

Working Paper, August 2019

Isak Svensson, Daniel Finnbogason

Abstract

Research has shown the potential of civil resistance in challenging autocratic state regimes. Yet, little is known about its applicability in *jihadist proto-states*, that is, territories governed by militant jihadist groups. We argue that civil resistance is more likely to occur when jihadists forcefully impose their rule on local populations and when organizational structures capable of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated. We develop this argument through a comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states: one that saw civil resistance (Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali) and two that did not (Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla in Yemen). We demonstrate how variation in the jihadists' governing strategies and the social structures for mobilization, created different conditions for civil resistance. Our study offers an innovative first attempt to bridge research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance, three fields that have been siloed in previous research.

Keywords: civil resistance; jihadist proto-states; rebel governance; civil society; al-Qaeda

Recent years have seen a significant rise in the number of radical Islamist groups with territorial aspirations who seek to establish so-called “jihadi proto-states” (Lia, 2015, p. 31), or “terrorist semi-states” (Honig & Yahel, 2017, p. 1). After the Arab Spring, many jihadist groups have expanded into the civilian realm, transforming themselves (at least partly) from underground terrorists into socially embedded insurgent groups. They have moved to declare proto-states on an unprecedented scale: Between 2011 and 2016, jihadist groups created more proto-states than in the preceding twenty years (Lia, 2016, p. 81). The creation of such proto-states forms part of a larger trend of a dramatic increase in armed conflicts over transnational Islamist claims. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its diffusion to other areas of the world indicate that jihadist proto-states are a serious contemporary security issue.

In this study we suggest that there is space for civil resistance against jihadist proto-states, something that has received little attention in policy-making and research. Where jihadists try to govern, they need civilians to accept their rule. Civilian populations can, nonetheless, withdraw their consent, mobilize, and resist jihadist rule. A fundamental insight from the study of civil resistance is that power ultimately relies on dependency relationships outside the power-holders’ control (Sharp, 1973). Yet, this insight remains to be incorporated in the study of jihadist proto-states. A growing body of work has shown the potential of nonviolent resistance to challenge unjust rules and authoritarian systems. Nonviolent means outperform violent means (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and increase the chances for democracy in the longer term (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005). After previous research predominantly focused on civil resistance against established state regimes, there has been a recent growth in interest in civil resistance against rebel governance (Arjona, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Barter, 2014; Hallward, Masullo, & Mouly, 2017; Idler, Garrido, & Mouly, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). Yet, with a few

exceptions (Aarseth, 2018; Revkin, 2018, 2020, forthcoming), there is next to nothing when it comes to empirical research on civil resistance against jihadist proto-states. Worth mentioning are the works by March and Revkin (2015) and Revkin (2016), which, however, focused primarily on ISIS's governance and its impact on civilian populations, rather than the conditions for civil resistance .

Stephan's (2015) seminal study on civil resistance against ISIS is a valuable entry-point for this discussion, but it only discussed the potential of civil resistance on a theoretical level, and provided anecdotal evidence. Moreover, although the rebel governance literature does engage with the question of local legitimacy and the relationship between rebels and their territorial constituencies (Huang, 2016; Kasfir, 2005; Mampilly, 2011; Schlichte, 2009; M. A. Stewart, 2018; Weinstein, 2007), it has largely avoided the study of civil resistance against jihadist rebel governance projects.

Our study addresses this research lacuna—located in-between the study of terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance—and is the first to ask why civil resistance occurs against some jihadist proto-states but not others. We advance an argument in which the interaction between the implementation of the jihadist groups' governance, and which (if any) of the local social structures for political mobilization that are activated, account for the popular response to jihadist proto-states. More specifically, we suggest that civil resistance against jihadist proto-states is more likely to occur when the jihadists forcefully impose their rule on local populations, thus generating grievances and motives for resistance, and when civil society organizations capable of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated to mobilize this potential for resistance. By contrast, civil resistance should be less likely to occur when civil society organizations are not activated.

We demonstrate the feasibility of our argument by conducting a comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states. We compare the case of Mali, where there was manifest and organized civil resistance against the Islamic Emirate of Azawad in 2012, with two cases without civil resistance: the Islamic State of Iraq (2006-2008) and the Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla in Yemen (2015-2016). Whereas the former was met with mainly armed resistance (the Sunni Awakening campaign), the latter saw neither armed nor unarmed organized and collective resistance by locals under its rule. In line with our theory, we argue that civil resistance against the Islamic Emirate of Azawad can be explained by the active role that Malian civil society took in mobilizing the grievances that arose from the jihadists' forceful implementation of their rule, which included strict *sharia* law and *hudud* punishments. al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) rule was equally strict, but civil resistance did not occur because it was instead organized by tribal networks, whose gender norms, customs for dispute resolution as well as easy access to weapons and readily mobilized militias favored violent resistance against the jihadists. By contrast, al-Qaeda's more careful approach to governing in Yemen, which rested on indirect (rather than direct) control through a ruling council staffed with local dignitaries and bureaucrats in Mukalla, prevented the rise of strong motives and networks for resistance.

Research on civil resistance against jihadist proto-states could shed light on the role of civilians living under jihadist rule, thus, taking civilian agency seriously in these situations. Before we can evaluate whether civil resistance could be an untapped potential for countering jihadist rule, we first need to understand why it occurs. Moreover, although jihadist proto-states in many ways resemble other examples of rebel governance, there are important differences between these types of rebel governance, which merit the study of jihadist rebel governance as a particular subcategory of rebel governance. Jihadist rebel governance, as all rebel governance,

seeks to establish control over territory, uses violence to assert power, depends on at least some degree of popular consent, and varies with regard to commitment to ideology and effective governance. Jihadist proto-states are different primarily due to their transnational territorial ambitions. For example, as will be seen below, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and later leaders of AQI saw Iraq as one arena for restoring the caliphate and spread global *jihad*. This feature distinguishes jihadist proto-states from most other rebel governance projects whose territorial ambitions are typically confined to a particular subnational region.

Theoretical Framework: Explaining civil resistance in jihadist proto-states

There is a growing scholarly debate on why civil resistance occurs in some cases, but not in others (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Karakaya, 2018; Schaftenaar, 2017). Previous research has identified four clusters of factors that help explain outbreaks of nonviolent conflict: grievances, political opportunities, modernization, and resource mobilization (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Our argument draws mainly on two of these factors: grievances and resource mobilization.

Grievances provide motivations for dissent and may stem from longer-term structural discrepancies between expectations and performance of a political and economic system. Such discrepancies can lead to ‘relative deprivation’, or to more immediate triggers of resistance, when civilians experience a behavior from a power holder as ethically and politically outrageous, leading to a moral shock (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). Previous research has shown that repression of political opposition can backfire and escalate grievances, thus strengthening rather than weakening motives for mobilization, depending on the nature of repression as well as the ability of the opposition to delegitimize the rulers and maintain resilience (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2007; Francisco, 2004).

Yet, grievances are not enough to explain resistance, as not all actors with grievances decide to collectively resist. Dissenting voices also need to have the capacity to resist. Human, economic or other types of resources conducive to mass-mobilization have thus been highlighted as other important explanations for why civil resistance occurs (Tilly, 2003). Of crucial importance are the social structures and the existence of a mobilization infrastructure, which can help to overcome collective action problems, pool resources and share information (Goldstone, 1994; Lichbach, 1998; McAdam, 1986). Movement entrepreneurs who can utilize preexisting organizational structures are in a better position to organize popular mobilization against power-holders (Butcher & Svensson, 2016). Here, civil society institutions can play an important role by providing “safe spaces” that help to overcome the coordination- and collective action problems (Nepstad, 2011).

Drawing on a grievances- and resource mobilization framework, we argue that civil resistance against jihadist proto-states can be explained by the interaction between the ruling jihadist group’s approach to governance and the type of social structures for political mobilization that are activated in a certain locality. More specifically, we argue that civil resistance against jihadist proto-states is more likely to occur when the jihadists forcefully impose their rule on local populations, thus generating grievances and motives for resistance, and when civil society organizations are the main structures that are activated to mobilize the potential for resistance. By contrast, our argument implies that collective civil resistance (but not necessarily violent resistance or “private” nonviolent resistance) is less likely when civil society organizations are not activated to mobilize collective political action. In line with previous research, our argument thus suggests that grievances provide motives for resistance whereas civil society organizations turn those grievances into actual resistance. Grievances, in our model, can

thus be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition on its own for resistance to arise, because there also have to be social structures capable of mobilizing collective nonviolent action.

