
Recovering

Nonviolent

History

Civil Resistance
in Liberation Struggles

edited by
Maciej J. Bartkowski



BOULDER
LONDON

12

West Papua: Civil Resistance, Framing, and Identity, 1910s–2012

Jason MacLeod

On June 4, 2000, the Morning Star flag, the enduring symbol of a “new Papua” and Papuan nationalism,¹ was openly displayed during a large public gathering in Imbi Square, Jayapura, and the capital of West Papua.² Tens of thousands of people stood solemnly, fixated as the flag was raised beside the Indonesian flag. Many participants were openly crying, expressing years of suppressed emotion. The Papuans present were civilians, all unarmed. Indonesian police stood at the back, their guns lowered. Behind the gathered Papuans was a large statue of Yos Sudarso, an Indonesian military hero, poised ready to repel unseen enemies.³ That day the Papuans turned their backs on Sudarso’s statue, intensely focusing on the Morning Star flag and their desire for a different kind of tomorrow.

Only a year earlier, security forces on Biak Island had massacred over 100 Papuans at a similar flag raising; the military had violently repressed peaceful flag-raising events across the territory. But the political climate was now more open. Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid extended the hand of détente. He had unbanned the Morning Star flag and helped a national gathering of Papuan independence activists organized by the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papua Presidium Council), the group that planned the June flag raising. A month later security forces would again use lethal force to prevent flag raisings.⁴ But for now in the uncertain freedom of the “Papuan Spring,” they watched impassively.⁵

At this flag raising, Papuans rejected their Indonesian identity and embraced a different way of being, a longing for a different kind of political

community. They sang the banned national anthem “Hai Tanahku Papua,” wore traditional dress, and danced traditional Papuan dances.

If in some respects the flag raising mirrored Indonesian nationalist rituals,⁶ there was one vital difference. Indonesian nationalist events recount armed struggle against the Dutch and military defense of the state, thus legitimating the contemporary role of Indonesian security forces.⁷ Papuans, in turning their backs on Sudarso’s statue, rejected being Indonesian and part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia⁸ while implicitly opposing armed struggle as the primary means of liberation. This flag raising in Imbi Square was part of a pattern of determined civil resistance, the primary method of struggle for Papuan self-determination.

My first argument in this chapter is that Papuans overwhelmingly rely on nonviolent civil resistance to oppose Indonesian rule. My second is that civil resistance forms, frames, and reinforces Papuan national identity while, at the same time, Papuan national identity—animated by Melanesian⁹ culture and Christianity—propels civil resistance.

Historical Background

While their Melanesian kin living in Papua New Guinea were colonized by the British, Australians, and Germans,¹⁰ West Papua was the easternmost point of the Dutch East Indies. When Indonesia formally became independent in 1949, the Netherlands retained control of West Papua, arguing that it was politically and culturally distinct.¹¹ Belatedly, they started to create Papuan-led institutional forms of self-rule in preparation for independence. On December 1, 1961, an embryonic Papuan parliament officially raised a new flag (the Morning Star), unveiled a coat of arms, and performed West Papua’s national anthem. From that time, many Papuans have observed December 1 as their national day. However, these moves toward independence triggered Indonesian plans for military invasion.

In 1962, the Dutch were persuaded to place West Papua under transitional UN rule. In less than a year, on May 1, 1963, administration was transferred to the Indonesian government on the condition that there would be an internationally supervised act of self-determination. Instead of a referendum, the Indonesian government carried out what they called the Act of Free Choice—a “consultation” restricted to just 1,022 handpicked men, less than 0.01 percent of the Papuan population.¹² The Act of Free Choice took place under conditions of extreme violence and intimidation by Indonesian security personnel toward the indigenous Papuans.¹³ Despite this, the UN General Assembly in November 1969 duly “took note” and West Papua was formally integrated into Indonesia and removed from the list of territories awaiting decolonization.¹⁴ The stage was set for protracted conflict.

Early Resistance Movements

Indigenous Papuan nations have resisted incursions from outsiders for centuries.¹⁵ From the 1850s to 1939, the Dutch colonialists, seeking to protect the spice trade, faced no fewer than forty-two rebellions (both violent and nonviolent).¹⁶ Religious-political movements, anthropologically sometimes labeled cargo cults, were often in reality early forms of Papuan resistance.

By 1911, Papuan resistance leaders urged followers not to pay taxes and to withhold labor.¹⁷ These tactics were repeated in 1938 in a nonviolent movement that was unmistakably nationalistic, both in terms of geographic scope and its goals—the unity and self-determination of diverse tribes. Angganeta Menufandu, a *konor* (indigenous prophet), articulated grievances and incited dissent through Koreri, an indigenous ideology from Biak Island that she infused with Christian symbols and rituals.

The nonviolent tactics that appeared in 1911 predominated during the Koreri uprising: mass noncooperation with Dutch orders to participate in forced labor gangs, collective tax resistance, and mass defiance of government and mission bans on *wor* (ritual singing and dancing). For Angganeta, a commitment to nonviolent discipline was central because she taught that the shedding of blood “bars the way to *Koreri*.”¹⁸ The Dutch tricolor flag was inverted—a reversal of the colonial political order—and the Morning Star and a cross were added, symbolizing a coming Papuan kingdom. Two decades later, this flag would inspire the design of the Papuans’ national flag.

The movement, which continued until 1943, aroused strong religious fervor. As Angganeta’s influence spread, pilgrims disregarded Dutch and mission bans to visit her. The Dutch sent police to torch the houses constructed by pilgrims, provoking outrage and increasing the movement’s popularity. By now Angganeta was known as Angganeta Bin Damai (Angganeta woman of peace). When she was arrested, Biak erupted in riots. After completing her sentence, Angganeta returned to the island of Insumbabi where she was enthusiastically welcomed. Visiting pilgrims breached Dutch bans on performing *wor* and drinking palm wine, shed their Western clothes for traditional Biak loincloths, and followed food taboos handed down in Man-armakeri stories.¹⁹ A Dutch administrator at the time saw this movement as “far less a religion than a self-conscious Papuan nationalism.”²⁰

The Japanese invasion was initially welcomed as expelling the Dutch but, after incidents of Japanese cruelty, the movement sought freedom from all foreign control. In 1942, Angganeta was imprisoned again. Movement leadership passed to Stephanus Simiopiaref, a Biak man in jail for murder. He escaped and tried to free Angganeta. Now the movement became more nationalistic and martial, replete with units, ranks, and wooden rifles. Stephanus proclaimed himself “General,” acknowledging Angganeta as “Queen.” Previously leadership had rested with women and “peace women” even

banished those “who wanted war and had shed blood” to the neighboring small island of Rani (renamed Gadara) as a way of maintaining nonviolent discipline.²¹ These exiles now became warriors in Stephanus’s movement.

