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# Recovering

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# Nonviolent

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# History

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Civil Resistance  
in Liberation Struggles

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## Mozambique: Liberation Myths and Resistance Strategies, 1920s–1970s

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Few regions of the world have experienced the depth of strategic nonviolent action and tactical nonviolent innovation in practice and deliberation as has Africa. The anticolonial era, stretching across the continent from the 1950s through the 1980s, afforded liberation leaders tremendous opportunities for discussion and debate on the merits of diverse forms of nonviolent resistance as well as armed struggle. At times, these forms were viewed as dichotomized and rival opposites. However, analysis of the seemingly clear-cut example of Mozambique's successful armed struggle offers a more nuanced view.

Mozambique stands out as an example where peaceful or civil resistance was a significant factor in the freedom movement, yet the successes of its ten-year armed struggle against Portugal (1964–1974) have overshadowed the complementary use of a range of tactics used over the long haul. In this chapter, I suggest that behind the images associated with the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)—portraits of proud mother warriors with rifles in one arm and babies in the other, with songs and poems extolling the joys to come “when bullets begin to flower”<sup>1</sup>—there is a less often told story of nonmilitary combat.

In FRELIMO's perspective, the fight against colonial rule was also a struggle to reverse the severe social, political, and economic underdevelopment caused by colonialism. From 1966 onward, parcels of land—from north to south—were liberated from colonial rule and zones of popular control were established. Although these liberated zones functioned under the leadership of the guerrilla-based FRELIMO, their very existence relied more on the nonmilitary strategic concept of building parallel political processes. The liberated areas became miniature “states-in-the-making,”

where systems of dual power rivaled the Portuguese overseers.<sup>2</sup> The short- and long-term nature of this revolutionary civic project was recognized at the highest levels of Mozambican resistance. Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel, underscored this in his 1975 Independence Day speech:

The State is not an eternal and immutable structure; the state is not the bureaucratic machinery of civil servants, nor something abstract, nor a mere technical apparatus. . . . The colonial state must be replaced by a people's State . . . which wipes out exploitation and releases the creative initiative of the masses and the productive forces. In the phase of the people's democracy in which we are now engaged as a phase of the Mozambican revolutionary process, our aim is to lay the material, ideological, administrative and social foundation of our State. . . . The new battle is only beginning.<sup>3</sup>

Although expressed in military terms, the "battle" Machel describes is essentially one of constructing schools and health centers, building civic organizations and structures of accountability, and setting up a popular, functioning infrastructure.<sup>4</sup> This project, which began long before the 1975 military victory, is the focus of this investigation.

## **Direct Resistance in the Early Years of Colonization**

From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, the European drive for conquest exacerbated conflicts between the various peoples of what became Mozambique. After centuries of Arab, Swahili, and Portuguese rule, twentieth-century anticolonial movements began to call for unity across tribal, linguistic, and local lines. They started organizing primarily in exile, protesting against Portuguese domination and for "cultural improvement" for the majority of the uneducated population. One such group, the Liga Africana, was formed in Lisbon in 1923 during (and under the auspices of) the Third Pan-African Congress hosted by W. E. B. Du Bois.

The Liga Africana and other groups formed at this time petitioned the Lisbon government for reform. They wrote manifestos, held public meetings and forums, and sent letters and delegations to the colonial and domestic officials. These groups, however, were quickly and ruthlessly repressed, then driven underground altogether with the advent of fascism and the rise to power in Portugal of Antonio Salazar at the end of the decade.<sup>5</sup> Salazar's authoritarian New State (*Estado Novo*) was installed in Lisbon in 1933. Proclaiming its principles as anti-liberalism, anticommunism, and an understanding of Portugal as a pluricontinental empire, it put an end to overt anticolonial initiatives and little resistance could further develop until after World War II.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, small and localized acts of what might be

called subaltern resistance took place throughout Mozambique in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Since Portuguese colonialism was carried out with as few settlers as possible, contact between the colonizers and the colonized took place on only select occasions: when land was being seized, when people were being conscripted into labor camps, and when taxes were being collected. Non-cooperation therefore was expressed most explicitly in response to these activities, and took cultural and largely ethnic-specific forms such as singing, dancing, and carving. The Chope and Makonde peoples, for example, became known for their acts ridiculing and resisting Portuguese rule.<sup>7</sup> To caricature the colonizers, they carved light-shaded wooden figures with distorted features. Some of the sculptures suggested greedy plantation overlords holding illegal torture instruments. Community-based performances portrayed whites as foolish thugs, but through songs in languages unidentifiable by the Europeans and choreographed movements that appeared as traditional to the untrained observer.<sup>8</sup>

A few cross-ethnic, regional racial and religious groups also emerged during this period, carrying out political activities that, while cloaked in social terms, were implicitly hostile to European domination. For instance, mutual aid societies were formed to provide scholarships for students and apprentices. Even some newspapers and magazines developed in the major towns and cities of 1930s Mozambique, including groupings of Africans, mulattoes, Muslims, and Indians. One of the more prominent, *The African Cry* (O Brado Africano), in 1932 brazenly called for an immediate end to colonial injustices:

Enough! We've had to put up with you, to suffer the terrible consequences of your follies, of your demands. . . . We want to be treated in the same way that you are. We do not aspire to the comforts you surround yourselves with, thanks to our strength . . . even less do we aspire to a life dominated by the idea of robbing [one's] brother.<sup>9</sup>

### **Mozambican Resistance in the 1940s–1960s**

Mozambican intellectual Eduardo Mondlane, who was to become a founder and first president of FRELIMO, was the foremost chronicler of the movements of the 1940s and beyond. He contrasted the racist political conditions faced by the small minority of educated Mozambicans such as himself and the peasant farmers who made up the majority and whose struggle was mainly against the daily violence of forced labor and inhuman economic conditions. For the elite, resistance took “a purely cultural expression,” for instance, in the writings and paintings of Luis Bernardo Honwana, Noemia de Sousa, and Malangatana Ngwenya.<sup>10</sup> Mondlane saw that much work

would be required to bridge the colonized groups. The foundation in 1949 of the student group Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Mocambique (NESAM) was to play a key role in this.

Although NESAM was a small part of the population, probably comprising several hundred members at its height, it included many future leaders, including Mondlane. Its importance lay in the ability to reach people throughout the nation, across wide geographical areas, with a nationalist understanding that advocated for the majority of Mozambicans. In fact, by reaching the core of educated black youth, NESAM provided a space for dialogue and reevaluation on questions of nationalism and indigenous culture, breaking colonial attempts at splitting the African elite away from their ethnic roots. For more than a decade, it gave current and former students a context for conceptualizing a future Mozambique separate from colonial designs. NESAM also concretely demonstrated the significance of a civic networking structure.<sup>11</sup>

The development of NESAM coincided with growing activity among urban workers, including dock workers in the capital, Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), and farmers on nearby plantations. A series of strikes in 1947 led to a major work stoppage and uprising a year later, aborted only when Portuguese authorities deported several hundred radicals and severely punished others.<sup>12</sup> Labor organizing continued formally and informally and, in 1956, forty-nine strikers were killed during a dock strike in Lourenco Marques.<sup>13</sup> In the early 1960s, strikes spread to the ports of Beira and Nacala, now supported by the newly formed FRELIMO's clandestine structures. Focusing on cruel working conditions, it was easy to link these grievances to colonialism. However, violent repression, including arrests and deaths, commented Mondlane, "temporarily discourage[d] both the masses and the leadership from considering strike action as a possible effective political method."<sup>14</sup>

Rural resistance also grew after World War II. As hundreds of thousands of peasants were forced to plant and pick cotton for the Portuguese market, noncompliance with meeting quotas and other forms of sabotage were common. In 1947, in one of Mozambique's most spectacular instances of labor resistance, 7,000 women from the town of Buzi refused to plant the colonial administrator's cotton seed, effectively ceasing crop production for a short period while demanding not only increased wages but greater control over the land they worked.<sup>15</sup>

In Gaza Province, in both 1955 and 1958, large-scale production boycotts were organized until cotton-picking wages were increased.<sup>16</sup> Farmers from Cabo Delgado Province regularly crossed the border to Tanganyika where the African National Union was organizing indigenous farming cooperatives, prefiguring the *Ujamaa* concept of future Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere.<sup>17</sup> In part influenced and aided by this, the African Voluntary Cotton

Society of Mozambique was formed. Based in the Mueda region under the leadership of Makonde nationalist Lazaro Nkavandame, the community-based cooperative became a model of civil resistance functioning outside of colonial control. In a special agreement negotiated with the Lisbon authorities, the Cabo cooperative gained thousands of members, ultimately tripling production from its previous level under colonial control.<sup>18</sup> By offering a Mozambican-led agricultural initiative, they inspired local farmers and families to intensify their efforts at earning a living wage and proving their effectiveness as workers and traders. Despite harassment and occasional arrests for this indigenous form of competition, the cooperative continued for several years, negotiating exemptions from forced labor from local authorities while operating in a narrow, semilegal climate. As neighboring Tanganyika pushed for self-rule throughout the late 1950s, the Mozambican cooperative became more radical.<sup>19</sup>

### **The Mueda Massacre and Its Aftermath**

The undisputed, though often unmentioned, turning point in the movement for Mozambique's independence came on June 16, 1960, when a massive and peaceful protest was planned in Mueda. The Portuguese provincial governor of Cabo Delgado was visiting Mueda, and several thousand Africans, organized by the cooperative and by nationalist activists, had turned out to hear how he would respond to their demands for greater sovereignty. After a private meeting between the governor and several civic leaders, those members of the assembled crowd who wished to address him were asked to come forward and be recognized. However, when civic leaders came forward, provincial police seized them, bound their hands, and beat and arrested them.<sup>20</sup> As the crowd attempted to stop the arrests, the governor ordered a company of Portuguese troops, who had been hidden, to fire on the nonviolent assembly. Less than three months after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, the Mueda massacre in Mozambique claimed the lives of over 500 peaceful protesters. The cooperative officially collapsed and many surviving militants and independence activists fled the country.<sup>21</sup>