Jihadist armed groups forcefully impose their rule when they employ a nonpluralist approach to governance that removes power from previous power holders and concentrates it in the hands of the jihadists, and when their implementation of *sharia* law and *hudud* penalties contradicts local traditions. Kalyvas highlighted that “their rule is often highly interventionist, clashes with established local norms and practices, (...), and generates considerable popular opposition and resentment” (Kalyvas, 2018, p. 44). Indeed, jihadist armed groups often struggle to gain local legitimacy for their globalized, revolutionary ideology (Drevon, 2017).

One reason why jihadist groups are sometimes perceived as alien relates to the global nature of the jihadist movement. As described by Kalyvas, “A key feature that sets jihadist groups apart from many other rebel groups is their transnational dimension: they are part of a broader transnational social movement” (Kalyvas, 2018, p. 42). Many contemporary jihadist groups are part of this movement in which they exchange ideas, resources and fighters (Hafez, 2003; Hegghammer, 2010; Moghadam, 2008; Staniland, 2014). The movement shares a common set of ideas about, for instance, the legitimization of violence, the principles of governance as based on strict *sharia* law, and the practice of excommunication (*takfir*), that is, demarcating who is a true Muslim and who is not (Crenshaw, 2017; Gerges, 2005; Hoffman, 2004; Mendelsohn, 2016).

As argued by Lia (2015), jihadist proto-states typically share four traits. First, they are committed to governance: In addition to their military activities, they spend significant resources on delivering various civilian services. Second, they are deeply ideological projects. They follow the ideological imperative to apply *sharia* law and wage *jihad*, which often takes the form of

vigorously oppressing minorities, implementing physical punishments, and razing “unislamic” shrines, tombs, and monuments. Third, they are local manifestations of an essentially *international* movement. Their leaders try to attract foreign fighters, endorsement from foreign religious clerics, as well as funding and material support from external constituencies. Fourth and related to the third point, disregarding current international borders and aiming to create a new world order, they are aggressive towards neighboring states and seek territorial expansion (Lia, 2015).

The global appeal and reach of the jihadist movement has been its main asset. It has allowed the movement to transcend national borders and create unique synergies between local theaters of conflict. Militarily, the ability of groups and individuals to resurrect themselves in other parts of the network has made the movement extraordinarily resilient (Gerges, 2016; Toft & Zhukov, 2015). Yet, the globalized character of the jihadist movement can also create problems, by generating tensions in the local contexts where the revolutionary, globalized ideology manifests itself in the jihadists’ institutions, governance and social practices. Thus, the transnational character of Islamist groups can also be a weakness, as it risks alienating the groups from local customs (Bakke, 2014).

The second tier of our argument deals with the type of social structures that are activated to mobilize collective resistance. Here, we suggest that an active civil society increases the propensity for civil resistance because it provides the necessary precampaign mobilization infrastructure. Civil society organizations build the essential qualities needed for mobilization, in terms of awareness-building, coordination, information-sharing, and experiences of the strategies of civil resistance. Societies with stronger civil society structures are in general better equipped for nonviolent mobilization (Butcher & Svensson, 2016). Previous studies have suggested that

nonviolent uprisings require organizational structures for mobilization, as civilians need them to coordinate and organize nonviolent action (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 305). Local level civil institutions can help to explain group-level nonviolent responses to armed actors (Kaplan, 2013). Second, more vibrant civil society structures tend to appeal to a broader, more inclusive pool of people, by suffering of less severe gender-biases. Previous research has linked higher degrees of gender equality (Schafteenaar, 2017), and inclusive gender ideologies among organizations (Asal, Legault, Szekely, & Wilkenfeld, 2013) with the choice of peaceful forms of resistance, whereas gender inequalities are associated with higher risks for civil violence (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005). Because more vibrant civil societies are generally associated with more inclusive gender norms, there are greater pools of potential activists, and lower barriers to inclusion.

Research Design

Civil resistance is understood as organized and collective manifest nonviolent action aimed at challenging a status quo or defending against a violent attempt to overthrow an existing order (Sharp, 1973). Civil resistance, in this article, thus excludes action that is private (or of a more hidden nature) rather than public and manifest, individual-based rather than collective, and violent rather than nonviolent (Nepstad, 2011; Schock, 2005, 2013; Zunes, 1994). Examples of included events are large-scale public protests, acts of disobedience, demonstrations, and strikes. In line with previous research, we require that there must be a series of such events rather than one isolated protest (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). We also require that the civil resistance aims directly at the jihadist proto-state, rather than at a government for its lack of action against the jihadists. The other central concept here, *jihadist proto-states*, is defined as territories that have

been declared as emirates, Islamic states, or caliphates, and that are controlled and governed by militant jihadi groups (see Table 1). Our terminology and definition draw on the work of Lia (2015).

Departing from the data collected by Lia (2015) on 19 jihadist proto-states since 1989, we selected three cases for comparison: one jihadist proto-state that faced civil resistance and two that did not. Additionally, we wanted the two cases that did *not* experience civil resistance to display one each of the other two possible subvariations in the dependent variable. That is, we selected one case that saw *violent* collective resistance and one case that saw *no* collective resistance. This allowed us to capture all three possible variations of resistance. We wish to stress, however, that because we mainly seek to explain the onset of *civil* resistance in jihadist proto-states, the other two cases serve primarily as reference cases to our main case of interest.

In order to identify our cases, we first established three scope criteria, all coded by Lia (2015). First, to ensure a minimum level of establishment, the proto-state had to have lasted for at least six months.¹ As a result, proto-states such as the “Caucasus Emirate”, that lasted only one month (October 2007), were excluded. Second, the jihadist groups had to have had territorial control over their proclaimed proto-states. This criterion ruled out, for example, The Islamic Republic of Imbaba run by al-Gama’a al-Islamiya in Egypt, whose territorial control was too limited. Third, we included only proto-states that had civilian institutions, in order to analyze cases that bore as much similarity as possible to “normal” states. As a result, cases such as The

¹ The time period for each case extended from the first day of the year when the proto-state was proclaimed, to the last day of the year *after* it ended. The goal was capture retroactive reporting on proto-states, because reporting from affected areas may have been restricted during the time of the proto-states. As for those proto-states that Lia coded as ongoing in his study, we let the end date extend to December 31, 2017, which is when we finished the Factiva-based data collection.

Islamic Emirate of Kunar in Afghanistan (1989-1991) and the proto-state of Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon were excluded.

These scope criteria left us with 12 possible cases, for each of which we conducted a Factiva search in order to determine whether they faced civil resistance as defined in this study.² Table 1 provides an overview of these cases (AQAP appears twice because the group declared two separate proto-states in Yemen). If there were more than ten separate events of nonviolent protests, we specified this as *Extensive*; if less than ten but more than one, as *Occasional*. From this distribution we then selected one case from the first category and two from the other that bore as many similarities to each other as possible. We thus selected the proto-states proclaimed by al-Qaeda's different regional branches: AQIM (including its governing partners Ansar Dine and MUJAO), AQI, and AQAP, because of their similarities in terms of ideology, strategy, and tactics through their ties to one central organizing actor, al-Qaeda Central. Several of the other groups (e.g. Taliban, al-Shabaab, and al-Nusra) also have links to al-Qaeda Central, but in a more loose and autonomous way, whereas some (such as GIA and Ansar al-Islam) are unaffiliated with al-Qaeda and more stand-alone groups.

² See the Appendix, for more information on the Factiva search.

Table 1. Occurrence of civil resistance in jihadist proto-states

Group(s)	Country	Proto-state duration	Civil resistance
Taliban	Afghanistan	1994 –	Yes (occasional)
Al-Shabaab	Somalia	2009 –	Yes (extensive)
AQIM/Ansar Dine/MUJAO	Mali	2012-2013	Yes (extensive)
Al-Nusra Front	Syria	2013 –	Yes (occasional)
ISIS	Iraq/Syria	2013 –	Yes (occasional)
MSSI/Ansar al- Shari'ah Libya/ISIS	Libya	2014 –	Yes (occasional)
Boko Haram	Nigeria	2014 –	Yes (extensive)
GIA	Algeria	1993-1995	No
Ansar al-Islam	Iraq	2001-2003	No
AQI	Iraq	2004-2008	No
AQAP/Ansar al- Sharia	Yemen	2011-2012	No
AQAP/Ansar al- Sharia	Yemen	2015 –	No

Note. “Proto-state duration” refers to the years in which the proto-state was proclaimed and ended. Certain proto-states lack an end year because they were still ongoing at the time of publication of Lia’s study. Acronyms used: AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), MSSI (Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam), GIA (Armed Islamic Group), AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq), AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).

