
Recovering

Nonviolent

History

Civil Resistance
in Liberation Struggles

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Palestine: Nonviolent Resistance in the Struggle for Statehood, 1920s–2012

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A series of external interventions in Palestine around the time of World War I created what would become an acute and pernicious conflict. After the Ottoman Empire was divided into British and French spheres of influence, General Edmund Allenby militarily entered Palestine on December 9, 1917.¹ The League of Nations granted Britain the mandate for Palestine in 1922. Yet the most defining colonial intrusion was British foreign secretary Arthur James Lord Balfour's declaration in a November 2, 1917, letter to the leader of British Jewry, the banker Lionel Walter Lord Rothschild:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The idea of a restored Israel, with exiled Israelites returning to the Promised Land, appealed not only to the British government but to much of the West, thus planting the seeds, in David Gilmour's words, for "spectacular antagonism in Palestine through ignorance and disregard for its Arab inhabitants."²

Palestinian Resistance in the 1920s and 1930s

Six Palestine Arab Congresses gathered between 1919 and 1923 in opposition to Lord Balfour's pledge to the Zionists.³ In Palestine, waves of protests

broke out against its ratification⁴ and opposed the separation of Palestine from what was then Greater Syria, an alliance considered by militant young Palestinians the best vehicle for independence.

During most of the 1920s, the Palestinian resistance was led by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti (Sunni Muslim leader), and others in the often feuding Arab elites. Directed toward London and its support for the Zionist movement, it used nonviolent methods of persuasion and appeal. These included the simplest forms of protest and assertion, including assemblies, deputations, demonstrations, processions, declarations, and petitions. Continuing with these methods, the Palestinians added noncooperation to their repertoire in the form of social, economic, and electoral boycotts and resignation from jobs in the British colonial administration. They sustained protests against land grants to Zionists and escalated approaches of noncooperation as shops closed across the country. *Mukhtars* (village chiefs or mayors) refused to cooperate with government commissioners. As mosques offered prayers about the danger facing Palestine, villagers were encouraged not to pay tithes to a non-Muslim government. Those who sold land to Zionists or their brokers were excommunicated (i.e., denied access to Islamic sites).

Women were often at the forefront, as Palestinian collective nonviolent action sought abrogation of the Balfour Declaration, an end to the British mandate, and national independence.⁵ Women protested against the eviction of peasants from farmland purchased by Zionist colonies and agents. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, women organized a silent procession to exhibit their disapproval of the mandate's policies, submitted statements to each diplomatic consulate, and sent protest telegrams to Queen Mary.⁶

Riots broke out on May 1, 1921, in Jaffa, the main port in Palestine. Yet generally speaking from 1920 to 1924, the Palestinian Arabs continued to apply political pressure on London and to stress that no elements of Palestinian society could cooperate with Britain while British policy was based on the Balfour language. They rejected all compromise proposals coming from London. A British colonel's contemporary account notes the "wonderful self-control and exemplary behaviour of the local [Palestinian] Christians and Arabs" in response to Lord Balfour's first and only trip to Palestine, in March and April 1925, to inaugurate the Hebrew University.⁷ During the one-day strike, all Arab shops closed and Jerusalem's Arab newspapers were bordered with mourning black.⁸ Nevertheless, political scientist Ann Mosely Lesch contends,

The Arabs' attempts to influence British policy through delegations, political strikes, and election boycott appeared a failure by the mid-1920s. . . . As a result, the Arab movement began to split between those who felt that the best strategy would be to grasp any available lever of power in Palestine in order to influence policy, and those who held that total opposition and anomic violence would force the British into rethinking their policy.⁹

On September 24, 1928, Yom Kippur (the Jewish Day of Atonement), Jewish worshipers put up a partition at the outer wall of the temple in Jerusalem. Across Palestine, rumors spread that the great Jewish temple might be rebuilt on the sacred site of al-Aqsa mosque,¹⁰ setting off spiraling events known as the uprisings of 1929¹¹ with hundreds of Jews and Palestinians killed and wounded.¹²

Palestinian nonviolent resistance both intensified and broadened in the 1930s. General strikes increased, as did Palestinian organizational capacity with the development of a far-reaching committee structure. Political parties evolved. When this disciplined nonviolent action failed to bring change, some groups turned to rural violence. In summer 1931, a Palestinian conference in Nablus responded to British assistance for Jewish defense not solely by discussing independence or boycotting imports, but by calling for their own defense organization and purchase of weapons.¹³

The patrician families of Jerusalem did not reject violence in principle; rather, they believed that making reasoned claims offered the best hope for a fair hearing from both Britain and the Zionists. Yet as a new generation of educated Palestinian nationalists gained influence, they disparaged the tools of protest and noncooperation chosen by the Jerusalem elite. A chief source of internal dissension was “disagreement over methods.” Soraya Antonius writes, “Some leaders believed only force could attain the national goals. Others believed gradualism and diplomacy would be more effective.”¹⁴ It is clear in retrospect that, if the Palestinians’ pleas and protests had been heeded, the option of armed struggle would have seemed less attractive.

Concepts of national interests or nationhood were unknown to the peasantry; the name “Palestine” had only recently replaced “Southern Syria.” Absorbing shocks from successive losses caused by Jewish emigrés and British bureaucrats—both seeking jurisdiction over land considered by Muslims to be second in holiness only to Mecca and Medina—Palestinian peasants looked for solutions in Islam. The pathway to redemption and restoration would, they believed, be found in jihad, protecting the faith. Dispossessed and estranged farmers drifted to Old Haifa where Shaikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam was organizing secret armed cells. Qassam’s model of guerrilla warfare through secret societies was followed in the mid- to late 1930s and continues into the present as a prototype of Islamic revivalist resistance. For evicted laborers, Islam, as interpreted by Qassam, became the starting place for the coming mass opposition, much of it violent.¹⁵

Strikes by Palestinians were frequent and, in 1936, possibly the longest in history occurred in Palestine. The *al-thawra al-kubra* (great revolt) of the Palestinians started with a general strike called at a nationalist conference in Nablus in April 1936. This initiated the last period of coherent, well-planned, and national nonviolent civil resistance until the 1987 intifada, a half century later.¹⁶ National committees were quickly organized to coordinate a widespread effort to bring all economic activity to a total standstill.

The newly formed Arab Higher Committee demanded a halt to Jewish immigration, restrictions on land sales to Jews, and establishment of a national government accountable to a representative council—in other words, an independent Palestinian state. Several hundred veiled women marched in Gaza on April 25, 1936. With great speed, local committees of the national body were set up, each deciding its priorities although generally echoing the Arab Higher Committee's demands. The autonomy of these local committees contributed to the strike's resilience. As authorities locked up one area leader, another emerged. By the end of June, nearly all Palestinian businesses and transportation across the country had ground to a halt.