Mondlane's account of the massacre refers to the cooperative events preceding the demonstration as "spontaneous agitation," and decries the world's lack of attention to this "culminating" activity of years of struggle.<sup>22</sup> FRELIMO cadre Teresinha Mblale, whose uncle was killed at Mueda, notes bitterly, "Our people were unarmed when they began to shoot." Mondlane reflected that she was "one of thousands who determined never again to be unarmed in the face of Portuguese violence." Nothing in the north of the country would ever return to normal and, throughout Mozambique, a new course of struggle was set in motion. As in South Africa, nonviolent

strategy—which arguably had a weaker theoretical basis in Mozambique—was officially and formally deemed irrelevant. “Throughout the region,” Mondlane wrote, the massacre had “aroused the bitterest hatred against the Portuguese and showed once and for all that peaceful resistance was futile.”<sup>23</sup>

As pan-African pacifist Bill Sutherland comments concerning both Sharpeville and Mueda, “people confuse defeat with death, and assume that nonviolence is only valid as long as nobody gets hurt or killed.”<sup>24</sup> Both Sharpeville and Mueda saw dramatic examples of people power, with people not fully recognizing their strength. The fact that neither movement was prepared for such violence or the shock caused speaks more to the limitations of the moment than to an inherent weakness in unarmed strategies. Although the massacre at Mueda demonstrated the overpowering force that violence could play in that situation, it in no way diminished the radical sentiments spreading across the country. It was not a coincidence, but rather a direct consequence of the massacre that leading Mozambicans now intensified their work for unity and for the formation of a national front.

Three nationalist organizations vied for leadership between 1960 and the formation of FRELIMO in 1962, yet there was little active talk about armed struggle and no actual military engagement took place. To be sure, most leaders thought an organized armed uprising would be necessary, but they also understood some of the difficulties it would entail. Furthermore, alongside any guerrilla campaign, it would be vital to mobilize civil resistance. Mondlane, who helped forge the unity needed to create a nationwide front, was himself a participant in the civic protests of the 1940s and 1950s. By the end of 1960, he had become convinced that “normal political pressure and agitation” would not win freedom for his country, but he retained an extremely developed sense this would require a multifaceted series of actions mobilizing the population.<sup>25</sup>

### **Tactical Debates Within the Building of the United Front**

A September 1962 gathering brought together representatives of the three main nationalist groups in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where each had made its headquarters. According to George Houser and Herb Shore of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), every Mozambican assembled “had come to know the reprisals which immediately followed small-scale resistance or peaceful protest. . . . They were ready for unity.”<sup>26</sup> At Nyerere’s urging, and with the support of other leading pan-Africanists, FRELIMO was formed with broad objectives. “To build real freedom,” Nyerere insisted, “demands a positive understanding and positive actions, not simply a rejection of colonialism.”<sup>27</sup> This First Congress of FRELIMO therefore set forth as principles and aims the need to “encourage and support the formation

and consolidation of trade unions, youth and women's organizations"; to "promote by every method the social and cultural development of the Mozambican women"; to "promote the literacy of the Mozambican people, creating schools wherever possible"; to "mobilize popular opinion"; and to "procure diplomatic, moral and material help for the cause of the Mozambican people from the African states and from all peace and freedom loving people."<sup>28</sup>

Years later, Mozambican prime minister Pascal Mocumbi, a physician who took part in the First Congress of FRELIMO, underscored the general sentiment there: "We said that we would fight by all means for our liberation. . . . These words were deliberate. We wanted to reach these objectives through peaceful means."<sup>29</sup>

Though popular histories of FRELIMO romanticize the armed struggle,<sup>30</sup> a careful review of FRELIMO's early development under Mondlane's and Machel's leadership shows that the armed aspect of the revolutionary campaign was not primary.<sup>31</sup> In contrast to the strategies advanced by Ernesto Che Guevara, Mondlane and FRELIMO rejected outright the idea that military action (whether by a small *foco* or by a large army) could serve as a means to rally and properly mobilize masses of people. Their priority was ground-up, village-level, popular base building, as implemented in the FRELIMO-controlled zones throughout the late 1960s and throughout the entire country after independence. Through the building of energetic civic organizations and embedding in the educational curriculum, this emphasis on mass, popular participation was an organizational mandate. Mondlane was particularly adept at remaining open and flexible about any methods to improve the flow of information from the people to FRELIMO militants and cadre. In fact, when Guevara traveled in Africa spreading his experiences of the Cuban successes of small, inspirational guerrilla forces, Mondlane pointedly disagreed, arguing that, in Mozambique at least, a broader, mass-based strategy was needed.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, claims that FRELIMO, "in contrast to their organizational predecessors[,] . . . abandoned existing policy-commitments to non-violence"<sup>33</sup> seem dubious. It would certainly be more accurate to suggest that, in keeping with the experiences of their historic forebearers who engaged in diverse acts of civil resistance, FRELIMO was consistent in focusing its work around building civic institutions and popular, nonmilitary forms of alternatives to colonialism. The building of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM), the Organization of Mozambican Youth (OJM), and the Workers' Union received significant human and fiscal resources. The armed struggle, though deemed important and necessary, was of secondary concern to the majority of FRELIMO's leadership.