Having selected these al-Qaeda branches, we consulted a range of qualitative sources to determine which two cases displayed the clearest subvariation in terms of not having had civil resistance. Here we eventually settled on AQI and AQAP/Ansar al-Sharia (2015-) as the reference cases for our main case of interest, the Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali. These two cases stood out because the former faced collective violent resistance, the so-called Sunni Awakening, whereas the latter faced neither armed nor unarmed collective resistance. We decided to focus on the second proto-state by al-Qaeda in Yemen because the first lacked a clear outcome on the dependent variable: Although locals set up a council in the city of Jaar to negotiate with AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia (Amnesty International, 2012), these initiatives were instances of negotiation rather than resistance as such. We thus decided to exclude this case because it was too difficult to place it in one of the categories of civil resistance, armed resistance and non-resistance

Empirical Analysis: Explaining variation in resistance to jihadi rule

In this section, we provide brief backgrounders on the cases and then turn to the comparative cross-case analysis. We argue that civil resistance occurred in Mali because local civil society organizations were able to turn strong grievances into collective political action. Thus, in addition to grievances, there were sufficient resource mobilization capacities. In Iraq, communities had strong grievances too. Yet, there, mobilization of dissent occurred through tribal structures whose customs for conflict resolution and availability of arms were more conducive to violent resistance. Finally, in Yemen, AQAP's relatively accommodative and effective governance seems to have prevented the rise of strong grievances and thus clear motives for resistance.

Islamic Emirate of Azawad, 2012-2013

In early 2012, the jihadist Ansar Dine group and the secular National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) took control over Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in Northern Mali. But MNLA soon split from this coalition as Ansar Dine allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and AQIM splinter group Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Together they proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Azawad in the conquered territories in March 2012 and introduced harsh *sharia* law and *hudud* punishments (Lebovich, 2013; Lia, 2015; Roggio, 2013; Stuster & Noble, 2014). Women were forced to wear the *hijab*, otherwise they would be whipped. Individuals accused of theft and looting were amputated or executed, and unmarried couples stoned. The jihadists also banned alcohol, tobacco, music, television, dancing, and sports. These laws were in line with Ansar Dine's goals, which were to enforce *sharia* throughout Mali (Flood, 2012). AQIM and MUJAO had transnational ambitions. AQIM's goal is to overthrow regimes in several North and West African countries and install a caliphate in the region, based on *sharia* law (Chivvis & Liepman, 2013). MUJAO's objective was to "expand jihad in West Africa" (Flood, 2012, p. 5).

It is thought that around 300,000 Malians fled their homes during this period (Gaasholt, 2013; Stuster & Noble, 2014). Infamously, the militants also destroyed ancient and sacred shrines in the areas they controlled, most notably in Timbuktu (Lebovich, 2013). The enforcement of strict *sharia* caused resentment among locals, who for centuries had lived under a more moderate form of Islam (Roggio, 2013; Stuster & Noble, 2014). Civil resistance took place in several occupied Northern Malian towns, and in the capital, Bamako, between May and October 2012. Many local imams and other prominent individuals refused to cooperate with the extremists, and numerous displays of disobedience took place, including the organization of

forbidden sports and cultural events (Gaasholt, 2013; Lebovich, 2013). The first major display of civil resistance was in Gao in mid-May, when hundreds of residents joined a protest against the ban on playing football and watching TV. On that day, locals reportedly also formed a protective belt around ancient tombs, preventing their destruction by the jihadists (L'Obs, 2012). Gao also saw civil resistance in early August, as hundreds of residents blocked the entrance to the town square where the Islamic police were to amputate the hands of alleged thieves (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In Kidal, in June, at least 150 people, mostly women and youth, protested the application of the *sharia*. Also in June, in Timbuktu, the jihadists' infamous destruction of ancient tombs caused people to march in the streets (Hirsch, 2012). Moreover, parents took their children out of school and other establishments in Timbuktu, after boys and girls were put in separate classes, and girls were forced to wear full body robes. Tuareg women protested after Ansar Dine decided they must wear the veil and banned them from participating in economic ventures (Haddadi, 2012). In mid-July, locals in the town of Goundam near Timbuktu prevented the jihadists from entering the town mosque to perform their Friday prayers (Times of Malta, 2012). Goundam also saw youths setting up road blocks in protest against Ansar Dine's beating of a woman who, allegedly, had not covered her baby's head with a veil (Hirsch, 2012).

Jihadi rule and motives for popular resistance. The jihadist coalition in Mali was considered mostly foreign, with only Ansar Dine being able to claim domestic roots. Witnesses said the majority of commanders and many trainers in the armed groups were from Mauritania, Algeria, Western Sahara, Tunisia, and Chad (International Crisis Group, 2013). They brought with them an alien version of Islam and radically different ideas about social structures and

cultural life, which they tried to violently enforce upon the local populations. The disconnect between the foreign jihadists and their interpretation of Islam, on the one hand, and local culture and traditions, on the other hand, seems to have been an important factor in generating potential for mobilization among locals.

Most Malians adhere to a tolerant form of Islam influenced by Sufism, which includes mystical beliefs and ancestor worship. They celebrate artistic expression, especially music, and the liberal philosophy of the exiles. Although women have little access to the public political sphere, they are respected and play an important role in the social order (International Crisis Group, 2012; Lackenbauer, Tham Lindell, & Ingerstad, 2015). The jihadists' introduction of strict *sharia* law, the destruction of sacred mausoleums, and the repression of local culture and traditions, triggered strong grievances among local communities. For instance, as locals prevented MUJAO militants in Gao from amputating the hand of one of their fellow group members who stood accused of stealing, one resident said: "We don't want to know what this young man did, but they are not going to cut his hand off in front of us" (Agence France Presse, 2012b, para. 6). Thus, locals felt obliged to intervene although the accused was a MUJAO member. And related to a protest in May 2012, a radio host in Gao expressed the prevalent public frustration: "Women, children, the young, everyone is outside and demands the departure of the armed groups. We are no longer afraid. Too much, it is too much" (L'Obs, 2012, para. 8, translated from French).

In Timbuktu, the large-scale destruction of sacred mausoleums, which have great religious, historical, and cultural value to Malians, by Ansar Dine and AQIM militants in May and June 2012, caused particularly strong tensions between the locals and the jihadists. As expressed by a man who witnessed the destruction of the tomb of a Sufi saint: "As they broke the

tomb, yelling ‘Allah hu Akbar’ for all to hear, hundreds of us were weeping both inside and out” (Human Rights Watch, 2012). These events represented a breaking point for the population in Timbuktu, said Alpha Sanechirfi, director of the Malian Office of Tourism in Timbuktu: “When they smashed our mausoleums, it hurt us deeply. For us, it was game over” (Callimachi, 2013a). Accordingly, angry residents came out in large numbers to protest. City mayor Ousmane Cissé said: “They are protesting against the destruction of our culture and abuse of our local residents” (Hirsch, 2012). Similar developments took place under Ansar Dine and MNLA in Gao, where the added involvement of MUJAO, which claimed the city on April 5, increased tensions between the locals and what they perceived as an alien force (Galy, 2013).

Social structures and the type of resistance. The jihadist proto-states in Mali and Iraq saw collective and manifest resistance, albeit in different forms. In Northern Mali, it was civil society organizations, with substantial participation by women, that provided the necessary networks and resources for nonviolent mobilization. The political debate in Mali has been open and extensive since the end of military rule in the early 1990s, and freedom of assembly and association have been respected. Many civic groups and NGOs have been able to operate actively without interference from the state, although their activities in the north have been restricted during periods of deteriorating security. The constitution has also guaranteed workers the right to form unions and to strike (Freedom House, 2012). The fact that civil society in Mali had had time and space for growing, organizing, and acting, could thus explain why organizational resources and social networks were in place that were activated in the crisis of 2012-2013.