Britain responded with collective punishments, imposing fines, conducting mass arrests, and demolishing homes. Despite the detention of 2,598 Palestinians¹⁷ and the imprisonment of some 400 leaders of strike committees,¹⁸ the strike persisted. Guerrilla tactics became more evident, as underground Qassamite armed bands moved into the forefront.¹⁹ They detonated railway lines, derailed two trains, blew up a bridge, obstructed roads, and sliced telephone wires. "Despite the success of the general strike in many parts of Palestine," Zachary Lockman concludes, "the nationalist movement's inability to make it [total] undermined its effectiveness."²⁰ Public fatigue set in, especially among Palestinian citrus grove owners, and the stevedores and boat owners at the Jaffa port.²¹ On October 10, 1936, after 174 days—nearly six months—ostensibly at the behest of Arab monarchs, the Arab Higher Committee ended the strike that had nearly paralyzed the country.

After the strike ended, calm prevailed until a few weeks before the release of the British-appointed Peel Commission's report in July 1937, when leaked excerpts disclosed Lord Peel's intention to recommend the partition of Palestine. Rebellion recommenced.²²

Following the assassination in Nazareth on September 26 of the acting district commissioner for Galilee, Lewis Andrews,²³ and his guards, the Arab Higher Committee was declared illegal, several leaders arrested and deported (the grand mufti fled, evading arrest), and its committees banned. Armed bands sabotaged transportation and communications by destroying train tracks, and gangs with weapons seized control of towns, collected taxes, and held kangaroo courts. By April 1938, more than 1,000 bellicose acts during a six-month period had been recorded, including fifty-five political murders and thirty-two attempted assassinations, as Palestinian insurgents killed other Palestinians that they considered traitors, including intellectuals, exacerbating kinship and other conflicts.²⁴

The revised British policy, combining "appeasement" (abandoning partition) with "suppression," succeeded in putting down the rebellion after more than 1,000 deaths (mainly in the closing period).²⁵ The British government belatedly recognized, as the Palestinian Arabs had argued since

1917, that the situation created by London was unfeasible and irredeemable.²⁶ The general strike had been organized and nonviolent—its boycotts and noncooperation methods were models of disciplined implementation through local coordinating committees—but its restraint ultimately collapsed. Major turns to violence had occurred with the May 1921 riots and the 1929 uprisings, but the evidence suggests that these episodes were aberrant and not premeditated or planned, at least until the anarchic violence of 1938–1939.²⁷ Moreover, the British administration and leaders of the global Zionist movement disregarded the Palestinians’ remarkable and more prevalent displays of restrained self-discipline, thereby strengthening those elements advocating violent resistance, including the forerunners of today’s violent Islamic revivalist organizations.

Mythologies of Liberating Palestine Through Armed Struggle

On May 14, 1948, the Zionists proclaimed the state of Israel. The next day, when British forces withdrew, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan invaded. Their forces outnumbered the Israelis, but were ill-equipped, poorly led, and disunited. When the armistice was signed in 1949, Israel controlled not just the 55 percent allocated by the UN partition plan but 78 percent of mandatory Palestine. The 1948 war had killed 6,000 of Palestine’s Jews, 1 percent, but for the Palestinian Arabs was a catastrophe. The remaining quarter of the country—what became the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip—came under the control of Jordan and Egypt. The Arab state envisaged in the UN plan never materialized and approximately 750,000 Palestinian refugees (half the Palestinian population in 1948) fled their homes or property and suffered other losses during the fighting. Dispossessed, lacking the ability and tools to eke out a living in their new places of exile, they dispersed to the West Bank and Gaza or to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Palestinian refugees in the teeming camps of the 1950s could see that Arab unity had not protected their rights and were receptive to arguments for armed struggle, often promoted by the better educated and with encouragement from the Syrian government.²⁸ Palestinian guerrilla movements began to develop. Fateh was founded in 1957 and seized the initiative.²⁹ The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then and now a front primarily composed of refugees, grew out of an Arab League meeting in Cairo in 1964. Its charter called for preparations for armed struggle by starting military training camps. In 1968, the PLO revised this charter, declaring “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine.” Almost unlimited support initially existed for the *fedayeen* (guerrillas, literally “self-sacrificers”) as they

began to form units in the refugee camps of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Subsequently, Palestinians would carry out some of the twentieth century's most notorious attacks. Indeed, most of the PLO's operations were directed against civilians.³⁰ Decades of nonviolent means of struggle were repudiated, without any evidence that guerrilla methods could affect the underlying issues.

In June 1967, Israel conquered East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip—the remaining quarter of the land that the United Nations had allocated Palestinians in 1947—and placed the territories of the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. Sociologist Rosemary Sayigh comments, “Few peoples have been more systematically kept helpless in the face of attack than the Palestinians, and it is not surprising that the symbol of their resurgence after 1967 was the gun.”³¹

In February 1969, Fateh took over the PLO and Yasser Arafat was elected chair. Banned by the Israelis, the PLO's main base until 1970 was in Jordan. It relocated to Beirut (until the Israeli invasion of 1982) and then to Tunis in remote North Africa, isolated from conceptual innovations and organizational changes that were developing inside the occupied territories. In addition, the Qassamite option and support for armed struggle became entrenched as a tendency in Palestinian polity.

Many Palestinians were captivated by stories of guerrilla resistance from the Algerian war for independence (Algerian guerrilla methods had been used in Fateh's mid-1960s raids³²); the 1959 Cuban revolution, whose appeal lay in the fact that it was perceived not as a popular movement but as action triggered by twelve *commandantes* hidden in the Sierra Maestra³³; and the French and US defeats in Indochina. Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, works by Mao Tse-tung, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Régis Debray, and Frantz Fanon were circulated. Palestinian philosopher Sari Nusseibeh recalled that, in the early 1980s, “Our students were in love with that business of the cleansing power of violence.”³⁴ Nusseibeh contended, in contrast, that these armed struggles had little relevance to their situation, not least because the Palestinians had been disarmed after 1967.

Reassertion of the Validity of Nonviolent Action: The First Intifada of 1987

Inside the territories captured in 1967, Palestinians began to organize themselves. Unseen, an incipient nonviolent mass movement began to cohere, its target the ending of Israeli occupation. In 1969, the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) broke the Israeli ban on political organizing. Numerically small, the PCP believed that long-range political goals, such as an independent state, could be achieved only through comparably long-term changes in the

social structure. Over the next two decades, this decision would unleash organizing efforts by civilian groups (including many that identified with factions of the distant PLO).

