Minds of the Movement
An ICNC blog on the people and power of civil resistance
In front of the Russian Embassy in Berlin, a quiet vigil stands in solidarity with Ukrainian freedom. Berlin. January, 2026. Credit: Amber French
In a world marked by renewed invasion, democratic backsliding, coups, and hybrid warfare, governments are pouring vast resources into military deterrence. Yet one of the most powerful–and underdeveloped–tools of national defense remains largely absent from security policy: civilian-based defense. This is surprising, in light of the increasingly recognized role the Ukrainian people have played in resisting invasion and other forms of Russian aggression.
It is time to revisit this concept–not as a framework confined to academic debate, but as a serious policy option grounded in decades of research and historical and contemporary experience. This topic is not aspirational; the “quiet frontline” of civil society and ordinary people are a force to be reckoned with when their freedom is under fire.
Redefining defense
Civilian-based defense rests on a basic insight: defense is necessary. Societies must be able to protect their people, institutions, and freedoms. Denouncing war is not enough. If a population lacks credible means of defense, it remains vulnerable to invasion, coups, and authoritarian consolidation.
But defense does not have to mean military force alone.
Military power can sometimes deter aggression. It can also escalate conflict, risk catastrophic destruction, or prove ineffective against adversaries with superior military might. And in cases of internal authoritarian takeover, military institutions themselves are often captured or neutralized.
Civilian-based defense offers a different logic. Instead of defending territory with weapons, it defends society by making a country ungovernable to an aggressor or usurper. It shifts the focus of defense from controlling territory to controlling cooperation. Because political power ultimately depends on obedience, collaboration, and institutional compliance, a society prepared to withdraw those forms of support can deny aggressors the ability to rule.
Gene Sharp, whose work shaped the modern study of strategic nonviolent resistance, spent decades developing this concept and coined the term “transarmament”—not disarmament, but a gradual shift from reliance on military weapons systems to organized civilian-based deterrence and defense. The aim was not to eliminate defense, but to redesign it: to build a system in which the population itself becomes the primary instrument of national resilience.
Lessons from Czechoslovakia 1968: Improvised resistance
Peace art on the vestiges of the Berlin Wall. Berlin. January, 2026. Credit: Amber French
One of the most instructive cases is Czechoslovakia in 1968. When Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded to crush the Prague Spring reforms, the Czechoslovak army did not mount significant military resistance; soldiers were ordered to remain in their barracks. The Soviets expected the operation to be swift. They estimated it would take four days to overwhelm the Czechoslovak armed forces, suppress any military opposition, and install a compliant puppet government.
They were completely unprepared for the kind of resistance they encountered.
Citizens refused cooperation. Underground radio broadcasts coordinated messaging and instructions. Street signs were removed to slow troop movements. Workers withheld collaboration. Officials resisted forming a puppet government. For days–and then months–the Soviets struggled to consolidate control.
The resistance was largely improvised. There was no preexisting civilian-based defense doctrine, no coordinated training, no contingency planning. Yet it significantly disrupted the invasion and delayed political consolidation for eight months.
The strategic implication is clear: if improvised noncooperation could achieve this much, what might be possible with advance preparation?
Civilian-based defense as policy
Civilian-based defense (CBD) is not improvised protest. It is a preplanned, institutionalized component of national defense policy.
It involves preparing the population, civil society institutions, media, local governments, and professional associations to:
- Refuse cooperation with occupying forces or illegitimate authorities
- Maintain parallel institutions and communications
- Protect the legitimacy of constitutional governance
- Undermine the morale and reliability of aggressors’ troops and administrators
CBD draws on the documented methods of nonviolent action–protest, noncooperation, and intervention–catalogued in Sharp’s well-known list of 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action. These range from strikes and boycotts to the creation of parallel institutions and alternative media. Since Sharp's time, social scientists have in fact documented more than 400 tactics.