As the first protests broke out in Gao in mid-May 2012, the Collective of Inhabitants of the North (*Colléctif des Ressortissants du Nord Mali*, COREN), a Bamako-based umbrella for civil society organizations in Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Timbuktu, released a statement assuring “all populations of the north of its support and its determination to back them up” (Agence France Presse, 2012a, para. 3). Accordingly, socioanthropologist Lalla Mairam Haidara, a native of Timbuktu and a specialist on women’s rights in Mali, said that against the background of government inaction towards the northern occupation, COREN and other northern civil society organizations “responded through convictions, sit-ins, and protest marches” (as cited in Colekessian, 2012, para. 11). And in Bamako, COREN played an active role in keeping the issue of the northern occupation in the public eye, on occasions gathering thousands in stadiums and protest marches in the capital (Lecocq et al., 2013; Saddier, 2017).

Women’s rights groups played an important part in the nonviolent mobilization in Northern Mali. In the words of Haidara: “Dozens of women from the Collective of Northern Women and national women’s groups are at the forefront of the conflict, challenging what they believe to be a lack of interest” (as cited in Colekessian, 2012, para. 13). Indeed, women led the protests against the MNLA and the jihadists, which was partly the result of structural factors, partly of situational circumstances. On the one hand, in Malian society, age outranks gender in social hierarchies, which granted older women indirect agency through their position in the hierarchy relative to younger men, by mobilizing them to protest (Lackenbauer et al., 2015, pp. 23, 59).³ On the other hand, women gained episodic power, and thereby more direct agency, because many men either left or stayed at home (Lackenbauer et al., 2015, p. 60).

³ The authors note that, despite their lack of direct agency, women *do* organize themselves in associations at the local level, and that these associations serve a range of purposes, including political protest. Women in Mali have also, as pointed out by Lloyd-George (2012), enjoyed relative freedom and equality compared to other countries in the region.

The association Women of the Azawad organized protests in Kidal on June 6 and in Khalil on June 7, cities 500 km apart, in response to the violent imposition of *sharia* and the repression of local culture. The latter protest was allegedly triggered by Ansar Dine's violent repression of the protest in Kidal on the day before, which indicates the links in the network of women's organizations in the north and the role they played in resisting the jihadists' rule (Lecocq et al., 2013). In Timbuktu in October, an estimated 100-300 women gathered to protest against Ansar Dine's harsh rules on women's clothing. As one participant said: "Life has become more and more difficult with these people... We are tired. They impose veils on us and now they are hunting us like bandits for not wearing them" (Reuters, 2012). Women also wrote critical songs and poems against the jihadists, which they distributed via social networks and cell phones (Lackenbauer et al., 2015; Lecocq et al., 2013).

Islamic State of Iraq, 2006-2008⁴

On 13 October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), an umbrella organization for Salafi-jihadist groups in Iraq dominated by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),⁵ proclaimed The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the predecessor of ISIS. The claimed territory of the proto-state covered Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Niwana, Salah al-Din, and Babel provinces in Iraq's Sunni Triangle (al-Tamimi, 2015; Gerges, 2016). In reality, however, AQI's territorial control was weak, but the group was still able to carry out nonmilitary activities, especially in terms of implementing *sharia* law (Lia, 2015). In Anbar province, where AQI was most consolidated, the

⁴ Lia codes the starting point of this proto-state as 2004, because AQI already controlled territory by then. Yet, because the ISI was not actually proclaimed until October 2006, we use 2006 as the starting point.

⁵ Even after the declaration of ISI, it continued to be known and referred to as AQI. Some previous studies (Byman, 2015; Gerges, 2016) have thus used ISI interchangeably with AQI.

organization set up Islamic courts that banned cigarettes, imposed a strict dress code for women, and prohibited female drivers (al-Tamimi, 2015; Jones & Libicki, 2008).

AQI did not hesitate to carry out bloody attacks against their fellow Sunnis, including prominent tribal, religious, and resistance figures. They brutally killed nonsupporters, in particular those working with the Iraqi government or the U.S. forces, and also targeted symbols of Iraqi nationalism, by decapitating tribal leaders and members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Where the organization governed, it forced families to provide subsistence and shelter to the jihadists and marry their daughters to suicide bombers (Al-Jabouri & Jensen, 2010; Lister, 2014). These acts caused public support for AQI from ordinary Iraqis, Sunni tribal leaders, and even other insurgent groups, to wane (Al-Jabouri & Jensen, 2010; Gerges, 2016).

AQI's declaration of an Islamic state in October 2006 further accentuated the ideological divide between the group and its surrounding communities. Late AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his successors saw Iraq as one arena in a larger transnational project to restore the caliphate and spread global *jihad*. This transnational ideology did not resonate well with Iraqis who doubted that the group had their best interests in mind. Moreover, AQI's religious ideology clashed with the greater Sunni nationalist resistance (Al-Jabouri & Jensen, 2010; Gerges, 2016). Tribal leaders in particular were wary of a theocratic ideology that left little room for tribal authority. It was a direct threat to their power, aggravated by the jihadists' intrusion on their traditional smuggling routes (Fishman, 2009; Jones & Libicki, 2008). Finally, although some other major insurgent groups in Iraq at the time also adhered to Salafist ideology, none of them prioritized the restoration of the caliphate. The divide between them and AQI eventually grew even more as AQI attacked and killed an increasing number of their leaders (Jones & Libicki, 2008).

Jihadi rule and motives for popular resistance. Just like in Mali, the violent and alien elements of AQI rule created mobilization potential for the local Iraqi communities. Perhaps most importantly, AQI posed a serious threat to tribal power, as it was cutting into the tribes' lucrative banditry and smuggling business, thereby undermining their key revenue sources. One of the affected tribes was the Albu Risha, which had lost control over parts of the Baghdad-Amman road, where extortion of traders and travelers had been a key income. The challenge to tribal livelihoods and revenues was a source of growing resentment towards AQI and has been cited as the most important reason to why the tribes finally stood up (Green, 2010; Jones & Libicki, 2008; Long, 2008; Malkasian, 2017; Simon, 2008). Other contributing factors were AQI's transnational and fundamentalist ideology, its harsh *sharia* regime, violent attacks on fellow Sunnis, and the harassment of civilians, including property theft and the kidnapping of women. From the perspective of tribal leaders, AQI's ideology was a threat to their authority and clashed with their more local or national agendas. Civilian populations, on the other hand, were alienated by AQI's extreme demands and violent rule. By September 2006, AQI had lost much of the legitimacy it enjoyed early in the war, and the Sunni triangle, previously an important AQI base, was becoming an increasingly hostile place (Andersen, 2017, pp. 94-95; Green, 2010, p. 593; Long, 2008, p. 77).

Social structures and the type of resistance. In Iraq, unlike Mali, resource mobilization was based on tribal structures. Although, in 2006, freedom of association and assembly were recognized in law and NGOs could in theory operate without restrictions, in practice, their activities in several regions remained limited due to insecurity (Freedom House, 2006). Furthermore, Iraqis had only recently come from decades of dictatorship under Saddam Hussein,

whose regime restricted freedom of assembly to progovernment gatherings, whereas freedom of association extended only to progovernment political parties or civic groups. There were also restrictions on the right to strike and no independent unions were allowed. Thus, civil society organizations in Iraq lacked the strength and influence to mobilize collective civil resistance against AQI. This type of agency was instead reserved for tribal structures, which, in the absence of strong central authority, have endured as the primary mechanism of societal organization, with tribal leaders administering resource and conflict management and law enforcement (Khan, 2010, p. 3). Accordingly, it was the tribes that mobilized the resistance against AQI.

Organized through tribal structures, the main response to AQI was a violent one. By September 2006 the Sunni Triangle had become hostile to AQI. The group had alienated Iraqis and Sunni tribal leaders who began to organize militias against the jihadists (Warrick, 2015). In Anbar province, Sheikh Sattar had gathered 25 of the 31 tribes to set up the Anbar Salvation Council, whose primary strategy was to ramp up the police forces of Ramadi and other Anbar towns to retake control. In mid-2007 the strategy was bearing fruit: The Anbar police force had grown to 24,000 members (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Seeing this development, other tribes beyond Anbar soon formed similar councils, and less than a year after the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council, the Sunni Awakening was born, a nationwide armed resistance movement with an estimated 80,000 militias (Gerges, 2016).