In the 1970s, new political space opened with the emergence of community-based networks and civilian mobilization. In effect, creating a fledgling civil society—a sphere of public life where citizens could interact unreservedly and more or less without intrusion from the Israeli authorities—countless self-governing voluntary professional associations, student and faculty unions, women's committees, youth groups, and even a prisoners' movement evolved to fill voids created by military occupation as well as to oppose it. According to Mahdi Abd al-Hadi, head of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, an estimated 45,000 committees were in existence by 1987.³⁵

By the 1980s, the exiles' guerrilla military strikes and sorties, and some clandestine operations inside the occupied territories, no longer held much allure for the residents of the Palestinian areas. This ambivalence about armed struggle was not based on moral abhorrence of violence, but arose from the reality that cross-border sorties or forays by combat squads brought Israeli reprisals and collective punishments to rain down on the residents in the territories.³⁶ The formation of thousands of committees and associations into grassroots networks of popular mobilization combined with other influences at work, such as the promotion of fresh ideas about how to struggle for rights, thus facilitating a reassertion of nonviolent methods.

In 1987, civil resistance reemerged, aimed at lifting the military occupation, and was called *intifada*. No appropriate term for “nonviolent” exists in Arabic or Hebrew. *Sumud* (steadfastness) had after 1967 been promoted inside the territories, the idea being that the perseverance required to persist with everyday life under belligerent circumstances and staying on the land is itself a form of resistance. *Sumud* offered a nonviolent option between accepting military occupation and choosing armed struggle.³⁷ The word *intifada* went further. Drawn from the verb *nafada*, suggesting recovering or recuperation, it also implies “shaking off,” like shaking dirt from a rug. To Palestinian cultural anthropologist Ali Hussein Qleibo, *intifada* “connotes the removal of unnecessary elements; shaking off preexisting weaknesses.”³⁸ The word *uprising*—the term chosen by English-speaking Palestinians—fails to convey the sense of sloughing off passivity. *Intifada* is one of the few Arabic words to enter the vocabulary of international politics.³⁹

The first *intifada* of 1987 enlisted virtually all segments of the Palestinian population. It was not spontaneous as many perceived, but a mass unarmed mobilization resulting from a decades-long spread of knowledge about nonviolent strategies throughout Palestinian society. In contrast to the PLO's military doctrine and its rubric “all means of struggle,” during the 1980s activist scholars were producing and translating writings that propounded

political tools as more realistic than armed struggle for the disarmed Palestinians. Changes in political thought were led by some two dozen Palestinian organizer intellectuals who argued among other points that statehood could compensate for the losses of their ancestral lands and who proffered coexistence with Israel in return for citizenship in their own state.⁴⁰ Some writings advanced a penetrating recognition: Palestinian cooperation had in part allowed Israel's military occupation to persist and such obedience could be withdrawn.⁴¹

Among the generative forces for the 1987 intifada were a series of joint Israeli-Palestinian committees against the occupation that began working together in 1980 around East Jerusalem. These committees had by 1985 merged into the Committee Confronting the Iron Fist, which used banners, boycotts, documentation, denunciation, demonstrations, lobbying, marches, news releases, petitions, picketing, speeches, and vigils to exert pressure for lifting the occupation.⁴² All posters, pickets, and news releases were written in Arabic, English, and Hebrew.

Once the intifada started, new Israeli peace groups proliferated.⁴³ Perhaps 40 percent of all Israeli solidarity activity with the intifada came from newly formed groups.⁴⁴ One of the properties of nonviolent action is its ability to cause divisions within the ranks of the target group.

Palestinian nonviolent action in the 1980s was more sophisticated than in the 1920s and 1930s. A new politics developed as an entire society under military occupation unified, based on changes in popular thinking about how to transform their situation, including the withdrawal of their own cooperation with the occupation. In the first month of the intifada, harmonized actions could be seen in disparate localities: civil disobedience, fasting, general and local strikes, marches, public prayers, renaming of streets and schools, resigning from jobs, ringing of church bells, and unfurling of flags. Palestinians employed more than 100 differentiated nonviolent methods from December 1987 to March 1990.

Within the first month of the intifada, Israel placed 200,000 Palestinians under curfew in the West Bank and Gaza, which rose to 1 million by December 1989. Noncooperation was able to continue despite reprisals and crackdowns thanks to hundreds of popular committees, often started and run by women, which sustained communities under curfew or on strike. With precedents from women's collective actions in 1929 and 1933, from December 1987 to March 1988 women alone held more than 100 demonstrations. Paradoxically, Israeli-imposed curfews, school closings, and closure of six universities in February 1988 helped to spread ideas about nonviolent struggle. As 14,500 students and professors were sent home to their villages and refugee camps, a baker sat with a physics professor or a student to plan distribution of bread—or to decide the next nonviolent action against the occupation.

A leadership collective remained clandestine to evade arrest. It consisted of representatives from the four main secular-nationalist factions in the occupied territories. Despite being called the Unified National Leadership Command, it did not command the population but rather coordinated actions. Local committees could make independent decisions. The Command encouraged shifting action centers from one location to another and sought to prevent fatigue by advocating varying nonviolent methods.

None of the Command's biweekly leaflets bade the destruction of Israel or death to Jews. Rather, they presented the Palestinian strategy as aiming at peace through negotiations and built on three political aims: (1) acceptance of Israel in its pre-1967 borders; (2) removal of Israeli authority from the occupied territories; and (3) establishment of a Palestinian state. The leaflets shed light on the uprising's internal strategic deliberations, including an eighteen-month-long debate on adopting "total" civil disobedience. The relationship between the Command inside the territories and the PLO in Tunis was fraught with disagreement because the PLO did not understand nonviolent strategies or civil disobedience.

Thousands of Israeli soldiers were on active duty in the territories, thus stone throwing by youths—far from being seen as evidence of the absence of weapons—aroused Israeli fears. This practice ultimately lessened the achievements of the uprising. Actual fatalities show how the thrown stones distorted Israeli perceptions. According to an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson, in 1988–1991 Palestinians killed a total of twelve Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza while Israelis killed 706 Palestinian civilians.⁴⁵

Groups in the Qassamite tradition, such as Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), found a place within the circumference of the intifada. In September 1990, Fateh and Hamas signed a thirteen-point pact of honor. Hamas endorsed armed struggle and refusal to recognize Israel—stances contrary to the intifada's framework of nonviolent struggle and desire for negotiations with Israel. In the pact, however, Hamas softened its position to the lifting of Israel's military occupation, thereby reversing its position on partition of Palestine.