“The core of Stephanus’ message and political propaganda,” writes Susanna Rizzo, “was the attainment of political independence and national unity.”²² Despite favoring armed struggle, Stephanus’s analysis of power could fit in a nonviolent action manual: the source of Papuan servitude was their willingness to obey foreign orders. Building on Angganeta’s reclamation of traditions, Stephanus further fused Papuan identity and Christianity into a nationalist ideology of resistance based on promoting mass withdrawal of consent and refusal to cooperate with foreign rule: “From the moment the foreigners arrived we had to obey orders and were no longer *free people in our own land*. But our time is coming; the masters will be slaves and the slaves masters.”²³

The Japanese responded ruthlessly to the call for armed resistance, eliminating resistance groups and killing leaders, including Angganeta who was executed in mid-1942. On October 10, 1943, the Japanese massacred between 600 and 2,000 Biak Islanders.²⁴ At this point, the violent uprising imploded. The rebels attacked not only the Japanese, but also collaborators and bystanders. The violence continued in 1944 when the United States drove the Japanese out of Biak, at the cost of thousands of lives of Japanese and islanders.

Papuan nationalism was now out of the box. After Angganeta and Stephanus’s movement and a simultaneous Papuan rebellion against Dutch rule in Tanah Merah in the south, resistance movements explicitly began to promote unity and the idea of a free and independent West Papua.²⁵

Papuan Core Grievances and Indonesian Policies

Five mutually reinforcing grievances animate the ongoing West Papuan resistance:²⁶

1. A contested view of history. While for Indonesia the 1969 Act of Free Choice was the last stage of an internationally endorsed decolonization process, most Papuans see it as a fraud—“the Act of No Choice”—and denounce the United Nations for acquiescing in the violation of their right to self-determination.
2. State-sanctioned human rights violations in West Papua.
3. Economic injustice characterized by destructive large-scale development projects, especially mines, oil and gas projects, logging, and palm oil plantations.
4. Migration of Indonesians from other parts of the archipelago into West Papua, resulting in conflict and competition between migrant

and indigenous populations over land, resources, and economic and political opportunities.²⁷

5. Institutional racism and indigenous disadvantage and marginalization in the economy, education, health sector, security forces, and bureaucracy.²⁸

These grievances form a narrative of betrayal and suffering at the hands of the international community, the Indonesian state, and global capital, resulting in high levels of frustration and a near total distrust of the central government. Jakarta's legitimacy is so low that even elected Papuan politicians and senior Papuan civil servants have little commitment to the Indonesian state.²⁹ The overwhelming majority of Papuans, particularly the students and youth, want independence.

Since 1963, the Indonesian pattern of rule has consisted of three central strategies:

- *Modernization*, promoting large-scale development projects and immigration that do not benefit ordinary Papuans.
- *Repression*, including the widespread use of torture, which is both targeted and indiscriminate.
- *Closing off the province from outside scrutiny*: from the Act of Free Choice in 1969 to Suharto's fall in May 1998, West Papua was a military operations area. The region remains off limits to international journalists, diplomats, and international human rights organizations. While Indonesia moves toward greater democratization elsewhere, West Papua remains semi-authoritarian, ruled by local Papuan elites and a repressive occupying military and police force.

Indonesian nationalist leaders understood the threat that Papuan nationalism posed, renaming the territory Irian Jaya and the indigenous population as Irianese. In a few short years "being Papuan" went from something promoted by the Dutch to something criminalized by the Indonesians.³⁰ Ever since mass civil resistance forced Suharto from power, military operations and repressive police action have continued in West Papua.

Cultural Resistance

During the 1970s, Papuan activists challenged Suharto's attempts to impose a hegemonic Indonesian identity. The cultural music group Mambesak, founded by Arnold Ap and Sam Kapissa, collected and performed songs and dances from all over West Papua, thus fashioning a pan-Papuan identity transcending tribal differences. Initially, Mambesak carefully framed their cultural action as a contribution to diversity in a unified Indonesia but, for

Papuan audiences, the implicit message of songs in their own languages, local dances, and hidden metaphors “kept a sense of alternative identities alive” that evoked pride in being Papuan.³¹

Occasionally, Mambesak were overtly political, as in 1977 when they danced naked to protest the Indonesian’s bloody Operasi Koteka (Operation Penis Gourd) in the Bailem Valley.³² Inspired by Mambesak, Papuan performance groups proliferated in the early 1980s until a new wave of repression hit them.

In November 1983 Ap was arrested and imprisoned, and in April 1984 he and another Mambesak member, Eddie Mofu, were killed, allegedly trying to escape. These murders were part of reprisals in the wake of a foiled attack by Papuan guerrillas. To draw international attention to the grave situation, some 11,000 Papuans took part in an organized mass exodus east to Papua New Guinea. Once again Papuan songs and dances were banned, and once again performing them became an act of civil resistance.

Through music and dance, Papuans came to see themselves as a distinct people with their own culture, different and separate from Indonesian culture and identity. Song commemorated suffering at the hands of the state—privations not officially taught, but remembered and passed on orally by Papuan clans and tribes.³³ As performances spread across tribal boundaries, Papuans began to see their experience under Indonesian rule as a collective injustice and Indonesian rule as intolerable. “In a dominated political environment, performing a dance of familiar local origin, to music played by local performers using *tifa* (a traditional Papuan drum) and uku-lele, among people considered ‘us,’ was affective.”³⁴ Teaching and spreading cultural performance was like “sharpening the blade of a knife.”³⁵ This remains the case today when song is also used to exhort unity.³⁶

The most politicized way of expressing Papuan identity is through raising the Morning Star flag—a symbol imbued with hidden, mythical Papuan understanding of the inevitability of transformation.³⁷ Filep Karma, a Biak civil servant and activist who at the time of this writing is in jail after being sentenced to fifteen years for raising the Morning Star flag at a nonviolent demonstration in 2004, explicitly acknowledges Koreri and Angganeta’s movement as a source of inspiration for his own actions.³⁸ The Indonesian authorities, recognizing the power of symbols, see displaying the flag as tantamount to declaring independence. Consequently, despite the nonviolent nature of flag raisings, state security forces under Suharto and since have dealt harshly with flag raisers, be they civilians or members of the armed resistance.³⁹

The Role of Church Leaders and Christianity

Christian churches are the only foreign institutions to have taken root in West Papua. They simultaneously play both a pacifying and mobilizing

role, reflecting different theological traditions as well as ethnic composition. Despite this mixed history many, but not all, pro-independence activists explicitly use Christian frames to facilitate collective action. The churches as institutions have also provided an organizational base and protection for those engaged in liberation work.

