Recovering Nonviolent History

Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles

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Insights into Nonviolent Liberation Struggles

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Revolution reveals in a flash how civil obedience—to laws, to rulers, to institutions—is but the outward manifestation of [people's] support and consent.

—Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*

Throughout this book, the authors have noted that civil resistance often remains unexamined by researchers and historians because the ordinary people who engage in civil resistance are seen as weak and lacking political power, particularly in relation to oppressive state structures and unfavorable conditions. State power is material and predicated on its monopoly of violence. When the state uses its superior means of violent coercion against unarmed populations, the expected outcome is either subordination or annihilation (genocide or politicide) of any nonmilitary and, thus, powerless party.[1] The prevailing view is that those struggling for independence can face oppression and reduce the asymmetry of force only if they take up arms. Resisting an opponent or occupier violently is seen as the sole option for the downtrodden, short of surrender or inaction.

This default thinking about material power often overlooks the fact that ordinary people have historically been able to strategize and plan effective individual and group actions that turn their perceived weaknesses into strengths. Far from choosing violence as the only or even last available option, self-actuating people can be a contending force precisely because they are capable of identifying and agreeing together to pursue strategically the

best available options to seek their goals through nonviolent engagement. This ability to choose unarmed confrontation (political over military) against an oppressive adversary presupposes not desperation but a recognition of opportunities, not martyrdom and physical destruction but a drive for self-preservation, self-organization, institution building, and skills development.

This choice requires that people not be seduced by romanticized violence, the idea that young, able-bodied men must be the prime actors in the struggle (as is so often the case in guerrilla warfare). Rather, people opting for civil resistance understand that coordinated participation and purposeful actions by all civilian resisters—women, men, children, youth, adults, elders, and people from diverse sectors of society—are necessary in order for a movement to wield sufficient power. Once the seemingly powerless are recognized as being capable of initiative, an important cognitive recognition takes place so that people can choose outside of two deep-seated polar opposite choices: violence or passivity. Then, they can mount an alternative means of waging conflict through withdrawal of consent and mass-based nonviolent mobilization.

The fervent nationalist and triumphalist approach to historiography (to borrow from Chapter 5 on Mozambique), together with political factions burnishing historical legacies of their victorious armed struggles (Algeria, Burma, Kosovo) as a way to justify and consolidate their power, and combined with a popular view of people as a disempowered collective, have all led to reductionist thinking about independence struggles and movements that gives more weight to the potential of violence and violent actors than they actually deserve. This view in turn has reinforced the message that force of arms alone creates change, thereby discouraging those who want to challenge the new regime with means other than violence, and that this change can take place only through an elite vanguard and not ordinary people.

Furthermore, by incorporating into the study of popular liberation struggles the analytical lenses of civil resistance, this book goes beyond the Great Man theory of political change—or the idea that charismatic individuals shape history. The study of civil resistance with its focus on the role of shared agency helps contextualize the role of leaders. Most of the analyzed movements were in fact leaderless but, in those cases (e.g., in Hungary, Zambia, Ghana, and Egypt in 1919) where single individuals played an important role, it was also clear that the leaders were responding to people's views that equally empowered and constrained the leaders' actions.

This volume discounts the sole importance of structural or state-centric conditions as determinants of political change and gives weight to the role of conscientious and autonomous agency epitomized by the independent actions of ordinary people. This departure is quite significant given the prevalence of structuralist and process-oriented approaches in the studies of revolutionary

changes.[2] The book's historical lens helps discover and show the origin, paths of development, and resilience of civil resistance despite constraining or oppressive conditions and structures that seemingly favored either armed rebellion or general passivity and surrender. As such, the chapters are very much in line with the view that "structural conditions might define the possibilities for revolutionary insurrections . . . but they do not explain how specific groups or individuals act, what options they pursue (and how), or what possibilities they may realize."[3] In fact, many chapters demonstrate how common people, far from being resigned and passive in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles, resorted to a variety of forms of nonviolent individual and collective resistance. By doing so, they not only influenced trajectories of important socioeconomic and political changes, but in essence made them happen.