It was more than simple rhetoric that Mondlane, in writing about the need for self-defense and military action, began by stating that FRELIMO



had been “determined to do everything in our power to try to gain independence by peaceful means.”<sup>34</sup> For most of the 1960s, FRELIMO leaders debated between “two lines of struggle.”<sup>35</sup> One, voiced by Mondlane and Machel, wanted to go beyond mere “flag” independence to an end to all forms of colonialism and colonial thinking. The opposing line placed greater emphasis on military means, but merely wanted to force the Portuguese out (and replace them with Mozambicans who would serve as loyal presidents and businessmen). A conventional change of political power and government, without a transformation of people’s consciousness or social and economic conditions, would not require the tedious (and nonviolent) work of mass organizing.<sup>36</sup>

In this light, the conversations between Mondlane and Sutherland bear particular significance. Sutherland had, by the early 1960s, become an active representative of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, one of the organizations that helped push for unity among the constituent groupings in early FRELIMO. Maintaining their personal commitment to nonviolence as a philosophy as well as a tactic, Mondlane and Sutherland shared a “true, personal relationship” so Sutherland’s pushing for a nonviolent approach undoubtedly played some role in those formative years.<sup>37</sup> Sutherland advised Mondlane on the importance of discipline within the ranks of the freedom fighters, noting that the Algerian movement, despite its reputation, had at points responded to provocative violence on the part of the French by remaining nonresponsive, not violent. Mondlane confirmed this through his own Algerian contacts and reported to Sutherland that, though both the Algerian and Mozambican movements needed their armed capacity, this nonmilitary phase of the Algerian resistance was seen as a great setback for the French. “It might be beneficial,” Mondlane suggested, “[having] some training of people in nonviolent techniques” and he intended to propose this to FRELIMO’s executive committee.<sup>38</sup> Why these seminars never took place has been a source of conjecture. Did vanguardist or hard-line elements within FRELIMO’s leadership block them?<sup>39</sup> The evidence suggests that tactical considerations were resolved through open discussion and debate without violent confrontation among the leadership.

### **Armed Struggle and the Building of Parallel Civic Structures**

The guerrilla war, with barely 200 combatants, started in earnest in 1964. In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a parcel bomb in Tanzania. Probably the Portuguese intelligence agents responsible expected Mondlane’s death to cause confusion and defeatism in FRELIMO’s leadership. However, eventually

Mondlane's colleague and friend Samora Machel succeeded him. Under Machel's watch, military tactics extended greatly, developing into a full people's war with armed propaganda at the forefront.<sup>40</sup>

As already mentioned, however, the liberated zones held by FRELIMO in this period were formed on the basis of a tightly woven network of strong civic associations that operated as parallel structures to the repressive Portuguese colonial government. They transformed into local engines of a people's democracy after independence, but maintained significant autonomy despite ties to the official FRELIMO organizational and governmental structures. With emphasis on literacy and education, extended traditional and modern health care, affordable and safe housing, and consumer protections, Mozambican society was led in many respects by its Organization of Mozambican Women. The OMM developed out of FRELIMO, but maintained independent functioning from it. It grew to have local associates in every province, town, and village of the country, mobilizing the countryside as well as urban factories and centers. By the early 1970s, when FRELIMO fighters numbered nearly 7,000, it is likely that OMM membership figures rivaled that number.<sup>41</sup>

The importance of the OMM increased after Mozambique became fully independent. It provided women, who were understood to be the center of economic and social development, with vocational training; education in family planning, literacy, and political development; and a space for social and cultural conversation. By the 1980s, the group had grown into the hundreds of thousands. In the late 1990s, the estimated membership exceeded 1 million. The OMM, by this time, had separated from FRELIMO (all civic organizations were encouraged to have full autonomy as the country moved toward multiparty direct democracy).<sup>42</sup> The OMM today certainly ranks as one of Africa's most dynamic and successful civic organizations.

In cooperation with Mozambican youth and workers' organizations, OMM instilled a dynamic form of participatory engagement in all its work, confirming Machel's view that "when we involve everyone in solving problems, when we make everyone feel responsible for solving problems which we face, we are collectivizing our leadership, collectivizing our lives."<sup>43</sup> Though smaller in number than OMM, the OJM engaged young people from all walks of life in the liberation process. Political education took place in social settings: as children were recruited into sports teams, as students were assisted in their educational endeavors, and as youth prepared for work. In sharp contrast to how youth were viewed in other burgeoning nation-states, the OJM was not simply a mechanism for recruiting young people into the armed forces. For those who did join the armed struggle, schools for learning reading, writing, and basic math were set up in the bush because these skills were deemed as important as the technical soldiering skills they had to learn.<sup>44</sup>