Tribal leaders were not the only Sunnis to side with the anti-AQI coalition. Defections to AQI and continued AQI attacks on their leaders soon led other Sunni insurgent groups to join the fight. Seeing AQI's growing dominance and assertiveness, they feared a loss of power and contributed large numbers of fighters to the anti-AQI coalition (Fishman, 2009; Gerges, 2016; Jones & Libicki, 2008). Moreover, as the Sunni Awakening spread across Iraq in mid-2007, the

U.S. initiated a program in which it paid Sunni tribesmen and former resistance fighters to man security checkpoints in AQI areas of operations, gather intelligence, and engage in direct combat (Al-Jabouri & Jensen, 2010). The U.S. also offered protection to tribes for building up local police forces. Between 2007 and 2008, the support for local armed resistance networks was a key element of U.S. anti-AQI strategy that helped expel AQI from its strongholds in Ramadi and Falluja (Gerges, 2016; Jones & Libicki, 2008). The U.S. also strengthened its unilateral actions by inserting thousands of new combat soldiers into Iraq and initiating daily raids on jihadi hideouts by special operations teams (Byman, 2015 #114).

There are three main explanations for why the mobilization of resistance through the tribal structure in Iraq was not nonviolent. One is related to tribal customs for conflict resolution (Carroll, 2011).⁶ Khan points out that customs among Sunni tribes in Iraq require male members to protect the family honor, display their masculinity and courage in battle, and avenge the death of other members of the tribe. The latter of these customs refers to the concept of “blood feuds”, which is especially important in single families within a tribe. Blood feuds are settled by either killing the responsible person of another tribe or arranging financial compensation for the dead. Khan tells of running blood feuds between AQI and several tribes, which resulted from AQI assassinations of tribal leaders (Khan, 2010, pp. 4-5). The fact that tribes were bound to certain customary practices that centered on violence rather than nonviolence, could help explain the violent nature of the resistance against AQI’s proto-state.

A second factor was the presence of arms. The tribal society had a preexisting resource structure in terms of decentralized access to arms as well as through the networks of local tribal militias. After 1991, Saddam Hussein had allowed tribal sheikhs to build up their own armies

⁶ For historical background, see Frank H. Stewart (1987).

equipped with light and heavier weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, to allow the sheikhs to police their respective areas. Moreover, in 1996, as part of a broader effort of retribalization of Iraq, Saddam set up a high council of tribal chiefs, to grant the tribes political privilege, weapons, and land (Long, 2008; Simon, 2008). The fact that the tribal society was armed implied that it possessed the means for violent resistance.

The Iraqi tribal society's violent response must also be understood in light of the pivotal role played by external actors. The tribal leaders' anticipations of external support and, especially, what *type* of external support they could attract, conditioned the mobilization potential for armed resistance in Iraq. Previous research has shown that although foreign involvement plays a relatively minor role in explaining the occurrence and outcome of civil resistance campaigns, the importance of external factors is much greater when it comes to armed campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 59; Dudouet, 2015; Nepstad, 2015, p. 121). The tribes needed a strategy for stopping AQI infringements on their power and boosting security in the region (Andersen, 2017, p. 202). And they were well aware that increasing security was a top priority for the US-led international coalition in Iraq, which was suffering heavy casualties from AQI attacks. The US had invested heavily in the fight against AQI and in rebuilding the war-torn country, while simultaneously trying to navigate an increasingly war-critical population back home. Thus, it may be that the tribes expected the US to adopt a strategy in which the tribes assumed greater responsibility for strengthening security, in this case by building up police forces in the Sunni triangle. In sum, tribal leaders may have anticipated greater external support for a resistance strategy that focused on hard security rather than nonviolent protest. By contrast, there was no external troop involvement in the Malian conflict in 2012, it only arrived at a later

stage. Thus, there are reasons to expect that the prospect of external intervention played a less decisive role in the considerations of the opposition to the jihadists in Mali.

Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla, 2015-2016

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has a long-standing presence in Yemen. The group was formed in January 2009 under the leadership of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, but its Yemeni roots can be traced back to the early-mid 1990s. With the start of the popular uprising against then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, AQAP and its local affiliate Ansar al-Sharia took control over several towns in Abyan and Shabwah Governorates in May 2011, where they declared an Islamic emirate and implemented sharia law. Having ruled the areas for a year, a joint military assault by the Yemeni army and local militias eventually pushed AQAP back to their mountain hideouts in May 2012 (International Crisis Group, 2017; Karmon, 2015; Stuster & Noble, 2014; Swift, 2012). On a mission to Yemen in Summer 2012, Amnesty International documented a wide range of human rights abuses perpetrated by the groups during their rule. These abuses included summary killings, amputations, and public flogging of alleged criminals, harassment and detainment of community activists, violations of women's rights, disruptions of education and health care, and the destruction of "idolatrous" tombs and shrines (Amnesty International, 2012).

In the context of ongoing civil war and state collapse, AQAP reverted to guerrilla warfare and asymmetrical attacks. Nevertheless, shortly after the Saudi Arabia-led international coalition initiated attacks against the Houthi-Saleh forces, AQAP again captured territories in Southern Yemen. In early April 2015, the group established control over large areas along the coastline of Hadhramaut Governorate, including Mukalla, and proclaimed the Islamic Principality of al-

Mukalla (Bawzir, 2016). Upon its arrival in Mukalla, the fifth largest city in Yemen, AQAP freed several hundred inmates from a prison (including some senior AQAP operatives). They also looted the city's central bank and took control over its ports. This strategy helped the group to consolidate its hold of the city and install civilian institutions to govern the lives of locals (Horton, 2015). Instead of establishing direct rule, however, AQAP created a ruling council of local dignitaries and prominent non-al-Qaeda members, the Hadhramaut National Council (HNC), and handed it a budget to pay salaries, import fuel, and hire staff to pick up garbage (Hubbard, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2017). The group remained in charge of security, military operations, and dispute resolution, but left everyday governance to local bureaucrats under the supervision of the HNC.

Jihadi rule and the lack of motives for popular resistance. Unlike in Mali and Iraq, AQAP adjusted to the local context, which was partly due to the nationality of most of its members: AQAP is a Yemeni organization with mainly Yemeni members (International Crisis Group, 2017). It has an extensive social and family network in Hadhramaut Governorate and other parts of the country, and therefore focused on working within the limits of local norms and sensibilities (International Crisis Group, 2016a, 2016b). For example, one report by International Crisis Group argues that AQAP's pragmatism and effective governance were key factors to secure public acceptance. They prioritized security, basic service provision, and set up a judicial system for resolving grievances, but refrained from the strict application of *sharia* (International Crisis Group, 2017). Although they introduced religious courts, a religious police force, and an unpopular ban on selling *qat*, they adjusted their strategies to the local context: The courts were seen as fair and swift in contrast to the slow system of the state, locals were hired to the religious

police force, and the ban on *qat* was only sporadically enforced. Adding to this, AQAP allowed women to stay outside after dark, interfered little with dress norms, did not force people to pray or pay a religious tax, and made no effort to ban smoking, music, or television (Horton, 2015; Hubbard, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2016a, 2017). AQAP's softer, more accommodative approach may have prevented the rise of strong local mobilization potential against the organization, and could thus help explain why AQAP seemingly faced neither nonviolent nor violent manifest and collective resistance.

Conclusion: Understanding civil resistance against jihadist proto-states

In this study, we have argued that civil resistance against jihadist proto-states can be explained by the interaction between the jihadist governance and the social structures for political mobilization that are activated in a certain locality. More specifically, we argue that civil resistance occurs when jihadist rulers impose an alien ideology and rule, and when civil society organizations are activated to mobilize collective nonviolent action. By contrast, when mobilization occurs through tribal or other traditional authority structures, rather than through civil society organizations, resistance is more likely to be violent. Variations in the nature and degree of resistance against jihadist proto-states is an analytical focal point that can help to bridge insights from research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance. In Mali, the jihadist rulers tried to enforce an alien and violent Islamist ideology, thus generating strong motives for resistance, which civil society organizations pounced on to mobilize people for collective nonviolent political action. In Iraq, AQI used a similar approach to governance, but civil resistance did not occur because dissent was instead mobilized through tribal structures and manifested itself as a large-scale violent resistance movement. Lastly, nonresistance in Yemen

can be explained by AQAP's more accommodative and efficient rule, where the jihadist proto-state built strong alliances with the tribal structures, relative to its counterparts in Mali and Iraq, which created better conditions for relative acceptance among local communities.