Christian missionaries first arrived in Mansiram, a small island off the coast near Manokwari in 1855. Evangelism spread to the Central Highlands much later.⁴⁰ The 2000 census indicated that some 90 percent of the indigenous Papuan population is Christian.⁴¹ Much of the theology preached in West Papua is conservative. The largest church, the Protestant Gereja Kristen Injil (GKI), has seen its role as protector of its congregation, cautioning against active resistance and even promoting the 1969 Act of Free Choice. The GKI is further constrained on the coast by the active participation of a significant proportion of migrants, including present and former Indonesian soldiers. Consequently, some Papuans view Christianity as at best irrelevant⁴² and at worst as hindering or undermining resistance.⁴³

Those Christian leaders working for social change have for the most part carefully eschewed political references to independence or separatism, instead invoking the gospel mandate to speak out about human rights, justice, and peace. Over time, more church leaders have become outspoken about human rights violations and the need for far-reaching justice. Some have joined pro-independence groups, called for political dialogue, taken up arms, and become active in campaigns for civil and political or economic, social, and cultural rights. Such leaders argue that the Indonesian state needs to engage politically with independence activists, whether armed or unarmed, if they want an end to conflict.

The moderator of the Kingmi Church, Benny Giay, argues that a Papuan nonviolent liberation theology is emerging organically from the Papuan people as praxis that animates action.⁴⁴ Some of its contours include

- A recognition of *memoria passionis* (the suffering of the Papuan people)⁴⁵ and an active involvement in the struggle for human rights, peace, and justice as a necessary part of being a Christian. A church that serves the people must engage itself in struggle; people need to experience God as a liberator in their own lives.⁴⁶
- A commitment to struggle through nonviolent action in ways that are consistent with the gospel injunction to “love enemies,” but are simultaneously directed toward realizing a transformed social, political, and economic order.⁴⁷
- Pride in being Papuan. This includes a critical appraisal of those Papuan cultural values and practices that support liberation, justice, and peace, rejecting any not consistent with Christian faith.⁴⁸ It also includes incorporating Papuan cultural performances—music, dance, indigenous Papuan languages, and rituals—into church liturgies.

This practice dates back to early resistance movements, was reinvigorated by Mambesak, and has been taken up by Protestants and Catholics.⁴⁹

- A theological justification of the need for self-government. God has made Papuans different from Indonesians and has given them their own land.⁵⁰
- The importance of resisting illegitimate government.⁵¹
- A belief in the inevitability of liberation and a concomitant recognition of the need for reconciliation, including reconciling personal, tribal, and political differences within the movement. Church leaders regularly urge movement unity.

Christian identity and beliefs act as transformative frames that promote what Doug McAdam called “cognitive liberation,” the belief that not only have Papuans been subject to a grave injustice but collectively they can take action to challenge and ultimately transform oppression.⁵²

Papuan Resistance Since the Fall of Suharto

It is possible to map five overlapping phases of the struggle since Suharto’s fall in 1998.

Phase 1: The Papuan Spring

Suharto’s fall released long-repressed hopes for freedom and led to a temporary political liberalization and openness at a time when the central government and military had not yet consolidated their power. Tens of thousands of Papuans mobilized in an atmosphere of euphoria and expectation of independence. In 1999 a team of 100 Papuans met Indonesian president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie to demand independence. Although the meeting had no clear outcome, the Papuan struggle had exploded onto center stage and the team returned home to a hero’s welcome.⁵³

Mass civilian-based mobilization by Papuans led the central government to accept the Special Autonomy proposal, a compromise endorsed by Papuan moderates and their allies. This was not full independence, although the proposal developed by Papuan leaders (which was ultimately rejected in Jakarta) went a long way toward meeting many Papuan demands.⁵⁴

Phase 2: The Collapse of Special Autonomy and Return to Repression

In 2001 after the central government had already agreed to Special Autonomy, the state jailed five Papuan independence leaders. Shortly after, in

November 2001 Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) assassinated Theys Eluay, chair of the Presidium Dewan Papua. Jakarta proceeded to divide the territory into two separate provinces, renewed a campaign of public acts of terror, and then failed to implement regulations essential for the acceptance of Special Autonomy by most Papuans.

Phase 3: Decline of the Overt Independence Movement and Emergence of Limited Campaigns

This phase overlapped the widespread disillusionment about Special Autonomy. As Jakarta squeezed the political space for pro-independence campaigning, more localized struggles emerged. Some were widespread, like the successful campaign that scuttled plans for a third province. Others were initially less visible such as local campaigns against logging and palm oil plantations and the Papuan women fruit and vegetable sellers' campaign for their own market place in the capital.

With the development of more localized campaigns, students demanded closure of the Freeport McMoRan/Rio Tinto gold and copper mine. The campaign against the mine, however, dissipated after a demonstration in Jayapura turned violent in March 2006 and Papuans stoned five security forces to death. Brimob (the paramilitary mobile police) retaliated, shooting up student dormitories and randomly arresting and beating Papuans. Hundreds fled to neighboring Papua New Guinea. These events set back student organizing for years.

Conditions for workers at the Freeport mine and landowners remained dire. Tongoi Papua, the first independent labor union in West Papua, was formed in 2006 by indigenous workers of the mine, uniting highlanders and islanders who had previously been separated by decades of mistrust and mutual suspicion. In April 2007, mass demonstrations and a 6,000-strong labor strike won Papuan mine workers improved conditions, including doubling the wages of the most poorly paid mine workers. Four years later, 8,000 Papuan and Indonesian workers at the mine went on strike again, over low wages, poor conditions, and the right to organize as workers. Several miners had been shot and killed by unidentifiable assailants. By November 2011 analysts estimated that the mine had forfeited a staggering US\$1.3 billion in lost revenues.⁵⁵

Phase 4: Noncooperation Spreads to State Institutions

By 2009–2010, precipitated by an emerging consensus that Special Autonomy had failed and that the religious-inspired Papua Land of Peace Campaign was ineffectual,⁵⁶ Papuan leaders felt that a more forceful approach was needed.

On June 9 and 10, 2010, the Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP; Papuan People's Assembly), a state institution, held an open forum to evaluate Special

Autonomy. This Papuan-only senate advises the Jakarta-controlled provincial parliament on how to safeguard Papuan cultural traditions and values. The MRP concluded that Special Autonomy had failed. It promised protection and prosperity. Instead, torture and human rights violations by the security forces were worsening; migrants continued to pour in, further marginalizing indigenous Papuans; and business as usual continued for transnational companies, safe in the knowledge that the Indonesian military was keeping a repressive lid on boiling Papuan anger.

On June 18, in coordination with the newly formed Forum Demokrasi Rakyat Papua Bersatu (FORDEM; Democratic Forum of the United Papuan People), 15,000 Papuans from seven districts demanded that parliamentarians should hand back discredited Special Autonomy to Jakarta in no less than three weeks. After this deadline, 20,000 indigenous Papuans—many in traditional dress—walked and danced their way from the MRP offices to the center of Jayapura. When the protesters reached parliament, the demonstration became a two-day occupation of the building by thousands of Papuans, surrounded by fully armed police, water cannons, and armored personnel carriers. This was the largest civilian mobilization since the Papuan Spring of 1998–2000.⁵⁷

In the past, the Papuan movement has targeted Jakarta and the international community, asking others to give them independence while their political representatives waited for the next injection of Indonesian cash. This time, it was different. Papuans targeted their own leaders, demanding a special session to return Special Autonomy to Jakarta. Papuans did not want the law revised; they wanted political negotiations and a referendum.