Armed Resistance Cloaked in the Archetype of Masculinity

Changing entrenched views about the effectiveness of armed resistance is particularly hard as they are usually rooted in a warrior psychology that is shaped by violent masculinity and patriarchy. Struggles for independence typically have privileged male leadership. As a consequence, conspiracies of belligerent men plotting in small, secretive circles in an atmosphere that congratulates violent bravery and rewards machismo, leave little room for recognizing the importance of nonviolent alternatives or the contributions of women or non-fighting-age young men to the struggle. In fact, the discourse of hegemonic victors tends to conform to a masculinist construct that, as Jean Bethke Elshtain maintains, from antiquity through to the present has divided society into "just warriors" (male fighters and protectors) and "beautiful souls" (female victims and noncombatants).[4] The circle of just warriors is also limited as it would normally exclude men who wanted to play other roles (i.e., gays) or their virility did not conform to the prevailing warrior archetype. Furthermore, teaching history, including the rise of nations, formation of state institutions, conduct of state politics, and development and implementation of public policies, shapes a nation's commemorative landscape and punctuates it with stories of military battles, patriotic risings, wars, and violent defeats—all dominated by men, be they soldiers, scholars, politicians, or other elite actors. This has inhibited people from remembering, acknowledging, and understanding the presence and efficacy of civil resistance, including the central place of women at the forefront of nonviolent actions during nationalist struggles—a role that is highlighted in most of the chapters in this book. Here, we see women engaged in writing and distributing petitions; organizing and leading demonstrations and protests; setting up and running autonomous associations and

educational institutions; and supporting and participating in social and economic boycotts, strikes, and sit-ins.

Masculinity and Civil Resistance

While armed struggle and violent masculinity are almost symbiotically joined in the historical imagination, the question of systemic male domination in civil resistance is more complex and ambiguous. Foreign occupation and colonization has frequently been based on economic exploitation and has often involved cultural genocide or extreme forms of coercion such as slavery, forced migration, resettlement, and conscription. Often a systematic part of foreign domination has been sexual exploitation of women and (as mentioned in Chapter 7 on Egypt) humiliation of indigenous men.[5] In conditions where a foreign colonizer's racist stereotypes affected both a symbolic and real emasculation, the oppressed population—particularly its men—often saw "regaining manhood" as a basic element of independence equivalent to self-respect or dignity. Becoming men is thus a common theme to be found in both armed and nonviolent anticolonial struggles, as indeed in other struggles against other kinds of oppression.[6]

A further common feature in many independence movements and not only in armed struggles is that after liberation women activists retreat—either voluntarily or under social pressure—to the private sphere and men resume their traditional dominance in public life. Women have been at the forefront of grassroots organizing, movement building, and waging nonviolent struggles for independence, and not only when male activists were in prison or exile. However, revolutionary struggles for statehood, with perceived high stakes for power in newly emerging nations, defined resistance in existential terms and forced women to subordinate their gender-specific demands to overriding national priorities such as state building, territorial integrity, and defense of the ethnonational community. Little if any room was left to consider the lingering problems of discrimination of women and their unequal representation or to acknowledge the historical role of women in the civic part of the struggle. For example, in Poland, the role of women as social activists, teachers, organizers, and writers during the resistance was rarely extended beyond that of a silent, supporting cast whose nonviolent activism was first and foremost needed for national liberation rather than gender emancipation. In Kosovo, women were at the heart of the opening phase of the nonviolent struggle and feminist questioning of patriarchal traditions broadened the vision of change. This, however, was eventually subordinated to more militant nationalist and militaristic themes.