A comparative analysis, as has been conducted in this study, does not have the analytical leverage to rule out alternative explanations. We recognize that the variation in civilians' responses may be due to other factors. For example, a strand in previous research emphasizes political opportunities that civil resisters capitalize on (Tarrow, 2011). Political opportunities for nonviolent mobilization are thought to exist when activists see low costs of mobilization and expect that mobilization can be successful. One element of the political opportunity framework is elite divisions, which indicates that power holders are less in control over the situation than previously and that there may be possibilities for nonviolent challenges to be effective (Skocpol, 1979). It is possible that internal splits within the local jihadist proto-state in Mali created political opportunities for civil resistance, which activists used. Further, the absence of civil resistance in Iraq and Yemen might have been because AQI and AQAP were more unified as organizations. Still, we do not find this to be a particularly convincing explanation, as it has been argued that it is only when armed actors are in complete control over an area and its population, that they can allow dissent to be raised (Kasfir, 2005). Thus, elite divisions amongst jihadist groups could as well undermine the opportunities for civil resistance.

Another alternative explanation for the onset of civil resistance is so-called "regional contagion", which is suggested to have a positive effect on the likelihood of civil resistance. Regional contagion refers to the effect that contemporary civil resistance campaigns in the surrounding region can have on potential nonviolent activists in a given country (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, & Kucik, 2015; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). With respect to our study, it may be

that the Arab Spring protests that unfolded across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 inspired and emboldened civil society organizations and local communities in Mali. Having witnessed these events, would-be civil resisters in jihadist proto-states may have believed that they too could be successful in displacing their authoritarian rulers. A higher perceived likelihood of success, in turn, could have lowered obstacles to mobilization. Future studies could investigate this in greater depth, for instance, through interviews with leading figures and organizations in the Northern Mali nonviolent resistance. By contrast, around the time of AQI's installment of an Islamic state in Iraq, there were arguably no civil resistance campaigns of similar magnitude in the region, and thus not the same kind of (perceived) momentum for nonviolent political action. This may form part of an alternative explanation as to why the Iraqi resistance to AQI was violent rather than nonviolent.

A factor related to this, is that jihadist groups may observe and learn from previous attempts at establishing jihadist proto-states, either by themselves or by other groups, and adjust their approach to rule better. In fact, it has been suggested that AQAP learned from its experience of ruling in Abyan and displayed improved governing skills once they were in control of Mukalla. They arrived in Mukalla with a softer approach, socializing with residents and avoiding the introduction of draconian rules. They created the HNC instead of ruling directly, launched infrastructure projects, and provided social services such as the distribution of food and medical supplies. They even organized community events and street festivals. Further indication of AQAP having learned its lesson came in a letter from AQAP leader al-Wuhayshi to the leaders of AQIM, after AQAP had to withdraw from Abyan, in which he advised them on how to govern well. For example, he urged them to refrain from using Islamic punishments as much as possible (Callimachi, 2013b; International Crisis Group, 2017). Besides learning from their own

previous attempt at governing in Abyan, AQAP leaders could of course also learn from the failures of AQI in the mid-2000s and AQIM in 2012-2013. This learning experience may well be the best explanation to why AQAP rule in Mukalla did not create strong grievances and collective resistance against the jihadists. Similarly, one may ask whether there would have been (such strong) collective resistance against AQIM in Mali if their leaders had followed al-Wuhayshi's advice. The pragmatism of AQAP is surprising for al-Qaeda-associated groups, and points out an interesting avenue for future studies: to explore how jihadist groups learn from their mistakes to improve their governing prospects. If, by doing so, they are able to build positive long-term relationships with local communities, this also raises cause for concern.

Our screening of civil resistance in jihadist proto-states provides a first comprehensive overview of civil resistance in these contexts, and allowed for a systematic identification of cases for comparative analysis. We recognize the limitations with this screening, in terms of the differences in data availability and how such differences can potentially affect the way we measure the observed outcome in the dependent variable, civil resistance. International media may pay more attention to violent than nonviolent events, and thus, our focus is on news articles to determine the presence versus absence of civil resistance, could be a potential problem (Dorff, 2019). It is possible that the material we use leads us to miss out on important events of civil resistance that occurred in the midst of violent conflict and terrorism. Perhaps nowhere more so than in Iraq in the mid-late 2000s, where civil resistance against AQI could easily have been marginalized in reporting on Iraq due to the ongoing violent unrest, especially because there was such heavy international military involvement. On the other hand, one could argue that even nonviolent resistance would attract international attention once it reaches a certain magnitude, that is, when it gathers large numbers of people in streets and squares, especially in a country

like Iraq at the time, which was in the spotlight of international news media. Nevertheless, we recognize that reporting bias may be a problem in the study, which could be alleviated by a more focused case study on nonviolent political mobilization in Iraq.

This is the first comparative study of civil resistance against jihadist proto-states, yet it does not take all possible nuances into account. We recognize that further analysis should be done that takes intracase variation into account. For example, whereas there has been a relatively stable support base for Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra Front) in Northern Syria, there have also been areas in which civilians have protested against their rule (Haid, 2017). In Afghanistan, during the rule of the Taliban, there were pockets of territory where local resistance occurred and increased over time, resulting in the Taliban changing certain policies. For example, local opposition to the ban on music may have contributed to the decision of Mullah Omar, leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, to return to local leaders the freedom to choose the extent to which the ban should be implemented. Thus, when confronted with the realities of local governance, the policies of the jihadists seemed to change (Giustozzi, 2010, p. 16). Moreover, our study focuses on *onset* of civil resistance, and so more research is needed on the dynamics of civil resistance once it has been initiated, and the conditions under which it can be successful.

We recognize that the structural factors we have identified here can go a long way in explaining the occurrence of civil resistance in jihadist proto-states, but that they clearly do not tell the full story. The occurrence of nonviolent resistance cannot be understood without taking the individual agency of civilians into account (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Ultimately, there is an essential element of agency in the strategic choice to resist jihadist proto-states that cannot fully be captured by the structural explanations.

Even though our study is limited to civil resistance against jihadist proto-states, our findings could be applicable to a wider universe of cases. In other words, the conditions that explain the onset of civil resistance against jihadist proto-states could be generalizable to civil resistance against rebel governance more generally. On the other hand, jihadist groups do possess certain characteristics that distinguish them from other types of rebels. In particular, they aspire to goals and territories that transcend the local and the national. Due to this transnational ideology, it may be that jihadist rebel governance creates unique conditions for civil resistance. These noted differences provide rationale for the study of (popular resistance against) jihadist proto-states as a phenomenon in its own right. Systematic comparison between jihadist rebel governance and other forms of rebel governance is a promising avenue for future research, but it is beyond the scope of this study. An important task for future research is thus to devote more attention to comparative analysis of jihadist and other types of rebel governance and how they affect the prospects for civil resistance.

References

- Aarseth, M. B. (2018). Resistance in the Caliphate's classrooms: Mosul civilians vs IS. *Middle East Policy*, 25, 46-63. doi:10.1111/mepo.12324
- Agence France Presse. (2012a, May 15). North Mali citizens 'set to resist' occupying forces. Retrieved from <https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.its.uu.se/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp=Print&hc=Publication>
- Agence France Presse. (2012b, August 05). Protesters stop Mali Islamists from cutting off thief's hand. Retrieved from <https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.its.uu.se/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp=Print&hc=Publication>
- Al-Jabouri, N. A., & Jensen, S. (2010). The Iraqi and AQI roles in the Sunni Awakening. *Prism*, 2, 3-18.
- al-Tamimi, A. (2015). The evolution in Islamic State administration: The documentary evidence. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9, 117-129. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/447/html>
- Amnesty International. (2012). *Conflict in Yemen: Abyan's darkest hour*. Retrieved from https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/mde_31.010.2012_conflict_in_yemen_-_abyans_darkest_hour.pdf
- Andersen, L. E. (2017). The locals strike back: The Anbar Awakening in Iraq and the rise of Islamic State. In L. W. Moe & M. M. Müller (Eds.), *Reconfiguring intervention: complexity, resilience and the 'local turn' in counterinsurgent warfare* (pp. 187-205). London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-58877-7