Phase 5: Independence Declared Again

The occupation of parliament failed to result in dialogue mediated by a third party or a referendum. Neither did it precipitate discussion about Special Autonomy. Instead, the president proposed the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua (UP4B). Papuan resistance leaders saw this as further evidence that Jakarta views West Papua's crises as an economic rather than political problem.

Faced with intransigence on the part of the Indonesian government, Papuan leaders escalated tactics. On October 19, 2011, the last day of the Third Papuan People's Congress, a three-day gathering of unarmed resistance groups, Papuan leaders declared independence. The response from the security forces was swift and brutal. About an hour after the congress concluded, the security forces opened fire. Three Papuans were shot and killed. Two were fatally stabbed. Three hundred people were arrested and beaten. At the time of this writing, six of the leaders remain in jail, charged with treason. In contrast, the police who shot, stabbed, beat, and tortured people received only warning letters.

The killing of protesters at the congress relayed by phone, Facebook, YouTube, and mailing lists outraged Papuans, which led more to support independence. It divided political elites inside Indonesia, attracted more third-party support for the West Papuan cause, and revealed the ugly face of Indonesian colonial rule.

This backfire dynamic was evident a few weeks later on December 1, 2011. Despite being fired at during the congress, senior leaders organized nonviolent independence celebrations across the country. The six jailed independence leaders urged Papuans to “celebrate independence in an atmosphere of peace, safety and calm.”⁵⁸ Tens of thousands of Papuans—in Jayapura, Sentani, Manokwari, Sorong, Merauke, Timika, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Wamena, and inside Indonesia in Jogjakarta and Jakarta—waved the banned Morning Star flag and shouted “freedom.” At many demonstrations inside West Papua, the October 19 Declaration of Independence was read again. Papuans had cast off their fear in a way that has not been seen before. In Sorong, for example, even Papuan government civil servants and retired Papuan military personnel joined the December 1 rally, prompting one experienced organizer to remark that this was “really different from previously.”⁵⁹

The Third Papuan People’s Congress and December 1, 2011, have altered the political climate in West Papua. Papuans are less fearful, they are angrier, and they are less likely to obey bans on freedom of expression. As civil resisters simultaneously become a civilian media network, the Indonesian government’s ban on the media is becoming increasingly impossible to enforce.

The following year the position of radicals on both sides of the political divide had hardened. The Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB; West Papua National Committee), a nonviolent pro-independence group, continued to press for a referendum on West Papua’s political status while the Indonesian military stigmatized nonviolent pro-independence groups as violent separatists who threatened the viability of the Indonesian state. Such people, the Indonesian security forces argued, forfeited their rights to protection. As KNPB protests continued to grow the country was rocked by a spate of fatal shootings followed by bomb attacks in Wamena and Jayapura. Talk of dialogue dissipated as the Indonesian police fingered KNPB as responsible for the violence. This was despite the fact that no hard evidence linked KNPB to either the shootings or the bombings. In contrast dozens of witnesses had seen members of the police shoot and kill two of the victims. KNPB chair Viktor Yeimo also consistently denied the group’s involvement in violence and pressed home their nonviolent credentials but to no avail. By November 2012 the Indonesian police and military had all but “declared war” on KNPB. Detachment 88, the US- and Australian-trained and -funded counterterrorist police group, members of the Indonesian police, and the Indonesian military launched a brutal countrywide offensive, killing KNPB activists, jailing scores of others, and forcing the entire leadership underground.

Far from neutralizing dissent, repression by the Indonesian state has only galvanized Papuan's freedom dreams.

Civil Resistance and Development of Collective Identity

Civil resistance in West Papua not only expresses collective identity, but also helps form and consolidate a pan-Papuan identity. Indigenous Papuan culture and Christianity in West Papua act as markers of difference between Papuans and others—the Dutch and the Japanese in the past and Indonesian migrants in the present. However, identity is not formed only in opposition to being Indonesian, but also in relation to resistance, particularly civilian-based resistance. Nonviolent tactical choices grow out of a distinctly Papuan culture and faith. In turn, they generate and reinforce Papuan unity by emphasizing and re-creating shared identity and meaning.

The shared cultural practices in Angganeta's movement were easily replicated across clan and tribal differences, as the music and dance group Mambesak were to show. In addition to song, dance, and the Morning Star flag, food also offers scope for affirming a distinct Papuan and non-Indonesian identity. In Angganeta's day, people from Biak observed Manarmakeri's taboos. Today some Papuans who are committed to a free and independent West Papua eat sago, sweet potatoes, fish, and pig (traditional West Papuan produce) while avoiding the food of collaboration: rice, tofu, and tempe (traditional Indonesian food).

Christianity has become another marker of difference between Papuans, who are overwhelmingly Christian, and Indonesian migrants, who are overwhelmingly Muslim.⁶⁰ Culture and Christianity are entwined. Angganeta, for instance, used Christian place names to mark transformed or liberated territory and she was often called the "Golden Woman of Judea" or "Mary" and greeted her "disciples" with the refrain, "Ye-sus Christus and liberty."⁶¹ Nowadays many Papuan activists sign off their correspondence and greet crowds with "shalom," the Hebrew expression for peace, differentiating it from the analogous Muslim greeting, "salam."

Papuan Christians use church services and prayer to support the cause of self-determination.⁶² Many Papuan Christians perceive God as a liberator who gave Papuans their unique identity, their own cultural practices, and their own homeland:

God created people to be different. Papuans are different to Javanese and different to other people too. God gave Papua to Papuans as a home, so they could eat sago and sweet potato there. God gave them a penis gourd (koteka) and loincloth (cawat) for clothes. God gave them curly hair and black skin. Papuans are Papuans. They can never be turned into Javanese or Sumatrans, or vice versa. The Javanese were given Java. Tahu (soya

bean curd) and tempe (soya bean cake) is their food. Their skin is light and their hair is straight. The real problem is that those in power in this republic have tried as best they could to make Papuans talk, think, look and behave like Javanese (or Sumatrans), and that goes against the order of God's creation. That is where the conflict comes from. How to end it? Let the Papuans and the Javanese each develop according to their own tastes and rhythms, each in their own land.⁶³

Giay explains how faith enables liberation and inspires hope: "The Bible becomes a 'window' that gives people new possibilities, new dimensions to see a better world than the one they live in every day. The Bible portrays a new world, free from manipulation, intimidation, and trauma. It lifts up the eyes of those who are oppressed to a new world. Sometimes people see in this new world a New Papua, an independent West Papua."⁶⁴