Finally, it has to be acknowledged that on the theme of gender, Étienne de la Boétie, Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, and the pioneering nonviolent

action researcher Gene Sharp, all of whom have shaped the conceptual framework of nonviolent resistance, have also been men of their time who replaced the heroism of male physicality with the heroism of the wise counselor or strategist who was usually assumed to be a man. Mohandas Gandhi (Mahatma)—while campaigning for the uplift of women (expanding their rights) and stressing the importance of their contribution to the struggle—has been criticized not only for his own behavior that depended on a supportive, obedient wife, but also his exaltation of self-sacrifice seen as part of a manly conduct. The predominantly masculinist views and writings of the forebears of strategic nonviolent resistance are now seen as having suppressed alternative discourses, including the recognition of women's agency.[7]

Transnational Dimensions of Nonviolent Struggles

The extent to which foreign occupiers depend on domestic consent of the occupied population varies (e.g., the British in the American colonies or Burma relied more on the indigenous authorities and population than is the case for the Indonesian government in West Papua).

However, in general, struggles for independence and self-rule waged against unduly foreign influence, domination, or occupation are often hard to win because the foreign hegemon or occupier usually draws substantial resources and support from its own capital and society. Therefore, these foreign masters may not necessarily depend in full on the ongoing cooperation and obedience of the subjugated population, often ruled by a small, domestic political elite submissive to the wishes of those masters (e.g., Chapter 8 on Iran).

Furthermore, in contrast to domestic antiauthoritarian movements, struggles for independence and self-rule do not usually threaten to sweep the occupier's ruling class out of power or put their lives directly in danger since the challengers are either militarily weaker, geographically distant, or both. Much less pronounced in the situation of the domestic authoritarian regimes that face internal revolt, a considerable social distance between occupier and occupied population not only makes physical or political elimination of the occupying foreign elites rather unlikely, but it plays a large role in ensuring that the loyalty of the foreign troops—the main force that carries out repressive orders—remains with their home country or government. Because it is not very probable that the indigenous population will be able to shift the allegiance of occupying troops, foreign rulers can maintain their readiness and capability to use extreme brutality in case their control seems to be in jeopardy.

This is not to say that the populations of occupied societies cannot exercise any direct leverage over the occupiers, particularly if the occupier's

goals are to introduce settlements (as in Palestine); integrate or assimilate the local population with the culture, society, territory, or polity of the colonizers (as in Algeria and Poland); profit from extraction of resources or water pathways (as in West Papua and Egypt); or enlist the colonized population in cheap labor and use its local market for profitable manufacturing and trade (as in Britain's American colonies). In such circumstances, the occupiers rely on at least some degree of cooperation or acquiescence from parts of the controlled society in order to maintain a semblance of stability and ensure that transportation and communication routes remain open, that trade in goods and money is unimpeded, and that colonial structures are not jeopardized by the indigenous population. Generally, however, the wide distance between a foreign government and a subjugated population limits the latter's influence over the occupier and makes it necessary for the population to create external leverage by taking its cause to an international audience and to the society of the occupying forces. In doing so, a nonviolent posture is more likely to attract potential allies abroad and gain the support of groups within the occupier's society while a violent response is more likely to dismay international state and nonstate actors and solidify the support of the occupier's society for repressive tactics against the occupied population.

External actors do not always have a substantial impact on nonviolent movements[8] and successful civil resistance relies on the decisive agency of local people, not foreign forces. But the cases of the United States, Zambia, Mozambique, Poland, West Papua, Algeria, Egypt, and Palestine, among others, show that in some circumstances there are clear benefits to enlisting international sympathy, winning over external allies or, at least, neutralizing traditional supporters of the adversaries. In all of these cases, civil resisters were cognizant of the importance of cultivating international support to further their cause.

With regard to the question of how such support is cultivated, Gene Sharp suggests that appealing vaguely to "world opinion" is not enough since "a determined opponent can ignore hostile opinion."[9] What an outside third party is unlikely to disregard, however, is when the civil resisters are effective in disrupting the opponent's existing power relations, and increasing the costs of maintaining control that, in turn, often leads to a disproportionate use of violent force by the agents of the regime—the actions that are likely to backfire on domestic and international levels. Sharp explains the linkage between grassroots actions and external help in the following words:

> It is in the nature of the nonviolent technique that the main brunt of the struggle must be borne not by third parties but by the grievance group immediately affected by an opponent's policies. For third-party opinion and actions to be most effective . . . they must . . . play the auxiliary role of backing up the main struggle. . . . Overconfidence in the potential of aid