FRELIMO's preference for limited armed propaganda over military confrontation is illustrated by their strategy against the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Tete Province. This 1970 scheme was a direct corporate challenge to FRELIMO's base-building work in the north of the country. The dam, financed by South Africa's Anglo-American Corporation, was to supply electricity to mainly the neighboring apartheid regime. Because it was not a genuine development project initiated to benefit the people on whose land it was being built, FRELIMO called the proposal a "crime against humanity" and mounted regional and international educational campaigns against it. For their part, the Portuguese forcibly resettled many Mozambicans living in surrounding villages, then spread defoliants and landmines around the area in order to prevent FRELIMO attacks. However, FRELIMO never planned a frontal attack on the dam, although this was a region where the armed liberation forces of Mozambique were relatively strong. Instead, it planned a war of attrition, carrying out small acts of sabotage (e.g., the cutting of transmission line cables and destruction of unstaffed transmission towers) that would be a drain on the colonial powers' fiscal and physical resources.<sup>45</sup> "We'll eat away at the project," noted Machel, "making it more expensive and taking longer to construct."<sup>46</sup> By the end of the war for independence four years later, the armies of South Africa and Rhodesia had to fly equipment in under heavy guard just to attempt to maintain work on the uncompleted plant.

### **Independence, Civil War, and the Development of Mythologized Histories**

In the decade following the 1974–1975 independence of Mozambique, despite armed attacks from neighboring South Africa and Rhodesia, FRELIMO was as likely to draw on the "weapon of culture" as it was to promote military means.<sup>47</sup> In the years just prior to and immediately following independence, it is also clear that peaceful means, and an unusually sophisticated understanding of how liberation can bring about emancipation for the colonizer as well as the colonized, dominated FRELIMO's relationship with the Portuguese. Portugal's colonial struggles and the war in Mozambique in particular played a significant role in mobilizing dissent within the mother country. FRELIMO consciously tried to influence the Portuguese military. Most dramatically in 1975, after the fall of the dictatorship but before independence, it sent home captured Portuguese soldiers—utilizing the "sophisticated weapon" of class consciousness over simple race-based prejudice. As their boat arrived, the former prisoners hung a huge sign over the boat side: "Let's do it like FRELIMO—People's Power."<sup>48</sup> By the time of the primarily nonviolent Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which brought

an end to decades of fascism and a moderate socialist government to the fore, 100,000 Portuguese men had dodged or resisted conscripted military service against the rebellious colonists.<sup>49</sup>

Former Mozambican minister of education and first lady Graca Machel likened the end of the war for independence to a circle. “We come back to the beginning. After those pauses of having to organize armed struggle, having people killed, having infrastructures destroyed, after this we have to come back to the beginning and start with negotiations. What we could have done if [the Portuguese] had accepted it in the first place!”<sup>50</sup>

Tragically, the beginning of independence marked another phase of violent warfare for the people of Mozambique, as South Africa and Rhodesia quickly set up their own army to destroy the gains made by the revolutionary process and to cut Mozambican support to neighboring liberation movements.<sup>51</sup> Initially the war was presented as national defense against the “armed bandits” of counterrevolution, later acknowledged as the political-military force known as the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Most of the civil war was fought, unsuccessfully, through use of traditional military strategies. FRELIMO could not, in simple military terms, counter the covert attacks supplied and aided by South African and US mercenaries that were aimed at their destabilization. However, FRELIMO also tried to establish mass-based educational campaigns. When grassroots resistance to the war began in 1990, it came not from FRELIMO structures, but from an unarmed community defense movement known as the Naparama (irresistible force). Led by a self-proclaimed spiritual healer named Manuel Antonio, it successfully established several neutral zones before the civil war ended, often scaring the antigovernment forces into laying down their arms without resorting to violence themselves.<sup>52</sup> The peace ultimately negotiated between FRELIMO and RENAMO relied heavily on nonmilitary negotiations and conflict resolution techniques.<sup>53</sup>

Much postwar research on Mozambique has focused on nonviolent mediation techniques used in attempting to end the civil conflict.<sup>54</sup> While some observers suggest that the intensity of the conflict derived from the armed nature of the war for independence, few recognize the extent of civil resistance or the psychosocial effects of the unarmed struggle in the decades leading to independence—before and during the development of FRELIMO.<sup>55</sup>

### **Postindependence Thoughts on the Mozambican Resistance**

Military accounts indicate that by 1967, just four years after the start of armed struggle, one-fifth of Mozambique’s territory was under FRELIMO control.<sup>56</sup> Behind these military gains, however, lay the building of civil

resistance. Taking issue with the accounts of Basil Davidson,<sup>57</sup> Joseph Hanlon,<sup>58</sup> and John Saul,<sup>59</sup> Aquino de Braganca and Jacques Depelchin stress the role of “political and ideological solidity.”<sup>60</sup> As the war raged on, FRELIMO’s military challenges to Portugal’s more numerous and better-equipped military became more and more successful. Nevertheless, Machel himself indicated in the late 1970s that the nonmilitary political and socioeconomic achievements were the key; they furnished the basis for military success.<sup>61</sup>