This faith-based injunction to struggle nonviolently helps to humanize Papuans to others and to ennoble Papuan views of themselves. Racist foreign discourses of Papuans as "savages" and "cannibals" are turned on their head. Through civil resistance, Papuans become dignified and "civilized" while members of Indonesian security forces—Brimob, Kostrad (infantry combat troops), and Kopassus, in particular, that use torture and barbaric killings against the Papuan people—become "devils," the signifiers of the "savage."⁶⁵

Unlike other parts of Indonesia, Papuan national identity is not a sub-national identity that complements and enriches Indonesian identity. Rather, Papuan nationalism is in competition with Indonesian identity and acts as a unifying force between diverse Papuan tribes. Papuan nationalism shaped through the process of defining Papuanness in relation to not being Indonesian also reinforces nonviolent discipline. The promotion of Papuan nationalism has not led to any widespread or regular interethnic violence between Papuans and Indonesians. Although the potential for ethnic conflict is real, incidents of interethnic violence have been extremely rare.⁶⁶

Framing and Mobilization Around Collective Identity: A Two-Edged Sword

Mobilization around Papuan national identity works well in transcending tribal differences, but poses problems in creating networks of support as well as in its narrow strategic focus on independence—a demand less likely to resonate with potential Indonesian allies than to arouse fears that Papuans and their allies are seeking to unravel the Indonesian state.

This especially is a problem for Papuans because the Indonesian government could control Papuan land and exploit their resources even if the Papuans withhold cooperation. To maintain the occupation, Jakarta depends less on Papuans than on sustaining domestic support for a greater Indonesia.

In brief, Papuans need Indonesian allies. However, when Papuans exclusively appeal to indigenous identity and Christianity, frame their grievances around historical injustices, and communicate their aspirations in ways that emphasize independence, they unwittingly limit their ability to mobilize support from other Indonesians who are overwhelmingly nationalist and Muslim. As a result, Papuans reduce their chances of winning over a key influence on the Indonesian government: the Indonesian people.

In addition, the Indonesian state also depends on technical, economic, military, and diplomatic assistance and support from Jakarta's international allies. Therefore, a key element of any strategy of liberation requires Papuans to build broad alliances. Domestic (inside Indonesia) and international (outside Indonesia) solidarity then needs to be directed at key sources of the Indonesian government's power in order to restrain Jakarta's capability and willingness to repress Papuans.⁶⁷

Papuan student activists complained to Neles Tebay, a Catholic priest facilitating internal dialogue between Papuan political factions and working toward dialogue with the Indonesian government, that progressive Indonesian students will support protests against the Freeport mine or for demilitarization, but will not join them in demanding a referendum for independence and do not seem to care about the historical injustices toward Papuans. Tebay responded, "psychologically it is always going to be difficult for Indonesian students to support Papuans wanting to address historical grievances. Their understanding of history is too different from Papuans and the emotional attachment to a unitary Indonesian state of even the most progressive student runs deep."⁶⁸ Instead, he counseled Papuan students first to find out what Indonesian students are passionate about. "Perhaps it is the environment, or corruption, or anti-militarism. Find this issue and then work together."

This highlights the conundrum for Papuan activists. There is a perception that working for intermediate objectives means selling out the long-term goal of independence. Yet to build Indonesian support for Papuans and put pressure on the Jakarta government require framing campaigns around intermediate objectives like freedom of expression, democracy, environmental protection, corruption, sustainable development, universal access to education and health services, accountable government, and human rights. This does not mean giving up on larger goals like independence, but views strategy and mobilizing the movement as a process of Papuans building their power through reaching out to potential allies and winning more limited campaigns that will undermine military impunity or stop ecological devastation. Such campaigns can simultaneously strengthen Indonesian democracy and build Papuans' international reputation—developments that will leave Papuans in a better position to realize larger aspirations.⁶⁹ This is a strategic challenge. Papuans need to use collective action frames that resonate with different audiences at different times, define intermediate demands, and

time mobilization to achieve short-term objectives, but in ways that leave the movement in a stronger position to achieve their ultimate goal: full political freedom.

A further danger in depending primarily on a collective Papuan identity to mobilize resistance is that a new Papua is best built on an inclusive vision and a deeper articulation of the multiple meanings of *merdeka* (freedom).⁷⁰ John Rumbiak and Benny Giay urge that this vision needs to include not only diverse Papuan tribes, but also Indonesian migrants.⁷¹ Mobilization through an exclusive Papuan identity will create a fragile unity, perhaps liable to break down under stress and certainly incapable of carrying through an agenda for democratic transformation.

A few Papuan activists have told me that independence will solve everything, “ushering in the promised land” and “a time of plenty when no one will have to work.”⁷² Other Papuans recognize that an independent West Papuan state could replicate the problems Papuans have with current governance or generate a new set of problems without resolving the underlying causes of injustice. For instance, resource conflict generated by mining and logging companies will not necessarily be resolved through independence. This is why civil resistance needs to be waged in ways that prefigure the kind of society Papuans want.

Conclusion

Since 1998, nonviolent means for addressing Papuan grievances and pursuing Papuan aspirations have been used more regularly and more extensively than violence or conventional political activity. Papuans recognize the futility of violent resistance against the Indonesian Army that is simply more numerous and better equipped than any armed challenge that Papuans could hope to mount. And when the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional-Papua Barat (TPN-PB; West Papuan National Liberation Army) does use violence, reprisals by the security forces exact a heavy cost on the civilian population. “Whenever there is violence there is a tendency for a violent response. That is why we need to keep our political struggle nonviolent,” says former political prisoner Reverend Obed Komba.⁷³

Papuan civil resistance also draws on continuous traditions of nonviolent resistance that stretch back to at least the 1850s and it relies heavily on indigenous and cultural frames as well as Christian narratives. Over many decades, civil resistance has formed and reinforced collective Papuan identity and Papuan nationalism through giving Papuans a means to defy successive colonial powers while casting the Papuan struggle as one that is civilized, dignified, and blessed by God. At the same time, this deeply rooted collective identity and nationalism has helped to strengthen civil

resistance by mobilizing ordinary Papuans and forging unity among tribal groups.

Papuans have a long history of struggle against outside incursions through overt and everyday acts of resistance. Because this is so strongly based in Papuan culture and values, resistance has a strength and vitality that at times seems irrepressible. This strong collective identity is a source of empowerment for nonviolent resistance, but it can sometimes frame resistance too narrowly. An exclusive identity framed around ethnicity, Christianity, and independence restricts Papuans' ability to construct alliances with progressive Indonesians and to capitalize on decades of Papuan-led international solidarity work, thereby greatly reducing the leverage Papuans have in Jakarta. In opting for everything independence Papuans risk gaining nothing. At the same time, making demands other than independence does not necessarily mean rejecting independence; it is about building social and political power for continued struggle. In order to build alliances with progressive Indonesians, Papuans may need to consider redirecting horizontal framing around what it means to "be" Papuan to vertical framing around state and corporate abuses.