The Command survived four waves of arrests, but chagrin began to spread among Palestinians as Israeli officials eventually imprisoned or deported the specific activist intellectuals who had laid the groundwork for the uprising and steered it, and there appeared to be only bitter fruits from the exertions of nonviolent discipline. The consensus on nonviolent strategies eventually collapsed because of threefold opposition: it took years for the Israelis to recognize that the uprising had political rather than military goals; the PLO concerned itself with preventing a new leadership from arising in the territories; and international powers failed to seize the unparalleled openings for building peace presented in 1987–1990 (an exception being the 1991 Madrid peace conference).

When the Palestinians were successful and saw positive results, it coincided with the early two and a half years of the intifada, when they were at their most disciplined in applying nonviolent methods. The first intifada's achievements include the 1991 Madrid peace conference and the opening of political space for the 1993 Oslo Accords, notwithstanding the latter's subsequent invalidation by all parties to the conflict.

Palestinian resistance during the intifada, for the first time, succeeded in converting the occupation into an economic burden, as for example, documented by the independent Adva Center in Tel Aviv. Shlomo Swirski, the institute's head, advised an Israeli newspaper that although he could not speak definitively, he estimated that the occupation had cost Israel \$100 billion over the preceding forty years. Israel could withstand such high costs because of external support and funding.⁴⁶

In December 1988, Arafat formally and publicly declared Israel's right to exist and repudiated terrorism largely as a consequence of the 1987 intifada's civil resistance. Even so, it had not been until November 1988—eleven months after the initiation of the intifada—that the PLO publicly proposed the concept of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel. This compromise was a direct outcome of the changes in political thought manifested in the uprising inside the territories.

Palestinian Statehood Forged Through Armed or Nonviolent Resistance?

An author who has written widely on the theme of Palestinian armed struggle and nationhood is Yezid Sayigh, professor of Middle East studies at King's College, London. While conceding a significant symbolic role to armed struggle and acknowledging its centrality in PLO rhetoric even as late as the 1980s, he also points out that the practice has been problematic:

If the PLO hoped to establish a democratic secular state for Arabs and Jews in Palestine, then bombings or dramatic raids (both basically indiscriminate) hardly reassured the Israelis of the PLO's intentions. Indeed, even when the PLO's political aims were more modest—such as setting up a separate Palestinian ministate (primarily) through international diplomacy—indiscriminate military action worked against Palestinian interests. It hardened Israeli resolve and alienated the very international parties whose pressure on Israel was considered crucial by the PLO. . . . The nature of Palestinian action (especially terrorism) tended to undermine, rather than reinforce, the PLO's political and moral message to Israel and the West.⁴⁷

Furthermore, Sayigh suggests that, even in the 1970s in the occupied territories, *sumud* was a more relevant concept while, by the 1980s, "social

and political organization—dubbed ‘mass action’—was an important embodiment of national identity and will in these circumstances.”⁴⁸

Fateh, the largest faction in the PLO, had a symbolic importance and certain of its activists played a vital practical role in building diffuse community-based groups throughout East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, in the prisoners’ movement and among student and faculty organizations.⁴⁹ Yet Sayigh notes the PLO’s “hostile disregard for strategies of non-violent resistance.” Instead, the mainstream PLO leadership took a “statist approach” that

viewed the population as a target audience to be co-opted through the provision of services and public goods. It strove neither for social mobilization, in the sense of assisting local communities or social groups to gain collective control over resources, nor for transformation of social relations, but rather to construct an alternative framework (to Israel) for the exercise of political power.⁵⁰

An evolution had occurred: Palestinian civilian organizations, instead of being consigned to be support for guerrillas, had come to form the bedrock for an unarmed movement.

A formative role in promoting the nonviolent strategies of this movement was played by a circle of activist intellectuals who, over a period of years and especially in the 1980s, redefined the concepts, symbols, and discourse of retributive armed struggle. For example, they substituted *independence* for *liberation*. They framed their quest in the context of international recognition of human rights, consolidated in the period after the 1975 Helsinki Accords, rather than what they regarded as the spent dogmas of armed insurrection. Even when the emerging civilian organizations were identified with factions—a feature of Palestinian life under occupation—membership was voluntary, nominal, heraldic, and associated with families. Recruits were neither conscripted nor press-ganged.

The resultant movement of movements created the capacity for the Palestinians to endure Israeli reprisals, particularly during the intifada’s productive years (1987–1990), before Israel incarcerated or deported the very activist intellectuals who had helped bring about this new thinking. The nonviolent discipline broke down as the PLO took over the intifada in March 1990. Rebel armed groups reasserted themselves. Nonetheless, for nearly three years, Palestinian organizer intellectuals around East Jerusalem and Bir Zeit University in Ramallah succeeded in overcoming the nearly insuperable predicament of factional disunity while pressing for a “white revolution” of no bloodshed and coaching their compatriots to work for entitlements through nonviolent struggle.⁵¹ This extended, multiyear process of building nonmilitary political capability can properly be regarded as foundational in constructing a Palestinian state.

The earlier monopolistic ideologies of armed struggle, rather than reconstructing societal structures and reconstituting the body politic, had left the Palestinians weakened and beholden to Arab state sponsorship. The 1987 intifada, its predecessor movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and the work by the activist intellectuals and popular committees cumulatively opened up Palestinian society and did more for coining a model of authentic democratic governance in the Arab world than any other force to date. Not only could military command structures of the guerrilla units not protect Palestinian communities from the repressive violence of military occupation, they could not generate democratic leaders. The leadership that emerged during the birth and life of the uprising was the most egalitarian and committed to democracy in the Arab world in the twentieth century. Moreover, residual knowledge of nonviolent action and the ability of citizens to withdraw their cooperation from corrupt or unjust governance are essential prerequisites for the Palestinian people in order for them to be able to restrain any rise of internal despotism in the future.