> from others may distract resistance efforts from their own most important tasks. In fact, third-party support is more likely to be forthcoming when nonviolent struggle by the grievance group is being waged effectively.[10]

Thus, the strategy for undermining the immediate control of the adversary is central to successful civil resistance, as various episodes in this book describe. This is seen as far back as the eighteenth century, when the American campaigns of nonconsumption, nonimportation, and nonexportation convinced the British mercantile establishment to pressure their own government to reduce colonial taxation. Another element of successful civil resistance—highlighted in the work of Sayyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (el-Afghani) in nineteenth-century Iran and through various figures in the twentieth-century pan-African movement—is the development of strategic skills, training of activists, and establishment of publications in places abroad that are out of the reach of domestic forces of repression. In addition, diaspora communities have often played an important role in giving voice to a domestic movement, as with Poland in the nineteenth century, or in raising funds among Kosovo Albanians to support their movement for independence. The Cuban example cautions that a diaspora can give impetus to armed resistance instead of nonviolent actions.

Johan Galtung refers to the strategy of reaching out to potential third-party allies as "the great chain of nonviolence" that, by extending nonviolent resistance beyond the domestic battlefield, reduces the social distance between the occupied and the occupier's society.[11] This in turn increases the chances to influence the domestic base of the occupying regime. The strategy involves looking for potential links in the chain, with the idea that they will lead to further links with other external groups that can become potential allies of the nonviolent movement. Some opportunities for making these links might seem obvious, for instance, when students from colonies studied at universities of colonial powers—in Britain, France, Portugal, and Indonesia—and connected with opinion leaders of the colonial societies through fellow students and local citizens. Other instances—such as the transformation of missionaries from agents of cultural imperialism to critics of foreign domination and advocates for the rights of the subjugated—suggest new potential alliances across borders and among foreign and local groups and institutions within the colonized or occupied country. The effect of such alliances and solidarity might not be immediately decisive to the outcome of the struggle, but questioning within the dominant society—for example, by some policymakers, intellectuals, business elites, or functionaries that are asked to carry out repressive orders—can have a cumulative impact by eroding belief in the legitimacy of foreign domination or the will to pay the price of maintaining it.

Over time, the scope for transnational action can expand, as other examples in this book indicate. One such form of expanded activities is

transnational support for domestic nonviolent movements through international nonviolent interventions, as was done with the World Peace Brigade in Zambia—the organization established in 1961 to furnish small teams of peace activists to intervene nonviolently in conflicts. Another form is seen in the Bangladesh freedom struggle, which featured considerable diaspora mobilization for lobbying and funds as well as a nonviolent contestation of the West Pakistani blockade. Known as Operation Omega, this unarmed confrontation involved an international group of activists trying to deliver humanitarian aid to Bangladesh. Additionally, the first pop solidarity mega-concert organized by George Harrison and Ravi Shankar in 1971 was attended by 40,000 people, but reached many more through the movie and best-selling album that helped raise international awareness about the plight of Bangladeshi refugees and collect funds.[12]

In many ways, these actions were forerunners to contemporary "chains" of transnational solidarity to support the Palestinians such as the international boycott of products from Israeli settlements and the Freedom Flotillas to challenge Israel's blockade of Gaza.[13] Through the conscious use of nonviolent actions, Palestinians and their allies, which included some Israelis, have mounted these solidarity campaigns. Activists from other countries and from Israel have also joined Palestinians in repeated protests against the Segregation Wall in the West Bank.