Arguably, the nonviolent and unconventional forms of civic participation and action have mobilized more people, secured more political gains, and best sustained collective Papuan identity. But civil resistance that is influenced by a relatively narrower understanding of Papuan national identity and desire for an independent state alienates progressive Indonesians and has so far failed to secure broader international support. The question remains: How can Papuans transform their civil resistance into a series of more limited campaigns waged within more broadly defined, and thus potentially more acceptable, struggles for social, economic, cultural, civic, and political rights that simultaneously build a momentum for independence?

Notes

The author thanks Maciej Bartkowski, Anne Brown, Brian Martin, Cammi Webb, Daniel Ritter, Howard Clark, Jill Prideaux, Peter King, Jim Elmslie, and Richard Chauvel for comments.

1. *New Papua* is an open term, pointing to a transformed society without prescribing its form. It was popularized in the book by Benny Giay, *Toward a New Papua*. See Benny Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru* (Jayapura: Deiyai and Elsham Papua, 2000). *Papuans* here indicates indigenous Melanesians under Indonesian rule in western New Guinea. *West Papua* and *new Papua* refer to the provinces Papua and Papua Barat.

2. This event is captured in Mark Worth's film, *Land of the Morning Star* (a Film Australia National Interest Program produced with the assistance of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation) and referred to in Richard Chauvel, "Papuan Nationalism: Christianity and Ethnicity," in *The Politics of the Periphery in Indonesia*, ed. Minako Sakai, Glenn Banks, and J. H. Walker (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 201.

3. Sudarso died in January 1962 in an Indonesian military operation to gain control of West Papua.

4. Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Irian Jaya, 1999–2000" (Jakarta: Human Rights Watch, 2000), www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/papua/, accessed April 2, 2007; Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: Violence and Political Impasse in Papua" (Jakarta: Human Rights Watch, 2000).

5. The phrase "Papuan Spring" was coined by Richard Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation* (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005). Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has had four presidents—Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, 1998–1999; Abdurrahman Wahid, 1999–2001; Megawati Sukarnoputri, 2001–2004; and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2004.

6. Michael Cookson, "Batik Irian: Imprints of Indonesian Papua" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2008).

7. Since independence, the primary role of Indonesia's security forces has been to defend Indonesia's territorial integrity against "separatism" in Indonesia's restive peripheries: Aceh in the west, Maluku and West Papua in the east, and, prior to 1999, East Timor.

8. The English translation of the official name of the Indonesian state, Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia.

9. The Pacific subregion of Melanesia comprises New Guinea (Indonesian-ruled West Papua in the west and independent Papua New Guinea in the east), the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Fiji, and the Torres Strait Islands. In the island of New Guinea (Papua New Guinea and West Papua) alone, there are some 1,200 distinct languages. In the rural areas people live in close-knit, semiautonomous, kin-based communities, with subsistence-based economies. Communally owned land connects Melanesians with an entwined past, present, and future in which the spirit realm and ancestors continue to play a central role. Melanesian political culture is based more on influence than authority, but with considerable diversity in leadership traditions. A high value is placed on dialogue, reciprocity, and exchange. See, for instance, M. Anne Brown, "Custom and Identity: Reflections on and Representations of Violence in Melanesia," in *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity*, ed. Nikki Slocum-Bradley (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), 183–208.

10. Australia administered Papua New Guinea as a UN protectorate until independence in 1975.

11. In West Papua, unlike elsewhere in the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch chose not to operate through local rulers but established a second layer of administration run by Indonesian migrants. While this experience deepened non-Papuan Indonesians' attachment to a state that included all the former Dutch East Indies, Papuans resented the administrative role of non-Papuans, hence, their belated and marginal involvement in Indonesia's independence struggle. Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism*.

12. Exact numbers vary but John Saltford, a leading historian of the period, argues in *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003) that 1,026 people were originally selected with 1,022 (less than 0.01 percent of the population) eventually participating in the Act of Free Choice. The Act of Free Choice consisted of a series of "consultations" with a few hundred participants at a time. These staged events were held in different parts of the country over the course of a few months.

13. Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*; Pieter Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice: Decolonisation and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).

14. "Take note" is the UN's lowest rank of approval. It implies that the matter in question was agreed to but with some misgivings and open to review later. Dr. Greg Poulgrain, personal communication with the author, April 2, 2006.

15. Prior to Indonesians assuming control of the territory, the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, British, sultan of Tidore, and various traders and missionaries made claim to all or part of West Papua.

16. Susanna Rizzo, "From Paradise Lost to Promised Land: Christianity and the Rise of West Papuan Nationalism" (PhD dissertation, University of Wollongong, 2004); Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of "Cargo" Cults in Melanesia* (London: Paladin, 1967); Freerk Kamma, *Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area* (The Hague: Koninklijk Instituut, 1972); Danilyn Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 190.

17. Kamma, *Koreri*; Rizzo, "From Paradise Lost to Promised Land."

18. Kamma, *Koreri*, cited in Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 189.

19. Angganeta prophesied that Manarmakeri would return to liberate the Papuans. Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 151.

20. Jan Victor de Bruijn, "The Mansren Cult of Biak," *South Pacific* 5, no. 1 (1951): 10.

21. Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 194–195.

22. Rizzo, "From Paradise Lost to Promised Land," 307; Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 197; Kamma, *Koreri*.

23. Hugo Pos, "The Revolt of Mansren," *American Anthropologist* 52 (1960): 561–564, cited in Rizzo, "From Paradise Lost to Promised Land," 307–308 (Rizzo's emphasis).

24. Kamma cited in Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 200.

25. Rizzo, "From Paradise Lost to Promised Land," 308.

26. See Neles Tebay, *West Papua: The Struggle for Peace and Justice* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 2005); Jason MacLeod, "Self-Determination and Autonomy: The Meaning of Freedom in West Papua," in *Security and Development in the Pacific Islands: Social Resilience in Emerging States*, ed. M. Anne Brown (London: Lynne Rienner, 2007); Jason MacLeod, "The Role of Strategy in Advancing Nonviolent Resistance in West Papua," in *Building Sustainable Futures: Enacting Peace and Development*, ed. Luc Reyhler, Julianne Funck Deckard, and Kevin H. R. Villanueva (Bilbao: University of Deusto, 2009). The Indonesian Institute of Sciences suggests four themes for Papuan grievances: political status and historical construction of the conflict; state violence and rights violations; failure of development; and marginalization and discrimination. See Muridan S. Widjojo et al., *Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future* (Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences, 2008).

27. In many urban areas of West Papua, the indigenous populations are already a minority. In the remote interior, they make up approximately 80 percent of the population. The 2010 census details the influx of non-Papuans: Papua Province has the highest rate of Indonesian immigration (5.48 percent) in Indonesia and Papua Barat Province the fourth (3.72 percent).