Continuation of Nonviolent Struggle into the Early Twenty-First Century

Mirroring the pattern of the 1920s and 1930s, a number of local, nonviolent Palestinian movements are at work with restraint and perseverance, pressing for protection against further losses of their land from the Israeli barrier now colloquially called “the wall.” In April 2002, the Israeli government announced its plans for constructing “separation barriers,” purportedly to prevent the infiltration into Israel of suicide bombers. Regarding these suicide bombings in the second, or so-called al-Aqsa, intifada that erupted in September 2000, former US colonel Robert L. Helvey contends,

Because the Palestinian Authority failed to aggressively dissociate itself from these terrorist acts, Israeli public support for a negotiated homeland for Palestinians evaporated, and the international community began backing away from influencing restraint on Israeli settlement policies and Israel’s violent occupation of the West Bank. . . . If the objective of these terrorists’ attacks was to end Israeli occupation, one must question the wisdom of confronting Israel at its strongest point—military force.⁵²

In contrast, a number of small, nonviolent movements are attempting to minimize the destructiveness of the wall being erected by Israel among their communities. These dramatic local mobilizations are articulate in repudiating armed struggle as the means to a limited end. Parts of the barrier consist of twenty-five-foot-high segments of concrete—more than twice the height of the Berlin Wall. The Israeli human rights monitoring organization B’Tselem adamantly maintains that the barrier’s route “defies all security

logic and appears politically motivated.”⁵³ In challenging “the wall” the Palestinians garner the support of the international solidarity networks that had not been evident in the past and revive their governance of local committees—reminiscent of the Palestinian self-organization in 1936 during the first stage of the great revolt and in the 1987 intifada.

Often missed by the established news media, these nonviolent campaigns called “the intifada of the wall” are avidly covered by Israeli, Palestinian, and joint alternative media. Such local movements are adept at citizen journalism and electronic transnational activism. They consistently benefit from direct personal participation by Israeli sympathizers and allies, as well as the presence of international supporters. Rulings made by the Israeli high court in favor of these movements are often disregarded by the IDF, and the reaction of the Israeli authorities and international onlookers is negligible. The pattern persists of ignoring the Palestinians’ nonviolent action while responding to violent episodes.

An exception is the attention paid by mainstream media to several international flotillas that have sought, beginning in June 2010, to bring relief supplies by sea to Gaza, home to 1.5 million Palestinians, two-thirds of them refugees. After Hamas won parliamentary elections in 2006, the United States and European Union tightened their restrictions on aid for Gaza while Israel restricted travel and commerce and constricted entry points into the Gaza Strip. In December 2008, to halt rocket fire from Gaza, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead, in which 1,400 Gazans and 13 Israelis died. Israel’s continued blockage of Gaza faced increasing international criticism, which saw a European-led “Freedom Flotilla” attempt to challenge it regularly between 2010 and 2012. An Israeli military raid on a Turkish-flagged ship in June 2010 left nine foreign activists dead, and three months later a flotilla by Jews further internationalized Palestinian nonviolent struggle against Israeli’s occupation. Aziz Dweik, a Hamas parliamentarian in the West Bank, noted the countervailing logic of nonviolent action as a form of power. He told the *Wall Street Journal*, “When we use violence, we help Israel win international support; the [2010] Gaza flotilla has done more for Gaza than 10,000 rockets.”⁵⁴

A former commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade in Jenin, which falls within the Qassamite tradition, Zakaria al-Zubeidi, made a personal decision that nonviolent cultural resistance was preferable to armed struggle and became cofounder of an independent playhouse. Supported by private donations, the Freedom Theatre at the Jenin Refugee Camp uses the cultural tools of drama, giant puppets, and music. In September–October 2012 the theater sponsored its first Freedom Ride, in which a Freedom Bus traveled from Jenin to the south Hebron hills, traversing the entire West Bank. At each stop, trained actors from Jenin enacted extraordinary stories of everyday people coping under occupation, including home demolitions, land confiscation, army invasions, arbitrary arrests, and violence by Israeli

settlers. Most of the freedom riders were international visitors, apart from actors and crew.

A Palestinian “Empty Stomach” campaign led by the Palestinian political prisoners in Israel uses hunger strikes to press Israeli officials and popularize demands. In contrast to the historical antecedents of Palestinian hunger strikes in Israeli prisons in 1970, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1987, such fasts now draw worldwide attention in news reports, aided by Palestinian social media and greater interest in popular resistance as a result of the Arab Awakening that began in 2010. The exact impact of hunger strikes may be uncertain, although in 2012 conditions in Israeli prisons improved as a result.

With a goal of prevailing upon Israel to conform to international resolutions pertaining to the Palestinians and end the occupation, Palestinian civic organizations launched a Boycott Divestment Sanctions (BDS) campaign in 2005 noting the historic example of tertiary sanctions applied against the apartheid regime of South Africa. BDS has become a globally decentralized international campaign that seeks worldwide application of third-party sanctions against Israel with corporate disinvestment and boycotts.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) appears to be evolving in its stance and sometimes leans toward supporting popular civil resistance. The PA has launched some nonviolent campaigns, for example, boycotting of products from Israeli settlements. A successful bid to recognize Palestine as a non-member observer state at the United Nations has not been solely limited to diplomatic efforts; it has involved enlisting local and international grassroots patronage.

Conclusion

The turmoil caused by the Balfour Declaration and the UN decision on partition has never subsided. Yet Zionists and others have long contradicted the plain, observable facts of the period after World War I, which show that the Palestinians were not irredeemably committed to violence. The same internal disagreements over methods among the Palestinian leadership that characterized the decade of the 1930s are relevant in the period after 1969; they were at work during the 1987 intifada and endure today.

If only posthumously it must be acknowledged that in any acute conflict, the nonviolent challengers can control only their own actions; they cannot succeed without changes taking place in the target group. The repeated failures of Britain and the Zionists to respond to the Palestinians’ nonviolent sanctions of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be laid at the feet of the civil resisters. By autumn 1938, historian J. C. Hurewitz observes, “events

taught the lesson that the use of violence as a political weapon produced results which otherwise appeared unobtainable.”⁵⁵ It is also often the case that the nonviolent protagonists cannot productively pursue their claims for justice without successful outside, third-party assistance.

The development of a Palestinian capacity for self-governance owes less to notions of armed revolt than to the fledgling civil society built by the civilian movements of the 1980s, which laid the groundwork and infrastructure for an overwhelmingly unarmed 1987 uprising. The 1987 intifada provided the Palestinian people with experience and mass participation in a proto-democracy. It was guided by human rights discourses, self-governing community-based organizations could transmute themselves into popular committees and make survival possible despite heavy reprisals and curfews, and understanding of the power of noncooperation was widespread. Even though undermined and splintered when Arafat and the PLO returned from exile in Tunis in 1994, an emergent Palestinian civil society is a prerequisite for the evolution of coexistence and building peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

For more than two years beginning in 1987, Palestinians waged struggle against the occupation, refusing to use firearms against the Israeli soldiers and settlers in their midst, and they succeeded in applying the most cogent pressures to date to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel, with implied acceptance of the latter’s permanence.

More than any other factor, Palestinian civil resistance has been decisive in creating the foundations for Palestinian democracy and statehood. Nonetheless, the historical record continues to reveal a paucity of efforts to strengthen the influence of Palestinians who advocated civil action as opposed to military strategies to preserve their way of life and establish their oft-promised state alongside the state of Israel.