Diffusion of the Civil Resistance Know-How

There has been a noticeable spread of civil resistance over recent decades, even in the struggles ravaged by the most acute conflicts: for example, against dictatorship, occupation, or for self-determination—from eight instances that are known to have taken place between 1899 and 1950, to sixty-five between 1951 and 2000, and already to fifty within the first and second decade of the twenty-first century (including the 2011 nonviolent insurrections of the Arab Spring).[14] This trend, among others, has been facilitated by the increasing success rate that civil resistance movements have had in achieving their objectives.[15]

With each victory—and failure—popular resisters learn from experiences of their own as well as those of others while international institutions, scholars, and trainers have transnationalized the knowledge of strategic nonviolent conflict through publications, workshops, and other educational initiatives. The role and impact of these international actors is important, though it bears mention that it has always been the inventiveness and resourcefulness of the population itself that has driven civil resistance.[16]

Dissemination of the knowledge of nonviolent resistance, combined with its skillful application to indigenous conditions, has been historically notable as a factor in the proliferation of civil resistance movements and

subsequent academic studies and research. Gandhi learned, among others, from the Hungarian civil resistance of the 1850s–1860s and the Russian Revolution of 1905.[17] Also the Hungarian nonviolent struggle was an inspiration for Arthur Griffith, the leader of the Irish nationalist movement Sinn Féin, and the Finnish constitutionalists who resisted czarist Russia. The Russian revolution of 1905 created ripple effects of largely nonviolent popular uprisings in Russia's near and far abroad. As described in Chapter 8, at the end of 1905, unarmed Iranians took to the streets and built citizens' committees to press for constitutional changes, including a democratically elected parliament. At the same time, as highlighted in Chapter 14, the Russian part of partitioned Poland, awakened by the events in Russia proper, was soon engulfed in waves of workers' and school strikes, demonstrations, and citizens' antiregime activities that came with rising demands for social, political, and national rights, including the use of the Polish language in schools and public offices.

The process of transnationalization of civil resistance practice and knowledge has continued during decolonization struggles in Africa where, among others, Ghanaian and Zambian leaders—see Chapters 3 and 4, respectively—read Gandhi's work and drew lessons from the Indian resistance against the British, including Gandhi's idea to devise and lead their own independence campaigns. Decades later, sharing civil resistance experience across borders has been especially visible, first with the so-called color revolutions (Serbia, 2000; Georgia, 2003; Ukraine, 2004) and later with the Arab Spring. The transnational diffusion of civil resistance has also included specific methods adopted from the tactical repertoire of past victorious nonviolent struggles in other, more contemporary, conflicts with the goal of emulating earlier successes. In November 2011, for example, the Palestinian freedom riders, without required permits, boarded an Israeli public bus headed to Jerusalem and were subsequently arrested before being able to reach the city.[18] By establishing a transnational and timeless linkage between their struggle and the famous freedom riders' campaigns of the US civil rights movement against segregated buses, Palestinians sought to dramatize the discriminatory policies they face on a daily basis. Through the adoption of what are now considered legendary tactics from another historical struggle, Palestinians attempted to appeal to the conscience of the American public and strike an emotional chord with potential supporters in the United States, Israel, and other countries.

Tactical Dynamics of Civil Resistance

As a means of waging struggle, one of the strengths of civil resistance is that it sets a low threshold for individual and collective participation and, thus, offers opportunities for many groups to join. These people and groups

would have been unlikely to enlist en masse in armed struggle, much less lead it. Therefore, nonviolent nationalist movements allowed thousands of children, elders, and women, many of whom would have had at most marginal involvement in an armed struggle, to be at the vanguard of nonviolent defiance (see Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 14, and 16 on Ghana, Zambia, Algeria, Egypt, Bangladesh, Poland, and the United States).

Furthermore, regimes often see their repression of civil resistance backfiring on them. This can bend the willingness or capacity of the authorities to carry out repressive policies, which in turn paves the way for concessions. In Poland, the Russian authorities' initial repression against school strikers in 1905 only increased resistance and social protests, forcing the czarist government to concede the right to Polish-language education. In Egypt in 1919, the British deported the main nationalist leaders and tried to crush their supporters. But by 1920–1921, faced with a growing popular resistance, the British offered political dialogue. Backlash against violent government actions has often been magnified by word-of-mouth about committed atrocities (Bangladesh), by communication tools such as telegraph and newspapers (Iran, Egypt, Poland), or by the Internet and social media (West Papua, Palestine). All of these have been used to increase both domestic mobilization and international sympathy for the liberation cause.