28. The Indonesian government's educational policy aims to promote integration into the Unitary Republic. See Jason MacLeod, "Self-Determination and Autonomy"; and Brigham Golden, "Letter to the Editor," *Van Zorge Report*, November 30, 2000, 33–34.

29. John Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson, and Leah Dunn, *Anomie and Violence: Non-Truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2010), 133–134.

30. Diana Glazebrook, "Dwelling in Exile, Perceiving Return: West Papuan Refugees from Irian Jaya Living at East Awin in Western Province, Papua New Guinea" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2001), 60.

31. Danilyn Rutherford, "Remembering Sam Kapissa," *Inside Indonesia* 67 (2001): 16–17, cited in Diana Glazebrook, "Teaching Performance Art Is Like Sharpening the Blade of a Knife," *Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 5, no. 1 (2004): 5.

32. Glazebrook, "Teaching Performance Art," 8–9. When the Dani rebelled against this attempted ban on the penis gourd, hundreds—perhaps thousands—of them were killed. Villagers still tell stories of elders dropped from military helicopters and the Bailem River flowing red with blood.

33. Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru*; Budi Hernawan and Theo van den Broek, "Dialog Nasional Papua, sebuah kisah 'Memoria Passionis': kisah ingatan penderitaan sebangsa," *Tifa Irian* 8 (March 1999).

34. Gillian Bottomley, *From Another Place: Migration and the Politics of Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), cited in Glazebrook, "Teaching Performance Art," 9.

35. This analogy was shared with Glazebrook ("Teaching Performance Art," 1) by a West Papuan refugee.

36. Alex Rayfield, "Singing for Life," *Inside Indonesia* 78 (2004): 7–8. The members of the contemporary Papuan music group Gejolak, for instance, refer back to reading or listening to Mambesak while chewing betel nut, which they link with resistance and liberation.

37. The Morning Star gives Manarmakeri the secret of life.

38. Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*.

39. Despite President Yudhuyono's international reputation as a democrat, Indonesian Law 77/2007 contradicts the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and reverses Wahid's decision to allow the Morning Star flag to be displayed alongside and lower than the Indonesian flag.

40. Protestant missionaries opened posts in the Paniai region in 1938 and in Bailem Valley in 1954. Missionaries were often the first contact that highlanders had with Western society.

41. This information was not updated in the 2010 census.

42. In the mid-1990s, Benny Giay and Theo van den Broek traveled to the highlands to negotiate the release of two Belgian filmmakers held hostage by guerrillas. Giay and van den Broek were met by a group of Papuans who formally handed them their Bibles, saying that evangelical Christianity had not helped them in their struggle for independence. See Renee Kjar, "The Invisible Aristocrat: Benny Giay in Papuan History" (bachelor of arts honors thesis, Australian National University, 2002), www.papuaweb.org.au/dlib/s123/kjar/ba.pdf, accessed October 4, 2010.

43. Field notes, Jayapura, December 10, 2009. See also Reverend Willem Rumsawir: during the 1969 Act of Free Choice "people burnt their Bibles and said 'Where is the Church?' The Church is empty. Pastors talk about Emmanuel [God with us], but where is Emmanuel? God is not on our side when it comes to politics." Quoted in Charles E. Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua: A Collection of Personal Histories in West Papua* (Jayapura: Deyai, 2007), 44.

44. Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 35.

45. Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru*; Hernawan and van den Broek, "Dialog Nasional Papua."

46. Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 41, 44–45.

47. See Herman Awom quoted in Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 150: "From 1965 to 1998, Papuans fought for independence using guerrilla tactics

in the forest. . . . [After 1998] Mr. Theys Eluay was the one who came up with the idea of correcting the history of Papua. After that, we realized that fighting a guerilla war wouldn't work, because we don't have weapons like they did in Aceh. So we choose to learn the qualities of struggle from persons like Mahatma Gandhi, which is through peaceful means. Now we struggle through non-violence. We want to use dialogue, by sitting down with the government officials, and discuss democratically the future of Papua. We want an open and democratic discussion with government officials. We also follow the example of Jesus, who told us to love our enemies. That is why after Theys was killed, I told the people we cannot avenge his death. We have to be peaceful. We are going to overwhelm this country through peace."

48. This included tribal wars and cannibalism. Obed Komba quoted in Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 52.

49. Glazebrook, "Teaching Performance Art," 6.

50. Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru*.

51. According to Willem Rumsawir, "If the government fails to fulfil its duties, then I reject them as a government. Can a government, as God's servant, kill people like here in Papua? God's servants don't kill people!" Quoted in Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 42. Benny Giay asserts that the church "must confess its sins for supporting the government . . . [it has] not been playing its prophetic role of being the conscience of the nation." Quoted in Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 35.

52. David Snow and Robert Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization," in *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Grenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), 197–217; Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 48–51.

53. Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism*.

54. See Peter King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004).

55. John McBeth, "Papua Miners' Strike: Everyone's a Loser," *Jakarta Globe*, November 22, 2011, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/papua-miners-strike-everyones-a-loser/480053>, accessed November 8, 2012.

56. In contrast to the Papuan desire to create a zone of peace, the reality came to be seen as an Indonesian-imposed zone of emergency.

57. Jason MacLeod, "Papuan Struggle Enters New Phase," *Open Democracy*, June 26, 2010, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/jason-macleod/papuan-struggle-enters-new-phase>, accessed November 8, 2012.

58. Alex Rayfield, "Exclusive: Detained Papuan Leaders Speak Out," *New Matilda*, November 30, 2011, <http://newmatilda.com/2011/11/30/exclusive-detained-papuan-leaders-speak-out>, accessed November 8, 2012.

59. Senior tribal leader in Sorong, personal correspondence with the author, December 3, 2011.

60. While some Indonesian migrants are Christians (members of the Batak tribe from Sumatra and Christian groups from Central and North Sulawesi), they practice their faith in radically different ways from Papuan Christians.

61. Kamma cited in Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 192.

62. Papuan leaders use prayer to open mass gatherings and set the scene for discussions about liberation. At every clandestine meeting of resistance groups that I attended, daily proceedings began with prayer.

63. Agu Iwanggin quoted by Benny Giay, "Towards a New Papua," *Inside Indonesia*, July–September 2001, www.insideindonesia.org/edit67/giay.htm, accessed August 25, 2010; Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru*.

64. Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru*.

65. See, for instance, the torture and murder of a Papuan priest by Kostrad troops in April 2010, filmed and posted online in October 2010 (West Papua Media, "Indonesia's Abu Ghraib: Brutal Torture Footage Emerges from Puncak Jaya of Priest's Killing by Indonesian Security Forces," *West Papua Media*, October 18, 2010, <http://westpapuamedia.info/2010/10/18/indonesias-abu-ghraib-brutal-torture-footage-emerges-from-puncak-jaya-of-priests-killing-by-indonesian-security-forces/>, accessed November 8, 2012). See also Eben Kirksey, "From Cannibal to Terrorist: State Violence, Indigenous Resistance and Representation in West Papua" (master's thesis, University of Oxford, 2002).