Crucially, this approach is grounded in an analysis of political power, that regimes depend on the cooperation of key pillars: bureaucrats, media, workers, security forces, economic elites, and the broader population. If those pillars withdraw obedience and assistance, even a heavily armed regime faces severe limitations.
CBD therefore shifts the focus of defense from destroying an opponent’s forces to eroding their capacity to rule. The question is not whether societies will defend themselves, but how. If effective civilian-based defense can be demonstrated and institutionalized, it can offer governments a real policy choice beyond just military deterrence and a path forward capable of denying aggressors their objectives.
Why this matters now
Contemporary threats are not limited to conventional invasion. In many of the risks democracies now face, military power offers limited protection. Tanks cannot prevent electoral manipulation. Fighter jets cannot secure institutional loyalty. Nuclear deterrence does not stop constitutional erosion.
Yet organized civilian resistance can.
At the same time, research shows that contemporary movements defending human rights worldwide are proliferating but succeeding at lower rates than in previous
decades. Authoritarian regimes have adapted. Repression is more sophisticated. Disinformation campaigns, digital manipulation, and emerging technologies–including AI-enabled surveillance and influence operations–have expanded the tools of control.
Any observer of nonviolent conflict and unarmed resistance can clearly see that the Kremlin understands the dynamics of this form of strategic competition. Their methods include, for example, removing opportunities for Ukrainians to fraternize with Russian soldiers or to produce defections; the Russian soldiers are incentivized with awards for committing the most brutal acts. That the Kremlin and other authoritarian entities understand these dynamics, and are working to undermine them makes strategic planning and institutional support even more critical.
What institutions can do
For policymakers and institutional actors, the question is not whether people will resist attacks on their societies; they already do. The question is whether their resistance will be isolated, reactive, and vulnerable–or strategic, coordinated, and resilient.
Concrete steps could include:
- Norm-setting in security forums
Major security institutions–such as regional alliances and global forums–can formally recognize organized nonviolent defense as a legitimate component of national security. This signals that civilian resistance is not fringe activism, but a serious defensive capability. - Capacity building
Invest in training civil servants, educators, media professionals, and local governments in crisis noncooperation protocols. Just as military units rehearse contingency plans, civilian institutions can rehearse democracy defense and noncooperation scenarios. - Legal and policy frameworks
Governments can adopt legislation that protects the right to protest, shields civil society from arbitrary criminalization, and defines procedures for institutional noncooperation in the event of unconstitutional seizure of power. - Digital and communications infrastructure
Support for secure communications, alternative broadcasting systems, and decentralized information networks can prevent authoritarian actors from monopolizing narrative control. - Youth integration
Young people are often at the forefront of nonviolent struggles. Integrating youth councils and intergenerational mentorship into security dialogues strengthens democratic resilience and innovation.
These measures are not symbolic. They build what might be called a “civil resistance muscle” –a society’s latent capacity to respond quickly and cohesively to threats.
Ethical and strategic advantages
Civilian-based defense does not promise a world without conflict. It accepts that acute conflicts will occur. But it seeks to wage them in ways that:
- Reduce reliance on violence
- Preserve social fabric and infrastructure
- Strengthen democratic agency
- Increase the legitimacy of the defending society
Moreover, a society trained in civilian defense is not merely reactive. The same capacities that deter coups and occupations–organization, solidarity, independent institutions–also strengthen democracy in normal times.
A strategic blind spot
Despite its documented history, civilian-based defense remains largely absent from mainstream security doctrine. It receives a fraction of the research funding and policy attention devoted to military innovation.
This omission is a strategic liability.
Authoritarian regimes understand the power of organized civil resistance–often better than democracies do. That is why they criminalize NGOs, restrict media, surveil activists, and label protest as extremism or even terrorism.
When democratic governments neglect civilian-based defense, they leave a vacuum–one that authoritarians are eager to fill.
Security in the 21st century must mean more than territorial defense. It must include the protection of democratic institutions, civil liberties, and human dignity.
Civilian-based defense offers a practical pathway to do so. And it may be one of the most important security innovations still waiting to be fully embraced.