The empirical studies described in this book provide a plethora of information on the methods of civil resistance. The volume relies in part on Gene Sharp's categories of nonviolent actions (see Table 18.1)—protest and persuasion; social, political, and economic noncooperation; and disruptive and creative nonviolent interventions—to study the extent to which nonviolent resistance and its strategic dimension were present in nationalist struggles.

Instances of civil resistance in the empirical studies were classified according to the categories shown in Table 18.1 in order to develop conflict summary tables that are included in the Appendix. These tables in the Appendix list a wide range of nonviolent methods used by a given movement and provide information about the participation, length, and direct or immediate impact of individual tactics as well as the long-term, cumulative influence of a set of tactics (referred to in the tables as a "campaign"). This information is intended to offer a quick tactical snapshot of each struggle, show the relationship between campaigns and tactics, and provide a framework for a systematic analysis of tactical impact. This can help readers to better analyze and understand the trajectory of a struggle, where nonviolent methods used in one place and time influence the evolving situational context that iteratively sets the stage for the subsequent development of the struggle. The Appendix also offers a useful reference for discussing tactical innovation and the sequencing of methods that can prove essential for a movement to maintain its momentum.[19] Finally, the Appendix illustrates the degree to which this volume supplements (through the descriptions of

Table 18.1 Methods of Nonviolent Action

	Noncooperation			Nonviolent Intervention	
Protest and Persuasion	Social	Political	Economic	Disruptive	Creative
Symbolic acts of expression of grievances toward a status quo or in support of desired change.	Acts of limiting or refusal of engagement in typical performance of duties, obedience to and following of established sociocultural conventions and practices.	Acts of suspending or refusing to carry on usual forms of political and civic participation.	Acts of suspending or refusing to carry on economic relationships as expected.	Acts designed to directly interject into a normalcy of a given state of affairs by disrupting or preventing established patterns of behavior, institutions, policies, and relationships.	Acts designed to interject into a normalcy of a given state of affairs by embarking on resource- or relationship-creating activities that generate new patterns of behavior, institutions, policies, or practices,

Source: Based on Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* part 2: *The Methods of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

immediate and long-term outcomes of nonviolent methods and campaigns) and enriches (through the emphasis on indirect, more subtle forms of resistance) Sharp's list of 198 methods of nonviolent action.[20]

The empirical cases included in this volume fortify and expand Sharp's taxonomy of unarmed methods of struggle in a strongly heuristic manner. The development of knowledge about nonviolent methods has in fact been driven by people's creativity and their push to develop and master effective operations—often through trial and error—to overcome specific injustices. This epistemology of tactical dynamism of civil resistance in liberation struggles is partly being developed inductively—through case studies presented in this book—and is then reflected in the conflict summaries in the Appendix, and through quantitative research that identifies crucial movement-centric variables—nonviolent discipline, self-sustaining collective organizing, coalition building, unity, and resilience, among others—in order to explain the trajectories of nonviolent resistance as well as to lead to greater understanding of the immediate and possible long-term outcomes of civil resistance struggles.

The Enduring Impact of Civil Resistance

Though more research is required, civil resistance can create and leave behind a legacy of defiance in the form of sociocultural practices, political tradition, generational stories, and individual or collective memories that a population may unconsciously and instinctively draw from during future crises. This attests to the continued importance and relevance that civil resistance may have in other, yet to come, pivotal moments of a nation's quest for freedom. It therefore is not a coincidence that Poles who lived under the communist oppression during the twentieth century looked to their nineteenth-century progenitors of nonviolent actions to develop their own effective, but also surprisingly similar, repertoires of nonviolent methods of resistance. Likewise, Burmese and Algerians at the end of the 1980s and during the 2000s, and Egyptians in 2011, have deployed an arsenal of nonviolent strategies and tactics startlingly reminiscent of the resistance activities that their predecessors relied on during their nationalist struggles decades ago.

