm).

18. “Concept Note Guidelines,” Partnership for Transparency Fund, <http://ptfund.org/apply-grant/concept-note-guidelines/>.

19. Chêne, “U4 Expert Answer.”