## Conclusion

Judge Albie Sachs—an apartheid political prisoner exiled in Mozambique where he lost his arm and the sight of one eye in an assassination attempt, and later architect of the postapartheid South Africa constitution—is in a good position to review the Mozambique independence struggle. He says,

The military and non-military resistance used in Mozambique to win independence cannot be separated from one another. The military dimension permitted a complete rupture with colonial hegemony, a questioning of everything and the envisaging of a totally different society. The non-military dimension ensured that having physical force at one’s command was never an end in itself; that the “enemy” was a system of injustice, not a race of people; that it was never enough to fight for justice but that justice had to exist inside ourselves; that captured Portuguese soldiers should be treated with compassion rather than rancor; and that the liberation war should be transformed into political dialogue to achieve independence as soon as conditions for principled agreements could be negotiated between equals.<sup>62</sup>

By giving credence to the many strengths derived from the civil resistance campaigns mounted for Mozambique’s independence, Sachs—and the selected accounts of his Mozambican colleagues from Mondlane to Machel, Chissano, and beyond—helps dispel the myths of liberation through militarism. Certainly this most popular of armed national liberation movements made gains through military means, but it is equally clear that nonmilitary tactics and the building for a revolutionary and nonviolent civil society played a defining and definitive role in the overall freedom process. FRELIMO’s early focus on a people’s democracy emboldened by strong civic institutions was directly influenced by the preceding decades of grass-roots strikes, women’s federations, alternative economic cooperatives, and reformist educational campaigns.

During the decades of 1940s through 1960s, the growing civic activism and direct nonviolent resistance—waged *en masse* by various societal groups—both influenced and consolidated collective understandings of

common identity (and shared destiny as one nation) among the majority of Mozambicans. Suddenly, intellectuals, students, peasants, and laborers, both women and men, found unity and common purpose through their non-violent civic engagements and struggle. This new and intensified feature of Mozambican life and national identity gave further impetus for collective resistance during the crucial decade of the 1970s.

Taken alongside decades of struggle using mass, nonviolent resistance and a widespread understanding of the great and horrible costs of military action during the civil war, this collective consciousness can now be seen in contemporary adherence to popular democratic electoral participation, continued high levels of involvement in community-based grassroots organizations, and an openness to an internationalism that defies traditional North-South or East-West dynamics. This resistance and reconciliation consciousness is clear in the words and deeds of national leaders and local civilians alike, as modern Mozambique helps model peaceful postwar relations throughout Africa. It is noteworthy for a country so long wracked with anticolonial and civil war that, in 2009, Maputo's social center Rua D'arte energetically hosted the carnival for the World March for Peace and Nonviolence.<sup>63</sup>

Academics and activists alike will do well to use the example of Mozambique, so apparently simple a story of armed victory, to understand the complexities involved in truly radical transformations. Through strikes and songs, newspapers and petitions, and organizations that grew in numbers beyond the Portuguese abilities to contain them and beyond any armed structure initiated by FRELIMO, the people of Mozambique have consistently shown the power of civil society. Mozambique's story, indeed, must be rewritten to emphasize the strategic possibilities afforded by unarmed mass resistance.

## Notes

1. Margaret Dickinson, ed., *When Bullets Begin to Flower* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), 33.

2. John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 11. Mozambican vice-president and militant Marxist Marcelino Dos Santos later characterized the work beyond national liberation as one of building revolutionary nationalism. From his perspective, setting up communal structures and a mass, communal consciousness would make reversal of the gains from armed struggles profoundly difficult because the masses would rise up against these types of capitalist, antidemocratic notions (21).

3. Samora Machel, "The People's Republic of Mozambique: The Struggle Continues," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 4 (1975): 19–20.

4. See, for example, Chris Searle, *We're Building a New School: Diary of a Teacher in Mozambique* (London: Zed Press, 1981), 49.

5. William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 55.

6. Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1969), 107.
7. *Ibid.*, 103–104.
8. Zachery Kingdon, *A Host of Devils: The History and Context of the Making of Makonde Spirit* (London: Routledge, 2002), 24.
9. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 106.
10. *Ibid.*, 108.
11. *Ibid.*, 114.
12. See Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*; as well as Teresa Cruz e Silva, “Identity and Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique, 1930–1974,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 225.
13. Beata Mtyingizana, “Mozambique, Worker Protests,” in *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*, ed. Immanuel Ness (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 249.
14. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 116.
15. Carmeliza Rosario, Inge Tvedten, and Margarida Paulo, “Mucupuki”: *Social Relations of Rural-Urban Poverty in Central Mozambique* (Bergen: CMI Reports; Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2008), 17. See also Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
16. Allan Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution 1900–1982* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 66.
17. Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 10.
18. Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* (London: Zed Books, 1984), 23–24.
19. Hans Abrahamson and Andres Nilsson, *Mozambique—The Troubled Transition: From Socialist Construction to Free-Market Capitalism* (London: Zed Books, 1995), 22.
20. Basil Davidson, “The Prospects for the Southern Half of Africa,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, no. 176, November 1968. From an interview with Alberto Joaquim Chipande recorded by Davidson at the Second Congress of FRELIMO, Niasa Province, Mozambique, July 1968.
21. David Robinson, “Socialism in Mozambique? The ‘Mozambican Revolution’ in Critical Perspective,” *LIMINA: A Journal of Historical and Cultural Studies*, no. 9 (2003): 135–137.
22. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 117.
23. *Ibid.*, 117–118.
24. Bill Sutherland, pan-Africanist activist, interviewed by Matt Meyer, Brooklyn, New York, November 15, 1993; excerpts of which appear in Sutherland and Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000), 150–152.
25. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 121–122.
26. George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom* (New York: Africa Fund, 1975), 29–30.
27. Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1969), 102.
28. Houser and Shore, *Mozambique*, 30.
29. Sutherland and Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi*, 123. This was taken from an interview with Mocumbi, Mozambican minister of foreign affairs, by the authors, Maputo, July 24, 1992.
30. See, for example, from the government press: Edicao do Departamento de Trabalho Ideologico, *Historia da FRELIMO* (Maputo: FRELIMO, 1983), 7–9.