As the centenary of the Balfour Declaration approaches, an opportunity presents itself for Britain to apologize formally for its actions that set in train a deadly conflict and for world powers to assure the emergence of a just and peaceful Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel.

Notes

This chapter draws on material in Mary Elizabeth King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance* (New York: Nation Books, 2007).

1. George MacMunn and Cyril Falls, *Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine: From the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917* (History of the Great War) (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928), 260–261.

2. David Gilmour, “The Unregarded Prophet: Lord Curzon and the Palestine Question,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 3 (1996): 67.

3. Bernard Wasserstein notes them as follows: Haifa, Damascus, Haifa, Jerusalem, Nablus, and Jaffa. Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917–1929* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 57, 60, 94–95, 106, 120, 125. See A. W. Kayyali, *Palestine: A Modern History* (London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, n.d., ca. 1971), 60, 88, 99, 113, 119. The British government forbade the second congress planned for Jerusalem. Muhammad Y. Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 204–205.

4. The Allied powers ratified the declaration at San Remo on April 25, 1920.

5. Kayyali, *Palestine*, 168; Simona Sharoni, *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution, 1995), 59; Soraya Antonius, "Fighting on Two Fronts: Conversations with Palestinian Women," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 8, no. 3 (1979): 26–27.

6. Matiel E. T. Mogannam, *The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem* (London: Herbert Joseph, 1937), 69–76; Ellen Fleischman, *Jerusalem Women's Organizations During the British Mandate: 1920s–1930s*, monograph (East Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1995), 26. See also Julie M. Peteet, *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 50–51.

7. "Beyond showing their feelings by passing the day in prayer, with closed houses and places of business shrouded in black, and shunning the precincts of the new University, the Mohammedans made no hostile demonstration of any kind; and a similar attitude was taken by the Christian population." P. H. H. Massy, *Eastern Mediterranean Lands: Twenty Years of Life, Sport, and Travel* (London: George Routledge and Son, 1928), 70.

8. Philip Jones, *Britain and Palestine, 1914–1948: Archival Sources for the History of the British Mandate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 40; Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour: First Earl of Balfour, K.G., O.M., F.R.S., 1906–30*, vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson, 1936), 365.

9. Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate," in *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, ed. William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 28.

10. Sami Hadawi, *Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A Comprehensive Study* (London: Saqi Books, 1988), 37; Wasserstein, *British in Palestine*, 223.

11. Historian Yehoshua Porath cites the Western Wall conflict as marking the widening of the Palestine predicament from a local issue into a pan-Arab and Muslim question. Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, vol. 1: 1918–29 (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 258–273.

12. The British Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on these events (the Shaw Report) judged the violence was not premeditated and raised concerns about British failure to protect Arab rights and about Jewish immigration exceeding the "absorptive capacity" of Palestine's economy. *Report of the Commission on Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929*, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 3530 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, March 1930).

13. Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Husaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 30, 31. Kayyali, *Palestine*, 165.

14. Antonius, "Fighting on Two Fronts," 39.

15. Nels Johnson, *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism* (London: Kegan Paul, 1982), 56–58.

16. This is not to say there were no episodes of nonviolent struggle. Occasional national campaigns occurred, such as the Palestinian Land Day in 1976, and episodes of sustained local resistance such as the successful nonviolent defense of the village of Battir in 1948. See Jawad Botmeh, "Civil Resistance in Palestine: The Village of Battir in 1948" (master's thesis, Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, 2006), <http://www.preparingforpeace.org/pdfpapers/s2-JawadBotmeh.pdf>, accessed November 4, 2012. In the 1960s, a nonviolent campaign was instituted against land confiscation for construction of Karmiel in Galilee, a city built according to an urban master plan. See Uri Davis, *Crossing the Border: An Autobiography of an Anti-Zionist Palestinian Jew* (London: Books and Books, 1995), 63–90. More research is needed on this period. See also as examples, Mazin Qumsiyeh, *Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment* (London: Pluto Press, 2010); and Andrew Rigby, *Palestinian Resistance and Nonviolence* (East Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 2010).

17. The figure of 2,598 detentions was given in Parliament, as cited by Barbara Kalkas, "The Revolt of 1936: A Chronicle of Events," in *The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 249–250.

18. Mogannam, *Arab Woman*, 305.

19. Shai Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine, 1929–39: The Case of Sheikh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam and His Movement," in *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel*, ed. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 78.

20. Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arabs and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 241.

21. Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion*, vol. 2: 1929–39 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 212.

22. The Peel Commission's partition plan would have joined the Arab portion of Palestine with Trans-Jordan, putting it under the rule of King Abdullah.

23. Andrews was regarded as the ablest of the Palestine Service and he spoke Arabic and Hebrew. Christopher Sykes, *Orde Wingate* (London: Collins, 1959), 136. The Palestinian Arabs believed that he was expediting the transfer of Galilee to the Jews, as called for in the partition plan. Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy* (London: George G. Harrap, 1946; reprint, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), 188–189. This was the first assassination of a British administrator by Palestinians. He was the most senior British official to have been slain in Palestine. Lesch, "Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement," 221.

24. Papers of Sir Charles Tegart, box 2, file 3, Centre of Middle Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford, as cited by Martin Kolinsky, "The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security," in *Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s*, ed. Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 155.

25. Kolinsky reports 547 Jews and 494 Arabs were killed in three years. Kolinsky, "Collapse and Restoration," in *ibid.*, 162. British official data suggest 5,000 may have been killed and 14,000 wounded. See Walid Khalidi, ed., *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), appendix 4, 846–849.

26. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 549 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), 136–140, 362.

27. Philip Mattar concludes that political violence in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933 did not constitute revolts, but "localized spontaneous riots." Philip Mattar, *The*

Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 149.

28. William B. Quandt, "Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism," in *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, ed. William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 56.

29. Fateh is both a palindrome and acronym for Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filistiniyya or Palestinian Liberation Movement.

30. Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 24, 26.

31. Rosemary Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (London: Zed Press, 1979), 154.

32. Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–68* (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 58.

33. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Fadaye'en Action and Arab Strategy," *Adelphi Papers* No. 53 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969 [1968]), 17.

34. Sari Nusseibeh, president of Al-Quds University and pivotal in guiding the 1987 intifada, interviewed by the author, East Jerusalem, January 28, 1996. See Sari Nusseibeh, *Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life*, with Anthony David (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

35. As quoted in John Kifner, "Israelis and Palestinians Change Their Tactics but Not Their Goals," *New York Times*, May 15, 1988, 1.

36. See, for example, Alain Gresh, "Palestinian Communists and the Intifadah," trans. Diane Belle James, *Middle East Report* 157 (1989): 35.