- Arjona, A. (2015). Civilian resistance to rebel governance. In A. Arjona, N. Kasfir, & Z. C. Mampilly (Eds.), *Rebel governance in civil war* (pp. 180-202). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Arjona, A. (2016a). Institutions, civilian resistance, and wartime social order: A process-driven natural experiment in the Colombian civil war. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 58, 99-122. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00320.x
- Arjona, A. (2016b). *Rebelocracy - social order in the Colombian civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Asal, V., Legault, R., Szekely, O., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2013). Gender ideologies and forms of contentious mobilization in the Middle East. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50, 305-318. doi:10.1177/0022343313476528
- Bakke, K. M. (2014). Help wanted?: The mixed record of foreign fighters in domestic insurgencies. *International Security*, 38, 150-187. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00156
- Barter, J. S. (2014). *Civilian strategy in civil war: Insights from Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bawzir, A. (2016, January 14). While war rages nearby, al-Qaeda quietly builds a Yemeni emirate. *International Boulevard*. Retrieved from <http://www.internationalboulevard.com/while-war-rages-nearby-al-qaeda-quietly-builds-a-yemeni-emirate/>
- Braithwaite, A., Braithwaite, J. M., & Kucik, J. (2015). The conditioning effect of protest history on the emulation of nonviolent conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52, 697-711. doi:10.1177/0022343315593993

- Butcher, C., & Svensson, I. (2016). Manufacturing dissent: Modernization and the onset of major nonviolent resistance campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *60*, 311-339.
doi:10.1177/0022002714541843
- Byman, D. (2015). *Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the global jihadist movement: what everyone needs to know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Callimachi, R. (2013a, February 14). In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left behind a manifesto. *Associated Press*. Retrieved from <https://www.pulitzer.org/files/2014/international-reporting/callimachi/04callimachi2014.pdf>
- Callimachi, R. (2013b, August 09). Yemen terror boss left blueprint for waging jihad. *USA Today*. Retrieved from <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/08/09/yemen-terror-boss/2636559/>
- Caprioli, M. (2005). Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, *49*, 161-178. doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2005.00340.x
- Carey, S. C. (2006). The dynamic relationship between protest and repression. *Political Research Quarterly*, *59*, 1-11. doi:10.1177/106591290605900101
- Carroll, K. B. (2011). Tribal law and reconciliation in the new Iraq. *Middle East Journal*, *65*, 11-29. doi:10.3751/65.1.11
- Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013). *Inequality, grievances, and civil war*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chenoweth, E., & Lewis, O. A. (2013). Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*, 415-423.
doi:10.1177/0022343312471551

- Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why civil resistance works: the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chenoweth, E., & Ulfelder, J. (2017). Can structural conditions explain the onset of nonviolent uprisings? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*, 298-324. doi:10.1177/0022002715576574
- Chivvis, C. S., & Liepman, A. (2013). *North Africa's menace: AQIM's evolution and the U.S. policy response* (Research Reports). Retrieved from RAND Corporation website: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR415.html
- Colekessian, A. (2012, August 23). Political crisis in Mali and the rise of fundamentalisms. *AWID*. Retrieved from <https://www.awid.org/news-and-analysis/political-crisis-mali-and-rise-fundamentalisms>
- Crenshaw, M. (2017). Transnational jihadism & civil wars. *Daedalus*, *146*, 59-70. doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00459
- Davenport, C. (2007). State repression and political order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *10*, 1-23. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216
- Dorff, C. (2019). Violent and nonviolent resistance in contexts of prolonged crisis: The civilian perspective. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *4*, 286-291. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogz007
- Drevon, J. (2017). The jihadi social movement (JSM): Between factional hegemonic drive, national realities, and transnational ambitions. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *11*, 55-62. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/656/html>
- Dudouet, V. (2015). Sources, functions, and dilemmas of external assistance to civil resistance movements. In K. Schock (Ed.), *Civil resistance: comparative perspectives on nonviolent struggle* (Vol. 43, pp. 168-200). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. doi:10.5749/j.ctt16d6975

Fishman, B. (2009). *Dysfunction and decline: Lessons learned from inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq*.

West Point, NY. Retrieved from The Combating Terrorism Center At West Point

website: <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Dysfunction-and-Degline.pdf>

Flood, D. H. (2012). Between Islamization and secession: The contest for Northern Mali. *CTC*

Sentinel, 5, 1-6. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2012/07/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss72.pdf>

Francisco, R. A. (2004). After the massacre: Mobilization in the wake of harsh repression.

Mobilization: An International Journal, 9, 107-126.

Freedom House. (2006). Freedom in the world 2006: Iraq. Retrieved from

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/iraq>

Freedom House. (2012). Freedom in the world 2012: Mali. Retrieved from

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/mali>

Gaasholt, O. M. (2013). Northern Mali 2012: The short-lived triumph of irredentism. *Strategic*

Review for Southern Africa, 35, 68-91.

Galy, M. (2013). *La guerre au Mali: comprendre la crise au Sahel et au Sahara, enjeux et zones*

d'ombre. Paris: La Découverte.

Gerges, F. A. (2005). *The far enemy: Why jihad went global*. New York: Cambridge University

Press.

Gerges, F. A. (2016). *ISIS: A history*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Giustozzi, A. (2010). *Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and prospects*. New York. Retrieved

from The Century Foundation website: <https://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-Giustozzi.pdf>

- Goldstone, J. A. (1994). Is revolution individually rational?: Groups and individuals in revolutionary collective action. *Rationality and Society*, 6, 139-166.
doi:10.1177/1043463194006001008
- Green, D. R. (2010). Report from the field: The Fallujah awakening: A case study in counter-insurgency. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 21, 591-609.
doi:10.1080/09592318.2010.518860
- Haddadi, A. (2012, June 25). Northern Mali: Hardline Islamists Ansar Dine struggle to impose sharia law in Timbuktu. *International Business Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/northern-mali-s-islamists-sharia-law-angers-356010>
- Hafez, M. M. (2003). *Why Muslims rebel: repression and resistance in the Islamic world*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Haid, H. (2017). *Local community resistance to extremist groups in Syria: Lessons from Atarib*. Retrieved from Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs website: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-06-01-local-community-resistance-syria-atarib-haid.pdf>
- Hallward, M., Masullo, J., & Mouly, C. (2017). Civil resistance in armed conflict: Leveraging nonviolent action to navigate war, oppose violence and confront oppression. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12, 1-9. doi:10.1080/15423166.2017.1376431
- Hegghammer, T. (2010). The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad. *International Security*, 35, 53-94. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00023
- Hirsch, A. (2012, July 17). Islamic extremists face citizens uprising in Mali. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/17/islamist-extremists-alqaida-uprising-mali>

- Hoffman, B. (2004). The changing face of al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 27, 549-560. doi:10.1080/10576100490519813
- Honig, O., & Yahel, I. (2017). A fifth wave of terrorism? The emergence of terrorist semi-states. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-19. doi:10.1080/09546553.2017.1330201
- Horton, M. (2015). The Hadramawt: AQAP and the battle for Yemen's wealthiest governorate. *Terrorism Monitor*, 13. Retrieved from <https://jamestown.org/program/the-hadramawt-aqap-and-the-battle-for-yemens-wealthiest-governorate/>
- Huang, R. (2016). *The wartime origins of democratization: Civil war, rebel governance, and political regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hubbard, B. (2015, June 09). Al Qaeda tries a new tactic to keep power: Sharing It. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/world/middleeast/qaeda-yemen-syria-houthis.html>
- Human Rights Watch. (2012). *Mali: Islamist armed groups spread fear in North*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/25/mali-islamist-armed-groups-spread-fear-north>
- Idler, A., Garrido, M. B., & Mouly, C. (2015). Peace territories In Colombia: Comparing civil resistance in two war-torn communities. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 10, 1-15. doi:10.1080/15423166.2015.1082437
- International Crisis Group. (2012). *Mali: Avoiding escalation* (Africa Report No.189). Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-avoiding-escalation>
- International Crisis Group. (2013). *Mali: Security, dialogue and meaningful reform* (Africa Report No.201). Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-security-dialogue-and-meaningful-reform>

- International Crisis Group. (2016a). *Exploiting disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State* (Crisis Group Special Report No.1). Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state>
- International Crisis Group. (2016b). *Yemen: Is peace possible?* (Middle East Report No.167). Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/167-yemen-is-peace-possible.pdf>
- International Crisis Group. (2017). *Yemen's al-Qaeda: Expanding the base* (Middle East Report No.174). Retrieved from <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-the-base.pdf>
- Jones, S. G., & Libicki, M. C. (2008). *How terrorist groups end: lessons for countering Al Qaeda*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. doi:10.7249/mg741rc
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2018). Jihadi Rebels in Civil War. *Daedalus*, 147, 36-47. doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00472
- Kaplan, O. (2013). Protecting civilians in civil war: The institution of the ATCC in Colombia. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50, 351-367. doi:10.1177/0022343313477884
- Kaplan, O. (2017). *Resisting war: How communities protect themselves*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Karakaya, S. (2018). Globalization and contentious politics: A comparative analysis of nonviolent and violent campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 35, 315-335. doi:10.1177/0738894215623073
- Karatnycky, A., & Ackerman, P. (2005). *How freedom is won: From civic resistance to durable democracy*. Retrieved from Freedom House website: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/How%20Freedom%20is%20Won.pdf>