A careful analysis of nonviolent tactics, particularly those categorized as nonviolent creative intervention that involve parallel institution building, can offer useful insights into the longer-term impact of civil resistance on political change. As some chapters indicated, the tactics that developed civic, cultural, and political organizations and institutions during quieter resistance phases—if not undermined or destroyed by an armed conflict—might have helped with state building and generated a more tranquil post-independence political order.

While stopping short of making the general claim that civil resistance leads to more peaceful societies in the postconflict period, a number of cases in this book do point to the practice of nonviolent contestation as creating a more propitious and peaceful environment for state formation. In these examples, civil resistance contributed or led to the emergence of a more inclusive, participatory, and less violent postindependence political and constitutional order than likely would have been the case had violent resistance been used. This argument suggests that civil resistance can be "an incubator of democracy."[21] Recent quantitative findings reinforce this view by showing that political transitions brought about through bottom-up, nonviolent mobilization have better prospects for leading to the establishment of freer societies and more durable democracies than do transitions that come about through armed struggle, international military intervention, or change of power among powerholders.[22] This is because armed struggle usually requires martial values as well as hierarchical, secretive, and elitist leadership combined with skills in destroying, maiming, or killing an adversary. Victorious rebel leaders tend to bring all of these virtues and modi operandi into the new regime. At the same time, nonviolent movements generally require building broad coalitions across various segments of society and mastering skills of negotiation, rational deliberation, compromise, and moderation—the features that are propitious for and constitute an important harbinger of a democratic governance.

Consequently, not only does civil resistance provide a population with the means to wage a struggle or lay the foundation for the emergence of nascent state institutions, it also summons and engenders a psychologically constructive power that can create, shape, and strengthen a population's national identity to guard its cultural or societal fabric against foreign domination, assimilation, or annihilation.

Civil Resistance Studies as an Emerging Academic Discipline

Perhaps to a greater degree than in other social science disciplines, scholarship on civil resistance is an applied form of study that is necessarily derived from real events. In fact, civil resistance is gaining further credibility as a field of serious academic analysis because of spectacular outcomes exemplified by those regarded as powerless who are effectively challenging ostensibly invincible rulers, most recently in the Arab world. Even though there is yet no formally established academic discipline of civil resistance studies or advanced degrees offered in this subject, civil resistance as an organized interdisciplinary field of scholarship and research has been advancing since the 1950s. And a number of doctoral dissertations about strategic

nonviolent conflict and nonviolent campaigns and movements have been written at leading universities in recent decades.

A self-standing graduate specialization in civil resistance and the first endowed chair "in the study of nonviolent direct action and civil resistance" have been established.[23] These reflect an important, though still limited, shift in academia to provide more permanent, structured, and multidisciplinary frameworks and repositories for specialized knowledge on civil resistance, including an institutional home for a growing number of academic courses solely focused on strategic nonviolent conflict.

Since knowledge about nonviolent strategies is constantly tested and validated by the testimony of practitioners and by ongoing events, it ensures that civil resistance research—its hypotheses, findings, and recommendations directed to various audiences of academics, present and future action takers, journalists, policy experts, nongovernmental organization professionals—stays relevant and adequately explanatory. Because of the remarkable outcomes achieved by civil resistance (the shifting of power structures that governments and regional experts had tended to treat as permanent), there has been an accelerating interest on the part of universities, research centers, governments, democracy-promotion organizations, and international institutions in the means of civil resistance and the possibilities that it offers.

All above, this portends that civil resistance is on the cusp of becoming a self-standing scholarly discipline equivalent in importance to peace, conflict resolution, or security studies, which a few decades ago had no serious institutional presence in academia. Current events repeatedly indict past neglect of nonviolent struggle by larger political and social disciplines and call out for further research. This volume—by highlighting historical episodes where the role of civil resistance has been eclipsed—both serves as another contribution to the expanding analytical and empirical landscape on the subject and underlines the need for a stronger presence of this growing field in the academic institutions and beyond.

Notes

1. Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 57, 104.

2. See Alex de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1983); Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Patrick Van Inwegen, *Understanding Revolution* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2011); Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2008); Eric Selbin, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story* (London: Zed Books, 2010); Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).