37. See Raja Shehadeh, *The Third Way: A Journal of Life in the West Bank* (London: Quartet Books, 1982).

38. Ali Hussein Qleibo, *Before the Mountains Disappear: An Ethnographic Chronicle of the Modern Palestinians* (Jericho: Kloreus Books, 1992), 69.

39. The so-called second intifada is linguistically a misnomer as Palestinians returned to violence, including suicide bombings in Israel, far from the meaning of the original nomenclature.

40. The PLO in Tunis claimed to control social and political change within the territories. Yet key thinkers around East Jerusalem were pressing for expanding political and economic freedoms while seeking to end the military occupation, along with nonviolent struggle, as the most direct means to secure basic human rights. Three seminal works written by Sari Nusseibeh, clandestinely circulated, were influential in guiding the strategies of the intifada. The "Fourteen Points by Palestinian Personalities" was the first, corroborating the new political thinking, released at a news conference on January 14, 1988. Other activist intellectuals introducing new ideas and action strategies included Radwan Abu Ayyash, Haj Abd Abu-Diab, Ziad Abu Zayyad, Mamdouh Aker, Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, Mubarak Awad, Mahdi Abd al-Hadi, Feisel Hussein, Muhammad Jadallah, Zahira Kamal, Ghassan Khatib, Jonathan Kuttub, Raja Shehadeh, Riad al-Malki, Khalil Mahshi, Haidar Abd al-Shafi, Raja Shehadeh, and Hanna Siniora.

41. An argument was systematically advanced that Palestinian cooperation with the occupation had permitted it to prevail. This reasoning was proffered by the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, set up in 1984 in East Jerusalem by Mubarak Awad and Jonathan Kuttub, including through the center's distribution of translations of Gene Sharp's works.

42. In 1980, Feisel Hussein set up the Arab Studies Society in East Jerusalem and sought the Israeli journalist Gideon Spiro, a former conscript and decorated paratrooper, to begin this process of joint committees. See note 46.

43. According to Naomi Chazan, eighty-six new Israeli peace groups came into being. Naomi Chazan, interviewed by the author, West Jerusalem, June 6, 1988; Naomi Chazan, one-hour interview, interviewed by the author, East Jerusalem, November 12, 1994. Chazan is a political scientist and former Israeli Knesset Deputy Speaker.

44. David Hall-Cathala, *The Peace Movement in Israel, 1967–87* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 177, 216, 217.

45. Formal communication with author from Lt.-Col. Yehuda Weinraub, IDF head of information, Tel Aviv, pursuant to telephone request of March 18, 1997, trans. Reuven Gal. Gal is an Israeli former chief psychologist of the IDF.

46. According to Gideon Spiro, in an interview ca. 2007 Shlomo Swirski was asked by the Israeli newspaper *Yedioth Ahronoth* if he could give the costs of Israel's military occupation since 1967. Swirski responded that he could not speak conclusively, but estimated the occupation's costs to Israel at \$100 billion over the preceding forty years. In Spiro's view, "without the generous American foreign aid, the occupation would not be possible." Gideon Spiro, personal communication with the author, January 17, 2011. Gideon Spiro, Israeli conscript and former paratrooper, was decorated for his role in the 1956 Suez war, having emigrated from Berlin to British-controlled Palestine in 1939. He was among the Israeli troops who took military control for Israel over Arab East Jerusalem in 1967. In 1982, he became a founding member of Yesh Gvul (There Is a Limit), a movement of Israeli reserve soldiers who refused to serve in the 1982 war in Lebanon and challenged that war's legality. He was among the Israelis and Palestinians who began to work together against the occupation in the early 1980s. The author wishes to thank Spiro for his help. See Shlomo Swirski, *The Price of Occupation* (Tel Aviv: Adva Center, 2008), 119–122, http://israeli-occupation.org/docs/shlomo-swirski_the-burden-of%20occupation_200811.pdf, accessed November 4, 2012.

47. Yezid Sayigh, "Palestinian Armed Struggle: Means and Ends," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 1 (1986): 104, 105.

48. Yezid Sayigh, "The Armed Struggle and Palestinian Nationalism," in *The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964–1994*, ed. Abraham Sela and Moshe Ma'oz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 3.

49. By 1982, Fateh was paying attention to mass mobilization, as opposed to its tight guerrilla units, but many who sought elective office as "Fateh" in unions and associations were not Fateh in a cellular sense. Sari Nusseibeh clarified, "They were generally Fateh." For example, "Perhaps three cell members in a faculty union were Fateh, out of 150 who defined themselves as Fateh." Entire student movements were loosely allied with Fateh, but had no connection with the PLO. At then Bir Zeit College, the Fateh student movement grew "primarily by itself, independently; although there were students who were operatives in Fateh, on the whole, the student movement was not." Sari Nusseibeh, president of Al-Quds University, East Jerusalem, interviewed by the author, November 5, 1994. Hillel Frisch says that "none of these [new] movements contained an overarching secretariat or central committee that was responsible for all the organs within the movements," perhaps with the exception of the communists. Hillel Frisch, "Between Diffusion and Territorial Consolidation in Rebellion: Striking at the Hard Core of the *Intifada*," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 4 (1991): 48.

50. Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–93* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 612.

51. "The Palestinians knew that violence would be counterproductive. There was very real and conscious restraint—they wanted to keep it a 'white revolution' without bloodshed, . . . for example, not paying taxes, boycotting of Israeli goods,

and burning of identity cards. If there had been support from Tunis, it would have gone further and quicker.” Lucy Austin Nusseibeh, former director of the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, East Jerusalem, one-hour interview, by the author, East Jerusalem, November 5, 1994.

52. Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals* (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 117–118.

53. *A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City* (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2006), 13. B’Tselem (the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) was founded in 1989 to document human rights violations in the occupied territories and inform the Israeli public and policymakers about them.

54. Charles Levinson, “Israel’s Foes Embrace New Resistance Tactics: Hamas and Hezbollah Find Inspiration in Flotilla, Support Protest Movements,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 2, 2010, <http://greenhouse.economics.utah.edu/pipermail/rad-green/2010-July/039536.html>, accessed November 3, 2012.

55. J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), 93.

Appendix:

Conflict Summaries

This appendix has been compiled by the book's editor, Maciej Bartkowski, based on the information presented in the corresponding chapters of the book. Cases are arranged alphabetically. (Any omissions in the tables are either of the editor's own making or the information was not available.)