31. Herbert Shore, "Remembering Eduardo: Reflections on the Life and Legacy of Eduardo Mondlane," *Africa Today* 39, nos. 1–2 (1992): 41.

32. *Ibid.*, 41–42. Shore notes that Guevara himself visited Tanzania in late 1965, debating these points with Mondlane and others. Though this has scarcely been documented, Shore cites his own (and *Africa Today* guest editor Prexy Nesbitt's) conversations about these issues with Mondlane himself.

33. Simon Baynham, *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa* (London: Routledge, 1986), 130.

34. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 123.

35. *Ibid.*, 124.

36. Shore, "Remembering Eduardo," 42–44. For an alternate view that nonetheless confirms some of the same conclusions, see Uria T. Simango, "Gloomy Situation in Mozambique," November 3, 1969, *Mozambique Para Todos*, [www.macua.blogs.com/mozambique\\_para\\_todos](http://www.macua.blogs.com/mozambique_para_todos), accessed March 21, 2012. For some, the Reverend Uria Timoteo Simango, a FRELIMO founder, simply represented a pacifist-leaning democratic socialist while for others he was a traitor worthy of execution. See Walter Opello, "Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 2, no. 1 (1975): 66–82. Shore is of the point of view that Mondlane was also a democratic socialist.

37. Sutherland and Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi*, 115–116.

38. *Ibid.*, 116–117.

39. Bill Sutherland, pan-African activist, interviewed by Prexy Nesbitt and Mimi Edwards, Brooklyn, New York, July 19, 2003, used as an unpublished transcript background paper by William Minter, Gail Hovey, and Charles Cobb Jr., *No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American Activists Over Half a Century, 1950–2000* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007); and for the American Friends Service Committee video, *Bill Sutherland: Nonviolent Warrior for Peace* (Philadelphia: AFSC, 2005). Also Chude Mondlane, daughter of Eduardo Mondlane, interviewed by the authors, Brooklyn, New York, December 27, 2009.

40. Houser and Shore, *Mozambique*, 39.

41. These points are poignantly and concretely illustrated in Stephanie Urdang, *And Still They Dance: Women, War, and the Struggle for Change in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), 111–154, 244.

42. Gisela G. Geisler, *Women and the Remaking of Politics in Southern Africa: Negotiating Autonomy, Incorporation, and Representation* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika-institutet, 2004), 115.

43. Samora Machel, *Establishing People's Power to Serve the Masses* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977), 36.

44. Searle, *We're Building a New School*, 53.

45. Houser and Shore, *Mozambique*, 40–41. By the end of the war for independence, almost 2,000 towers needed to be replaced due to these acts of sabotage and nearly 3,000 needed to be refurbished.

46. Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, interviewed by George Houser, Dar es Salaam, June 17, 1970, as reprinted in Houser and Shore, *Mozambique*, 40.

47. See, for example, Mozambique Briefing, *The Weapon of Culture* (Maputo: Information Department, Frelimo Party Central Committee, 1987), 1–3. Also produced were briefings on the problem of children of war and President Chissano's proposed policies for a lasting peace (see *supra* note 33).

48. Iain Christie, *Machel of Mozambique* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988), 146.

49. Richard W. Leonard, "FRELIMO's Victories in Mozambique," *Issues: A Journal of Opinion, African Studies Association* 4, no. 2 (1974): 38–46.



50. Sutherland and Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi*, 120. This was taken from an interview with Graca Machel, widow of Samora Machel and former Mozambican minister of education, by the authors, Maputo, July 25, 1992.

51. William Finnegan called this dynamic the “harrowing” of Mozambique in *A Complicated War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 139. Also discussed in Barby Ulmer and Vic Ulmer, codirectors of Our Developing World educational agency, interviewed by Matt Meyer, February 27, 2010.

52. K. B. Wilson, “Cult of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 527–582. See also the work and website of NGO Conciliation Resources, [www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/key-actors.php](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/key-actors.php).

53. Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1984). See also the work of Conciliation Resources and Chronology of the Mozambican War, [www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/mozambique/chronology.php](http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/mozambique/chronology.php).

