Extending Horizon Books, 1980
Boston, MA
ISBN-10: 0875580912
ISBN-13: 978-0875580913
Social Power and Political Freedom might have been called “Rethinking Politics.” These penetrating, readable chapters urge us to think freshly about society’s gravest problems – and to seek new solutions to dictatorship, genocide, war and oppression – unbound by past doctrines.
Note: This resource contains Chapters 2, 4, 7, and 12 of “Social Power and Political Freedom.”
Introduction by Senator Mark O. Hatfield
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Rethinking Politics
2. Social Power and Political Freedom
3. The Lesson of Eichmann. A Review-Essay of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem
4. Facing Dictatorships With Confidence
5. Civil Disobedience in a Democracy
6. Freedom and Revolution. A Review of Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution
7. What is Required to Uproot Oppression? Strategic Problems of the South African Resistance
8. The Problems of Political Technique in Radical Politics
9. “The Political Equivalent of War”—Civilian-Based Defense
10. Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War
11. The Societal Imperative
12. Popular Empowerment
Appendices
LOCI OF POWER SET LIMITS TO THE RULER’S POWER CAPACITY
The power structure of the society as a whole includes both the relationships among these loci of power and between those and the ruler. The society’s power structure, that is, these relationships, in the long run determines the spheres and the strength of the ruler’s maximum effective power. When power is effectively diffused throughout the society among such loci the ruler’s power is most likely to be subjected to controls and limits. This condition is associated with political “freedom.” When, on the other hand, such loci have been seriously weakened, effectively destroyed, or have had their independent existence and autonomy of action destroyed by some type of superimposed controls, the ruler’s power is most likely to be uncontrolled. This condition is associated with “tyranny.” “When a man sees and feels one human authority only is the condition furthest removed from liberty,” Bertrand de Jouvenel has written.
When the loci of power are too numerous and strong to permit the ruler to exercise unlimited control or to destroy them, it may still be possible for the ruler to obtain from them the sources of power which he needs. In order to do so, however, the ruler must keep such social groups and institutions sufficiently sympathetic to him, his policies and measures, and his regime as a whole, so that they are willing to submit, cooperate, and make available the sources power. To achieve this, the ruler must adjust his behavior and policies in order to keep the goodwill and cooperation of the people who constitute the groups and institutions of the society. This is one type of indirect control which these loci of power exercise over a ruler, If such an adjustment is not attempted or is unsuccessful!, and the ruler offends the population he would rule, then the society s strong loci of power may, in open conflict, withhold the sources of power which they control and which the ruler requires. In this way the population acting through their groups and institutions may impose control over an ambitious antidemocratic ruler or even disintegrate the regime and dissolve the ruler’s power.
The reverse is also true. When these social groups and institutions lose their capacity for independent decision and action, their control of the sources of power, or are themselves drastically weakened or destroyed, such loss will contribute significantly to making the ruler’s power unlimited and uncontrollable. Under conditions in which such loci of power do not significantly exist and the subjects are a mass of atomized individuals incapable of effective group action, the ruler’s power will be the least controllable by the subjects.
Introduction by Senator Mark O. Hatfield
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Rethinking Politics
2. Social Power and Political Freedom
3. The Lesson of Eichmann. A Review-Essay of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem
4. Facing Dictatorships With Confidence
5. Civil Disobedience in a Democracy
6. Freedom and Revolution. A Review of Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution
7. What is Required to Uproot Oppression? Strategic Problems of the South African Resistance
8. The Problems of Political Technique in Radical Politics
9. “The Political Equivalent of War”—Civilian-Based Defense
10. Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War
11. The Societal Imperative
12. Popular Empowerment
Appendices
LOCI OF POWER SET LIMITS TO THE RULER’S POWER CAPACITY
The power structure of the society as a whole includes both the relationships among these loci of power and between those and the ruler. The society’s power structure, that is, these relationships, in the long run determines the spheres and the strength of the ruler’s maximum effective power. When power is effectively diffused throughout the society among such loci the ruler’s power is most likely to be subjected to controls and limits. This condition is associated with political “freedom.” When, on the other hand, such loci have been seriously weakened, effectively destroyed, or have had their independent existence and autonomy of action destroyed by some type of superimposed controls, the ruler’s power is most likely to be uncontrolled. This condition is associated with “tyranny.” “When a man sees and feels one human authority only is the condition furthest removed from liberty,” Bertrand de Jouvenel has written.
When the loci of power are too numerous and strong to permit the ruler to exercise unlimited control or to destroy them, it may still be possible for the ruler to obtain from them the sources of power which he needs. In order to do so, however, the ruler must keep such social groups and institutions sufficiently sympathetic to him, his policies and measures, and his regime as a whole, so that they are willing to submit, cooperate, and make available the sources power. To achieve this, the ruler must adjust his behavior and policies in order to keep the goodwill and cooperation of the people who constitute the groups and institutions of the society. This is one type of indirect control which these loci of power exercise over a ruler, If such an adjustment is not attempted or is unsuccessful!, and the ruler offends the population he would rule, then the society s strong loci of power may, in open conflict, withhold the sources of power which they control and which the ruler requires. In this way the population acting through their groups and institutions may impose control over an ambitious antidemocratic ruler or even disintegrate the regime and dissolve the ruler’s power.
The reverse is also true. When these social groups and institutions lose their capacity for independent decision and action, their control of the sources of power, or are themselves drastically weakened or destroyed, such loss will contribute significantly to making the ruler’s power unlimited and uncontrollable. Under conditions in which such loci of power do not significantly exist and the subjects are a mass of atomized individuals incapable of effective group action, the ruler’s power will be the least controllable by the subjects.