Key

Method and Type of Nonviolent Action

Nonviolent intervention

Disruptive

Creative

Noncooperation

Political

Economic

Social

Protest and persuasion

Length of the Campaign

Short: 1 day up to 4 weeks

Medium: 1 month up to 1 year

Long: More than 1 year

Level of Participation of People

Low: 1–100 people or less than 20 percent of the population

Medium: 100–1,000 people or between 20 percent and 50 percent of the population

High: More than 1,000 people or more than 50 percent of the population

Palestine							
Main Campaigns	Action	Method/ <i>Type</i>	Date	Length	Level of Participation	Direct Impact	Long-Term/Overall Impact of Civil Resistance
Palestinian resistance in the 1920s and early 1930s	Assemblies, deputations, entreaties, manifestos, processions, protests, and formal statements	Protest and persuasion	1920s	Long	High	The British opted for collective punishments: detentions, imposing fines, conducting mass arrests, and demolishing homes	Instilled relentless persistence in rejecting the Israeli occupation
	Demonstrations, marches, and petitions	Protest and persuasion	1920s	Long	High	The 1920s and 1930s nonviolent actions failed to influence the British, which split the Arab movement between moderates and those who considered violence as the most effective weapon	
	Printing black mourning bands on the front pages of Palestinian newspapers	Protest and persuasion	1920s	Medium	High		
	Election boycotts	Noncooperation/ <i>Political</i>	1920s	Medium	High		
	Resignation from jobs in the British colonial administration	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Disruptive</i>	1920s	Long	High		
Palestinian resistance in the 1920s and early 1930s	General strikes	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	1920s	Long	High	The British opted for collective punishments: detentions, imposing fines, conducting mass arrests, and demolishing homes The 1920s and 1930s nonviolent actions failed to influence the British and Zionists, which split the Arab movement between moderates and those who considered violence as the most effective weapon	Instilled relentless persistence in rejecting the Israeli occupation
	Village <i>mukhtars</i> refused to cooperate with government commissioners	Noncooperation/ <i>Political</i>	1920s	Long	Medium		
	Excommunication of those who had sold land to Zionist brokers or middlemen	Noncooperation/ <i>Social</i>	1920s	Long	High		
	Women protested against eviction of the peasantry from farmland	Protest and persuasion	1920s	Long	Medium		
	Women organized a silent procession, submitted statements to diplomatic consulates, and telegrammed protest petitions to Queen Mary	Protest and persuasion	1920s	Long	Medium		
	One-day strike: all the Arab shops closed	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	1925	Short	High		
	Political parties evolved	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	1930s	Long	High		
	Local and national committees formed to coordinate and lead strikes	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	1936				
	General strikes	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>	1936	Long	High		
	Several hundred veiled women marched in Gaza	Protest and persuasion	April 25, 1936	Medium	High		
	Development of <i>sumud</i> , a philosophy of persistence in doing everyday activities and thus staying on the land	Protest and persuasion; Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	Second half of 1960s	Long		Offered the “third way” between passivity in the face of military occupation and armed struggle	Helped Palestinians develop resilience and self-reliance
	Emergence of student and faculty unions, community-based networks, professional associations, and youth and women’s clubs	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	1970s	Long	High	Helped to create a nascent independent civil society Helped to promote new ideas about how to struggle for rights and facilitated a reassertion of nonviolent methods	The intifada’s achievements include the 1991 Madrid peace conference and the opening of political space for the 1993 Oslo Accords
Intifada of 1987	Activist scholars produced and translated writings on nonviolent resistance	Protest and persuasion	1980s	Long	Low	Popularized political tools as more realistic than armed struggle Spread awareness that the Israeli military occupation persisted in part because of Palestinians’ obedience, which could be withdrawn	Acceptance by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of the concept of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel Nonviolent resistance did more for coining a model of authentic democratic governance in the Arab world than any other force to date Nonviolent strategies shifted a discourse from independence to liberation and framed it around human rights
Intifada of 1987	Organization of joint Israeli-Palestinian committees against the occupation	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	1980–1990	Long	Medium	Solidarity network developed between Palestinian and Israeli groups Divisions within Israeli society	The intifada’s achievements include the 1991 Madrid peace conference and the opening of political space for the 1993 Oslo Accords Acceptance by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of the concept of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel Nonviolent resistance did more for coining a model of authentic democratic governance in the Arab world than any other force to date Nonviolent strategies shifted a discourse from independence to liberation and framed it around human rights
	The joint committees used banners, documentation, denunciation, news releases, speeches, picketing, leaflets, and vigils	Protest and persuasion		Long			
	Biweekly leaflets issued by the leadership command	Protest and persuasion		Long		Served as an important information and deliberation tool about direction of the uprising, including an 18-month-long debate on adopting total civil disobedience	
	Fasting	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Disruptive</i>				Israel introduced curfews in the West Bank and Gaza, arrested and exiled scholar activists	
	General and local strikes, resigning from jobs, and boycotts	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic</i>				School and university closings helped to spread ideas about nonviolent struggle as 14,500 students and professors were sent home to their villages and refugee camps where they planned the next nonviolent actions against the occupation	
	Public prayers	Protest and persuasion		Long			
	Renaming of streets and schools	Protest and persuasion					
	Ringling of church bells	Protest and persuasion					
	Unfurling of flags	Protest and persuasion		Long			
	Setting up clandestine leadership command that did not lead, but coordinated nonviolent actions	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>					
Intifada of the wall	Protests and demonstrations in villages directly affected by Israel’s separation barrier, called “the wall”	Protest and persuasion	2000s–2010s	Long	Medium	Israeli Supreme Court rulings in favor of the protesters’ demands The Israeli Defense Forces often disregard these rulings Alternative media, including Palestinian and Israeli, cover the intifada of the wall though international media largely ignore it	Increased international solidarity
Cultural resistance	Freedom Theatre at the Jenin refugee camp; songs, drama performances, use of giant puppets, driving a Freedom Bus from village to village	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Creative</i>	2010s	Long			Popularized nonviolent resistance and the plight of Palestinians living under occupation
“Empty Stomach” campaign	Hunger strikes of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Disruptive</i>		Long	High	Popularized demands of imprisoned Palestinians Conditions in Israeli prisons improved	
Boycott Divestment Sanctions campaign	Coalition of the Palestinian civic organizations and international solidarity groups working to promote tertiary sanctions against Israel	Noncooperation/ <i>Economic, Social, Political</i>	2005 onward	Long	High	Became a globally decentralized international campaign Led to third-party sanctions, including corporate disinvestment and cultural, social and economic boycotts	
Gaza flotilla	Ships with international activists attempt to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza Strip	Nonviolent intervention/ <i>Disruptive</i>	2010 onward	Long		Internationalized Palestinian nonviolent struggle against Israel’s occupation	