3. Eric Selbin, "Agency and Culture in Revolutions," in *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies,* ed. Jack A. Goldstone (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 2008), 78–79.

4. Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 151.

5. R. W. Connell, "Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities" in *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities,* ed. Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearns, and R. W. Connell (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 73.

6. I thank Howard Clark for the suggestion and clarification regarding this point.

7. For a feminist critique of nonviolent practitioners and scholars, see, among others, Bleiker, *Popular Dissent,* 151–154; Feminism and Nonviolence Study Group, *Piecing It Together: Feminism and Nonviolence* (London: Feminism and Nonviolence Study Group; War Resisters' International, 1983), www.wri-irg.org/pubs/Feminism_and_Nonviolence; Kate McGuinness, "Gene Sharp's Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 1 (1993): 101–115; Thomas Weber, "Gandhian Nonviolence and Its Critics," *Gandhi Marg* 28, no. 3 (2006): 269–283; Pam McAllister, ed., *Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence* (Philadelphia: New Society, 1982).

8. For example, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 7–44; Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *How Civil Resistance Works* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

9. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* part three: *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 662.

10. Ibid., 662–663.

11. Johan Galtung, *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989).

12. See Chapter 9 on Palestine and Paul Hare and Herb Blumberg, eds., *Liberation Without Violence: A Third-Party Approach* (London: Rex Collings, 1977).

13. See more about the international nonviolent mobilization against Pakistan and its actions in East Pakistan in Richard K. Taylor, *Blockade: A Guide to Nonviolent Intervention* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977).

14. See the NAVCO 1.0 dataset that includes nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1899 to 2006, http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/research-and-data; and the Global Nonviolent Action Database for more contemporary civil resistance struggles, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/.

15. Chenoweth and Stephan, *How Civil Resistance Works,* 7–9.

16. Gene Sharp, who heads the Albert Einstein Institute and has been rediscovered by the mainstream media transfixed by the 2011 Arab Spring, is careful not to overestimate the role of third parties, including his own, in nonviolent insurrections. For example, during an interview about the 2011 revolution in Egypt, Sharp was explicit about who in his view was really driving the January 25 nonviolent rising: "The people of Egypt did that—not me," he said. See "Times Topics: Gene Sharp," *New York Times,* February 17, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/gene_sharp/index.html, accessed February 17, 2011.

17. Mary E. King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 22–23.

18. Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, "Israel Arrests 'Freedom Riders' Challenging Apartheid Road System," *The Electronic Intifada,* Jerusalem, November 15, 2011,

http://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-arrests-freedom-riders-challenging-apartheid-road-system/10595#.TsU_gz0r27t, accessed November 16, 2011.

19. I thank Hardy Merriman for his insights on the summary tables, Suravi Bhandary for her incredibly meticulous work on creating the draft tables, and Consuelo Amat for additional table reviews.

20. See Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action.* A compact version of Sharp's 198 methods is available online at www.aeinstein.org/organizations103a.html, accessed June 10, 2011.

21. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). According to Jack DuVall various "emerging properties" of civil resistance—including popular representation, collective voluntary consent, moderation, and the use of reason—help nonviolent movements practice democracy under repression before such democracies "are formally open for business." Jack DuVall, discussions at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, August 25–26, 2011.

22. Peter Ackerman and Adrian Karatnicky, eds., *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Mobilization to Durable Democracy* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2005); Chenoweth and Stephan, *How Civil Resistance Works.* The latter study shows, for example, that the states that experienced nonviolent campaigns are ten times more likely to have stable and peaceful order five years after the end of the conflict than are the countries with a history of violent insurrections. And, the likelihood that the country will relapse to civil war within ten years after the end of the conflict is almost two times lower for nonviolent resistance than it is for violent struggle. See Chenoweth and Stephan, *How Civil Resistance Works,* particularly 60 and 201–219.

23. A graduate program on civil resistance is currently being offered at Rutgers University, www.ncas.rutgers.edu/program-civil-resistance; and the endowed chair on the study of nonviolent direct actions and civil resistance has been set up at the University of Massachusetts.