54. See, for example, Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*.

55. Lisa Bornstein, “Planning and Peacebuilding in Post-War Mozambique: From Narratives to Practices of Development,” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 4, no. 1 (2008): 38–51.

56. Brendan F. Jundanian, *The Mozambique Liberation Front*, vol. 110 (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1970), 76–80.

57. Basil Davidson, *The People’s Cause* (London: Longman, 1981), 127–128.

58. Hanlon, *Mozambique*, 292.

59. John Saul, ed., *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985), 420.

60. Aquino de Braganca and Jacques Depelchin, “From the Idealization of Frelimo to the Understanding of the Recent History of Mozambique,” *African Journal of Political Economy* 1 (1986): 169. De Braganca was killed later in 1986, in the plane carrying Samora Machel and thirty-two other Mozambican officials.

61. Saul, *The State and Revolution*, 45.

62. Albie Sachs, South African Constitutional Court Justice and former ANC leader based in Maputo, Mozambique, personal communication with the authors, February 24, 2010.

63. Djamila Andrade, *Mozambique: Carnival of the World March in Maputo* (Maputo: World March for Peace and Nonviolence, 2009), [www.nenasili.cz/en/3254\\_mozambiquecarnival-of-the-world-march-in-maputo](http://www.nenasili.cz/en/3254_mozambiquecarnival-of-the-world-march-in-maputo).

# Appendix:

## Conflict Summaries

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This appendix has been compiled by the book's editor, Maciej Bartkowski, based on the information presented in the corresponding chapters of the book. Cases are arranged alphabetically. (Any omissions in the tables are either of the editor's own making or the information was not available.)

### Key

#### *Method and Type of Nonviolent Action*

Nonviolent intervention

*Disruptive*

*Creative*

Noncooperation

*Political*

*Economic*

*Social*

Protest and persuasion

#### *Length of the Campaign*

Short: 1 day up to 4 weeks

Medium: 1 month up to 1 year

Long: More than 1 year

#### *Level of Participation of People*

Low: 1–100 people or less than 20 percent of the population

Medium: 100–1,000 people or between 20 percent and 50 percent of the population

High: More than 1,000 people or more than 50 percent of the population

Mozambique

Action	Method/ <i>Type</i>	Date	Length	Level of Participation	Direct Impact	Long-Term/Overall Impact of Civil Resistance
Singing, dancing, and carving caricatures of the colonizers with distorted features	Protest and persuasion	Late 1920s and early 1930s	Long	High	Delegitimizing colonial rule	Civil resistance of the 1940s–1960s influenced and consolidated collective understandings of common identity (and shared a destiny as one nation) among the majority of Mozambicans  The collective consciousness of resistance and reconciliation can now be seen in contemporary adherence to popular democratic electoral participation, continued high levels of involvement in community-based grassroots organizations, and an openness to an internationalism that defies traditional North-South or East-West dynamics
Forming mutual aid societies to provide scholarships for students and apprentices	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	Late 1920s and early 1930s	Long	High	Cross-ethnic and regional coalition building	
Setting up newspapers and magazines critical of colonial rule and European domination	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	Late 1920s and early 1930s	Long	High		
Writings and paintings with anticolonial themes	Protest and persuasion	1940s–1960	Long	Low		
Setting up a student group, Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Mocambique (NESAM)	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	1949	Long		Helped spur coalition building among colonized groups and across wide geographical areas Facilitated civic networking structure	Civil resistance of the 1940s–1960s influenced and consolidated collective understandings of common identity (and shared a destiny as one nation) among the majority of Mozambicans  The collective consciousness of resistance and reconciliation can now be seen in contemporary adherence to popular democratic electoral participation, continued high levels of involvement in community-based grassroots organizations, and an openness to an internationalism that defies traditional North-South or East-West dynamics
Urban workers’ and farmers’ strikes	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	With iteration from 1947 until early 1960s	Long	High	Offered self-organizing experience for workers	
Rural resistance in a form of noncompliance with quotas	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	1940s–1960s	Long	High	Demanded increased wages and greater control over the land	
Production boycotts	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	1955 and 1958	Long	Medium	Cotton-picking wages were increased	
Organizing community-based, indigenous farming cooperatives	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>		Long	High	Membership expanded by thousands Production increased Inspiration for local farmers to intensify their efforts at earning a living wage and proving their effectiveness as workers and traders Negotiated exemptions from forced labor with local authorities	
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) built parallel civic and nonmilitary alternative institutions	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	Second half of 1960s until 1970s	Long	High	Institutions transformed into local engines of a people’s democracy after independence One of FRELIMO’s institutions, the Organization of Mozambican Women, is today one of Africa’s most dynamic and successful civic organizations	
Acts of sabotage: cutting of transmission line cables and destruction of unstaffed transmission towers against Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Disruptive</i>	1970s	Short		Drained the colonial powers’ fiscal and physical resources, making the project more expensive	
Sending captured Portuguese soldiers back home	Protest and persuasion	1970s	Short		Many Portuguese soldiers refused military service in protest against their own government’s colonial policies	