- Karmon, E. (2015). Islamic State and al-Qaeda competing for hearts & minds. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9, 71-79. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/420>
- Kasfir, N. (2005). Guerrillas and civilian participation: the National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 271-296.
doi:10.1017/S0022278X05000832
- Khan, J. (2010). The Iraqi tribal structure: Background and influence on counter-terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 1. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/2/html>
- L'Obs. (2012, May 14). Mali: plusieurs blessés à Gao après des manifestations contre les groupes armés. [Mali: More people injured in Gao after protests against the armed groups]. Retrieved from <https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20120514.AFP6178/mali-plusieurs-blesses-a-gao-apres-des-manifestations-contre-les-groupes-armes.html>
- Lackenbauer, H., Tham Lindell, M., & Ingerstad, G. (2015). *If our men won't fight, we will*. Retrieved from Utrikes- & Försvarsdepartementen website: <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4121--SE>
- Lebovich, A. (2013). The local face of jihadism in Northern Mali. *CTC Sentinel*, 6, 4-10. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/>
- Lecocq, B., Mann, G., Whitehouse, B., Badi, D., Pelckmans, L., Belalimat, N., . . . Lacher, W. (2013). One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: a multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali. *Review of African Political Economy*, 40, 343-357. doi:10.1080/03056244.2013.799063

- Lia, B. (2015). Understanding jihadi proto-states. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9, 31-41. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441>
- Lia, B. (2016). Jihadism in the Arab world after 2011: Explaining Its expansion. *Middle East Policy*, 23, 74-91. doi:10.1111/mepo.12234
- Lichbach, M. I. (1998). Contending theories of contentious politics and the structure-action problem of social order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1, 401-424. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.401
- Lister, C. (2014). *Profiling the Islamic State* (Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper). Washington, D.C. Retrieved from Brookings Doha Center website: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/en_web_lister.pdf
- Lloyd-George, W. (2012, April 23). Armed groups in Northern Mali raping women. *Inter Press Service News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/04/armed-groups-in-northern-mali-raping-women/>
- Long, A. (2008). The Anbar Awakening. *Survival*, 50, 67-94. doi:10.1080/00396330802034283
- Malkasian, C. (2017). *Illusions of victory: The Anbar Awakening and the rise of the Islamic State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mampilly, Z. C. (2011). *Rebel rulers: insurgent governance and civilian life during war* (1 ed.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. doi:10.7591/j.ctt7zfvj
- March, A. F., & Revkin, M. R. (2015, April 15). Caliphate of law: ISIS's ground rules. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-15/caliphate-law>
- McAdam, D. (1986). Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of Freedom Summer. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92, 64-90. doi:10.1086/228463

- Melander, E. (2005). Gender equality and intrastate armed conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49, 695-714. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00384.x
- Mendelsohn, B. (2016). *The al-Qaeda franchise: The expansion of al-Qaeda and its consequences*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190205607.001.0001
- Moghadam, A. (2008). *The globalization of martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi jihad, and the diffusion of suicide attacks*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Nepstad, S. E. (2011). *Nonviolent revolutions: Civil resistance in the late 20th century*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778201.001.0001
- Nepstad, S. E. (2015). How regimes counter civil resistance movements: The cases of Panama and Kenya. In K. Schock (Ed.), *Civil resistance: comparative perspectives on nonviolent struggle* (Vol. 43). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. doi:10.5749/j.ctt16d6975
- Reuters. (2012, October 06). Women protest shariah law in Mali. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/world/africa/women-protest-shariah-law-in-mali.html>
- Revkin, M. R. (2016, January 10). ISIS's social contract: What the Islamic State offers civilians. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-01-10/isis-social-contract>
- Revkin, M. R. (2018). When terrorists govern: Protecting civilians in conflicts with state-building armed groups. *Harvard National Security Journal*, 9. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3047495

- Revkin, M. R. (2020, forthcoming). What explains taxation by resource-rich rebels? evidence from the Islamic State in Syria. *Journal of Politics*. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023317
- Roggio, B. (2013, August 12). Wuhayshi imparted lessons of AQAP operations in Yemen to AQIM. *FDD's Long War Journal*. Retrieved from https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/wuhayshi_imparts_les.php
- Saddier, M. (2017). A strong northern anti-rebellion voice during the Malian crisis: The Collectif des Ressortissants du Nord (COREN) in Bamako. *Mande Studies*, 19, 59-76.
- Schaftenaar, S. (2017). How (wo)men rebel: Exploring the effect of gender equality on nonviolent and armed conflict onset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54, 762-776.
doi:10.1177/0022343317722699
- Schlichte, K. (2009). *In the shadow of violence: the politics of armed groups* (Vol. 1). Frankfurt: Campus.
- Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies* (Vol. 22). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. doi:10.5749/j.ctttsmpb
- Schock, K. (2013). The practice and study of civil resistance. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50, 277-290. doi:10.1177/0022343313476530
- Sharp, G. (1973). *The politics of nonviolent action* (G. Sharp & M. Finkelstein Eds.). Boston: Porter Sargent.
- Simon, S. (2008). The price of the surge: How US strategy is hastening Iraq's demise. *Foreign Affairs*, 87, 57-76.
- Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Staniland, P. (2014). *Networks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. doi:10.7591/j.ctt5hh16w
- Stephan, M. J. (2015). Civil resistance vs. ISIS. *Journal of Resistance Studies*, 1, 127-150.
- Stewart, F. H. (1987). Tribal law in the Arab world: A review of the literature. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19, 473-490. doi:10.1017/S002074380005652X
- Stewart, M. A. (2018). Civil war as state-making: Strategic governance in civil war. *International Organization*, 72, 205-226. doi:10.1017/S0020818317000418
- Stuster, J. D., & Noble, E. (2014, 7 August). The failed Islamic States index: Why jihadis stink at governing. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/07/the-failed-islamic-states-index/>
- Swift, C. (2012). Arc of convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari`a and the struggle for Yemen. *CTC Sentinel*, 5, 1-6. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2012/06/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss61.pdf>
- Tarrow, S. G. (2011). *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics, revised and updated* (3 ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511973529
- Tilly, C. (2003). *The politics of collective violence*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Times of Malta. (2012, July 14). Malians protest at strict Islamic justice. Retrieved from <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120714/world/Malians-protest-at-strict-Islamic-justice.428483>

Toft, M. D., & Zhukov, Y. M. (2015). Islamists and nationalists: Rebel motivation and counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus. *American Political Science Review*, 109, 222-238. doi:10.1017/S000305541500012X

Warrick, J. (2015). *Black flags: The rise of ISIS*. New York, NY: Anchor.

Weinstein, J. M. (2007). *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zunes, S. (1994). Unarmed insurrections against authoritarian governments in the Third World: A new kind of revolution. *Third World Quarterly*, 15, 403-426.
doi:10.1080/01436599408420388

Appendix

In the actual Factiva search, we selected the relevant country and used the following search string: “protest* or demonstrat* or resist* or disobe* or nonviolen* or civil* or manifest* or strik* or boycott* or [name of jihadist proto-state*] or [name of relevant jihadist group*]”. Here we considered that different jihadist groups may be spelled differently, using, for example, both “Taliban” and “Taleban”. The sources we used were Reuters News Agency, Agence France Presse, Associated Press Newswires, BBC (if available, using the regional BBC outlet), and Xinhua News Agency. Finally, under “Subject” we used the following filters (in italics):

Political/General News, Crime/Legal Action: *Assault, Harassment, Probation/Home Detention, Vandalism/Trespass, Whistleblowers*; National/Public Security: *Civil Unrest, Law Enforcement, State Security Measures/Policies*; Politics/International Relations: *Domestic Politics*; Risk News: *Civil Unrest*; Society/Community: *Community/Civic Groups, Human Rights/Civil Liberties, Social Issues, Welfare/Social Services*.