66. There have been some episodes of interethnic violence—the most deadly being in Wamena in October 2000 when over thirty people (mostly civilian migrants) were reportedly killed after clashes between security forces and Papuans.

67. Papuan disappointment with international support has given rise to talk of the need for a "Super Santa Cruz" massacre (referring to the 1991 Dili massacre): if Papuans could provoke the security forces into overreacting, then a massacre captured on film and communicated to the outside world would trigger an international peacekeeping intervention. This strategy, however, is not widely shared. See Bilveer Singh, *Geopolitics and the Quest for Nationhood* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2008), 191; International Crisis Group, *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 11, 2010); Braithwaite et al., *Anomie and Violence*, 111.

68. Author's interview with Neles Tebay, Jayapura, December 8, 2008, and personal communication with the author, November 18, 2010.

69. There are various other constitutional options that could possibly bridge the gulf between most Papuan views and Indonesian nationalists.

70. MacLeod, "Self-Determination and Autonomy"; Braithwaite et al., *Anomie and Violence*.

71. Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru*; MacLeod, "Self-Determination and Autonomy."

72. Field notes, Wamena, November 18, 2006.

73. Farhadian, *The Testimony Project Papua*, 61.

Appendix:

Conflict Summaries

This appendix has been compiled by the book's editor, Maciej Bartkowski, based on the information presented in the corresponding chapters of the book. Cases are arranged alphabetically. (Any omissions in the tables are either of the editor's own making or the information was not available.)

Key

Method and Type of Nonviolent Action

Nonviolent intervention

Disruptive

Creative

Noncooperation

Political

Economic

Social

Protest and persuasion

Length of the Campaign

Short: 1 day up to 4 weeks

Medium: 1 month up to 1 year

Long: More than 1 year

Level of Participation of People

Low: 1–100 people or less than 20 percent of the population

Medium: 100–1,000 people or between 20 percent and 50 percent of the population

High: More than 1,000 people or more than 50 percent of the population

West Papua

Main Campaigns	Action	Method/ <i>Type</i>	Date	Length	Level of Participation	Direct Impact	Long-Term/Overall Impact of Civil Resistance
Anti-Dutch struggle	Refusal to pay taxes and labor withholding	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic, Political</i>	1911	Medium	High	The Dutch harassed the pilgrims that came to see Angganeta, which increased the anti-Dutch sentiment and the movement’s popularity The arrest of Angganeta led to further protests	Over many decades, civil resistance has formed and reinforced collective Papuan identity and Papuan nationalism Civil resistance is framed narrowly around ethnicity, Christianity, and independence that limits Papuans’ ability to form alliances with progressive Indonesians
	Wearing traditional Biak loincloths	Protest and persuasion					
	People defied Dutch orders that banned visits to Angganeta Menufandu, a <i>konor</i> (indigenous prophet)	Noncooperation/ <i>Social, Political</i>	1911	Medium			
	Designed a flag with inverted Dutch tricolor flag, Morning Star, and a cross as a symbol of the future Papuan kingdom	Protest and persuasion	1911	Long		The flag inspired the design of the Papuans’ national flag	
	Mass defiance of bans on <i>wor</i> (ritual singing and dancing) and drinking palm wine	Noncooperation/ <i>Social</i>	1911–1943	Long	High		
Anti-Indonesian struggle	People defied bans on Papuan songs and dances while the music group Mambesak performed songs in indigenous languages and local dances that included hidden identity-defining metaphors	Noncooperation/ <i>Social, Political</i> ; Protest and persuasion	1970s and 1980s	Long		Evoked pride in being Papuan and fashioned a pan-Papuan identity distinct from Indonesia. It transcended tribal differences Inspired other Papuan cultural groups that proliferated in the early 1980s Exhorted unity	
	Organized mass exodus of Papuans east to Papua New Guinea	Noncooperation/ <i>Political</i>	1984	Medium	High		
	Church leaders called for active engagement in campaigns for civil and political or economic, social, and cultural rights	Protest and persuasion				Emergence of the Papuan nonviolent liberation theology for rights and self-determination Instilling of the need and obligation to resist illegitimate government A recognition of the need for reconciling personal, tribal, and political differences within the movement	
The Papuan Spring	Creation of a parallel government with a 500-member panel and parallel civil society, including formation of human rights organizations	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	1999	Long	Medium		
	Mass civilian-based protests and demonstrations	Protest and persuasion	1999 onward	Long	Low	Led to the establishment of the Special Autonomy (it collapsed in 2001 and repression returned)	
The Papuan Spring	Local campaigns, including protests against logging and palm oil plantations, mobilization of the Papuan women market sellers to win their own marketplace in the capital, protests against third province	Protest and persuasion	2001 onward	Medium	Medium/ Low	Growth of student movement	Over many decades, civil resistance has formed and reinforced collective Papuan identity and Papuan nationalism Civil resistance is framed narrowly around ethnicity, Christianity, and independence that limits Papuans’ ability to form alliances with progressive Indonesians
	Raising the Morning Star flag	Protest and persuasion	2000 and 2004	Long	High	Symbolic rejection of being part of Indonesia Filep Karma, a Biak civil servant and activist, was sentenced to fifteen years for raising the Morning Star flag	
Anti-Indonesian struggle	Formation of first independent labor union of gold and copper mine workers in West Papua	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	2006			Helped breach differences and facilitated workers’ unity and organization in preparation for strike	
	Labor strike	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	April 2007	Short	High	Papuan mine workers won improved conditions, including doubling of their wages	
	Formation of FORDEM	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	2010			Prepared a petition	
	Petition delivered to the provincial parliament by 15,000 people	Protest and persuasion	June 18, 2010	Short	High		
	March of 20,000 Papuans to the provincial parliament	Protest and persuasion	August 2010	Short	High	When the protesters reached parliament, they began an occupation of the building	
	Two-day occupation (sit-in) of the provincial parliament	Protest and persuasion	August 2010	Short	High	Parliamentarians did not heed protesters’ demands	
	Third Papuan People’s Congress, a three-day gathering of unarmed resistance groups	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	October 2011	Short	High	During the last day of the event Papuan leaders declared independence Security forces opened fire, killing three Papuans, two were stabbed, hundreds were arrested Violence backfired Increased support for independence among Papuans who pressed forward with organizing pro-independence celebrations Led to divisions within political elites inside Indonesia Generated more outside attention and support for the West Papuan cause	
	Independence celebrations: waving the Morning Star flag; shouting “freedom”; reading in public the October 2011 Declaration of Independence	Protest and persuasion	December 2011	Short	High	Many Papuans cast off their fear of expressing their pro-independence views Wide segments of the Papuan society mobilized, including Papuan civil servant and retired military Hardened pro-independence stance among Papuans who press for national referendum on political status of the region Repression by the Indonesian military	